Welcome Aboard!

AHOY,


UPDATE 12/21/13, 11:42 HOURS

I am revealing who I am today i.e. posting my name, I am Keith Oeffinger, I was born in San Antonio Texas in 1963. See today's post 12/21/13 .


Update, 01/11/14 12:30 hours;

I would like to say, with only one reply, like three years ago, this blog seems too much like a mirror site to me. And it appears very few patriots are looking back at past posts.

The new “Fragmented Fighting Facts” series of posts that dedicates one post to each Basic rule has now been completed. This series starts with the post tilted “Post # 1, Planning, Preface” that posted on 05/12/13. This series is under the label “Tri-F in progress”. Posts well be updated as I edit or discover additional knowledge thus the series is the most current version of my "Fragmented Fighting Facts" manual. For an old but complete version i.e. all in one post copy. Patriots are welcomed to try viewing one of the “pages” listed in the “special word section” on the starboard side of the blog. I say try due to the fact I’m not sure if they are published i.e. viewable to the general public due to all the issues or HACKING with my blog. There is also a complete copy posted, that is titled, “Tri-F in progress” too, it was posted 11/13/10.

And feel free to fire away with a reply, (sarcasm on).


FLASH REPORT; the “TERRORIST ARE NOT AMONG US, AND NEVER WERE I.E. AL QAEDA IS A STAWL MAN, GHOST”.

The most important lesson that everyone should have taken away from the Boston Marathon bombings was that those young men proved that no al-queda members are in the u.s. Otherwise they too would just go get some presure cookers and had to a parade.

“I AM NOT A TERRORIST” this nation’s worst enemy is FEAR. This fear is being promoted mostly by the back woods, right wing, Christians of this nation. We need to separate church and state, period. And that is of course for the States sake.


I would like patriots to understand that I use the terms "official revealed fact" to mean what everyone is being told by officials, media etc. I use the term "kings truth" to mean what I know or believe to actually be the actual facts. I DO NOT MEAN IT IN A RELIGIOUS WAY. I.E. the term Kings is plural as in those running the show.


Preface for the Fragmented Fighting Facts

Note pink highlighted material is that, that IMO is questionable factually, it maybe an “official revealed fact” that I am questioning. The material may need to be defined i.e. explained more or it could be a personal note. Yellow is location undecided or unedited material i.e. unread that I have not decided on what to keep or not. Green means a change has been made i.e. an update. By noting the green updated highlights a Patriot well not have to read the Fragmented Fighting Facts in its entirety to stay current. Red is important, perhaps the "kings truth".

Newjarheaddean; this is my collection of combat notes. One might call it my anthology of combat tactics, techniques, methods and skills. The note taking began about fourty years ago (I was around 13 years old) with the observation of 10 rules listed with in a book covering the French and Indian i.e. Native American, wars, entitled “Roger’s Rangers”. That’s right the rules that started all this are “Army Ranger” rules, this book was located in the “Westfall” library in San Antonio Texas off of Vance Jackson. I get a kick out of the libraries name due to the general agreement that modern or state vs state warfare started with the singing of the peace treaties at Westphalia. I could not read at the time; however I knew that a list in a book on war would be important. I copied those rules down like a scribe might have written hieroglyphs and had my dad read them to me. . This discovery preceded numerous sources including approximately one hundred books and about a dozen field manuals, of which a few were of WWII era. These were found at libraries, half price bookstores and garage sales. Since going on line in 2007, I have found material on web sites such as “Defense and National Interest” (DNI), “Global security”, “Strategy page” , “Wikipedia” and “Bayonet strength” and “Efour4ever” in the combat lessons learned section. These last two sites cover WWII.

Previously referred to as K.O.O.L.N. (acronym definition, top secret), FLASH REPORTS; I NOW AM TELLING EVERYONE IT STANDS FOR KEITH OEFFINGER'S ORGANIZATION OF LEARNED KNOWLEDGE the joke on me here was I believed Knowledge was spelled with an (N). I was a special education student and did not learn to read until my last year of high school. I have now titled my work “Fragmented Fighting Facts” or “Tri-F”; the name derives from the computer grammar function always alerting me to the fragmented nature of my sentences. This is due to the “just the facts, ma’am” manor the material is written i.e. there has been little if any effort to write in whole sentences or provide context. This is not to say there is no order with Tri-F, in fact there is a theme. I have laid out the information as one might expect a commander or members of a unit to recall it thus utilizing it to conduct a mission.

We start with “Planning”, followed by the section on “Defense”, then there’s “Preparations and conduct of patrols” or “PCP”, and we end with “Conduct of Engagements” or “COE”, i.e. engagements being the term used here for shootouts. Each section of Tri-F consists of numbered “Basic rules”, each basic rule followed by detailed notes that either relate to, explain, or give examples pertaining to the basic rules. As with the general format of Tri-F, each section’s basic rules are laid out as one might need to recall them. This is most obvious in the last section COE starting with basic rule number one, “Flash report”, i.e. actions to take upon contact with the enemy. This sections last basic rule deals with handling POWs.

Keep in mind this is a work in progress; I’m constantly discovering new information to add which in turn still at times requires rearranging things. At the same time, interestingly enough to me, I have not needed to rearrange my original order of the basic rules for quite some time. There are however, two instances where the detailed information fallowing a pair of basic rules became so similar I decided to combine the pair into one basic rule. These two occurrences are noted in footnotes.

Now heed this, out of all the information contained within this work, only an estimated 1% was taught to me while I was serving in the U.S.M.C. Moreover, to put a fine point on it, it’s worth noting I served in Charlie Company, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, i.e. an Infantry unit. Before my discharge (after only a two year cruse), I attended Jungle Warfare School in the northern training area of Okinawa (for two weeks), Mountain Warfare School in Korea (for one week) and Combat Town Camp Pendleton for MOUT training (for one day). I did not take part in any amphibious training nor did I ever go to Twenty Nine Palms for Desert Warfare training. We did ride around in AAVs once at Camp Pendleton. All in all I would say the only things I missed out on were a beach landing (at Coronado I believe) and a little sun burn, due to the fact that those twenty nine palms, I was told in the early eighties were all located at the front gate of that base. Needless to say, the training did not impress me, and I now know it was not going to get any better as some suggested to me at the time, and still others later claimed that I should have just stayed in longer.

With my position on the lack of training, I do wish to make it perfectly clear that I do support the service women and men in the U.S. armed forces. I also believe them to be as brave as any people on earth, (with the exception of the (Y) generation). My concern is in the way the Infantry especially is being mislead and used. I want people to understand my experience and IMO a lot of evidence suggests Uncle Sam intends to use his infantry in ways that does not include training any generation in the art of “traditional Guerilla combat tactics” i.e. as a “Traditional Commando” would be. I am not talking about “SWAT” team “Close quarter” tactics, like the “Stick dynamic entry”. That tactic should be called the “cluster f**k”. Just call that sort of tactic what it is NYPD (Cops T.V. show bad-boys, bad-boys) in Afghanistan.

The problem is that that tactic was developed by police departments to deal with an objective occupied by drugged up party animals, i.e. untrained civilians. The police never use it in a spur of the minute situation. They use it when the house/objective has been under constant surveillance for mouths in some cases and the police know all manner of information about everyone in the house and the structure and neighborhood in general. The cops choose a time when everyone is pasted out from partying the night before and have long lost any weapons (between the cushions or under the bed) they might have had on them as show pieces during the party. The primary reason for the large numbers of police in close proximity is to make sure the gang does not think the raid is a rival gang “brake in” and thus resist in any way. There is lots of yelling too, thus reinforcing the message that no one is trying to be covert, like one would be to get away with a crime.

This brings up an intriguing observation of mine; that being that by the book an assault should be made from the top down, yet the troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere use the Stick dynamic entry and usually enter from the front door, like a SWAT team. However resent high profile raids show the SWAT teams attacking from the top down. Examples you may recall are the raids on the Shinning path group in Peru in 2000 and the Mumbai raid by Indian forces on the Jewish center in 2008. IMO this proves the existence of what I’ll refer to as a “need to know” training policy, being followed by various governments, the purpose being to limit the number of true Commandos that could become tomorrow’s rebels, apposing corrupt governments. One last thing about the Stick, IMO every single time the regular forces unit conducting one of these foolish Stick dynamic entries comes under fire i.e. runs into resistance, the Stick brakes i.e. the whole unit evacuates and awaits some kind of support form tanks, guns, tubes or air. Bottom line IMO the Stick is used as a probing tactic and is meant to be a moral boosting show peace tactic to make the unit feel as if it has taken a hill, which was nothing more than another empty building, that IMO Intel suggested, was the case before the entry was ordered. Recalling the police policy of long periods of surveillance prior to raids.

It also seems to me that in light of the old saying “you can fight a war with bombs and blockades but only boots on the ground can win it” ( IMO, Uncle Sam has now revised that saying, as fallows) “you can win a war with bombs and blockades, but only the infantry can end the war”, farther more IMO Uncle Sam has gone one more step and decided to use private security companies and local i.e. indigenous people for the infantry role. All this fear of true commandos is all very similar to the “Mujahideen” not being allowed by various governments, to return to their homelands i.e. native nations, after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

And as for the U.S. and other Western nations, training foreigners to fight a counter insurgency goes. IMO this training includes nothing more than police procedures i.e. conducting investigations, forensics, searching individuals and buildings to collect evidence and yes serving warrants, if necessary, with those all mighty “stick” tactics. And of course, lots of “new innovative techniques and tactics” involving CAS and IMO (Old) so called high tech equipment the U.S. Military Industrial Congressional Complex wants to clear out of the warehouses.

All in all IMO Uncle Sam has chosen to put just about all his eggs in one advanced technology system, think Star Wars Storm Troopers or Matrix i.e. the Operator or Morpheus trying to guide Neo and others to safety. IMO it looks something like this; (x) unit go to (x) address, kick in front door, use stairs to your right, go south down hallway to (x) door, it is unlocked, interning room go to (x) window looking out window to the north you will see your target running east though the neighbors garden. All this information and the “live” feeds of target and area of operations would be provided by a fleet of satellites as well as Near space assets that are never mentioned by the media as current military assets and of course there’s the robots, UAVs and a flood of other covertly deployed sensors as well as covert eves dropping of any civilian electronic devices in the Area of operations.

Thus in light of these and similar so called “new innovative, techniques and tactics” (notice the media and governments choice of words “techniques and tactics” as if we’re talking Commando training i.e. why not use some modern high tech terms the system is so eager to introduce us all to normally as a matter of routine), IMO Uncle Sam has placed the traditional Guerrilla combat tactics, on the back burner and is hoping they all go the way of other black arts.

This is not just true of the infantry; let us take a peek at aerial combat. Does anyone out there actually think today’s U.S. pilots are turning and burning, pulling high (G) maneuvers trying to hit the entry windows and get inside the bandits turn. Think any pilot has conducted a yo-yo or split S maneuver lately or made the choice between a single or two-circle fight. Now days its all about stealth, ECM and Smart even autonomous weapons, missiles especially BVR tech. IMO this explains why the U.S. Navy is not concerned with not having a front line fighter equal to the USAF F-22 Raptor. An article I recently read on “Strategy page” mentioned a lot of talk about a Navy F/A-18E at an air show, displaying a little F-22 silhouette decal i.e. a simulated Kill credit symbol/icon. IMO the F/A- 18E did not gun down that kill.

And then everyone knows that just about all now and IMO soon all weapons systems including the bayonet well have a chip in it.

So if the electronics ever fail (maybe due to a shift in the axis of earths electromagnetic field, passed a certain point or perhaps a record size solar flare) IMO it well be the masters of the age-old Guerrilla combat tactics i.e. The Fragmented Fighting Facts Basic Rules that survive, keeping in mind “no one wins”.

I also wish, that those who join the various services where told all this up front i.e. “we do not intend to train you as a traditional Commando”.

Another thing I would like everyone to consider is that; what makes a Marine special is not the training she or he receives, no it’s the steel the youth demonstrates when they choose to join the Marines. Even when compared to the Special Forces, who IMO are only specialists in their particular field, once again mostly high tech specialties and whose ranks are filled with older personnel that have already been serving and have graduated from a boot camp i.e. are aware of the hoop and hype hurry up and wait tactics. And who are then usually chosen i.e. coached into changing their MOS. I am aware of the change in recruitment policy after 2001 allowing for direct entry into the S.F. community. IMO a rarity and IMO it is still not the same as just choosing to go to a Marine Corps Recruit Depot from the start.

Furthermore, to those who just well not accept the truth about the lack of training along the lines of traditional Guerrilla combat tactics. I can now say that I have exchanged comments with a number of Iraqi and Afghanistan combat vets. These comments can be found on the internet if you Google up my call sign, Newjarheaddean also spelled with one (D). IMO it is obvious that the tactics I speak of are news to the vets, some have made commits that proves in combat they were just winging it. And no, I don’t believe that all the vets are observing some kind of code of silence on these tactics including the vets who are against the wars. Unless everyone wants to say that YouTube and other internet companies are conspiring to edit all combat footage that shows these tactics being used and that, the vets are staging other videos that show them (albeit with great bravery) as armatures without a clue and winging it. If anyone ever sees video, showing the tactics listed in Tri-F being used, be sure and provide a link with your comment. I once saw a flash of film on CNN showing combat in Lebanon during the 1980s that showed some of these tactics being used by a Guerrilla fighter. I well also say I do believe that UAV footage is edited by the Pentagon to keep the public from seeing the few but well trained Taliban and other Guerrilla fighters that are using these tactics. Alternatively, maybe people think our professional highly trained well-equipped military is unable to defeat 10 – 20 thousand religious extremist amateur thugs in almost a decade of fighting. All the while killing at least by some estimates 100 a mouth including dozens of top commanders.

Let me also say, on the numbers of U.S. PTSD casualties, i.e. IMO, WIA, (And IMO deserving of a Purple Heart). The Government portrays these cases as a result of fighting a war that is “unlike any other war we have fought before” (LOL). Facing an enemy that is fighting in some mysterious and or cowardly manor that simply cannot be countered by military means. I believe the high numbers are a result of US forces fighting in a manner that is suicidal i.e. pointless and counterproductive to the real world situation. Example; you have a young brave American ready to fight for the nation, while on one of these IMO “Russian roulette parades” someone shoots at the unit from some building, everyone scrambles for cover, as some spray and pray, then after determining the location using SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems) sniper detectors, or one of the many similar vehicle mounted systems the commander calls in some sort of CAS, if someone’s brains have been blow out especially if it was an officer or the location is vague, a real “crowd pleaser” maybe used i.e. 2000 pounder.

IMO this is how 90% of engagements (fought by regular infantry units) are resolved. Special Forces are now and in the feature more and more regular infantry well be using the Matrix. And to those that think this is the exception I say show me the number of WIA or KIA (On either side) by small arms fire i.e. during traditional firefights. Even if one includes sniper fire those figures are really low. So IMO after witnessing all the carnage and innocent civilian life being lost and receiving all those looks from the witnesses, it is the American that realizes it is his unit that is not fighting right.

This is reinforced and really sinks in back in the states when the vet is asked to tell the Commando stories that never occurred and thus the vet must tell the truth i.e. give up the Commando reputation, keep it all inside or start lying. If the first option is chosen that unveiling reality is demoralizing and makes it all not worth it. If either one of the other chooses are made IMO the vet becomes the ticking bomb. And I can tell you all that many times, I have recalled being told once that “when you go home keep your mouth shut about the things we did. If you don’t you well be thought of as a liar or crazy and either which way your life well be over”. That First Sergeant was right, but like my daddy use to say, “He’s right but he does not know why he’s right” i.e. IMO the First Sgt. thought of what we did in terms of remarkable heroic feats. However, IMO certainly since the beginning of the Vietnam era, it is the lack of training i.e. the manner in which our service women and men are fighting that keeps this tragedy going.

I would also suggest the vets of today are just like I was 25 or so years ago in the sense that they know there training is lacking, however, they just cannot explain what’s missing. However unlike me they refuse to accept that old fashion “black arts” are the answer i.e. should be the basis of basic training. And I now know the “Black art” tactics they and I should have been trained in and I can now say, “The PFC that told the Corp it was out of step, now has provided the proof”. What surprises me is that most vets it seems don’t care at all about the tactics I speak of and seem to view me as an unpatriotic “party pooper”, when I’m just a U.S. Marine trying to improve the Corps and save lives. Bottom line IMO the infantry needs to consist of unmarried i.e. undistracted, NO CHILDREN, dedicated true professionals, trained in the tactics listed in Tri-F and many more I am sure exist.

And to those that say “chivalry is for the museums” I say “first we must have peace on earth”.

One Newjarheaddean

“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!

Update; 12/19/14 09/53 hours




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Tuesday, June 4, 2013

Post # 62, Conduct of Engagements, (Over all tips)

AHOY,

Update; 12/19/14 this post has more fews than any other COE section posts, 47 veiws.

Update; 06/12/13 10: 39 hours this was just the title change. 

FRAGMENTED FIGHTING FACTS


Conduct of Engagements


Basic rule # 17 was the last Basic rule of the Conduct of Engagements section. Here we have additional knowledge to consider.  

Over all tips


Joke: try to look unimportant, your foe maybe low on ammo. If you’re short of everything, except the enemy, you’re on the front. If your attack is going well, it’s an ambush. Incoming fire has the right away.

Characteristics of (military operations in urban/ on urbanized terrain) MOUT;

German term; Rat-n-creeg meaning rat warfare. MOUT operations may be conducted to capitalize on strategic or tactical advantages which control of an area gives to you or denies to the enemy. Major urban areas represent the power and wealth of a country in the form of cultural, economic, industrial, political and transportation, centers. The control of these centers well yield decisive psychological advantages which determine the success or failure of the larger conflict. It is more difficult to recover from an erroneous decision in MOUT. Commanders may decide to bypass if speed is essential to their mission, enough forces are not available, and logistically the attack cannot be supported. Or if no substantial threat exists in the area. Civilian casualties and significant collateral damage to structures, require commanders to consider the political and psychological consequences of attacking. The fact that the defenders are resisting indicates that they will fight hard. The first thing you do when approaching a defended city is attempt to get it to surrender. For riflemen and team leaders, the fight is to seize a foothold in a given building and clear individual rooms. At the squad level, the fight is for a floor or a single small building. The platoon fight involves larger buildings and small complexes. Troop requirements are 3-5 times grater. The necessity to provide life support and other essential services to civilians can siphon off resources and manpower. Troop strength depends on surprise and Intelligence (Cmdrs. rely primarily on human lntel for information). Troops are needed to prevent reoccupation and refuge control. Civilians fleeing will block roads. Conduct operations around civil evacuation plans. Enemy will try to blend in with population, curfews can help. In Somalia Marines noted, guerillas almost always slept between 04-08 hours. A hostile population is a serious security problem. Possible cons, robbery, sabotage, protest, children shadowing patrols; they not only can get killed but can provide information to the foe. Crowd control; Show, Shout, Shove, Shoot. The unit commander has one or two snipers who can shoot key individuals (those with weapons, those who appear to be orchestrating the riot). Helicopters hovering low over a mob, especially in a dry and dusty environment, stirs up a wind storm of dust, sand, and noise. If you have an M-1 tank, back it up to the mob thus utilizing the hot exhausts. Such vast areas are difficult to defend or attack in their entirety. On the urban battlefield, advantages and disadvantages in the areas of mobility, cover, and observation tend to even out for attacker and defender. Initially, however, the defender has a significant tactical advantage over the attacker due to defender’s knowledge of the terrain. The defender can prepare the ground in advance, build and reinforce obstacles, and select firing positions and observation posts. He can reconnoiter and improve routes between positions to supply and shift forces quickly.


(Reference, Def. # 12)

With MOUT, the attacker must forfeit, at least in part, the advantages of cover and concealment in order to move and concentrate forces; every action by the attacker is made more difficult because he must feel his way through a complex of manmade and natural terrain features. Attacker’s routes of advance are limited and more clearly defined, enhancing the defender's target-surveillance capability. The attacker must use increased communications to coordinate his forces, which reduces his ability to achieve surprise. Although the built-up area may not occupy dominant terrain, it normally has dominant terrain adjacent to it on at least one side. Doctrinally, the attacker will attempt to bypass and isolate a built-up area by securing the adjacent dominant terrain before the built-up area itself is directly attacked. Isolated positions can be left to small holding units. Therefore, the defender always attempts to establish his defense well forward of an urban area and well integrate surrounding dominant terrain, natural and manmade obstacles, as well as the smaller rural towns and villages into the defense as strong points, in order to engage and defeat the attacker on the approaches and flanks and limit the advantages of being bypassed and isolated. The key defensive concept is to draw the attacking force into preplanned kill zones. Engagement ranges are greatly reduced by urban features. Targets will generally be exposed for brief periods, frequently at ranges of less than 100 meters. These limitations induce close, violent combat. The depression and elevation limits for weapons may create dead spaces. To deal with target masking by increased dead spaces caused by buildings or rubble, the artillery batteries are positioned away from tall buildings and other masks. The use of field artillery in the direct fire role may be required to suppress gunners in hardened positions. Greater reliance must be placed by the attacker on indirect and long-range weapon systems or air. The attacker is most vulnerable to enemy fires during the initial phase of securing a foothold within the built-up area. Initially, artillery is located on the outskirts facing the attacker’s approach. From these locations the artillery engages the attacker at maximum ranges. The defenses mutually supporting strong points are echeloned in depth. Operating from positions in depth complements electronic warfare support measures and observation activities and limits the attacker’s ground reconnaissance and infiltration capabilities. The defense reverts to the conduct of defense only when; attacking forces break through defenses on the approaches. At the appropriate time, artillery displaces rapidly along predetermined primary and alternate routes to alternate or supplementary positions. Attacks are often launched at night or under other conditions of limited visibility. Added to weather conditions that limit visibility are the urban factors of smoke and dust, and concealment offered by shaded areas of varying intensities. On the approaches to urban areas, visibility is frequently less than 3960’ i.e. ¾ of a mile. The attacker may use such conditions to extend his reconnaissance, re-supply positions, cross open areas, or secure objectives. To counter this, the defense may shift defensive positions and crew-served weapons to alternate positions just before dark. He occupies or patrols open areas between units which are covered by fire during daylight. Employing noisemaking devices, tangle foot and or tactical wire, outside of buildings. Mines, LPs and OPs, with NVDs, remote sensors, and radars on the most likely to be used nighttime avenues of approach. Heat, seismic and acoustic (glorified microphones) for early warning sensors, have been used since Vietnam, and acoustic sensors were used during WWI. Current heat sensors can let you look inside a building for the presence of people. Seismic (microphones that listen through the ground) and lasers that can listen inside after hitting i.e. painting windows as well as acoustic sensors can be fired like tear gas grenades into buildings to detect the presence of defenders, for monitoring until the enemy, or the sensors, are discovered and destroyed. Also airborne or ground lasers that paint/use windows as contact points. Another innovation is the remote control robots. And so the battle will proceed with the attack of smaller built-up areas leading to the central complex. Fighting, will involve a series of coordinated actions at small-unit level. Elements are required to conduct a whole range of military operations. Funneling of forces favors the defender by limiting the number of maneuver elements that may be applied against a series of hubs that must be confronted in succession. Unlike deserts, forests, and jungles with a limited variety of fairly uniform, recurring terrain features, the urban battlefield is composed of an ever-changing mix of natural and manmade features. Frequently, larger forces will have units fighting on open terrain, on terrain within built-up areas, and in complexes where these two distinct terrain forms merge. Fighting is characterized by a multidimensional battle. It may be fought simultaneously above the ground, in the upper stories of buildings, on roofs, in buildings at street level, in the street, and below street level in sewer and subways systems. Sub terrain areas become contaminated hot spots after power goes out. Rain also makes storm and other sewer systems hazardous or impassible. Chemical agents are washed into drains as a result system contains agent concentrations much higher than surface. These effects become more pronounced as agents are absorbed by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls. Underground routes are of primary concern when considering guerrilla avenues of approach and lines of supply and communications. Sewers, subways, tunnels, cisterns and basements provide mobility, concealment cover and storage sites. Over pressures are magnified greatly.

(Reference, Appendix, overall tips, Sub terrain)

MOUT; overall maneuvers well be more methodical and synchronized. Isolation degrades C4I. Combat is more nonstop, much more physically demanding, more hand to hand, lots of fatigue. High casualty rates due to falling debris and lots of sharp items around. Explosions produce more flying debris especially glass. Casualties may occur on any level of buildings, though most occur outside. Troop density and close proximity of combat makes it difficult to provide supporting fires. MOUT consist of readymade cover and concealment. Back door inters generally provide better cover than front. Usually structures must be attacked before enemy in side can be. There will be more damage by fire. High rises can take 24 - 48 hours to burn out and cool down enough to be reoccupied. Destroyed buildings change topography of area, making rally points hard to recognize. Use phase lines (face of buildings not streets or allies) thus keeping your units from over advancing. When possible move along main streets parallel to buildings, i.e. no crossing main streets. Best to cross streets in the middle of the block. Right sides of streets are generally safer to move down. Remain on same side of street as foe. Move across danger areas one at a time, however once the area comes under fire it is best to cross as a group, all the while opening fire on suspected enemy locations. While crossing danger areas or while on patrols in general, each Marine is detailed to observe and or cover a certain area, such as second-floor windows on the opposite side of the street. When a street is narrow observing or firing into windows across the way can be difficult, because observer is forced to look along the buildings, rather than into windows or doors. When streets are wider observation throw openings is better. Engagement ranges MOUT; may vary from point-blank to the maximum effective range of a weapon. Minimum arming ranges must be considered. Engagement ranges average 300 feet, 90% of engagements are at 100’or less. Few personal targets visible beyond 150 feet. 5% at 300’ or more. Even snipers rarely take a shot farther than 1000’. If you spot foe, some distance away, take him out. If close up, aim in and allow the rest of your unit to react thus maximizing firepower in direction of possible foe unit, this is especially true in jungle combat. Also in jungle “if in doubt, don’t shoot”.

(Reference, COE General combat tips “characteristics of military operations in Jungle warfare” and “Fighting at night” below)

With two or more troops running for cover, shoot closest one to cover firsts. A foe in the open is worth two in the bush.  If your unit has group under fire, shoot troops farthest away from you first. They well be the ones going for the flanking moves. Units under fire tend to make a stand or retreat vs. attacking into unknown terrain. Do not retrieve your first expended magazine during contact because it will consume valuable time. As for locations of the shooter and the target. Both the shooter and the target may be inside or outside the same or separate buildings. Either one may be inside while the other is outside. Target angles can be either vertical or horizontal, or a combination of both. Spotting shooters; by analyzing impact points. Snow can give more indication of the direction of enemy fire. Spin of bullet vs. ricochet direction? Flat trajectory indicates elevated firing position. Direct fire round will sail right by you if it misses but falling (HE) round kills if it misses by yards. Direct fire sounds like ripping canvas, howitzers a two tone whistle. Direction of sound; bullets passing by your ear well sound like a bumble bee. Smoke from initial shot’s, due to excess oil in barrel. You might want to swab barrel before shooting. Dust from muzzle blast. Black smoke from surface of barrel can be seen by observer. Also steam from human bodies. Brass casings being ejected may reflect sunlight. Shoot at possible cover and concealment points, shooters tend to be located high; foe may use one high shooter to draw your unit into area of multiple low shooters. Periodically expose items to draw fire, i.e. “the old helmet on the bayonet”. Lastly you may have to advance under fire and have spotter (otter) watch for enemy. Spotters should not provide cover, so vision is not obscured by smoke.

(Reference, COE rule # 1)

Orange smoke/dust indication of impact of armor piecing (AP) incendiary rounds. With tracers, impacts can be indicated by ricochets (or lack thereof incase of hitting a human body). Most impact points cannot be spotted beyond tracer burn out range; around 3000’ for 7.62 mm, beyond that range you need visual aids. Scopes and binoculars ¼ out of focus can see thermal signature of rounds (aka Swirl) going down range. Swirl caused by pressure differences in air that reflects light differently. Also I.R. at night or day and for spotting muzzle flashes too. Modified suppressers that can ID units.

Vehicle commanders and drivers can walk gunners on target using ADDRACS, target reference points and the field expedient mil system (one finger, four fingers from the hay stack).  The impacts from MK-19 are easily seen and can be used to orient the other gunners.

Note add Support Group/element or cell, to assault unit; i.e. CAS, transportation, air, motor and sea or river craft. To also include communication etc.




(Reference, COE rule # 1)

Organizing the assault unit:

it well always have two basic elements, first an assault element (A.E.) the unit may include demolitions experts, electronic technicians, and whatever specialists that may be needed i.e. pilot, if the objective is to steal a specific enemy aircraft. Secondly, there is a security element; (S.E.). Each Marine must know the responsibilities and roles in either element. S.E. responsibilities, are securing the area or building in the case of MOUT and stopping enemy reinforcements from becoming involved, or to stop any would-be escapers and to cover the withdrawal of the A.E. and or entire assault unit.  Like with Cordon and knock missions, Outer circle keeps people out, inter keeps people in target buildings. Finally, they may provide the suppressive fire on objective. Immediately prior to the assault, suppressive fires are increased on the objective and continue until A.E. has entered the building. Isolate buildings by fire, layaway avenues of approach to building and its exits. Suppressive fires located outside adjacent to entry on the upper floor of previously cleared building. As unit inters supporting fire shifts to upper levels then to exits and adjacent buildings to cover enemy withdrawal or reinforcement routes. If your unit most retreat vacate two or three houses down the road at a time, burning first one for concealment. Burning out buildings is best at night, smoke can interfering with daytime combat. Conventional smoke screens in MOUT can drawl fire. The A.E. responsibilities are to secure the objective. The following fundamentals are to be considered when assaulting buildings: You should always try to attack buildings from top down. Know strength of roofs. Give the enemy an escape route. Enemy usually not very motivated to make a stand in someone else’s living room, lol! Attacking form the top also avoids enemy heavy-weapons positions, which will usually be located on lower levels. Considerations which will affect the decision on the point of entry; identify the route to the building from the last covered and concealed, or assault position. This is usually the shortest distance, immediately across the adjacent street, back yard, or alley. Ask yourself; from what enemy-held buildings can the enemy observe my avenue of approach? Then orient observation and fires on those points to break the mutual support between enemy positions. Being able to predict suspected enemy positions by reading the terrain is an important skill to develop. The assault element (AE), regardless of size, well attempt to close on the stern or flank(s) of an objective building, which well have more and better cover. If the building is located on a street with numerous adjacent buildings under enemy control an envelopment is not feasible, a stern attack is required. Alternatively, the attacker can initially clear nearby buildings and then attack the final objective simultaneously from the stern and flanks. Other considerations are the availability of access means to upper stories; again A.E. may seize an adjoining structure. Also consider the cover and concealment in the area. Often you will have to evaluate the relative risks of scaling the side of a building or clearing upward from the ground floor. Clearing from the bottom up may be the most frequent method in isolated, detached areas. Assaulting the bottom floor and clearing upward is a common method, except where buildings form continuous fronts. In this situation with ground level entry, the attacker attempts to close on flanks or stern of the buildings. When attacking from ground up, unit has better option of burning out enemy on upper floors. Shots fired up through floors can cause enemy to surrender quickly. First establish foot hold inside, than fight quickly to top floor and then down. If your mission requires long ropes, consider the use of 1" nylon tubing instead. It is lighter, more compact, and just as strong. Also garden hoses. Wire (communications) can hold up to 90 lbs. per cable. Black wire may have current going through it. Grappling hooks make sure there is enough rope to reach anchor point. Stand as close to building as possible assuring less exposure and horizontal distance hook must travel. Coils, one in hand with hook few in other, the rest coiled on ground. Throw gentle even lob, once the hook is in window, pulling it to one side ensures good bite. Keep tension on rope after securing bite. Scaling walls, you can climb pass windows at first, on your way to the rooftop, when repel back down. Clear rooms first before climbing to close as you past windows. Use grenades, keep weapon at the ready. Avoid initial entry at middle floor windows; if a middle floor is breached, it is used as a foot hold only, you still clear upper floors first. Each A.E. should, keep the procedures simple. Each member must know his entrance point. Set selector lever to full automatic. Fix bayonets or ready K-bars, for close encounters. Attack right behind prep fire and or percussions. Preferably, entry is gained through walls breached by explosives or gun fire. AE should avoid windows and doors as entry points because they are usually covered by fire or booby trapped, avoid obvious gates or holes in fences or walls. Move from room to room through walls. Walls can usually be breached with axes. House holing/mouse holing methods. Look though (can be as small as ice pick), also throw or drop though and go though types. Select rooms that have ceilings intact and Place an explosive charge against the ceiling and or floor wall juncture. Pros i.e. advantages, wall can provide climbing aid to ceiling hole. Charges placed at corners might provide access to four or eight rooms. Cons- i.e. disadvantages, this may weaken structures too.  In general, the resultant explosion should kill or stun defenders providing uncontested access to the next floor. Charges used for breaching outside walls are placed at fire places or brick walls better to prevent walls or buildings from collapsing. Box wall building designs have reinforced concrete walls exterior and interior difficult to breach. Inter wall 6-8”. The floor plans are predictable. Hallways circle around stairwells or elevators. Brick designs, exterior walls of buildings are at least 3 bricks thick. Total of 6 bricks between buildings. The floor plans are different on ground floors than upper levels, but over all similar in area. Holes made in outside or inside walls should be staggered, so enemy cannot shot through more than one at a time. Ideally, you should start on blind side of buildings that is the side without windows. House/mouse holing can be used offensively or defensively. Not possible after buildings reduced to rubble. Again never use obvious gates or holes in fences or walls. Clearing downward, stairs are covered by posting guard, they are not used. Enemy mouse holes to lower floors should never be used. Entrance to lower floors is gained by breaching the floor/ceiling with explosives and/or using lowered rope. After entry cover entries to basements or attics first. If there is a basement or attic it should be cleared first. Never stand in front of or near a closed door; never hide by the prominent window of a house. While inside buildings continue to watch outside. Hug inside walls. Clearing is usually done in circular pattern, from one main hallway. Secure the central stairwell. Stairwells, access ladders/fire escapes, usually are located at ends of hallways too. These plus large open rooms or areas or rooms with a view, i.e. balconies or roof tops over looking these areas and other points of interest are your prime objectives. All these locations provide mobility, concealment and can serve as relatively good fighting holes or sniper positions. Use extreme caution when in these areas during clearing phases.
Note check for this note in Tri-F, a too heavy charge brought the entire building down into the basement, leaving an unnecessary obstacle. One solution to this problem was to set the charges in fireplaces where the heavier side walls of the fireplace would prevent collapse of the walls.


Securing rooms; do not open doors by hand or attempt to kick them open. Shoot the door open by firing several rounds through the lock or blast the hinges, use battering rams or blow the door in with explosives. One Marine is positioned to cover inside and outside of the room. Interring rooms first Marine in, decides where next Marine goes. Example; next Marine left/right, second Marine repeats as he inters. Very tactics to avoid patterns. When possible tactics for adjacent buildings should be just opposite previous tactics. Always wear your load bearing equipment (LBE) buckled. If you're wounded, fellow Marines can drag you by the shoulder straps.

New, lighter, body army (with its quick release feature, which saves troops from drowning when they fall into water, or burning if their armor is caught on something during a vehicle accident or attack.


The stack/stick tactics;

The stack term P.O.D. point of dominance, no trooper land, fatal funnel.

Ex of stack, first Marine enters moves to far corner covers back five feet to left. AKA strait long. #2 secures door over back. Left note cover 5 # 2 door way moves two closet corners depends on hinge cover back lets back right cover bottom hooks rides door. #3fallow #1stays short covers front left corner 5’back right corner #4 fallow #2 secures door covers back left note cover five feet from back right explosives Marine.
A Spartan mother’s advice to her son who complained that his sword was too short. Take a step forward.
pausing in doorway to check stern.

1.) Stack Up In this example the element stacks up on one side of the door (where the door handle is
located). R1 is in the prone position, R2 is covering R1 and the opposite side of the door (i.e
hallway). The element leader is between the two teams, and also covers the hallway. B1
covers the right hand side of the stack, while B2 is guarding the rear (i.e. hallway).

2.) Open the door, deploy flash bang While R2 is covering the door, R1 (still in the prone position) opens the door, weapon at the ready. If no immediate threat is encountered, R2 throws in a flash bang.

3.) The fatal funnel R1 enters first, an covers the right half of the room. R2 is following
immediately and covers the left side of the room. B1 and B2 are covering
from the outside, getting ready to enter behind RT. Clear the doorway right
away!

4.) Clearing the room R1 goes to the right far corner, pointing his weapon to the opposite corner.
R2 clears to the near left corner, pointing his weapon to the opposite wall.
The far left corner is called "No-Man's-Land". Never point your weapon to the
direction of a team member

5.) Secure! R1 goes to the right far corner, pointing his weapon to "No-Man's-Land". R2
clears to the near left corner, pointing his weapon to "No-Man's-Land". Never
point your weapon to the direction of a team member!
B1 follows and goes to the near right corner, followed by B2 who stays near
the door and covers it. B1 will cover upper areas (like balcony’s etc.), if there
are any.

The element leader is the last one who enters the room. He then may issue
further orders?

This is proven more effective than the V tactic most SWAT teams up. With the V tactic you stack up on both sides of the door.



Reorganization and exploitation; cleared levels/floors and rooms should be marked (chalk, tape, spray paint or other aerosol sprays that may show with certain sensors), doors should at least be left open. At minimum secured areas or rooms are reported. As rooms are cleared attacker should fortify places as soon as occupying them. In a cleared building, reorganization to repel enemy counterattacks must be rapid. Initially (until S.E. member takes over) selected members of the AE will be assigned to cover potential enemy counterattack routes to any floor or building. The requirements are determined by the type of building and by the nature of adjacent terrain. For example, numerous open spaces require increased fire support to suppress/obscure enemy gunners while reinforcement units move across open terrain. Conversely, areas with numerous covered routes will decrease fire support requirements. On the other hand open areas are easier for one Marine to cover if the only concern is repelling enemy forces.  Deconstruction lumber is used to build later wells. They are pulled up stairs during attack. Have a pre-mission and post-mission checklist to ensure that nothing is left behind. Avg. 30 minutes to clear structure. Thus having taken an enemy position, the Squad cannot relax. They need to regroup, assess the cost of their attack, prepare for possible counter-attack, tend to their wounded and see too any prisoners they may have taken. If swift reinforcement by fresh troops is forthcoming, you can use the newly acquired position as a springboard for your own advance, allowing the original unit’s time to regroup before moving in behind them to take over in turn. If such is not the case, and further advance is necessary, the Squad would have little time to make its preparations before resuming. It is during this point the Squad is most vulnerable to counter-attack, occupying unfamiliar ground the enemy knew well, having expended ammunition, energy and quite likely blood to get there. During WWII, the second most important item of equipment to any Marine, after his weapon, was his entrenching tool. Troops learned to dig at least shallow pits the moment they halted in expectation of the coming barrage. Troops were trained to begin to dig even if the objective they had taken was but one of several they were tasked with that day. This was the only response to the inevitable bombardment they would shortly endure from the defender's artillery and mortar, excepting a night raid. The only way to survive its effects was to dig, deep. Digging in also gave some added protection in case of a feature withdrawal. If no immediate advance was to be ordered though, a more thorough reorganization could begin, shifting quickly from attack to defense. An ideal position would enable the defense to take the approaching enemy from one flank, rather than simply head on. The situation around the unit i.e. Battalion etc. would also need to be assessed. Circumstances could arise where one Battalion had made far better progress than those on its flanks in a major assault. Any feeling of pride in such an achievement would be tempered by the knowledge that the Battalion was actually more vulnerable as a result. It could find itself occupying a ‘bulge’ in the line, meaning instead of there being friendly troops on both flanks there were in fact enemy units. The commander would also be trying to find out what had happened to any units covering his flanks, in case they had faltered and he needed to protect a vulnerable approach by redeploying his own men. The Battalion Commander would also have to decide whether all the gains his troops had made were in fact defensible. It would be highly unlikely that all his subunits had advanced to the same depth. Some units would undoubtedly be pushed further out than others, making for an uneven perimeter. Some units may have to be pulled back to remedy this, a galling prospect for men who had fought hard to take a particular feature only to be told to abandon it shortly afterwards. There was an equally unappealing converse to this situation. His troops may have gained a tenuous hold on a particularly important piece of terrain, pulling back from which would offer the enemy a notable advantage, such as high ground for artillery or other observers. A renewed localized assault could be required to improve the position, or the Marines in place could simply be ordered to hold on until relieved. Senior commanders were always aware that an enemy who had been decisively repulsed and had no extensive lines of defense on which to fall back himself was acutely vulnerable to a rapid counter stroke. Following assault mortars were on call to deliver a salvo against any enemy counterattack delivered against the riflemen in this most vulnerable stage as they shifted from assault to defense. 



(Reference, Step # 2, leadership guidelines, Company Cmdr, “The Reserves”)

Terms; Plumb card and search ticket cards? With the term “search ticket card” IMO it would not be much more info than you would find in my Tri-F under “vehicle check point” section. Rule # 3 defense. Can anyone list these items on a search ticket?

(Reference, Defense, rule # 3, “Vehicle check points”)

Cordon and knock man of house asked out first to give permission for search. More places you search less likely enemy to hide things there again. Longer search time more by standers gathering around area.

(Reference, Step # 3, concepts of operations, part D) general phases of attack, phase four consolidation/exploitation.)

Weapons Conduct;

Small arms as for prepping your weapon for action you should smoke Iron sights, thus insuring a uniform flat black surface to maximize contrasts. However, a black uniformed enemy well blind in with the front sight post of your weapon at a distance. Always work action, to verify functioning of weapon and check ammo. Marines usually carry no more than 12, thirty round magazines. Magazine weight 1¼ lbs each. Place magazines upside down in your pouches to keep dirt out. First few and next to last few rounds in magazine are tracers. First few to indicate aim, next to last few to indicate low on ammo. Use one magazine full of tracers during infiltration and extraction, so the tracers can be used to identify enemy positions to air support. Never chamber round into hot weapon until you intend to fire. Heat expansion causes cook offs and jamming. Ammo cool enough to hold is safe to fire. Average barrel temperature 200-700 degrees. Light rifles have lighter barrels than machine guns, can over heat with 100 rounds in less than a minute. Minimum sustained fire considered to be 36 rpm or 12 three to five round burst per minute. Barrel over heating depends on weather and exposure to sun too. Water cooled systems; a steady steam from jacket meant system was working. Do not let hot parts of weapons contact snow. With rapid cooling barrel will warp. Cold metal becomes brittle. Most braking parts are moving ones i.e. sears, firing pins, operating rods, recoil springs and magazine springs. Damage accurse mostly in beginning stages. When you first open fire, it helps to fire at a low rate of fire. Snow on weapons melts, seeps inside and freezes. Hands can be cupped over breeches to prevent and protect from cold in general. Infantry units should have more pistols for MOUT. There are many situations in buildings where a pistol is better than a rifle. Pistols provide back up weapons when rifles or MGs brake down. Improvised lanyards for the pistols using phone chords. These automatically retract when the pistol was holstered, unlike the straight issued chord. Note; the issued cord would be better for retrieving weapon especially from enemy who might have taken it, i.e. the cord instantly response to your jerking on it. Revolver pros; they can be fired from the holster. Better for using ammo that is not specifically for it, by rapping cartridges with tape to fit snug in the cylinder. Would only be good for close shot. By design, revolvers already leak gas from cylinder and barrel which slows muzzle velocity. In addition leaving more powder residue behind that can be detected by forensics. Revolvers can be cocked with one hand, with out the aid of a table or other corner edge needed with an automatic slide action pistol. No ejected empty casings, thus position of shooter difficult to determine. Cons; are bulky, take longer time to load, especially without quick loads, fewer rounds available too. The 9mm pistols cons, weak springs in the magazines, which tended to cause failure to fire and the tendency of bullets to fall out of magazines not fully loaded.
When moving, use a 30-round magazine in the SAW. Attach a drum in the ORP or once in position in a hasty ambush. SAW drum pouches are tightly fitted and tend to pop open when you drop into the prone. Use cloth tape with quick-release tabs to prevent this.
In MOUT munitions consumption is greater. During first day it can be five times greater than other types of combat.

SP 2000; The Army notes that a rifle company may fire 50,000 rounds in a two-hour battle, and that 95% of this will be suppressive fire intended to keep the enemy's head down, not to hit him.
After this battle the Marines reevaluated their combat load and reduced the amount of ammunition that they carried.  After the battle, Marines normally carried no more than 4 to 6 magazines and one grenade.  In the Company ambush in Bala Baluk no Marine fired more than four magazines in the eight hours of fighting despite the target rich environment.


There is more recon by fire, as well as many glancing blows on hard flat surfaces, 25% of impact fuses will fail. Rounds can be purposely ricocheted, especially on stone streets or sidewalks. Delay fused rounds are better for ricocheted fire. Aim fragmentation round at closed windows or at back wall of opened one, (AP) round at surrounding framework. Bunker apertures/port holes usually weaker then surrounding area. With impact fuse rubble occurs into room, delay fuse rubble outside room thus producing more sprawling. High explosive impact fused rounds achieve excellent results against troops in the open. HE, variable timed fuses, are recommended for discouraging movement in the open. HE, fuse delay, (bursts .05 seconds after impact) are good for penetrating rooftops of structures and causing casualties within structures. The round must penetrate the roof and top floor since experienced city fighters or snipers do not fight from the top floor. Proximity fuses for keeping OPs off rooftops. Mortars are well suited for combat in built-up areas because of their high rate of fire, steep angle of fall, and short minimum range. If the mortar is firing in excess of 885 mils to clear a frontal mask, the enemy counter battery threat is reduced. Chemical munitions are area coverage weapons, smoke or CS is used to clear a built-up area to drive enemy out of fortifications or to canalize the enemy, also to limit collateral damage or civilian casualties. Smoke employed in the defense obscures enemy air and ground observation, thereby limiting the accuracy of weapons and target acquisition. Smoke placed on roof tops i.e. along the horizon, by attacker can prevent defensive observations. Sometimes screening with smoke pots, generators, or artillery smoke munitions should be considered to cover the withdrawal of defending forces or the movement of attacking forces, or indeed the lack there of. Or to conceal attacks with white phosphorus rounds. Phosphorus wounded as shares of phosphorus is exposed to air it would burn again, keep victims rapped up. When covering a built-up area with a smoke haze or blanket, it is essential that all buildings be covered. Failure to obscure tall buildings, towers, and steeples will provide enemy observers with reference points for placement of rounds. Illumination or smoke rounds can be used to reorient maneuver forces.

Grenades: Joke, aka infantry personal artillery. Frag grenade wt one lbs Avg. 4-5 oz of explosive. 3-5 second fuses. Terms of nomenclature, powder train / fuse striker / firing pen igniter or detonator at end of fuse. WW1 frag 22 oz wt, two oz black powder. TNT shattered fragments to much but it was used in WW1. U.S. produced 50 million in WW11. Avg. Battalion used 500 per day. MK-19 40 mm, note rpm fast enough and muzzle velocity slow enough that a belt could be fired before first round impacted. (1960s) wt 140 lbs 9 oz shell, 2km range 17 second flight time. AP round could breach 60 mm of armor. 100 rpm, jammed every 5k rounds. U.S. Battalion equipped with ten weapons. USSR (1970) copy MK -19 the AGS-17 30 mm, wt. 90 lbs, 6 oz shell, 1700 m. max range 100 rpm, jammed every 1k rounds sometimes exploded. USSR Battalion equipped with eight weapons. M203 DUAL PURPOSE WEAPON (DPW) Significant characteristics of the M203, 40-mm Grenade Launcher, are; Maximum Range 400m, Minimum Safe Firing Range 31m, Minimum Arming Range 14-28m. This must be considered in close-in firing to insure that round will explode. Range at which a .5 i.e. 50% probability of target hit can be expected: Area Target (fire team size unit) 350m, Area Target (Vehicles/Emplacements) 200m, Point Target-Window 125m, Bunker Aperture 50m, Rounds; M651E1 Tactical CS; Effective in driving the enemy from structures, the round has some incendiary characteristics. It could be a fire hazard when used in buildings. M583 White Star Parachute; Is an effective signal and a battlefield illuminant that can be placed 300 meters forward of the squad position to illuminate an area 200 meters in diameter for a period of 40 seconds. XM585 Star Clusters; Are red, white, and green; used for signaling. CAUTION; the green star cluster may appear white in bright sunlight, so save green for night. XM635 Ground Smoke; is used for marking locations; not used for screening. Available in red, yellow, and green.

Hand grenades; AN-M8HC White Smoke and M18 Colored Smoke Grenades. These grenades are used for screening; to supplement screening provided by artillery, mortars, smoke pots or generators; and to mark locations or provide visual signals. Smoke grenades should be carried in or on the pack and not on the LBE (load bearing equipment) you do not fight with smoke grenades, and if you need one, 99 times out of 100, you will have time to get it from your pack. Rap paper tape through the rings of grenades and then tape the ring to the body of the grenade, making at least one rap around the entire ring. The paper tape will tear for fast use, while cloth tape is more difficult and plastic is too difficult. This also reduces noise, and covering the ring hole prevents snagging. However, your finger can still rip threw to grasp the ring for pulling. CS gas grenades are ideal for stopping or slowing down enemy troops and dogs pursuing your team and are effective in damp and wet weather, whereas CS powder will dissipate. WP grenades have a great psychological effect against enemy troops and can be used for the same purpose as CS grenades. The use of CS and WP at the same time will more than double their effectiveness. Keep pilots informed as to the use of smoke and especially WP. They may mistake them for marking rockets indicating an enemy position and attack you. Each team should carry one thermite grenade for destruction of either friendly or enemy equipment. M-34 WP/aka Thermite or incendiary hand grenade, the flame agent ignites when exposed to air, attaches to skin, clothing and continues to burn including the metal casing. Its smoke is not toxic but concentrated in small areas can cause choking and suffocation, smoke grenades too. M34 WP often used to destroy flammable objects, to drive the enemy from structures, or to create smoke screens to conceal movement. CAUTION: The M34 has a 35m bursting radius. MK 33 aka concussion/stun/flash bang grenade 178 decimals four times as high as shot gun. Concussion much greater than frag type. Very effective against troops in enclosed areas this holds true for fragmentation grenades too. Over all MK 33 reduces over all casualties. Minimizes friendly WIA. Stun grenades produce less smoke, fragmentation smoke is light black. MK3 A3 can be used for light demolitions. The MK3A2 offensive hand grenade, commonly referred to as the concussion grenade. The MK3A2 has an effective casualty radius in open areas of 2 meters. In winter or at altitude self-propelled grenade ranges maybe reduced due to slower burning of crimp charges and propellants. Throwing range max 40 m, 10-20 m is common. When throwing during winter hands most be completely dry, heavy mittens reduce range and accuracy. Vigorously throw grenades into rooms or bunkers so they kareem about, denying the enemy an opportunity to throw them back. In addition, at night grenades should only be thrown into these areas. M67 Fragmentation when used with the M213 time fuse, the grenade should be "cooked off" for two seconds to deny the enemy time to throw it back. Use extreme caution when throwing in thick vegetation, uphill or up stairs with upper windows brake glass first, always have cover chosen before throwing. Exploding on floors made of wood will sprawl splinters down to lower floors. (At night, throwing rocks at foe as rouse grenade ploy, the third time you throw a real one). M-34 fragments 35 m from point of det. For the M67 fragmentation grenade the effective kill zone five meter radius, while the casualty-inducing radius is approximately fifteen meters. Explosives 6 oz. wt 14 oz. fuse 4 seconds. Shrapnel cannot penetrate books, bricks, cinder blocks, doors, or sand bags. Causalities 100% within 2m, 75% within 4m, 50% within 6 m, 25% within 10 m, 5-10 %  15 m, and less than 1% 20 m away. Over all less than 10 % of causalities are KIA.WW11 grenades less effective.
Flash bang Grenade using aluminum powder i.e. when it is exposed to air it burns. Same tech that is behind FAE bombs.

Flame throwers have both physical and psychological effect. They do not require pin point accuracy, but fire most not spread to structures needed by friendly forces. “Blind angle burst” to exploit splattering effects of the thickened fuel, without exposing gunner (i.e. ricocheting off walls around corners) also “traversing burst” to cover large front. “Wet shot” unlit burst of fuel, lit by subsequent shot. Effective for destroying vehicles, equipment, or troops in basements/caves. Or to booby-trap an area. With a tank, fuel is allowed to seep into crevasses, vision ports or gun ports before it is lit. Flame throwers require no special back blast preparation. Operator most be provided cover while being brought forward. The British were not much taken with the backpack flamethrower, reasoning the operator was extremely vulnerable and had to fire at particularly close range. A vehicle-mounted weapon offered the possibility of much improved range and sustainability. Tank mounted systems had a range of 100 yards with a 60 second stream. Normally multi short bursts are used not a long single stream. Korean era flamethrowers; range 45 yards, 10 second continuous stream (fuel supply). Remote control vehicles can be equipment with flame throwers. No concern for operator, Video images are less detailed and there is no smell. Sound could be turned off too. Over all results less remorse by operators. Flamethrowers first used in WW 1 by Germany than French. British napalm fuel had greater range than gas liquid. M2A1-7 portable flame thrower effective range 20-50 m. M202 and M202A1, Multishot Rocket Launcher (FLASH), range for area fire out to 500 m. bunker aperture 50 m. Warhead a thicken flame agent ignites when exposed to air. Minimum safe combat range 20 m. which is the burst radius of warhead. Has a back blast which must be considered. Operator must still be provided cover. Used to knock out bunkers or fortified positions should be aimed directly at the aperture. Even if the round or burst misses, enough of the flaming material will enter the position to cause casualties. In Chechnya the Russians deployed RPO-A Shmel rocket-powered flamethrowers with a ‘capsule’ warhead containing 4 liters of liquid that produced a flame 4 m wide by 40 m long. It was first employed during the Soviet Afghan War against Mujahideen cave complexes, where it earned the ominous nickname, the ‘Devil’s Tube’ (IMO not tube but DICK). The 2.1 kg thermobaric warhead of the rocket-powered flame has the equivalent power of a 122 mm shell.

The Chechens were also very interested in capturing or obtaining any Shmel thermobaric weapon system available.  The Shmel is a 93mm caliber Russian flamethrower that is 920mm long and weighs 12kg.  It has a maximum range of 1,000 meters, a sighting maximum of 600 meters, and a minimum range of 20 meters.  The Shmel strongly resembles the U.S. Army’s light antitank weapon (LAW) of the 1970s.  The Russian force, to explain extensive damage to buildings in Grozny, stated that the Chechens had captured a boxcar full of Shmel weapons and were now using them indiscriminately. The Shmel was important because both sides realized a "heavy blast" direct-fire weapon system was a must for urban warfare. They also could be used against vehicles and fortified positions as a breaching device.
It was also reported that the Chechens would fire a "fuga" into a window before attacking. A "fuga" was an RPG-7 round with two 400-gram pieces of trotyl explosives attached with adhesive tape. The Chechens also attached napalm to antitank grenades, which would help damage the turret of the target.

RPGs could be used in the direct or indirect (that is, set up like a mortar) fire mode and was effective against people, vehicles, or helicopters as area or point weapons.  Russia used the flamethrower to drive snipers from their nests and clear buildings for the initial entry of Russian forces. 

Machine gun sections;
A four or five man team could realistically transport a gun, tripod and some 1000 rounds, which would enable the weapon to operate for a reasonable duration while further supplies were brought up. Note 1 thousand rounds divided by six round burst equaled 166 burst times three seconds between equals eight minutes of fire. The machine gun was capable of high angle fire against targets beyond obstacles such as trees or buildings, but such fire was largely speculative and judged wasteful of ammunition. The strength of the weapon was that it could literally sweep an area with automatic fire, completely dominating a whole expanse. MGs were not naturally offensive weapons. To operate effectively they needed a fixed position and access to a ready supply of ammunition. That largely limited their use in the ideal fast moving infantry attack. The infantrymen themselves represented something of a problem in that they placed a notable restriction on the gunners’ field of fire. A two gun Section supporting the advance of a Rifle Company in either V shape or arrowhead was faced with a peculiar problem. Once the riflemen left the start line, at which the MGs were located, they would quickly begin to obscure the field of fire. Unless the guns could be sited in some elevated, and by definition vulnerable position, their fire would have to be restricted to certain ‘lanes’ i.e. sectors.  These would mark the boundaries between the advancing Rifle Platoons, and would have to be kept completely clear if the gunners were to operate. Such circumstances notably compromised the effectiveness of the MGs. The solution was flanking fire. This harks back to the basic fire and movement techniques


(Reference, Step # 2, leadership guidelines, Light Machine gun group and COE rule # 3.)

The Section would set up a position to either the left or right of the Company it was detailed to support for an attack. However, it was in the defensive that the MG truly came into its own. A key principle in resisting an enemy assault was to keep his riflemen at bay. That was precisely what the MG was designed for. When deployed as part of a fixed line of defenses, the crews were relieved of the necessity to ‘shoot around’ their own troops. They could then exploit the weapons ability to saturate a whole area with automatic fire, making it impossible for any living thing to move within this sector of fire. Such an area could extend for a depth of 500 - 1000 meters and a breadth of several hundred. That a single gun team of three or four men could accomplish this released at least a Squad to bolster either the line or reserve. MGs operate best in pairs. In the defense, their placement was such that any attempt to outflank one gun brought the assault troops into view of its partner, and vice versa.

(Reference, Step # 2, leadership guidelines, Light Machine gun group and COE rule # 3.)

CIS Army lessons from Grozny

These include:
Culturally orient your forces so you’re not your own worst enemy out of cultural ignorance. Once insulted or mistreated, they became active fighters or supported the active fighters.
You need some way of sorting out the combatants from the non-combatants. The days of uniforms and organized units is over. The Russians were forced to resort to searching the pockets of civilians for military equipment and used dogs for sniffing for gunpowder and gun oil.
The psychological impact of high intensity urban combat is so intense that you need a large reserve to rotate units in and out of combat.
The Russians were surprised and embarrassed at the degree to which the Chechens exploited the use of cell phones, Motorola radios, improvised TV stations, light video cameras, and the Internet to win the information war.
Russians faced lots of snipers, these were dealt with massive fire power.
They found that boundaries between units were tactical weak points, and horizontal boundaries, in some cases, the Chechens held the third floor and above, while the Russians held the first two floors and or roof. If a unit holding the second floor evacuated parts of it without telling the unit on the ground floor, the Chechens would move in and attack the ground floor unit through the ceiling. Often this resulted in fratricide as the ground floor unit responded with uncontrolled fire through all of the ceilings, including the ones below that section of the building still occupied by Russians. Entire battles were fought through floors, ceilings, and walls without visual contact.
Ambushes were common. Sometimes having three tiers. Chechens would be underground, on the ground floor, and on the roof. Each group had a different task in the ambush.
The most common response by the Chechens to the Russian indirect and aerial firepower was hugging the Russian unit. If that halted the support it became a man on man fight if they didn't cease the supporting fires, the Russian units suffered just as much as the Chechens, sometimes even more, and the morale effect was much worse on the Russians.
Chechens weren't afraid of tanks and BMPs. They assigned groups of RPG gunners to fire volleys at the lead and trail vehicles. Once they were destroyed, the others were picked off one-by-one. Chechens chose firing positions high enough or low enough to stay out of the fields of fire of tank and BMP weapons.
Russian wounded and dead were hung upside down in windows of defended Chechen positions. Russians had to shoot at the bodies to engage the Chechens.
Russians were satisfied with the combat performance of most of their Infantry weapons. T-72 tank was dead meat -- too vulnerable, too awkward, not agile, no visibility, poor weapons coverage at short ranges. They were replaced by smaller numbers of older tanks and more self propelled artillery, more ADA weapons, and more BMPs. Precision guided weapons and UAVs were very useful. There was some need for non-lethal weapons, mostly riot gas and tranquilizer gas, not stuff like sticky foam. The Russian equivalent of the M202 Flash flame projector and the Mk 19 grenade launcher were very useful weapons. Ultimately, a strong combined arms team and flexible command and control meant more than the individual weapons use.

Quotations from Timothy Thomas’ paper, Battle for Grozny:  “Mobility was the key to success against the slower and heavier Russian force…  The Chechen force exploited Russian disorientation by moving behind and parallel to the Russian force once it entered the city… Chechens used civil defense as well as underground sewage and water tunnels both to flank and to get into the rear of military units…  Female snipers were rumored to be fighting for the Chechens…  The Chechens fought in a non-traditional way, with rapid mobile units instead of fixed defenses.  One key lesson was the importance of the sniper and the RPG gunner, or a combination of the two.  For example, snipers were employed to draw fire from a Russian force, and then a Chechen ambush position overlooking the activities of the sniper would open fire on the Russian column fighting the sniper.  Additionally, forces could operate successfully in an independent mode.”

However, I can say very briefly that the snipers pin down the supporting infantry while the vehicles are engaged with missiles. Also, anti-tank gunners must signal snipers (with flares or smoke) when they disable a vehicle. The snipers should use dice to determine which quadrant around the vehicle to snipe from to avoid bunching up. The Mongol technique of having horse archers attack and then retreat, staying just ahead of their pursuers while turning to fire over their shoulders, all the while drawing them into an ambush set by concealed lancers, can be duplicated in modern times with motorcycle-mounted snipers in the role of the horse archers and anti-tank gunners in the role of the lancers.


HRT hostage rescue tactics; research this subject.


Taliban infantry tactics

Why don’t Taliban use pistols i.e. where are the Jessie James of Afghanistan?
Have the Taliban used the D.C. sniper tactic of Mobil/vehicle shooting platforms?

They are extremely disciplined with all weapons and only engaged targets who were within the effective ranges. Firing their AKs on single shot. Machineguns fired in bursts to conserve ammunition.
This is a dedicated enemy that is not easily frightened: Ineffective suppression is absolutely ineffective. The enemy is not scared by noise. During the fight we observed a fighter calmly aim an RPG while 50 cal rounds were kicking up within a meter of his position. Typically crew served weapons do not dislodge enemy fighters the enemy is unnerved by HE 40mm HE, mortars, and CAS. 


Taliban verses Iraqi’s

Marines say the heavy armor added for protection in Iraq is too rough on the vehicles' transmissions in Afghanistan's much hillier terrain, and the vehicles frequently break down.


The Marines have found other differences:
In Iraq, American forces could win over remote farmlands by swaying urban centers. In Afghanistan, there's little connection between the farmlands and the mudhut villages that pass for towns.

In Iraq, armored vehicles could travel on both the roads and the desert. Here, the paved roads are mostly for outsiders -- travelers, truckers and foreign troops. To reach the populace, American forces must find unmapped caravan routes that run through treacherous terrain.
In Iraq, a half-hour firefight was considered a long engagement; here, Marines have fought battles that have lasted as long as eight hours.

When the Taliban does take on the Marines, it's a different kind of fight, Marines said.
For one, the Taliban will wait until they're ready, not just when an opportunity appears. They will clear the area of women and children. And when the attack comes, it's often a full-scale attack, said one Marine captain and Iraq veteran who asked not to be identified because he wasn't sure he was allowed to discuss tactics.
Afghans "are willing to fight to the death. They recover their wounded, just like we do," said the captain. "When I am fighting here, I am fighting a professional army. If direct fighting does not work, they will go to an IED. ... To fight them, you are pulling every play out of the playbook."


Taliban normally utilize RPGs on mounted forces and small arms on dismounted troops. Often engaged the dismounted at 150 m, vehicles at 200-300m with RPGs and PK MGs, They would suppress the turret gunner with PKs and use volleys of RPGs on the vehicle fronts to start fires, not the troop compartments then wait for the dismount. Outside 300m attacks were with rockets and mortars. They focused fire on heavy weapons or radios.

They have maneuvered on platoons but generally preferred to keep the platoon at a distance and maneuver about the battlefield in defilade i.e. irrigation ditches (karez irrigation ditches) to attack the flanks. These ditches ranged from four to seven feet deep and made any frontal attacks very difficult. They well fight to the death when fixed by fires. The platoon has had great success using vehicles to deceive the enemy into expecting a mounted attack from one direction while attacking them from another direction with dismounted forces.

First the terrain often presented poor off road traffic ability. Use dismounted infantry or air assault. The mujahideen learned to take out command vehicles early in the battle. Command vehicles were always distinguished by extra antennae, and may often come to a stop first and maneuver in a different manner than the rest of a patrol.

The Mujahideen formed special armored-vehicle hunter-killer teams where 50 to 80% of the personnel were armed with RPG-7s. This could be up to 15 RPGs. When there weren't mortars available, these groups also used their RPG-7s as a form of pseudo-artillery and conducted RPG preparation fires. The Soviets tried to stay at least 300 meters away from the Mujahideen--out of AK-47 and RPG- 7 moving target range.

The Mujahideen did vary ambush positions in the same ambush site. Their primary concern was to hit the column where it was the weakest ‐ usually in the middle or rear ‐ unless the purpose was to bottle up the column.

Mujahideen received airline meals in the field.
Airstrip ? looked like a bandaid was used to fix wires to rocket casing for firing.

Deciding where to ambush a long convoy is usually driven by geography, intent and escape routes. If the terrain at the ambush site is very constricted, the guerrilla may want to attack the head of the convoy and block the route with a combination of a road block and burning vehicles.

The Soviet surrendered the initiative in movement control to the Mujahideen and never regained it. Consequently most of the Soviet actions in the area were reactive. In a guerrilla war, the loss of the initiative becomes decisive in the outcome of the tactical combat. What mostly contributed to Mujahideen success in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy was their elaborate planning, secrecy in movement and coordinated action. This became possible through detailed information about the enemy including the size, direction of movement and estimated time of arrival of the enemy convoy to ambush site.


Russian tank barrels were incapable of dealing with hunter-killer teams fighting from basements and second or third-story positions.
The Russians attached ZSU 23-4 and 2S6 track-mounted antiaircraft guns to armored columns to respond to these difficult-to-engage hunter-killer teams.
When the Soviets moved through heavy vegetation in Afghanistan, they would sometimes walk a wall of high-explosive fragmentation rounds in front of the vehicles to keep the RPG gunners at bay--or at least to ruin their aim. This is an expensive option in terms of artillery or mortar rounds, but it does work.
When practical, the best way to protect ground vehicles from the RPG is to put infantry well forward of the vehicles to find and destroy the RPG gunners. Combat vehicles should stay out of urban areas or areas dominated by overwatching terrain and tall trees until the infantry has cleared and posted the area. Moving under smoke or at night also helps. Convoys should have a security escort, smoke laying capability and helicopter coverage. All vehicle drivers should have several smoke grenades.

The Soviet's five divisions, four separate brigades and four separate regiments, and smaller support units of the 40th Army. Soviet strength varied from 90-104,000 troops.
The guerrilla mastery of the roads strangled the Soviet efforts. Soviet equipment losses included 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces or mortars, 1138 communications or CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles and 11,369 trucks. Many of these losses were on the highways, and a key loss was the large amount of cargo carrying trucks.
Soviet dead and missing in Afghanistan amounted to almost 15,000 troops, a modest percent of the 642,000 Soviets who served during the ten‐year war. And the dead tell no tales at home. Far more telling were the 469,685 casualties, fully 73 percent of the overall force, who ultimately returned home to the Soviet Union. Even more appalling were the numbers of troops who fell victim to disease (415,932), of which 115,308 suffered from infectious hepatitis and 31,080 from typhoid fever. Beyond the sheer magnitude of these numbers is what these figures say about Soviet military hygiene and the conditions surrounding troop life.

Approximately 620,000 Soviets served in Afghanistan. Of these, 525,000 were in the Soviet Armed Forces while another 90,000 were in the KGB and 5,000 were in the MVD. The Soviets invested much national treasure and lost 13,833 killed. Of their 469,685 sick and wounded, 10,751 became invalids.

Soviets refered to the Muj. As (Doosh-manh). Muj. Called the Kalashnikovs (Khali-kovs or Alah-kovs).

Mechanized forces usually fight effectively only when dismounted and when using their carriers for support or as a maneuver reserve. Ample engineer troops are essential for both sides.

The Soviet Ground Forces developed the bronegruppa concept to use the firepower of the personnel carriers in an independent reserve once the motorized rifle soldiers had dismounted. It was a bold step, for commanders of mechanized forces dislike separating their dismounted infantry from their carriers. However, terrain often dictated that the BMPs, BMDs and BTRs could not follow or support their squads. [The bronegruppa is a temporary grouping of four-five tanks, BMPs or BTRs or any combination of such vehicles. The BMPs (tracked combat vehicles) or BTRs (wheeled combat vehicles) are deployed without their normally assigned infantry squad on board and fight away from their dismounted troops. The grouping has a significant direct fire capability and serves as a maneuver reserve.] The bronegruppa concept gave the commander a potent, maneuverable reserve which could attack independently on the flanks, block expected enemy routes of withdrawal, serve as a mobile fire platform to reinforce elements in contact, serve as a battle taxi to pick up forces (which had infiltrated or air landed earlier and had finished their mission), perform patrols, serve in an economy of force role in both the offense and defense, and provide convoy escort and security functions. APC gun turnets lacked elevation to engage Muj. On steep cliffs along roads.

In general, the Soviet ground soldier remained tied to his personnel carrier and to the equipment which was designed to be carried by that personnel carrier. Consequently, the standard flak jacket weighed 16 kilograms (35 pounds). This was acceptable when dismounting a carrier and assaulting for less than a kilometer. However, a dismounted advance of three kilometers in flak jackets would stall due to troop exhaustion.
Armored vehicles were restricted to the roads and valley floors.

Without the ton or more of added armor, American hummer vehicles can speed across bad roads, or open terrain. But the weight of armor makes the hummer more difficult to maneuver cross country, or on bad roads, and requires driving at slower speeds to avoid damage to the suspension or other mechanical components. The Taliban prefer unarmored pick-up trucks or SUVs, which can quickly get away from the lumbering American vehicles.
If the Taliban take off on foot, they are also faster and more agile, because they are not carrying 30 or more pounds of body armor (vest and helmet). If the chase is close, the Taliban will drop most of what they are carrying (except their weapon) in order to get away.

The Afghans also fight differently than the Iraqis. For one thing, the Afghans are not as suicidal, and plan more carefully. The Iraqis favored the ambush, using fewer than a dozen people and a roadside bomb. The Iraqis were also enthusiastic about suicide bombers and using civilians as human shields. The Afghans prefer large scale attacks, carefully planned, and away from civilians.
But the Afghans will not shoot and run, like the Iraqis. The Afghans will shoot it out for hours, trying to drag out the battle until nightfall (when they have a better chance of sneaking away, in spate of U.S. night vision equipment.)
The Afghans are clever in that they will observe an American unit for days, weeks, or months, trying to find a weakness they can exploit. You cannot afford to get sloppy around the Afghans, because if they catch that lapse, they will exploit your mistake.

RPGs tactics

Firing RPG from prone laying perpendicular.

IMO RPGs being used as anti little human tank tactic, solider mentioning how he could not roll back over in a trench etc after he had fallen down. IMO way to much gear.
The Soviet Army assigned one RPG-7 per motorized rifle squad. Forces involved in regional conflicts tend to add more RPGs to their organizations. In the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian 11-man squad had two RPG-7 gunners. In the Soviet-Afghan War, the Mujahideen averaged one RPG for every 10-12 combatants in 1983-1985 by 1987, two RPG-7s for every 10-12 combatants.
The Spetsnaz were not authorized RPG-7s in their TO&Es. Instead, they were issued RPG-16s or RPG-22s. The RPG-16s and RPG-22s lacked the range and punch of the RPG-7, so Spetsnaz used captured Chinese and Pakistani RPG-7s. They preferred these RPGs to the Soviet model since they are lighter, and have a folding bipod and a carrying handle. 
The antitank round has a lethal bursting radius of 4 meters.
The Mujahideen learned that the best way to destroy a vehicle was to engage it with two or three RPGs simultaneously from a range of 20-50 meters. The chances of hitting the target with a lethal shot are greatly increased by firing a number of shots at close range. Further, the vehicle has fewer counter options. Rpg gunner’s operated with an infantry i.e. assistant crewman, and changed positions after every shot.

The current RPG 7 weighs about 17 pounds, with most grenades weighing five pounds each.
The real damage from RPG fire was the fragments from the exploding grenades. Even the anti-tank round (the most common fired by the RPG) would throw out wounding fragments for 10-15 feet. These rarely killed, but troops were often wounded
Most RPG anti-tank rounds can penetrate 12-20 inches of ordinary armor.
Without much practice, a user can hit a vehicle sized target most of the time at ranges of 50-100 meters. As an operator fires more rounds, he becomes capable of hitting stationary targets at up to 500 meters, and moving targets at 300 meters. It's this last skill that has made the RPG dangerous against helicopters.
Irregulars also like using the RPG as a form of artillery. Get a bunch of RPGs firing at the same area say, a kilometer away, and you will do some damage to any people walking around. The rather more rare (and expensive) anti-personnel RPG rockets will spew out fragments up to 30 feet or more.

The RPG launcher costs anywhere from $100-$500 (lots of second hand stuff out there.) The most common RPG ammo is the anti-tank rocket and these go for $50-100 each.
Actually, many troops have expressed an interest in just getting the RPG, which has a larger (6 pound) warhead, and is a lot cheaper (the RPG launcher goes for about $500 each, brand new, and the more advanced rockets can be had for under a hundred dollars each).

The RPG-29 is the most common recent development of the RPG line. It entered production just before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. It is available through legitimate, or black market, arms dealers and is more expensive than the RPG-7 (which is manufactured by many countries.) RPG-29 launchers cost over $500 each, and the rockets go for about $300 each.
With a ten pound launcher firing a 14.7 pound 105mm rocket, the RPG-29 warhead is designed to get past some forms of reactive armor (ERA). The larger weapon (3.3 feet long when carried out, six feet long when ready to fire and 65 percent heavier than the 85mm RPG-7) is more difficult to carry around and fire, but has an effective range of 500 meters. The warhead can also penetrate five feet of reinforced concrete.

Soviet equipment
losses included 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces or mortars, 1138 communications or CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles and 11,369 trucks. Many of these losses were on the highways, and a key loss was the large amount of cargo‐carrying trucks.
Soviet strength varied from 90‐104,000 troops. The Soviet's five divisions, four separate brigades and four separate regiments, and smaller support units of the 40th Army.
However, terrain often dictated that the BMPs (tracked), BMDs and BTRs (wheeled) could not follow or support their squads. BTKs?
Forces were up‐gunned with extra machine guns, AGS‐17 and mortars.
[The bronegruppa is a temporary grouping of four‐five tanks, BMPs or BTRs‐or any combination of such vehicles. The BMPs (tracked combat vehicles) or BTRs (wheeled combat vehicles) are deployed without their normally assigned infantry squad on board and fight away from their dismounted troops. The grouping has a significant direct‐fire capability and serves as a maneuver reserve.]

The bronegruppa concept gave the commander a potent, maneuverable reserve which could attack independently on the flanks, block expected enemy routes of withdrawal, serve as a mobile fire platform to reinforce elements in contact, serve as a battle taxi to pick‐up forces (which had infiltrated or air‐landed earlier and had finished their mission), perform patrols, serve in an economy‐of‐force role in both the offense and defense, and provide convoy escort and security functions.
The soldier was never supposed to be more than 200 meters from his carrier. Consequently, the standard flak jacket weighed 16 kilograms (35 pounds). This was acceptable when dismounting a carrier and assaulting for less than a kilometer. However, a dismounted advance of three kilometers in flak jackets would stall due to troop exhaustion.

Senior leaders may find invaluable insights into the dangers and opportunities tactical units under their command may face in limited wars. Above all, the lessons in this book should help small unit leaders understand the need for security, deception, patrols, light and litter discipline, caution, vigilance, and the ability to seize the initiative in responding to unpredictable enemy actions and ambushes.

Soviet dead and missing in Afghanistan amounted to almost 15,000 troops, a modest percent of the 642,000 Soviets who served during the ten‐year war. And the dead tell no tales at home. Far more telling were the 469,685 casualties, fully 73 percent of the overall force, who ultimately returned home to the Soviet Union. Even more appalling were the numbers of troops who fell victim to disease (415,932), of which 115,308 suffered from infectious hepatitis and 31,080 from typhoid fever. Beyond the sheer magnitude of these numbers is what these figures say about Soviet military hygiene and the conditions surrounding troop life.

Units us corps x two divisions 1 armor cavalry regular and sup units. USSR army time four division and sup units each division of US and USSR time 12-16 Bn

ww11 average west division 10 AFV per 1k troop today 100 per 1k troops.

OEF Gazette Oct. 2010

The Taliban leaders quickly learned through spotters that the platoon had left the FOB, and they monitored the platoon’s route via additional spotters. Several leaders were to meet in the village that day, and as a result, over 100 insurgents were in the village.
During an ambush the Taliban were expecting the large irrigation canal west of the road to prevent vehicles from moving in their direction. They were surprised to see the tanks cross the 7-foot gap, followed by the infantry.
Tanks fire control system can provide accurate target location information for rapid cueing of other weapons systems, with the provision of 10 digit plus elevation coordinates for GPS guided munitions.
Scanning their sector with the tanks thermal sights, the section of M1A1s indentified the mortar firing point just after the first rounds impacted at a range of 3900 meters.
For counter mobility and mobility operations, every tank platoon will have one track-width mine plow and one dozer blade. There are also plans to fit tanks with mine rollers, giving every tank platoon and tank company mobility support.
Leopard 2 tanks have proven extremely capable of operating in areas where wheeled vehicles could not travel and have made it far more difficult for the Taliban to predict likely avenues of approach for friendly coalition forces. Taliban fighters seem reluctant to attack targets that had attached tank escort.
The latest rounds M1028 Canister round 1100 tungsten steel balls or the multipurpose high explosive MPHE round with air burst fuse settings can engage targets accurately out to 4000 meters.
A Marine tank company deploying to Afghanistan would be less than 100 Marines but would be equipped with 14 M1A! tanks and 2 M88A2 Hercules tank retrievers.



Characteristics of military operations in cold climates and or mountains (MT):

Mountains are generally classified as low (600 to 1500 meters), medium (from 1500 to 3500 meters) and high-altitude (above 3600 meters). Siachin Glacier has the distinction of being the world's highest battlefield at 19K’. The Indian and Pakistani armies facing each other on this battlefield have been credited as being the foremost experts of high-altitude warfare. Casualties 80 % have been directly related to either cold or high altitude.
Five categories of altitude; Low altitude sea level to 5K’. Here, arterial blood oxygen saturation is 96 %. Moderate altitude from 5K to 8K’. No special conditioning or acclimatization require. Arterial blood oxygen saturation 92 %. High altitude extends from 8K to 14K’, arterial blood oxygen saturation ranges from 80-92 %. Altitude illness is common. Very high altitude from 14K to 18K’, altitude illness is the rule. Areas above 18K’ are considered Extreme altitudes. Altitude effects on available oxygen in air, at 100 meters or 328’ there is 99% as much oxygen available compared to sea level, 1000 m or 3280’ = 89%, 1500 m or 7921’ = 84%, 2000 m or 6561’ = 79%, 3000 m = 70%, 4000 m = 62%, 5000 m = 54%.

High altitudes are characterized by extreme cold, strong winds, thin air, intense solar and ultraviolet radiation, heavy fogs, deep snow, rapidly changing weather, including thunderstorms and blizzards the later can cut off outside contact for a week or longer. Avalanches and rockslides are not uncommon. Although jungle or forest may hug the mountain base, trees do not grow past 10K to 11,500 ft. depending on the latitude.

(Reference, Step # 3 concept of operations; Part B)

Medical concerns;
Acute altitude sickness (AMS) can occur at altitudes higher than 2,500 to 3,000 meters, which is lower than Pikes Peak. Disappearance of the symptoms of AMS (from four to seven days) does not indicate complete acclimatization. The incidence and severity of AMS symptoms vary with initial altitude, the rate of ascent, and the level of exertion and individual susceptibility. Athletes are no less likely to experience AMS than sedentary individuals. Some people just can’t adapt readily to high altitude. Occasionally Marines who originate from below 18k’ may suddenly lose adaptation know as chronic MT. sickness. Marines can also fall victim to High-altitude pulmonary edema (HAPE), or high-altitude cerebral edema (HACE).


(Reference, acclimatizing hypoxia hypoxemia)


Rules to avoid dying form altitude sickness;
Learn the early symptoms and be willing to recognize when you have them. Keep in mind your Judgment and thus self-evaluation well become impaired. The diagnosis of altitude sickness requires a high index of suspicion. Be advised: "If you are not doing well at altitude, its altitude illness until proven otherwise." Some of the behavioral effects are the same as a person who is intoxicated; irregular breathing, rapid hart beat, shortness of breath, slurred speech, headaches, loss of appetite, nausea, vomiting and loss of balance i.e. can’t walk a straight line. Decreased vigilance or concentration and memory. Increased errors in performing i.e. simple mental tasks. Increased lethargy or irritability, depression. Severe fatigue, sleep disturbances i.e. sleeplessness. Virtually all people who sleep above 10K ft. have an alteration in the control of their breathing during sleep. The result is a form of periodic breathing in which increasingly deep breaths are followed by a brief (5-30 second) period of apnea. The cycle then repeats itself. If the apnea episode is prolonged, the person may awaken suddenly with a profound sense of dyspnea. Awakening suddenly in a tent at high altitude feeling that one can’t breathe can be a frightening experience, and is often mistaken for the onset of HAPE. An immediate improvement upon awakening usually means that pulmonary edema is not present. Nocturnal awakening with dyspnea has triggered panic attacks. If periodic breathing at altitude is disturbing to the Marine, medics may prescribe 125mg of acetazolamide before bed. Also for AMS acetazolamide and dexamethosone, but only under medical supervision. Indigenous populations at high altitude often use narcotics, such as coca or hashish, to help manage the pain and stress of high altitude. Other treatments include evacuating to a lower altitude (a descent of at least 1,000 ft. for at least 24 hrs). Never ascend to sleep at a higher altitude with any symptoms of altitude sickness. Descend if your symptoms are getting worse while resting at the same altitude.

Acclimatization to altitude;
Deployments in mountains requires acclimatization before undertaking operations. Immediately upon arrival at high elevations, only minimal physical work can be performed because of physiological changes. Vigorous activity during ascent or within the first 24 hrs after ascent will increase both the incidence and severity of AMS symptoms. Acclimatization to height varies much more among individuals than that for heat. Some people adjust very easily others cannot get above 10K ft. The process of adjustment continues for weeks or months. Both acclimatization and the onset of altitude sickness take time, generally from 6-48 hrs to occur. So, visiting a high altitude for a few hours will not necessarily predict what will happen once one spends the night at that altitude. No reliable screening methods exist to determine who will be a good acclimatizer or not. History is best indicator. The ease with which someone can acclimatize is fairly consistent from trip to trip. For example, someone who dose well on a ski patrol at 10K ft. will not necessary do well if he or she flies to 10K ft. and spends the night. However, someone who has flown to 10K ft. in the past and done well will likely do well the next time. Someone who flew to 10K ft. and woke up with a headache the next day will probably have the same result the next time, and maybe a candidate for acetazolamide prophylaxis (see medic for medication advice). Acclimatization seems to have lots to due with genetics. Indigenous people can adjust to living at 18k’ for long periods of time and can make short visits to 28k’ with out sickness. These physiological changes i.e. adaptations are pronounced among mountain people who have lived in cold, high altitudes for generations. Compared to lowlanders, their bodies are short, squat, stocky, and barrel-chested, and their hands and feet are stubby. Their hearts are bigger and slower beating and their capillaries are wider. Their bodies contain 20 % more red blood cells (and hemoglobin in the blood) than lowlanders' do and these red blood cells are larger. The alveoli in their lungs are more open for oxygen absorption. Many develop a fatty epithelial pouch around the eyes to counteract cataract and snow blindness. They also consider 20/15 vision the bench mark for best vision where 20/20 is considered best vision in a modern western orientated population were much less time is spent out doors, exercising eye muscles.

The altitude at which complete acclimatization is possible is not a set point but for most (with proper ascent, nutrition and physical activity) it is about 14K ft. Despite all training and efforts, acclimatization is not possible at heights over 18K ft. (5418 meters) in fact attempts to acclimatize beyond 17K ft. results in a degradation of the body greater than the benefits gained. Thus exposure at these heights must be limited and closely supervised i.e. Marines at high altitudes need to be rotated out every 10 to 14 days. The indigenous populations can out-perform even the most acclimatized and physically fit Marine. The expectation that freshly deployed, unacclimatized troops can go immediately into action is unrealistic. Troops can acclimatize by appropriate staging techniques. Exposure should be conducted at progressively higher altitudes, starting at about 8K’ and ending at 14K’(no more than an additional 300 meters per day above 3,000 meters) is also a general rule. The Indian army acclimates its troops over a 14-day schedule with increases in altitude at 6 days, 4 days and then another 4 days.
Other rules of thumb to consider; if the change in elevation is large and abrupt AMS may begin at 8K ft. 10 to 20 % who ascend rapidly (in less than 24 hours) to altitudes up to 6K ft. Non-acclimatized can lose up to 50 % of their normal physical efficiency. Rapid ascent to elevations of 10K’ causes mild symptoms in 50 %, 12K’ to 14K’ will result in moderate symptoms in over 75 % and 12 to 18 % may have severe symptoms. Rapid ascent to 17,500’ causes severe, incapacitating symptoms in almost all individuals. Understanding acclimatization with a concept known as the "acclimatization line." A unit’s Marines standing at sea level would each have a hypothetical line of around 9K ft. below which they will feel fine, and above which they would experience symptoms of altitude illness. The height of this acclimatization line would vary genetically with each Marine. If a Marine ascends to altitude, but stays below the acclimatization line, there will be no symptoms, and the process of acclimatization can take place. After a night at 9K ft. one’s acclimatization line will rise, perhaps to 11K ft. If one moves up the next day to 11,300 ft. one would remain asymptomatic and continue to acclimatize. However, if the Marine moves up to 11,800 ft. symptoms of AMS would ensue. It appears that if one’s symptoms begin to occur very near to the acclimatization line, the body can continue to adjust, and a day’s rest at the same height will result in resolution of symptoms. If the symptoms at 11,800 ft. are ignored however, and the Marine moves up another 1500 ft. or so, the symptoms will continue to worsen and further adaptation will not take place. It is then necessary to get below the point where the symptoms began in order to start seeing improvement. This last point illustrates why it is so dangerous to ascend with any symptoms of altitude illness.

Acclimatization to temperatures;

Recognition of heat illnesses at higher altitudes may not be as apparent as at lower altitudes, because sweat evaporates very quickly. Measures to avoid dehydration and salt loss are extremely important. The risk of sunburn, particularly to the uncovered face, is greater in mountains than on the desert floor due to thinner atmosphere. Troops who have been sweating heavily before the temperature starts to drop, should take their wet shirts off and place them over relatively dry shirts and sweaters. This may have to be leader supervised and disciplined in the same manner as water consumption. Daily temperature variations make layering of clothing essential.
Basic Principles of Keeping Warm
Remember C-O-L-D to keep warm in winter.
Keep clothing Clean.
Avoid Overheating.
Wear Clothing Loose and in Layers.
Keep clothing Dry
Heat Production
The body's three main physiological means for producing heat are metabolism, exercise, and shivering.
Metabolism; Biochemical reactions which keep us alive produce heat as a by-product. Our basal metabolic rate is a constant internal furnace. When we are exposed to cold, for long periods, metabolism by itself does not produce enough heat to satisfy our body's entire heat requirements.
Exercise; muscles, which make up 50 % of our body weight, produce most of our heat during work. Short bursts of vigorous, physical effort generate heat. Moderate levels of exercise can be sustained for longer periods, there are limitations, however. Physical conditioning, strength, stamina, and fuel in the form of food and water are necessary to sustain activity.
Shivering; is a random, quivering of our muscles. It produces heat at a rate five times greater than our basal metabolic rate. It is our first defense against cold. Shivering occurs when temperature receptors in the skin and brain sense a decrease in body temperature and trigger the shivering response. As with work and exercise, the price of shivering is fuel. How long and how effectively we shiver is limited by the amount of carbohydrates stored in muscles and by the amount of water and oxygen available.
Heat Loss; There are five mechanisms by which our bodies lose heat. Note recall RRCCE pronounced R-see.
Respiration cools the body. As a Marine breathes in cold dry air, it is warmed and humidified in the lungs. As it is exhaled, as much as 25 percent of the body's heat can be lost. Placing a wool scarf or mask over the mouth and nose warms inhaled air and assists in keeping the body warm. NOTE A/c breather to cool the body?
Radiation is the emission of heat energy in the form of particles or waves. Energy is emitted by one body, transmitted through an intervening medium, and absorbed by another body. Infrared, or heat radiation, is transferred from a relatively hot to a relatively cold object. In winter, we lose heat to the environment through radiation. We receive radiative heat from the sun, fires, and reflections off snow, water or light-colored rocks.
When exposed to the environment, the skin serves as a radiator. Unlike the rest of the body, the blood vessels in the head (feet and hands?) do not constrict and reduce the blood supply flowing to the scalp. The head is, therefore, an excellent radiator of heat, eliminating from 35 to 50 % of our total heat production. In cold weather operations, dry insulation, especially on the head, is essential in minimizing heat loss. Hence the primary means of heat loss is through the skin.
Conduction; is the transfer of heat through direct contact between a relatively hot and a relatively cold object. Heat moves from the warmer to the colder object. We lose heat when we lie on snow, ice, and cold or wet frozen ground or sit or lean against floors and bulkheads in unheated interiors of vehicles. (Bird chicken bones and feathers to cool the body)
Convection; is the transfer of heat by the circulation or movement of relatively colder ambient environment (air or water) around the body.
Evaporation; is heat loss in the form of vapor. Heat is necessary for the evaporation of perspiration from the skin's surface. Evaporative heat loss accounts for 20 % of the body's normal total heat loss. When we become overheated through physical exertion, evaporation becomes our major mechanism for heat loss. Sweating accounts for roughly two thirds of our evaporative heat loss; the remaining one third is lost through breathing.

Note on dehydration; the tissues in the lungs are wet and warm. They have to be in order to work. No liquid there, no breathing. It's as simple as that. Cold air can still hold moisture, but not a whole lot. The amount of water vapor that can be held in the air decreases with temperature decrease. That means when you take a parcel of air and warm it up, it's capacity to hold moisture increases. It actually doubles for every 10 degree Celsius increase in temperature. The Relative Humidity greatly affects the rate of evaporation. Relative Humidity is defined as "The amount of water vapor an air mass can hold compared to the amount of water vapor it is currently holding." So a relative humidity of 80% means the air is holding 80% of the water that it can hold. Let's now look at what happens to the cold outside air as it enters the lungs. When you breathe in cold air, its capacity to hold moisture increases dramatically as it warms up. Air that went in at a relative humidity of 80% at freezing may now have a RH of 10% which means it can now hold 70% more water than when it came in to the lungs. The air draws the water out of your lung tissue like it or not. This dries out the inside of your lungs and your body replaces the moisture as fast as it can. This means you now have to drink more water to keep up with the loss. It is way too easy to dehydrate in the winter. Co-incidentally, when you breathe out again, the air cools off and looses its ability to hold moisture, reaches 100% RH and forms a cloud.
Eating snow to replace the water lost by breathing and working can be dangerous. When the snow melts in your mouth, it cools off the body. Ever eat ice cream to cool off on a hot day? Same thing happens in the winter. If you're shivering, (first stage of hypothermia) eating snow will cool you off even more and make the situation worse. However, if you're starting to overheat, by all means, go ahead and eat clean snow. It will cool you off and solve the pesky overheating problem.

Other medical concerns;
UV eye protective goggles should be used when the sun is shining through fog or clouds; a bright, cloudy day is deceptive and can be as dangerous to the eyes as a day of brilliant sunshine. The sunglasses are worn to shade the eyes from the rays of the sun that are reflected by the snow. Snow blindness is similar to sunburn, in that a deep burn may be received before discomfort is felt. To prevent snow blindness, sunglasses must be used from the start of exposure. Waiting for the appearance of discomfort is too late. The condition heals in a few days without permanent damage once unprotected exposure to sunlight is stopped. The risk of snow blindness is increased at high altitudes because the clear air allows more sunlight to penetrate the atmosphere. If sunglasses are lost or broken, a substitute can be improvised by cutting thin (IMO 1/16 inch) by 3 cm (l") long slits through a scrap of wood or cardboard approximately 15 cm (6") long and 3 cm (1") wide. (This works because the suns rays are vertical vs. horizontal slit of Eskimo goggles).
Everyone well experience an impairment of night vision and constriction in peripheral vision (up to 30 % at 6K’). Personnel who have had radial keratotomy corrective eye surgery should not go to high altitudes because their vision may permanently cloud.

Superficial bullet and shrapnel wounds can quickly turn fatal at altitude. Soviet experience in the mountains of Afghanistan proved that 13 to 15 men might be involved in carrying one patient. Exertion at altitude is difficult and the stretcher party has to provide its own security as well. Patients cannot be effectively treated at altitude, but have to be evacuated to lower altitudes to survive.

General Cold weather combat tips

Continuing mainly along the lines of Mountain and Cold weather warfare. Employment of the local population is most advantageous. Units will make more use of local populations, for intelligence about terrain and weather. Aircraft well be used more for weather, recon, and messages. Aerial photos oblique as well as vertical must be studied. In winter, short hours of daylight, fog, snowfall, blizzards, whiteouts, and drifting snow, especially above tree line, drastically limit visibility. At times, an overcast sky and snow-covered terrain create a phenomenon called flat light, which makes recognition of irregularities in the terrain extremely difficult. Heavy snow can change topography making rally points difficult to recognize, shadows and dark objects appear darker than usual. Snow and ice on crest blasted by the winds will be sculptured into odd- shaped drifts. It is relatively easier to conceal troops in barren mountains than on the desert floor due to rugged ground, deep shadows (especially at dawn and dusk), and the difficulties an observer encounters when establishing perspective. (Sinai) With barren mountains, the normal type camouflage net, which breaks up outline by shadow, maybe used rather than the overall cover normally used in the desert. NOTE one Marine moving out from under netting carrying tether rope for extension netting. Rope shot out in front of patrol over a tree branch or some anchor to secure rope to be used to string netting across route. Carefully placed rocks can be used to hide equipment, however rocks well chip and splinter under small arms fire.

Keep in mind Marines must be in peak physical condition. And will require additional stimuli and energy. Calorie intake of up to 6K calories per day. Short, wiry Marines are preferred to tall, muscular Marines. Those selected should have above-average intelligence to allow them to more-readily adapt to the trying terrain. Even the physically fit Marine experiences physiological and psychological degradation when at high elevations. During the first few days at high altitude, leaders have extreme difficulty in maintaining a coordinated unit.

Air transportation may be limited by scarcity of landing sites. Marines delivered by helicopters are less fatigued for fighting. Helicopters are inhibited by altitude and rugged terrain. Payloads and endurance are degraded due to thin air at attitude. Winds are turbulent with considerable fluctuations in air flow strength and direction, particularly on the lee side of mountains. These winds, combined with the terrain, produce extra strain on crews as they have little margin for error. Air assaults from 8K-10K ft. are best conducted by the CH-47. Helicopters providing excellent mobility but no surprise. NOTE pilots oxygen required? Fuel tanks are completely filled with the correct fuel and oil mixture to eliminate condensation. Pilots should never follow a predictable route, including rivers, canyons, streets or roads, for any length of time. Keep intervals of at least 500 yards so all aircraft are free to maneuver and fire guns. Avoid ground lights at night even a trash barrel fire can illuminate the rotors. If aircraft not available, reserves may have to be split up and placed behind key terrain, immediately available. Infantry must seek restrictive terrain to naturalize an enemy's mounted or air mobility advantage. If retrograde (moving backwards) operations are necessary, mountainous terrain is as good a place to conduct them as anywhere. More time is required to reconnoiter and prepare rearward positions. Unlike the desert floor where movement between positions is likely to cover relatively great distances, movement in these conditions is usually from ridge to ridge. Routes must be covered by flank guards, especially at defiles.

Terrain and weather gives battle a piece meal character. There are few approach routes and most of those are along valleys, which are covered by air defense and infantry forces using massed fire. Mountains restrict effective bombing and strafing by jet aircraft.
Time and space factors are extremely fluid. Varying sharply in response to weather and altitude, distance is measured in terms of time and energy. Distance between two points is as much vertical as horizontal. Up hill very slow, down hill can be very fast. This can be important with calculating return tip. More time required for Medical evacuations and all phases of operations. Extreme northern latitudes/Tundra terrain permits unrestricted maneuvers.
Patrols are used extensively to harass the enemy and prevent infiltration. With both environments, it is common to have small units widely dispersed, operating at great distances from other small units or there Command organizations. Requires extra radios, radars/sensors for the numerous OPs or LPs and other positions. Decentralization leads to poor control, more of a problem for offence.
In extreme north, tundra or mountains objectives should be limited, operations are conducted for specific goals, and this is true for Desert ops too. Strong points are easy to isolate and are buy passed more. Key objectives dominate terrain; vantage points for artillery and observation are a must.

Assaults; raid basics apply i.e. normally incorporate an assault element, a security element and a fire support element.
Modifying the TOE of units is likely. Example, an antitank platoon may not be necessary. The mobility, versatility in weapons and the self sufficient nature of the infantry unit, means they well do most of the fighting. In mountain, warfare (MT) mass is not as important as speed, where numbers are often a con, along with road bound vehicles. As a rule of thumb skies are left in a pre-assault position, as close combat on foot is easier to execute. Conversely deep snow may force unit to close on objective on skies. You can advance or retreat with fogs on MT. slopes, attack right behind storms. During blizzards or blowing snow the attacker should if possible keep 3200 mils, 180 degree arch to enemy unit’s stern or flank. Attack out of sun. Units well conduct more Night operations, the best opportunities are at night or during very poor visibility. Day time mostly spent in defense on reverse slopes. In extreme northern latitudes there are lots of flanking and frontal attacks on broad fronts. MT. Flank attacks on foot take a lot of time. Frontal attacks in day light through narrow sectors have little chance.
“Move alongside a column of troops 300 to 500 yards from them. Inside 200 yards you are vulnerable to SAWs and RPGs. Outside 600 yards you are vulnerable to artillery and air strikes. Stay in the safety zone; fire when there is an obstacle to shoot over such as a ditch.” And or when there is cover and or at least concealment. MT. particularly well suited for surprise ambushes lots of cover. Under favorable circumstances, the enemy can only see as far as 100 yards into open woods. (Note capabilities of sensors at angles to forest while in flight). In woods, Marines can be equipped with armor piercing ammo. Unnecessary vertical foot or vehicle movement should be avoided. Do not easily i.e. readily give up elevation gained. Make every effort to secure ground higher than enemy positions to allow the attack to be downhill. It may be possible to infiltrate to a position behind the enemy, preferably using the most difficult and hence unlikely route. Although this is very slow, it normally has the advantage of surprise. Positions in the enemy's stern might provide opportunity to kill the enemy as they reposition for or during their counterattack. The importance of dominate terrain, together with the enemy's knowledge that troops on the objective will be physically tired and dehydrated, makes an immediate counterattack lucrative. Reserves should be kept centrally located and or deployed by air to block or counterattack.


Weapons employment

Field artillery observation posts are emplaced on the highest ground available, although in low-cloud conditions it will be necessary to ensure that they are staggered in height. Predicting fire (i.e. firing tables) may be inaccurate due to rapidly changing weather conditions also making observed fire the best method. It may be difficult to find good gun positions at lower altitudes due to crest clearance problems so high-angle fire is often used. Artillery positions should be on reverse slopes and as close to the crest as possible-considering crest clearance and flash-cover. Individual guns should be sited in terrain folds and other places where they are naturally concealed. Artillery cannot be readily moved where there are not roads. Artillery positions are usually located where ammunition can be delivered-in valleys, villages, and near road heads.  Mortars are frequently more effective than guns or howitzers (due to high-angle fire). They are easier to shift around, can better engage reverse slopes and can be moved closer to the forward posts. In general, the best weapons are light artillery and mortars that are airmobile and can be manhandled so they can be positioned as high as possible. There is limited use for self-propelled weapons, although they may be used in valleys. It’s difficult to provide cover fire, especially for troops attacking down hill on reverse slopes. With snow and soft ground the effects of supporting fires over all is lessened.



(Reference Defense, over all tips, “There is considerable divergence of opinion” with reverse slopes etc.)

Mobility;
Because of difficulty in re-supply, the supply points will become especially lucrative targets. Bridges tunnels and passes are very important.

Because of the frequent interdictions of mountain roadways, military police are used to expedite traffic movement to the front. More engineer troops are needed, major tasks for engineers; Assist in selection, construction, improvement, and route repair, bridging or drainage to counter the problem of flash flooding and the denial of all to the enemy. De-mining is important due to the limited number of routes.

Vehicles;
Wheeled-vehicle transportation (trucks, mules, snowmobiles) should be employed as far forward as possible.
In Afghanistan, Canadian Army used small unit support vehicles (SUSV) i.e. quad runners to move over the terrain at high-altitude, allowing the infantry to ride or transport their loads into battle. These vehicles afforded some small arms protection.
Trucks, helicopters, mechanical mules, and snowmobiles (snow mobiles are capable of climbing 40 degree slopes) are key to mountain logistics, but above 13K ft. the logistics effort shifts to the backs of mules and porters.
Gasoline-powered trucks are clearly preferred over diesel. As the truck ascends the amount of oxygen available is reduced and the engine efficiency drops off. Cross-country and climbing capability decline as fuel usage soars. Gasoline engines may need their carburetors adjusted and Diesels may need to be fitted with turbochargers. In the mountains on average, vehicles lose 20 to 25 % of their rated carrying capability (i.e. vehicle engines lose 10-20 % of the horse power at 7k’, gas dose better) and can use up to 75 % more fuel. Military generators and vehicles are often diesel-powered, but standard diesel engines lose efficiency at 10K ft. and eventually stop functioning altogether because of insufficient oxygen.

Average increase in fuel consumption at altitude; (keep in mind head winds can increase consumption by 10%). Figures are for the number of gallons used per 100 km.
Conditions; with good maintenance, good roads.
Low Altitude (below 3km); 3 to 5% slope light vehicles (gas) average load uses 16 gallons. Trucks 3 to 5 tons (diesel) loaded 25 gallons, unloaded 20 gallons.
Low Altitude; 6 to 8% slope light Vehicles (gas) average load uses 17 gallons. Trucks 3 to 5 tons (diesel) loaded 30 gallons, unloaded 25 gallons.
Medium Altitude (up to 3km) ; 3 to 5% slope light vehicles (gas) average load 17 gallons, Trucks 3 to 5 tons (diesel) loaded 30 gallons, unloaded 25 gallons.
Medium Altitude; 6 to 8% lt veh. Avg. 18, Trucks loaded 32 gals. Unloaded 27 gals.
High Altitude (3km to 4km); 3 to 5% slope, lt. veh. 18 gals. Trucks loaded 32 gals. Unloaded 27 gals.   
High Altitude; 6 to 8% slope lt. veh. 20 gals. Trucks loaded 35 gals. Unloaded 30 gals.
High Altitude; (above 4km) 3 to 5% slope lt. veh. 20 gals. Truck loaded 35 gals. Unloaded 30 gals.
High Altitude; 6 to 8% slope lt. veh. 25 gals. Truck loaded 38 gals. Unloaded 33 gals.

Animals and porters;
Beyond the limits of wheeled transport, the only alternatives are animals or porters (which may need to be acclimatized). Many ungulate (having hoofs) species are traditional pack animals, including elephants, camels, the yak, reindeer, goats, water buffalo, llama, Alpacas and mules used to pack loads on the back, pull wagons, and or some could be ridden. Camels can smell humans 4 miles away and see them 2 miles away. Camels in Arabia can brink 50 gallons of water. The Bactrian Camel most eat snow (this in Mongolia) limiting its self to two gallons a day to prevent to much cooling of the body. Oxen can be slaughtered and eaten when meat is low and wild game impossible to find or tactical situation prevents hunting (horsemeat is eatable but tuff). Mules have more stamina and are more sure-footed than horses and have more resistance to disease. Summed up by George Washington; "Horses eat too much, work too little, and die too young." However, mules are subject to colic, heat exhaustion, injuries, and wounds. Most injuries and wounds result from poorly adjusted saddles, pack frames and harnesses. Stones, rocks, and debris on the trail can also wound a mule's hoof. Local mules are more immune to disease at altitude than humans and all mules have a keen sense of self-preservation that keeps them alive in mountain storms. Mules require a great deal of daily care and training. Muleteers, farriers, blacksmiths, and large animal veterinarians, who have been absent from many armies for decades, are essential for mule-borne logistics. Mules need new shoes every 30 days and there are special mule shoes for snow and ice.

Mules; are 12 to 17.5 hands (50 to 70 inches in height and weigh 600 to 1,500 lbs. The average donkey stands about 40 inches in height at the shoulders, but breeds range from 24 to 66 inches. Mule’s travel at 2½ mph. Oxen are slower, at 2 m.p.h. The ½-mile faster speed can save a week or more over long distances. Oxen can graze along the trail, but mules must be fed grain to supplement the grazing. American mules require 10 lbs of grain and 14 pounds of hay per day, which also becomes part of the logistics load therefore, less paying/combat freight can be hauled. The smaller mules of Argentina require 8 lbs of grain and 8 lbs of hay per day. Mules could go 24 hrs without water when they had a light load i.e. under 300 lbs. Mules can consume 25 to 30 liters of water a day and up to 50 liters in desert terrain. They also require a daily ounce of salt.
In WWI or II the standard army mule load was about 150 lbs. American mules can carry up to 20 % of their body weight (150-300 pounds) for 15 to 20 miles per day in mountains. Smaller mules in other locales will carry less. The maximum carrying weight for an Argentine mule is between 200 and 250 lbs. However, this is for low- and medium-altitudes. At high altitude, the maximum carrying weight drops below 200 lbs. Like humans, mules require time to acclimate to altitude. Muleteers and mules require about a month's training to get them ready to work above 3,000 meters. Like humans, mules tire easily above 4,000 meters and need to be rested frequently. Mules also have to be trained not to fear the noise of firearms and explosives so that they do not run off during a patrol.

Organized mule cargo units, rather than ad hoc teams led by local teamsters, are the preferred option, but local mules are always preferred over deployed mules. Equipage is a horse drawn carriage usually with its attendant servants. Since much of the material will be kept in dumps and moved in stages, the commander has to keep his transport requirements in hand. Energy conservation requires additional routines to deploy the logistics (like rations to the platoon, mortar rounds to the mortars).
General load information to consider;
Requirements for Infantry Company (180) planning a mountain march, attack and defense lasting for a total of 6 days. Note these figures do not include supplies carried by each Marine. Rations 1620 kilos, water (drink and cocking) 2,262 kilos (2565 liters). Ammunition 1,021 kilos.
Small mules carry 80 kilos, big mules up to 150 kilos.
Mule total 60 – 80. mules to carry 5,620 kilos of fodder, 4060 kilos of grain, 348 kilos of salt, and 18,416 kilos of water.
Consumption of water and wood; low and medium altitudes, man drinking 1.5 to 2 liters, cocking 5 liters. Animal summer 15 liters winter 10 liters. High altitude man drinking 2 to 2.5 liters, cocking 8 liters. Animals summer 15 liters, winter 10 liters.
Wood cocking uncovered at low altitude, 1kg per man, same for heating tent or shelter and in open.
Wood cocking uncovered at high attitude, 1kg per Marine, heating tent or shelter 1kg per Marine every 6 hours, in open 1kg per Marine every two hours. 

Porters; Mules cannot reach the higher elevations, and porters must haul the supplies forward. Although a porter cannot carry as much as a mule, they can move in places where mules cannot. However, porters will probably be reluctant to work too far away from their homes and villages. There is always a security consideration when using local porters. Short, wiry porter are preferred to tall, muscular porters. Selected porters should have above-average intelligence to allow them to more-readily adapt to the trying terrain.
Cargo capabilities; on foot up to 3kms Porter 20kg at 3-4km 20kg above 4km 15kg or less.
Marines up to 3km 15kg 3-3km 10-12kg above 4km 8-12kg.
On skis up to 3km porter 20kg 3-4km 12-15kg above 4km 12kg or less. Marine up to 3km 12kg 3-4km 12kg above 4km 10kg or less.
Physical performance; starts to be affected at about 1,000 meters altitude; the effect is not linear and the drop in performance is quite different for acclimated versus unacclimated individuals. A runner who is not acclimated will lose 10 to 12% in VO2max at an altitude of about 6,500 feet and 12 to 15% at 7,500 feet. However, performance will not be to the same degree because running economy is better at altitude (due to the less dense air resistance). Research at 6,500 feet indicated a 12% loss of VO2max, but 6% improvement in running economy resulting in 6% loss in performance. The duration of a run is also a factor. An 800-meter run is so anaerobic that little performance difference exists. A 1,500-meter run may be 6 to 10 seconds slower, but over 20 seconds slower for unacclimated runners. An unacclimated runner could expect to lose a minute in 5K and as much as two minutes for a 10K. Average for a 5k run 13 min. 10k run 27 minutes.


Characteristics of military operations in Jungle warfare:

Panic and phobias are magnified, fratricide dangers are high. During the night there are many more natural noises. Ambushes are used extensively they are multi-phase operations and are planned in some detail. First a suitable killing zone (K.Z.) is identified. It is a place where enemy units are expected to pass, and gives cover for the deployment then waiting and execution then extraction phases. The patrol must deploy into the area covertly, ideally under the cover of darkness, and will need to leave the area as soon as practical by a pre-determined route. Usually, two or more S.E. will be sent out a short distance from the K.Z. Their job is two fold; one to give early-warning of approaching enemy, and secondly, when the ambush is initiated, to prevent any enemy from escaping. Having set the ambush, the next phase is to wait. Executing an ambush, initiate it with an explosive device (such as a claymore mine). Note most crew serve MGs with open bolts give warning of opening fire. Afterwards clear the K.Z. by checking bodies for intelligence. Attacking troops in a thicket. First post Marines at corners. Machine gun small sections. Adjust/shift Marines and fire etc. In the jungle you must operate with combatant units at close ranges and possibly in all directions. It’s almost always best to be in line/column formations. When in doubt don’t shoot. Helicopters provide excellent mobility but no surprise. Inspect foliage closely, broken leaves, twigs, etc., often indicate when and in what direction the enemy has passed and how many were in the group. The amount of sap oozing from a broken limb can indicate time of passing. The steep hills and the dense vegetation and swamps tend to ‘canalize’ our advance. It is next to impossible to have flank security patrolling abreast of a moving column. It is difficult to send units more than a hundred feet to a flank and maintain contact with them. If we try to make any headway we have to risk exposed flanks. Patrols tend to try to reach objectives too quickly, moving too rapidly i.e. nosily through the brush. Maneuver option, a base of fire should be advanced along the ridges. “When encountering enemy on the move, our units had more success and suffered fewer casualties by opening fire and rushing through, than by trying to take cover and envelope the enemy. Grenades are more useful than rifles in patrol work. Any equipment which must be abandoned should be buried and camouflaged. Rifles can be kept perfectly dry at night by placing them on sticks, several inches off the ground and covering them with banana leaves. “It is noteworthy” that in the defense, each unit, even the squad established itself so as to provide all around security during darkness. With positions make use of varying elevations. In organizing the area defense all automatic weapons were sighted on sectors of fire coordinated with adjacent units. However, it was a standing rule that weapons never be fired at night, except to repulse a major night attack. In order to safeguard personnel and to avoid disclosing the position of automatic weapons, only knives and bayonets were used to take out small infiltrating parties. To guard against attacks after dark, we would set up the machine gun at one place, and then immediately after dark the gun would be moved to another prepared location. It was required that every telephone/radio be manned continuously from dark to daylight, eliminating the necessity of ringing. Therefore, whenever anything occurred, all leaders within the position instantly knew the situation.”

(Reference, Night Fighting below)


V/C not yelling at all when wounded or dying. Me what about Tali ban, or most any other foreigners?

Medivacs; total 406 thousand patients including 168 thousand combat casualties. Between 65-73 high velocity round effect i.e. wound track, tissue damage to organs and blood vessels too. And explosion victims with large fragments and very dirty wounds meant the victim was close to explosion.

Causalities Vietnam, small arms 51% of KIAs, 16% of WIA. Fragments 36% KIA, 65% WIA. Booby traps/mines 11% KIA = 4000, 15% WIA. Punji stakes only 2 % WIA. Others cause 2% KIA, 2% WIA.

WWII small arms 32 % and Korea 33%.

Vietnam, impact points of rounds on body; KIA, 16% muti-sites, 1% arms , 7% legs, 18% growing /abs, 19% upper torso , 39% head. WIA 20% multi site, arms 36%, legs, 5% groin, 7% upper torso, 14% head.

I don’t know the timeliness of the fallowing info I checked the site last mouth, OEF 175 KIA by small arms fire, total of both wars 1373 with 257 US Marines. This according to icasualties.com.


Fighting at night,

Night ops, radios are turned down. Make use of ear phones if available. Note in MT or cold weather warfare of WWII “fighting for the little kingdoms”/fighting holes, to retreat into the country side meant death by exposure. Close in night fighting combatants have instinctive tendency to form groups under low light conditions. You should move more frequently, farther and faster at night especially after contact with foe. Silence voice wise will make foe nervous, cause foe to shoot more. Muzzle flashes will give away locations, that’s were you though grenades, or attack with bayonets. Use extreme caution when throwing in thick brush or up hill. Throwing rocks at foe (especially down hill) as rouse grenade attack, the 3rd time you use real grenade.


(Reference, COE Over all tips, “if you spot foe” and Jungle warfare “It is noteworthy” above)


Knife fighting, Romans taught to thrust not slash. With swords/knifes slashes with the edge, though made with ever so much force seldom kill. As vital parts are defended by armor and bone. On the contrary a stab although it may only penetrate 2” is generally fatal. Besides with the attitude of striking, it is impossible to avoid exposing the right arm and side of the body, which is covered during a thrust. With thrust a foe receives the point before sword is seen. It must be observed that when engaging with spears/javelins/grenades, the left foot is advanced increasing throwing force. On contrary at close range with sword, right foot extended so that the body may present less a target to foe and right arm be ready to thrust with max force and reach and to counter enemy that may have broken line gotten behind you. Stabbing; blades edge held horizontal to ground (i.e. parallel) well penetrate between ribs. Stabbing heart via stomach less blood is spilt. Also arm pits, crotch or inter portion of the thigh are locations of vital arteries. Stabbing Pelvis hands width below navel, just above genitals. Axon (base of the back of head) also at end of spinal column just above buttocks. Slicing throat, tip of blade used just to one side of trachea. So the trachea is not cut, which would allow blood to inter airway and cause load gurgling sound.


Characteristics of military operations in Desert warfare

Illumination or smoke rounds can be used to reorient maneuvering forces.
Distances require longer lead times for reconnaissance and surveillance planning. Effective reconnaissance takes time.
Scouts are reconnaissance patrols, not combat patrols, and should attempt to gain information through stealth.
Consideration should be given to conducting reconnaissance during periods of limited visibility.
Very few civilians are encountered in desert operations, and information they give should be treated with caution.

Because there is little vegetation in the desert, strong shadows are readily observed from the air. Disrupt shadows by altering the shape of equipment, using the correct angle to the sun to minimize shadow size i.e. largest vertical surface perpendicular to the sun and to cause shadows to fall on broken ground or vegetation whenever possible.


(Reference, Defense rule # 5 Features of Recognition, shadow)

Open terrain and predominantly clear atmosphere generally offer excellent long-range visibility, but at certain times of the day it may be limited or distorted by the effects of heat. Visibility can be better during the night than day. 
The ideal observation should have the sun behind it and be as high as possible to lessen the effects of mirages and heat radiation from the ground.
Stake out your target line/engagement area (trigger point). This will prevent soldiers from engaging targets beyond the maximum effective range of the weapon system.
Observation of fires may be difficult. The lack of visible terrain features distorts the ability to make range estimations.
When preparing defensive positions, use every available means to know how far you can observe in front of your positions.
The enemy can see just as far as you can. Inspect your position from an enemy point of view.
Light and noise at night may be seen or heard from miles away, so strict light and noise discipline are necessary.
Sand and dust reveal movement in the desert. It is best to move at night or during periods of predawn morning dew. This includes resupply as well as tactical movements.
There are fewer terrain features in the desert. This hinders navigation and exposes friendly forces to the enemy. Take advantage of the least considered features, such as wadis, to conceal movement.
The enemy will try to attack with the sun low and behind him.

When natural obstacles are not available, units should use linear obstacles to stop enemy movement. Minefields must be rapidly laid over large areas to be effective. Employ “basic loads” of Class IV (sand bags, pickets, etc.) with all vehicles to expedite digging in. In the desert environment, camouflage and dispersion are a necessity for all forces.

Employ reverse slopes as much as possible and camouflage frontal parapets for individual/crew positions by making use of reverse slopes of natural drifts. This avoids obvious bunker positions being easily seen.

Extended depth and dispersion of vehicles will enhance survival. Dug in vehicles survive longer. Use of dummy positions is more important.

Air instability is most likely to cause quick, vertical, and irregular dissipation of an agent, leaving the target area relatively free of contamination quickly. Chemical weapons used during the heat of day are normally persistent nerve or blister agents.

Combat Service Support;

Medical support in the desert environment is challenged by remote locations.
In a non linear desert defense, enemy and friendly units may be intermingled, especially in poor visibility.
Medical treatment and evacuation will become more critical in the desert. The effectiveness of the combat lifesaver program has been proven.
Medics must constantly re-certify and train those who are designated as combat lifesavers. The standard should be at least one lifesaver per squad.
Rehearse how your unit will identify, treat, and evacuate casualties. This is as important as how you will fight.
When not in use, keep weapons, covered. Even though weapons are coverd, they may still have sand on them. Clean the weapon frequently so it will be ready when needed.
PMCS in the desert is absolutely essential. Left unattended, sand and wind will rapidly destroy the most basic piece of soldier gear.
Sand clogs fuel lines and wears out tires and other rubber and plastic parts faster. It also seeps into engines and cooling systems. This results in overheated engines that can cause sudden and catastrophic failure.
Food service organizations require intense supervision. Current menus must be augmented with fresh fruit, vegetables, and breads to provide soldiers the roughage and nutrients they need.

Command and control;

Desert evenings can be extremely long or short. Leaders should be concerned with EENT, BMNT, and percentage of illumination. These factors will be extremely important when conducting night operations.
Dry desert conditions can, at times, reduce radio signal strength and create unforeseen blind spots, even in aircraft FM communications may be degraded due to dead spots caused by  heavy concentrations of minerals close to the surface. Establish firm procedures for constant control, either by radio or through liason.
Ensure that all know the commander’s intent and rehearse battle drill so that actions are understood even in the absence of orders.

I know that you have warned against climbing to the top of the only tal building in a neighborhood or firing down the long axis of a major street.

Teamwork. Most of the advantages of teams apply only to the invaders. Crew served weapons reduce willful misses by reluctant killers. In static positions teams have more endurance.

Divide. Engage the invaders when they are crossing a boundary. Fire when half the invaders are inside a building and half outside it. Fire when half the invaders are in open and half in rough terrain. Fire at dawn or dusk when neither infrared nor visible light is optimal. Fire from one unit's area of operation into another's AO.

Armor

Tanks stopping on trench and spinning to crush troop’s

Threat attacks are based on two principles, speed and mass. Air land battle doctrine four basic tenets of initiative agility, synchronization and depth are constant. A heavy mechanized unit usually plans to win by sustaining a high rate of advance 20 mph i.e. 2-3 minutes per km. Generally 60 miles of range equal 3-5 hour’s time. Egyptian chariot speed 25 mph equal to modern tank. Note house power wt ratio hp divided by vehicle wt. Higher Hp. makes for move lively vehicle more important for acceleration and moving up hill, than for pure speed. Tracked vehicles on flat road surface will slide around corners like auto. Heavier vehicles more stable same as Cadillac vs. compact. Because APCs are lighter they can’t move across open ground as fast with out injuring Marines in side.
Tracked vehicles better two negotiate obstacles in MOUT, also do better off road, wheeled vehicles get stuck.

Over 60 tons tank becomes handicapped, lots of bridges cannot be used. Most tanks barely float if equipped to due so and cannot manage rough water.
MT drivers and crew passengers of open vehicles are very venerable to cold injuries. MOUT Dusts wares out pistons. Dust, rough handling character, places great strain on drives, communication equipment and night vision equipment. Vehicles use less fuel in MOUT than open. In open terrain vehicles that run out of fuel can be recovered later. Noise reduction with ear plugs etc. more important with tracked vehicles, over time adds to fatigue.
USSR wider tracked vehicle did better in mud. Vehicle used more fuel. Over all operationally 20% on road,40% off road, 40% stationary, engine running this well very with season more time off road summer when ground is dry and firm less when hot ( air con- no) cold snow or muddy more time for heater benefit.

Tank drivers main job keep tank covered/concealed, don’t move strait out of hull down position.
Narrow street were only one tank can proceed should be avoided.
Bridges and other prominent features may have indirect fire sighted on them.

The factors of cover, concealment, fields of fire, etc. considered in selecting other defensive positions are also applicable when selecting positions for combat vehicles. Utilizing any physical barrier available, such as low walls or piled-up rubble, brush or locating it within a building to gain additional cover and concealment. Tank and APC positions can be classified in general terms as hull-down or hide positions. Hull-down positions are dug in, to protect the vehicle by reducing its silhouette. Hide positions, as the name implies, deny the enemy direct observation of a tank or APC.
Maneuver unit at disadvantage do to lack of concealment. Tanks need only move 50-100’ to find ground cover, undulations. Tanks average 300 feet apart.


(Reference, COE rule # 7 and Defense rule # 6)

Ideally tank support infantry the exception is when combat is on flat open ground. In open terrain you are more likely to be attacked by horses/vehicles/helicopters than by infantry.
Featureless terrain troops in front of tanks to provide better information to tanks.
If cavalry is not strong enough to compete with foes inter mix it with infantry. Cavalry and infantry the later is more important to analyze.
For a last ditch direct assault dismount infantry first, to limit casualties. Dismounted infantry checking routes should clear high ground first. Make sure your forward infantry can be covered by tank crew behind you.
If infantry dose not fallow armored units within reasonable time, a section should be sent back to investigate. Tanks that get separated from infantry can not fire at bypassed enemy. In turning to withdrawal all tanks should turn about as right face to limit confusion as to the danger zones for infantry.
"We have saved our wire crews much work by carrying on each vehicle two poles with hooks on the ends so that we can quickly lift field-wire lines and run under them." After withdrawal paths closed with wire to prevent easy use for travel. No fighting positions are placed in tanks path that were made during assault.


Troops operating with tanks beware of debris from APDS rounds. 60 degrees ark during firing danger zone for APDS. Gun muzzle blast in MOUT can last 1-2 minutes. Troops can use for smoke screen. Smoke screen canisters danger when fired and can cause fires. Gunner “if driver says he has target. I knew to swing to the right”. Commander has over ride to turret if gunner fails to point gun. Hatches closed when firing gun or tow from concealed room or area. Tanks directing hot exhaust into manholes, fighting holes etc. with deflectors.


Killing tanks; the presents of tanks should not be exaggerated, the primary aim in training is to over come any inherent feelings of inferiority, when faced with enemy armor. No attempt should be made to turn training into a drill. This is pointless for there is neither a standard group of fighters nor a single tactic for fighting tanks at close range. Skill and imagination are the only answers.
The Chechen hunter–killer teams, like wolf packs searching out an isolated member of a family of deer, frequently attacked a single armored vehicle simultaneously from several different directions.
Chechen forces employing three- or four-man fire teams composed of a sniper a machine-gunner and a RPG gunner. IMO the teams system should have worked like this, first the sniper would force to crew to button up, then the machine gunner with armor piecing rounds would breach the reactive armor then would come a salvo of RPGs concentrated on the exposed area.

WWII tank vs. tank was rare more common to have tank vs. infantry. Try to separate them allow tanks to sweep over positions, separate fallow on infantry. Which can hold ground. Destroy armor at (T) intersections. Some armor used plows to forge paths. Plow vehicles move slowly and are prime targets, vehicles had to fallow predictable path.

Tanks weak point is with its tracks. Target tanks as they are exposing underside at crest.

Force crew to bottom up. Difficult for crew to observe or keep track of the direction of vehicle (orientation). Vehicle blind spaces most cars 15-20’ RV./van 20-30 ‘trucks 30-40’ short driver 50’.

Unlike the mortar or machine gun which usually target an area, the AT gun had to hit a very specific object, namely an armored vehicle. The AT gun was a purely line of sight weapon.  Its round flew on a flat trajectory so the gunner had to have a uninterrupted view of the target. 
A Rifle Company in the vanguard of a cautious advance would normally expect a number of guns to support it.  The only way to ensure there was always one gun capable of delivering immediate support was to advance them by bounds, one gun covering while another moved to a new position.  
To be at their most effective, the first few rounds of AT fire had to come as a complete surprise to the enemy.  Concealment and camouflage were vital tasks for the gun crews, perfectly attainable when operating from a well prepared defensive position, less so when deployed to protect infantryman who had just seized their objective.  
In open country, the guns were particularly susceptible to fire from the very tanks they sought to destroy, which could pitch HE shells at them from longer range than the crews could respond to with their amour piercing ammunition.  In close country, the threat came as much from enemy infantry accompanying the tanks to deal with just such an obstacle.  The only defense was to site the guns within the localities defended by friendly riflemen who could repulse the infantry with small arms fire while the gunners engaged the tanks. The guns could also fire high explosive ammunition against infantry targets. Chief among these was the reduction of strong points or fortified buildings were amour piercing rounds proving effective even at their longer ranges. 


Tanks vs. ATGMs; never point RPG or other back blast weapons upward or fire from prone (lose limbs). Anti tank weapons placed on elevated position to fire down at tank, 20 degrees angle increases hit 67% at 600 feet. 45 degree doubled odds compared to a surface level shoot. Four inches of vertical clearance over obstacles for muzzle of crew served weapons. Power lines, antennas and poles interfere with lead shots or shots from roofs. If electricity still on may shock operator or burn up computer and sensors. Some ATGMs may have trouble firing over water.

Direct fire weapons may need flank observer due to visibility obscured by dust round falling short, best to over shoot so observer dose not loose site of target. Concentrate indirect fire on lead element. If you try to pick them off one at a time you will be over run before you know it, mass combat power at right place and time. With average country side you well spot tank 1760 feet of range 40% of the time. 1/3 to ½ of a mile range 25% of the time. ¾ to 1 mile 20%. Over one mile 10%. Even in open areas the longest range figure is the rule. Tanks travel in undulations in terrain. Watch for dust esp. after long dry spells.

AT crews should not respond to enemy small arms fire. "At night, we placed a machine gun on both sides of a tank destroyer. When hostile tanks were heard approaching, the machine 'guns fired tracers until ricochets indicated that a tank was being hit. Both guns would then fire at the tank and the ATGM can fire at the point of the "V" formed by the converging tracers."

A number of vulnerable points were identified on machines, notably the vision ports, engine deck plate and the tracks. 

The Germans also deployed blocks of explosive which could be hung over the barrel of the main gun, mangling it on detonation.

Smoke grenades or generators (pots filled with chemical compounds) or any available materials including vegetation, were all used.
The hope was the smokescreen would be sufficient to degrade cooperation and mutual support between the tanks, forcing each to fight on its own and be defeated in detail. It should be noted, there was nothing to prevent one tank from machine-gunning the hull of another to clear it of enemy infantry, knowing the crew would be immune.

Germans developed Zimmerit coating. This was applied to Panzers to prevent magnetic charges being fixed to the hull, which proved quite effective.
Molotov cocktail or fire bottle in Red Army parlance.
A group of mines could be laced together and pulled into the path of an oncoming tank, (rather like the 'stinger' beloved of police forces for stopping stolen cars). 


SP 7/2000; Russia has developed a motorcycle sidecar that is equipped with an anti-tank guided missile launcher. The sidecar is designed to be equip cross country motorcycles used by reconnaissance units and Special Forces

SP member not a lot of even modern MBTs are built to withstand that many 30mm armor pircing shells across their upperworks. Things like hatches, optics and sights, those roof blow-out panels over bustle-mounted ammo magazines, and especially the radiator grills over the top of the engine decking, those are pitifully weak compared to actual turret faces and side armor.

Using hot tar to coat tanks vision posts etc.

(Reference, Step # 3, General phase threeThe assault, phase four Consolidation/Explotation)




“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!




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