Welcome Aboard!

AHOY,


UPDATE 12/21/13, 11:42 HOURS

I am revealing who I am today i.e. posting my name, I am Keith Oeffinger, I was born in San Antonio Texas in 1963. See today's post 12/21/13 .


Update, 01/11/14 12:30 hours;

I would like to say, with only one reply, like three years ago, this blog seems too much like a mirror site to me. And it appears very few patriots are looking back at past posts.

The new “Fragmented Fighting Facts” series of posts that dedicates one post to each Basic rule has now been completed. This series starts with the post tilted “Post # 1, Planning, Preface” that posted on 05/12/13. This series is under the label “Tri-F in progress”. Posts well be updated as I edit or discover additional knowledge thus the series is the most current version of my "Fragmented Fighting Facts" manual. For an old but complete version i.e. all in one post copy. Patriots are welcomed to try viewing one of the “pages” listed in the “special word section” on the starboard side of the blog. I say try due to the fact I’m not sure if they are published i.e. viewable to the general public due to all the issues or HACKING with my blog. There is also a complete copy posted, that is titled, “Tri-F in progress” too, it was posted 11/13/10.

And feel free to fire away with a reply, (sarcasm on).


FLASH REPORT; the “TERRORIST ARE NOT AMONG US, AND NEVER WERE I.E. AL QAEDA IS A STAWL MAN, GHOST”.

The most important lesson that everyone should have taken away from the Boston Marathon bombings was that those young men proved that no al-queda members are in the u.s. Otherwise they too would just go get some presure cookers and had to a parade.

“I AM NOT A TERRORIST” this nation’s worst enemy is FEAR. This fear is being promoted mostly by the back woods, right wing, Christians of this nation. We need to separate church and state, period. And that is of course for the States sake.


I would like patriots to understand that I use the terms "official revealed fact" to mean what everyone is being told by officials, media etc. I use the term "kings truth" to mean what I know or believe to actually be the actual facts. I DO NOT MEAN IT IN A RELIGIOUS WAY. I.E. the term Kings is plural as in those running the show.


Preface for the Fragmented Fighting Facts

Note pink highlighted material is that, that IMO is questionable factually, it maybe an “official revealed fact” that I am questioning. The material may need to be defined i.e. explained more or it could be a personal note. Yellow is location undecided or unedited material i.e. unread that I have not decided on what to keep or not. Green means a change has been made i.e. an update. By noting the green updated highlights a Patriot well not have to read the Fragmented Fighting Facts in its entirety to stay current. Red is important, perhaps the "kings truth".

Newjarheaddean; this is my collection of combat notes. One might call it my anthology of combat tactics, techniques, methods and skills. The note taking began about fourty years ago (I was around 13 years old) with the observation of 10 rules listed with in a book covering the French and Indian i.e. Native American, wars, entitled “Roger’s Rangers”. That’s right the rules that started all this are “Army Ranger” rules, this book was located in the “Westfall” library in San Antonio Texas off of Vance Jackson. I get a kick out of the libraries name due to the general agreement that modern or state vs state warfare started with the singing of the peace treaties at Westphalia. I could not read at the time; however I knew that a list in a book on war would be important. I copied those rules down like a scribe might have written hieroglyphs and had my dad read them to me. . This discovery preceded numerous sources including approximately one hundred books and about a dozen field manuals, of which a few were of WWII era. These were found at libraries, half price bookstores and garage sales. Since going on line in 2007, I have found material on web sites such as “Defense and National Interest” (DNI), “Global security”, “Strategy page” , “Wikipedia” and “Bayonet strength” and “Efour4ever” in the combat lessons learned section. These last two sites cover WWII.

Previously referred to as K.O.O.L.N. (acronym definition, top secret), FLASH REPORTS; I NOW AM TELLING EVERYONE IT STANDS FOR KEITH OEFFINGER'S ORGANIZATION OF LEARNED KNOWLEDGE the joke on me here was I believed Knowledge was spelled with an (N). I was a special education student and did not learn to read until my last year of high school. I have now titled my work “Fragmented Fighting Facts” or “Tri-F”; the name derives from the computer grammar function always alerting me to the fragmented nature of my sentences. This is due to the “just the facts, ma’am” manor the material is written i.e. there has been little if any effort to write in whole sentences or provide context. This is not to say there is no order with Tri-F, in fact there is a theme. I have laid out the information as one might expect a commander or members of a unit to recall it thus utilizing it to conduct a mission.

We start with “Planning”, followed by the section on “Defense”, then there’s “Preparations and conduct of patrols” or “PCP”, and we end with “Conduct of Engagements” or “COE”, i.e. engagements being the term used here for shootouts. Each section of Tri-F consists of numbered “Basic rules”, each basic rule followed by detailed notes that either relate to, explain, or give examples pertaining to the basic rules. As with the general format of Tri-F, each section’s basic rules are laid out as one might need to recall them. This is most obvious in the last section COE starting with basic rule number one, “Flash report”, i.e. actions to take upon contact with the enemy. This sections last basic rule deals with handling POWs.

Keep in mind this is a work in progress; I’m constantly discovering new information to add which in turn still at times requires rearranging things. At the same time, interestingly enough to me, I have not needed to rearrange my original order of the basic rules for quite some time. There are however, two instances where the detailed information fallowing a pair of basic rules became so similar I decided to combine the pair into one basic rule. These two occurrences are noted in footnotes.

Now heed this, out of all the information contained within this work, only an estimated 1% was taught to me while I was serving in the U.S.M.C. Moreover, to put a fine point on it, it’s worth noting I served in Charlie Company, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, i.e. an Infantry unit. Before my discharge (after only a two year cruse), I attended Jungle Warfare School in the northern training area of Okinawa (for two weeks), Mountain Warfare School in Korea (for one week) and Combat Town Camp Pendleton for MOUT training (for one day). I did not take part in any amphibious training nor did I ever go to Twenty Nine Palms for Desert Warfare training. We did ride around in AAVs once at Camp Pendleton. All in all I would say the only things I missed out on were a beach landing (at Coronado I believe) and a little sun burn, due to the fact that those twenty nine palms, I was told in the early eighties were all located at the front gate of that base. Needless to say, the training did not impress me, and I now know it was not going to get any better as some suggested to me at the time, and still others later claimed that I should have just stayed in longer.

With my position on the lack of training, I do wish to make it perfectly clear that I do support the service women and men in the U.S. armed forces. I also believe them to be as brave as any people on earth, (with the exception of the (Y) generation). My concern is in the way the Infantry especially is being mislead and used. I want people to understand my experience and IMO a lot of evidence suggests Uncle Sam intends to use his infantry in ways that does not include training any generation in the art of “traditional Guerilla combat tactics” i.e. as a “Traditional Commando” would be. I am not talking about “SWAT” team “Close quarter” tactics, like the “Stick dynamic entry”. That tactic should be called the “cluster f**k”. Just call that sort of tactic what it is NYPD (Cops T.V. show bad-boys, bad-boys) in Afghanistan.

The problem is that that tactic was developed by police departments to deal with an objective occupied by drugged up party animals, i.e. untrained civilians. The police never use it in a spur of the minute situation. They use it when the house/objective has been under constant surveillance for mouths in some cases and the police know all manner of information about everyone in the house and the structure and neighborhood in general. The cops choose a time when everyone is pasted out from partying the night before and have long lost any weapons (between the cushions or under the bed) they might have had on them as show pieces during the party. The primary reason for the large numbers of police in close proximity is to make sure the gang does not think the raid is a rival gang “brake in” and thus resist in any way. There is lots of yelling too, thus reinforcing the message that no one is trying to be covert, like one would be to get away with a crime.

This brings up an intriguing observation of mine; that being that by the book an assault should be made from the top down, yet the troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere use the Stick dynamic entry and usually enter from the front door, like a SWAT team. However resent high profile raids show the SWAT teams attacking from the top down. Examples you may recall are the raids on the Shinning path group in Peru in 2000 and the Mumbai raid by Indian forces on the Jewish center in 2008. IMO this proves the existence of what I’ll refer to as a “need to know” training policy, being followed by various governments, the purpose being to limit the number of true Commandos that could become tomorrow’s rebels, apposing corrupt governments. One last thing about the Stick, IMO every single time the regular forces unit conducting one of these foolish Stick dynamic entries comes under fire i.e. runs into resistance, the Stick brakes i.e. the whole unit evacuates and awaits some kind of support form tanks, guns, tubes or air. Bottom line IMO the Stick is used as a probing tactic and is meant to be a moral boosting show peace tactic to make the unit feel as if it has taken a hill, which was nothing more than another empty building, that IMO Intel suggested, was the case before the entry was ordered. Recalling the police policy of long periods of surveillance prior to raids.

It also seems to me that in light of the old saying “you can fight a war with bombs and blockades but only boots on the ground can win it” ( IMO, Uncle Sam has now revised that saying, as fallows) “you can win a war with bombs and blockades, but only the infantry can end the war”, farther more IMO Uncle Sam has gone one more step and decided to use private security companies and local i.e. indigenous people for the infantry role. All this fear of true commandos is all very similar to the “Mujahideen” not being allowed by various governments, to return to their homelands i.e. native nations, after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

And as for the U.S. and other Western nations, training foreigners to fight a counter insurgency goes. IMO this training includes nothing more than police procedures i.e. conducting investigations, forensics, searching individuals and buildings to collect evidence and yes serving warrants, if necessary, with those all mighty “stick” tactics. And of course, lots of “new innovative techniques and tactics” involving CAS and IMO (Old) so called high tech equipment the U.S. Military Industrial Congressional Complex wants to clear out of the warehouses.

All in all IMO Uncle Sam has chosen to put just about all his eggs in one advanced technology system, think Star Wars Storm Troopers or Matrix i.e. the Operator or Morpheus trying to guide Neo and others to safety. IMO it looks something like this; (x) unit go to (x) address, kick in front door, use stairs to your right, go south down hallway to (x) door, it is unlocked, interning room go to (x) window looking out window to the north you will see your target running east though the neighbors garden. All this information and the “live” feeds of target and area of operations would be provided by a fleet of satellites as well as Near space assets that are never mentioned by the media as current military assets and of course there’s the robots, UAVs and a flood of other covertly deployed sensors as well as covert eves dropping of any civilian electronic devices in the Area of operations.

Thus in light of these and similar so called “new innovative, techniques and tactics” (notice the media and governments choice of words “techniques and tactics” as if we’re talking Commando training i.e. why not use some modern high tech terms the system is so eager to introduce us all to normally as a matter of routine), IMO Uncle Sam has placed the traditional Guerrilla combat tactics, on the back burner and is hoping they all go the way of other black arts.

This is not just true of the infantry; let us take a peek at aerial combat. Does anyone out there actually think today’s U.S. pilots are turning and burning, pulling high (G) maneuvers trying to hit the entry windows and get inside the bandits turn. Think any pilot has conducted a yo-yo or split S maneuver lately or made the choice between a single or two-circle fight. Now days its all about stealth, ECM and Smart even autonomous weapons, missiles especially BVR tech. IMO this explains why the U.S. Navy is not concerned with not having a front line fighter equal to the USAF F-22 Raptor. An article I recently read on “Strategy page” mentioned a lot of talk about a Navy F/A-18E at an air show, displaying a little F-22 silhouette decal i.e. a simulated Kill credit symbol/icon. IMO the F/A- 18E did not gun down that kill.

And then everyone knows that just about all now and IMO soon all weapons systems including the bayonet well have a chip in it.

So if the electronics ever fail (maybe due to a shift in the axis of earths electromagnetic field, passed a certain point or perhaps a record size solar flare) IMO it well be the masters of the age-old Guerrilla combat tactics i.e. The Fragmented Fighting Facts Basic Rules that survive, keeping in mind “no one wins”.

I also wish, that those who join the various services where told all this up front i.e. “we do not intend to train you as a traditional Commando”.

Another thing I would like everyone to consider is that; what makes a Marine special is not the training she or he receives, no it’s the steel the youth demonstrates when they choose to join the Marines. Even when compared to the Special Forces, who IMO are only specialists in their particular field, once again mostly high tech specialties and whose ranks are filled with older personnel that have already been serving and have graduated from a boot camp i.e. are aware of the hoop and hype hurry up and wait tactics. And who are then usually chosen i.e. coached into changing their MOS. I am aware of the change in recruitment policy after 2001 allowing for direct entry into the S.F. community. IMO a rarity and IMO it is still not the same as just choosing to go to a Marine Corps Recruit Depot from the start.

Furthermore, to those who just well not accept the truth about the lack of training along the lines of traditional Guerrilla combat tactics. I can now say that I have exchanged comments with a number of Iraqi and Afghanistan combat vets. These comments can be found on the internet if you Google up my call sign, Newjarheaddean also spelled with one (D). IMO it is obvious that the tactics I speak of are news to the vets, some have made commits that proves in combat they were just winging it. And no, I don’t believe that all the vets are observing some kind of code of silence on these tactics including the vets who are against the wars. Unless everyone wants to say that YouTube and other internet companies are conspiring to edit all combat footage that shows these tactics being used and that, the vets are staging other videos that show them (albeit with great bravery) as armatures without a clue and winging it. If anyone ever sees video, showing the tactics listed in Tri-F being used, be sure and provide a link with your comment. I once saw a flash of film on CNN showing combat in Lebanon during the 1980s that showed some of these tactics being used by a Guerrilla fighter. I well also say I do believe that UAV footage is edited by the Pentagon to keep the public from seeing the few but well trained Taliban and other Guerrilla fighters that are using these tactics. Alternatively, maybe people think our professional highly trained well-equipped military is unable to defeat 10 – 20 thousand religious extremist amateur thugs in almost a decade of fighting. All the while killing at least by some estimates 100 a mouth including dozens of top commanders.

Let me also say, on the numbers of U.S. PTSD casualties, i.e. IMO, WIA, (And IMO deserving of a Purple Heart). The Government portrays these cases as a result of fighting a war that is “unlike any other war we have fought before” (LOL). Facing an enemy that is fighting in some mysterious and or cowardly manor that simply cannot be countered by military means. I believe the high numbers are a result of US forces fighting in a manner that is suicidal i.e. pointless and counterproductive to the real world situation. Example; you have a young brave American ready to fight for the nation, while on one of these IMO “Russian roulette parades” someone shoots at the unit from some building, everyone scrambles for cover, as some spray and pray, then after determining the location using SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems) sniper detectors, or one of the many similar vehicle mounted systems the commander calls in some sort of CAS, if someone’s brains have been blow out especially if it was an officer or the location is vague, a real “crowd pleaser” maybe used i.e. 2000 pounder.

IMO this is how 90% of engagements (fought by regular infantry units) are resolved. Special Forces are now and in the feature more and more regular infantry well be using the Matrix. And to those that think this is the exception I say show me the number of WIA or KIA (On either side) by small arms fire i.e. during traditional firefights. Even if one includes sniper fire those figures are really low. So IMO after witnessing all the carnage and innocent civilian life being lost and receiving all those looks from the witnesses, it is the American that realizes it is his unit that is not fighting right.

This is reinforced and really sinks in back in the states when the vet is asked to tell the Commando stories that never occurred and thus the vet must tell the truth i.e. give up the Commando reputation, keep it all inside or start lying. If the first option is chosen that unveiling reality is demoralizing and makes it all not worth it. If either one of the other chooses are made IMO the vet becomes the ticking bomb. And I can tell you all that many times, I have recalled being told once that “when you go home keep your mouth shut about the things we did. If you don’t you well be thought of as a liar or crazy and either which way your life well be over”. That First Sergeant was right, but like my daddy use to say, “He’s right but he does not know why he’s right” i.e. IMO the First Sgt. thought of what we did in terms of remarkable heroic feats. However, IMO certainly since the beginning of the Vietnam era, it is the lack of training i.e. the manner in which our service women and men are fighting that keeps this tragedy going.

I would also suggest the vets of today are just like I was 25 or so years ago in the sense that they know there training is lacking, however, they just cannot explain what’s missing. However unlike me they refuse to accept that old fashion “black arts” are the answer i.e. should be the basis of basic training. And I now know the “Black art” tactics they and I should have been trained in and I can now say, “The PFC that told the Corp it was out of step, now has provided the proof”. What surprises me is that most vets it seems don’t care at all about the tactics I speak of and seem to view me as an unpatriotic “party pooper”, when I’m just a U.S. Marine trying to improve the Corps and save lives. Bottom line IMO the infantry needs to consist of unmarried i.e. undistracted, NO CHILDREN, dedicated true professionals, trained in the tactics listed in Tri-F and many more I am sure exist.

And to those that say “chivalry is for the museums” I say “first we must have peace on earth”.

One Newjarheaddean

“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!

Update; 12/19/14 09/53 hours




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Conduct of Engagements section 2013


AHOY,

 Lets see if this works...


Conduct of engagements


1) Flash report:

This is individuals or units checking in with superiors, if things just don’t seem right. Something out of the ordinary happens. At first signs of trouble i.e. spotting the enemy or signs of the enemy and especially if shooting starts. This is so no one gets wiped out without someone knowing something about situation, waiting to hear from you or sending help. A round going by your ear sounds like the largest fastest bumble bee you ever heard. You may feel the puff of the swirl. In jungle thick wet vegetation muffles sound greatly contact up front or with point man may not be heard by entire unit. Hence word well have to be passed back down the line i.e. members well sound off (CONTACT). With gunfire during MOUT, one shot maybe thought of as a backfire, two or three is gunfire. If suppressors are used you might only hear rounds impacting i.e. pops, bings, dings, smacks, cracks, like a can roasting on a bond fire etc. If close, in MOUT you may here ejected casings hitting a surface. Sounding similar to a wind chime, metal for concrete, bamboo for wooden floors. You may also here the action working, sounding like machinery i.e. printing press. I note here the sounds of a fire fight can include all the above, (AT ONCE) along with whooshes, whistles, thumps etc.

(Reference, Over all tips “spotting shooters” at the end of this section)


Pre- attack warning signs: Basically you are looking for the absence of the normal and the presence of the abnormal. Lights being out, lack of activity by locals, especially when no children are playing. Windows opened but blinds, drapes or curtains pulled shut. Things of value left unattended or food cooking. Running over rocks while traveling at high speed in vehicles, thinking it was enemy fire. These pre-attack warning signs could also include…
Post attack signatures: spent castings, bullet holes, impact marks maybe chipped bark on a tree or downed vegetation i.e. branches or leaves, blood, drag marks indicating removal of the WIA or KIA. Disregarded equipment such as covers, gloves, magazines, web gear, medical gear or packaging. Fighting holes i.e. hastily prepared sites or scorch marks on sand bags, ground or walls, this from muzzle flash. Shadows forming long dark streaks in snow along firing lanes, extending out from fighting holes. Ice fogs accrue at minus 20 degrees or below, this is rounds crystallizing water vapor in the air, and forming a contrail like streak along the rounds trajectory. Will remain under still conditions for up to (30) minutes. Contrails from mortar and rocket rounds too. Damage to buildings such as windows, doors or gates. Smell of gun powder or other smoke from grass or structure fires.
Beyond 400 yards flak jacket and helmets make impacts non-fatal or harmless. Interceptor vest cons; Marines don’t know they’ve been hit i.e. fired upon. Impact trauma i.e. damage to surface allowed by test, a maximum of 44mm/2” diameter. Bullet flattened and twisted out of shape, meaning it has been ricocheted off of something.

Immediate action: with first shots unit leader dose a row call, inquires about injuries with in the unit. Ideally, he would just receive this info without having to inquire about it. You could use alphabetical order within unit. British using T-1 thru 3 i.e. levels of seriousness with WIA, T - 4 is a KIA. Depending on the foe’s range for one thing, IMO it would be best to make the most of, sign language i.e. hand signals to keep from revealing numbers and everyone’s locations to the foe. This would require word being passed along by others as everyone might not be visible to unit leader. Thus terrain, darkness or other visual difficulties may require sounding off with information especially “medical request” i.e. with urgency for care. Leader should check with support i.e. CAS assets too.

Any Marine who has seen the enemy, reports information simply as (who) including numbers of persons and weapons or equipment observed at a minimum. Examples; one person maybe described in the fallowing way, start by height “6 foot, 180 lbs, fallowed by hair and eyes if noted. Ideally, you maybe able to compare the subject to a well known actor or actress only needing to add short/tall or fat/thin version. Red on blue, pistol in right hand, flash light left hand. Meaning that the one you saw is about 6 foot tall, 180 lbs, etc wearing a red blouse and blue trousers etc. If you see a group, you might say four, fallowed by as many individual descriptions as you can note in the above mentioned manor. (What) running, taking up position. In addition, (where) reference i.e. east side of building or cardinal i.e. south of unit, clock face i.e. two o’clock, degrees/mills, it also maybe necessary to give range etc. Here when, why, and how are for the politicians to decide (LOL) i.e. IMO not necessary to use or define here.

Note w/immediate action as for Identifying the Foe, conceder using Stump/Branch/Stick and Mud/Dirt/Sand i.e. the Stump/short and heavy, branch/tall and thick or lean and mean or Stick/skinny or thin, in the Mud/dark, blacks. Dirt/tan, Mexicans etc. And sand/whites, northerner etc.

MCG April 2011, Ideas and issues (C2) The Ground Commander and the COC cmbt opr. Ctr. By 1st Lt. Adam J. Franco

Reporting can be a Units critical vulnerability or center of gravity (COG). Every Marine needs to understand the basics of “you, this is me” reporting. (SALTA) report i.e. size, activity enemy, location, time, activity friendly aka a call for fire.” IMO just SALT, i.e. (A) should be combined. Thus starting your battle drill/immediate action as well as your higher ups, which will include pulling in key leaders from the fire support team (FiST) and other units for support. 

Giving a rough direction and distance or basic ADDRAC (alert, direction, description, range, assignment, control) with unit leader obtaining a defense, advanced, GPS, receiver (DAGR) grid vice a cardinal direction and rough distance.

Evaluate the enemy i.e. observe, orient, decide, act. IMO maybe the five Ws and the H, would be better i.e. who, what, where, when, why and how.

SALTA Report example;

S) Size of the enemy. Number of elements and number of fighters in each element is important. One element with a few fighters may be a recon unit not a deliberate attack, enemy maybe attempting to harass or bait you into an ambush. With multiple elements and multiple fighters in each, it could be a deliberate attack.


A) Activity of the enemy.  The enemy’s movements are key to their overall plan. If the enemy is becoming decisively engaged using multiple elements, with multiple fighters in each, taking up firing positions, establishing a base of fire, and attempting to out flank, it is a deliberate attack i.e. enemy may have planned, prepared and coordinated. If the enemy is static or has fired a few shots and then egressed, that’s harassment or probing or an attempt to bait or a diversion.

note


Newjarheaddean; I find the term egressing, interesting due to the fact I’ve been planning on introducing some tactics and terms to Tri-F that I found mentioned by Vietnam pilots. Meanly switching channels on the egress i.e. after the attack on the objective. This would be in the Planning section, Step #3, Part D, Patrol order, shackle sheet notes.

What type of fire are you taking? Four types of small arms fire, and what they can mean. Note the order here is most important to least.


Detail analysis;
Sustained effective fire; effective i.e. preventing unit’s ability to maneuver and or return fire. Can mean the enemy has a plan and is attacking with numerous skilled fighters and or are already at close range.  When the fire is sustained, the ground commander and COC need to utilize supporting arms/ indirect fires, organic or otherwise i.e. Armor, mortars, CAS, or artillery. 
Sporadic effective fire; Enemy is engaging every few minutes with a few bursts or single shots. Affecting your unit’s ability to maneuver etc. The enemy might be at close range. Has a purpose, might be taking out equipment like antennas, tires, windshields, lights, sandbags thus weakening fighting holes thus showing skill. Or the enemy is trying to bait or probe i.e. wants to see your tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
Sustained ineffective fire; This type of fire will mostly come from inexperienced fighters, who lack fire discipline, training or the enemy is at long range, perhaps lacking estimate skills. Enemy may not be aiming but rather making noise thus it could be a diversion an attempt to keep unit from observing something.  It can again be baiting, probing or harassment. Although this would be costly i.e. wasteful for those tactics.  
Sporadic ineffective fire; enemy engaging every few minutes with a few bursts or single shots. The effects of the fire are not deterring the unit from maneuvering or returning fire. The enemy could be baiting, monitoring your TTP, harassing unit, such as disrupting taps or it simply could mean the enemy is at long range or not good shots.


What type of weapons system? Knowing the different types of weapons systems and their effective ranges will aid in locating the enemy and determine what type of force you are up against. Everyone utilizes Russian-style small arms, but different weapons mean different things. Many times in Marjah a light machinegun and AK–47s would engage us. This was standard for small ambushes or harassing fire. When we received a rocket propelled grenade shot or started receiving mortar impacts, we immediately knew it was a more deliberate attack. Newjarheaddean; here with say a PK or AK they use the same round right, so it would be the burst or accuracy that may I.D. a difference right? Because impact analysis of each round is going to show same damage.

Abbreviated version;
Sustained effective; the attack is on. Sporadic effective; engaging with purpose, close range and or skilled.
Sporadic ineffective; enemy could be baiting, monitoring TTP, harassing, lacks skill, or at long range. Sustained ineffective; mostly from inexperienced fighters, making noise, sustained rate equals lack of discipline, ineffective range they are trying to engage at or lack of training. In the COC, all this info, helps determine if a unit in contact situation needs to be declared and if a QRF is needed.

L) Location.

Friendly position should already be sent to higher at the initial contact; Newjarheaddean; if COC does not have their Blueforce Tracker data something’s wrong. If it has changed it can be corrected here.
Enemy position should be passed in one of the following ways: Mills and a distance using a VECTOR 21 laser range finder in conjuncture with DAGR Defense Advanced GPS receiver or compass. Guided reference graphic location, IMO this is a picture of a FOR i.e. feature of recognition aka way points. (not for targeting, but this allows the FiST to obtain an accurate precision strike suite for SOFs grid). The best means is a guided reference graphic talk-on. A VECTOR DAGR direction and distance or grid.
precision strike suite for SOFs, the acronym PSS SOF is pronounced, Piss off.

A soldier using PSS-SOF employs the Global Positioning System to find his own location. Then he takes a laser and lases to a target, so he can see the target on grid coordinates and also on a map. PSS-SOF then draws on three-dimensional imagery from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency so the soldier can see whether the target he’s about to shoot is correct. If the location is wrong, that soldier can drag and drop an icon on his computer screen to the correct location so that a precise munition can be called to fire at the target, Ralston said.
“this is not mensurated targeting, it is near-mensurated. But it is close enough that it will get you ‘precise’ targeting,” defined as targeting the right spot within 10 meters. Because it depends on stock imagery that is not updated, the system can’t be used for mobile targets, like tanks.

The recently fielded GMLRS provides greater precision with a smaller bang than Air Force firepower, Ralston said, because it fires a 200-pound warhead as opposed to dropping a 500-pound bomb.
Excalibur, an even smaller munition at 50 pounds, is even better for urban fighting, because it drops nearly vertically over its target, he said.

T) Time. When contact was initiated and the date time group.

Note an abreveated verson I found earlier.
SALTA (enemy situation (including size and equipment), enemy activity, location, time, friendly action) report.
S: Two to four men with small arms.
A: Explosion, either a bomb or a rocket propelled grenade, 15 meters to the north. AK fire on our rear.
L: Give grid or building number.
T: Time now.
A: Possible two wounded in action. Conducting triage and find, fix, flank source of AK fire. Stand by for medevac


Note I may have already moved this info i.e. combined it with activity above. A) Activity of friendlies. This is not your game plan just a quick assessment. Do you have positive identification? Are you returning fire? Can you maneuver? This gives the COC and higher headquarters a quick snapshot of what you are doing. You can look at this as the wave tops of your plan.
Clear site picture of what is going on. For example, “I am going to use my overwatch element in Compound 7 CE4 Sector to suppress the enemy fire team in the tree line as my satellite element maneuvers west 200 meters to a north/south running tree line to close on the enemy. I will contact you when my element begins maneuvering north in the tree line.” This kind of communication lets the COC know who is doing what, how you plan to maneuver, and when you will call them with your next update. This type of positive control of communications allows the unit leader to fight his element.

IMO; again, here I do not have a clear sight picture, this is wrong, the COC should just be monitoring, so Co does not have to repeat or waist time. IMO NO Satellite term should be used, to confusing with modern assets.


Attack commands; aka, Fire Commands, the British term is Quick battle orders (QBO). There are three parts with sub sections as fallows. Part one, Designation; (Who) example rifleman, Grenadier. Part two, Description; (What) describes target or action to be taken by unit member i.e. rush, followed by (Where) location again expressed as cardinal, clock face i.e. two o’clock or in degrees/mills fallowed by the range. In open areas True north is always considered 12 O’clock or (0) zero degrees, in a MOUT situation, grid north i.e. street layout should be used. Note with action to be taken, Example; rushes direction and range would be to the next desired location. Part three, Orders; (How) i.e. with automatic, semi and or with what type of ammo, HE, AP, tracers or fuse setting. Keep in mind that if Mark-19 rounds are striking a target, which other weapons could engage and take out, something is wrong. Mark-19 ammunition is heavy and should not be used when other weapons can do the same job. Also if you can knife them instead of shooting. Continuing with Part three, Orders next comes (When) i.e. on my command or fire/loose at well, “Ignis ubi paratus/fire when ready” etc. Again, Sign language/hand signals can be used if foe is at close range. This is also necessary when working with foreign troops. Whenever passing word IMO due so loud, clear and once, i.e. repeated at proper intervals only. In other words if you barely heard it chances are the next Marine did not hear it, or if the Marine beyond you is not observed or heard passing the word. Where’s the (Why)? (LOL) you are just to do or die, i.e. IMO there is no need to use or define why here.


(Reference, Defensive section rule # 7 Decide on signals)


Here we can add our calling for CAS and other support procedures. See Location above.

Encounter engagement;

Not all battles are straightforward situations of attacker versus defender.  At times, units encounter each other in the advance. Unlike running into a rearguard, which is protecting a retreating unit, an encounter engagement differs in that neither side is fully aware of the scale of the forces they are facing. This is because the enemy has probably not yet presented the greater part of its forces. At the Battalion level, the advance would be conducted with a single Rifle Company in the vanguard. The remainder of the Battalion would follow either in column or arrowhead formation. The latter was more likely as the Battalion approached areas they were uncertain of, as the Rifle Companies could deploy much quicker. Such encounters were as much about maneuvers as they were firepower. The action would begin at the lowest level, likely two groups of scouts running into one another. From there, the vanguard would deploy, seeking to outflank the enemy. What differentiates an encounter engagement is that, rather than attempting to defend their line or fall back slightly, the enemy often well be doing the same thing i.e. trying to outflank. Thus, the frontline well be fluid, as it has yet to be delineated. Such engagements can quickly develop into a general engagement as more units are fed in, with units searching for an open flank to exploit. Senior commanders could also be tempted by the possibility of ‘rolling up’ the enemy line before they can establish a defensive position. If one moved quickly, there was the chance of cutting off the enemy’s vanguard from its main force, but in so doing units were exposed to a similar fate. Equally, this opportunity could be lost if one opted for caution. The key to this decision rested on accurate intelligence. As well as the proximity and likelihood of reinforcements. 

Note; IMO on a Fire Team or Squad level it would always be best to be initially very aggressive with in a given area depending on terrain. That is to say, around the perimeter or within a single building with MOUT, or several hundred feet i.e. foot ball field size area in semi open terrain i.e. street side or brush country, however jungle terrain usually confines units to very small areas for maneuvering, and success depends more on your initial formation and immediate overwhelming firepower. 

2) Approach and pursue with care:

With wounded or apparently dead friendly what ever got him, sniper or booby trap, might get you. Snipers are usually limited to a narrow field of view and may not be able to readily differentiate between friendly and enemy forces. With booby-trap there maybe more than one. Body itself might be rigged. With foe all the above applies plus foe could be faking injury. Also, show caution when being hailed/called to locations. Don’t allow yourself to be led anywhere. With someone hailing i.e. calling you, modern equipment such as personal communication gear, cameras, video headsets etc. should limit reasons for one member needing another’s presents in the first place. However just because video shows no threat dose not mean there is not one. Approaching from other than the expected direction or entrance would help, use challenge and pass word system for blind corners or rooms etc. It is also wise to wait before approaching vehicles if you cannot positively I.D. anyone driving. Also show caution when being hailed to a vehicle, even if you can see a friend driving etc. your friend could be a hostage. Also with vehicles that are on fire, flammable cargo such as ammo may start to cook off. With pursuits, do not closely pursue individuals or units, you never know when the foe will stop and ambush or booby trap the path. Maybe just a few Dead Enders, unwilling or unable to retreat due to injury. You should pursue along parallel path. The key point is speed, over take and cut them off at the pass.

(Reference, PCP rule # 3, “snipers can be used” as well as COE rule # 3 below)

3) Attack or retreat in shifts:

This is covering each other during attacks or retreats i.e. during advancing or withdrawal rushes/movements and you should take special care in exposed places i.e. crossing open spaces, avenues or around blind corners. Attacking or retreating in shifts can also be done vertically i.e. from different floors. Teams can cover each other from different buildings. Historically horses i.e. cavalry units have been used to lead charges and cover retreats. When bounding with individuals, units or vehicles, those providing cover fire should be halted, making accurate fire of a half mile to one mile ranges possible. It is always best if the one providing cover is concealed too i.e. unseen no movement, remaining motionless until the one being covered is ready to provide cover. It maybe advantages at times to avoid even numbers with groups. For example an individual covering a fireteam or fireteam covering a platoon. Three methods: movement by successive bounds, this is leap froging to each others position. Take care to avoid bunching up in large groups. Movement by alternate bonds, this is leap froging pass one another’s positions. Note that, point man commonly moves to fast or far breaking formation (if you well). Three man filer buster method, the method starts with a three man unit in a (V) formation. It involved each Marine at some point becoming the so-called middleman (i.e. next to advance) and who advances between the other two Marines. This method provides a unique option, that being that a team could use it in a defensive stand, with the team leader remaining stationary i.e. becoming the center if you well at the base of the (V) while the other two took turns rushing between the leader and there fellow maneuvering Marine as they rotated around the team leader, thus shifting locations and providing fire in what ever direction the leader directed. At night especially, this would give the foe, an impression the unit was larger than just three. In general, the filer buster method also provided for maximum flexibility for units to change directions i.e. move and fight in any direction needed.
In principle the responsibilities of all Marines providing cover and with the filibuster method the two stationary Marines, are to assist the maneuvering middle man by placing well aimed shots on foe (i.e. shooting the foe) this distracts and keeps foe from being able to keep tabs on the maneuvering middleman and causes foe’s fire to be ineffective and or to seize. In addition, they keep tabs on foe, feed information to the middleman about foe. With filer buster method, the Marine located at the stern should initiate cover fire, ideally only a three round burst. This is due to the fact that middleman i.e. rusher well be quickly crossing the stream of cover fire.
With all methods of bounding Marines providing cover may chose to sound off “Move, or some other verbal” to indicate they are prepared to provide cover. This maybe the case in particular before the shooting starts. However ideally before shooting starts especially if foe is unaware of your units approach, hand signals, i.e. maybe a twisting of the rifle from horizontal to the upright should be used. IMO normally under fire most likely it well be the volume, location i.e. direction and perhaps slightly different sound of the weapon providing the cover fire that clues you in to the times to move i.e. rush. If your not shooting you should be, doing a tactical reload (i.e. loading even through your not completely out, IMO switch to full magazine and top off old magazine after placing it back in pouch) this is coupled with a 360 check, and or communicating with others or moving. You choose the method of bounding based on the amount of cover and concealment available in the area and the volume of fire you are under. If your group is under heavy fire, with lots of cover in area, there is less need for always alternating who moves next.
The methods of fire and movement described above have a drawback in the application. Depending upon the distance to be covered, the need to swap fire positions to maintain cover also slows the advance. Making rushes as long as possible can help, however the longer the assault takes, and with any lessening of cover fire, the greater the chance for the foe to target the attackers. An alternative is marching fire i.e. the Squad advancing as a single entity. All arms are brought to bear on the enemy during the advance. The key to success is in overwhelming supporting fire delivered from artillery, mortars, machine guns and ideally accompanying tanks. There is no subtlety involved whatsoever. The advantage is speed, using such shock action, a line of riflemen can advance quickly to the enemy line and move into the close combat i.e. Assault phase and when pressed resolutely it can be astoundingly successful.  
Even in very open terrain the well-trained rifleman will be able to locate and use all kinds of limited cover, such as slight depressions or rises. You can low crawl sometimes under cover fire right up to foe’s position. In snow you maybe able to crouch on to skies and slide or be pulled into positions. However, in very open areas, an advance will usually necessitate overwhelming fire superiority with consequent longer bounds between firing positions.

(Reference, STEP # 2, Leadership guidelines, Light machine gun group. And COE overall tips; Machine gun sections.) 


Unit estimated capabilities (i.e. speed and ranges obtainable). Comparative information to consider, (Olympic athletes 60 meter run 7 seconds. 100 meters 9.85 seconds. 200 meters 19.85 seconds. Also, various altitudes would affect performance). As a rule of thumb for Marines conducting alternate bounding cycles, with a column lateral movement, Marines humping 25- 50 lbs of combat kit, executing zigzags and momentary stops and or drops. 150’/50 m rushes in 20 seconds would be well within their capabilities. To continue, with a six man fire team, 50’ intervals, divided into two sections of three moving in pairs (i.e. pairs being last Marine from each section) cycle starts with rushers advancing 50’ past respective point man for a total rush of 150’/50m. Thus 40 seconds between individual rushes, 1 minute between cycles for each section. Thus 60 cycles per hour for a max of one hour. Thus 60 x 150’ = 9000’ exactly or about one and three quarters of a mile (9240’) an hour on average. Note if individuals rushed the entire length of the six-man fire team they would have to do 300’ rushes, taking up to a minute with 6-minute cycles, 10 cycles per hour 10 x 300’ equals 3000’ per hour. Note IMO with the last method the individual would be in motion far to long for secure movement however, the one advantage is more cover fire is at the ready. Therefore, if a unit was under heavy fire and the goal was to place one Marine in a specific location this would be the preferred method.  

With sections of three Marines each rushing as groups, each section member rushes 300’/100m or yards, in 30 seconds. 30 seconds between section rushes one minute cycles. Thus 60 cycles per hour for a maximum of one hour.  Thus 60 x 300’ = 18000’ (3.4 miles exact) or 3 and a half miles 18480 feet. 
More comparative information with unit runs female Olympic runners are doing 5kms i.e. 3miles in 15 minutes. Thus, IMO combat troops humping 25 lbs of kit 18 minutes would be well within their capabilities.
Note work figures for successive bounds of pairs or sections.   
Indian running units, vehicles or ships.
Firefighters said to be capable of climbing an average of 25 flights of stairs an hour. IMO the weight of equipment between firefighters and Marines would be about the same.

On “war cries”, one should not sound off until combatants have joined in combat. Sounding off too early, can be considered a sign of arrogance or cowardice. The effect is grater when foe is hearing cry, at the same time they are meeting weapons.
Note again on this GO, GO, GO, GO, we here the Mainers and troops barking out as they exit or enter things. This not only lets all foes in the area know precisely when your exiting or interring, it IMO distracts and hinders the hearing abilities of those in your unit. IMO its just hoop and hype Bull Shit cheerleading. I wound just prefer to here a single “Due it” i.e. the old D.I. command that is instilled in all Marines during boot camp (this being the execution command fallowing any detailed instructions). It should carry over to the FMF and there be reinforced.  

A fire team is the basic element of the GCE. It consists of four Marines: three riflemen and a team leader, typically a Corporal or Lance Corporal.
The USMC summarizes its fireteam organization with the mnemonic "ready-team-fire-assist", the following being the arrangement of the fireteam when in a column:
Rifleman: acts as a scout; "Ready".
Team Leader (M203): also works as the grenadier; "Team".
Automatic Rifleman (currently M249 SAW or M27 IAR, formerly BAR): also serves as second in command for the fireteam; "Fire".
Assistant Automatic Rifleman: carries extra ammunition; "Assist".

The fireteam is organized around the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon and now there is also the M-27 Infantry Automatic rifle I. A. R. Upon receiving fire, the fireteam can organize in a methodical way to engage the enemy with fireteam "rushes". Fireteam rushes are movement by one part of the team during cover by fire by the other part of the team. Generally, first the Rifleman and Team Leader will move ahead, being covered by the Automatic and Assistant Automatic Riflemen, then the Automatic and Assistant Automatic Riflemen will move up to the Rifleman and Team Leader, being covered by the Rifleman and Team Leader. The process is repeated until no forward progress is possible without serious risk to the entire fireteam. When finally upon the objective, the fireteam assumes a "hasty 180", where the Automatic Rifleman covers 11 o'clock to 1 o'clock (12 o'clock being the most likely avenue of enemy approach), with the Rifleman and Assistant Automatic Rifleman covering 9 to 11 and 1 to 3 respectively. The Team Leader is next to the Automatic Rifleman to complement his fire with grenade rounds and to assign targets for the M249. Once a frontal enemy counterattack is deemed unlikely, the fireteam then will assume a "consolidated 360" to ensure the flanks of the fireteam are protected. The position of Marines in the fireteam is sometimes called RTFA (Ready - Team - Fire - Assist) because of one of the fireteam formations that are possible.


Maneuvers and Formations;

At this point I would like to suggest everyone recall the General phases of an attack; one the approach, two contact, three the assault and four consolidation.

Maneuvers: Single envelopment – advantages, element of surprise is usually possible. Choose the ground you fight on. Causes enemy to fight in two directions. Generally effects foe’s moral vs. a frontal attack. Should not be used at night. Maneuver element two thirds of unit’s total strength. Uses fire and maneuver until fire and movement becomes necessary. Note; fire and maneuver involves units or groups moving. Fire and movement is individual Marines or vehicles  moving. Base element one third of unit’s total strength. Assist maneuver element in the same manor as mentioned under responsibilities of Marines providing cover fire in successive, alternate or filer buster methods.
Double envelopment – one form of a double envelopment is a pincer, note; over all the units movements could be simultaneous or alternating i.e. one element for holding/placing fire on target or used as a decoy.

Formations:

Column – Purpose; for traveling long distances. Make time. Difficult for foe to count your unit quickly. Keep injuries down. Put large unit through small narrow passages. Down hill movement, deep snow may also dictate the use of a line formation when it would not be considered suitable on level ground. Pros; strong flanks, good control and communication. Cons; weak point and stern. Slow in reacting laterally (i.e. to the bow or stern).

During WWII, a typical formation was lead by the Squad Leader. Behind him came the Gun Group, ready to provide quick supporting fire. The riflemen followed the gun team, with the Assistant Leader bringing up the rear in the German and American model to close up the formation. British and Russian variations placed him with the Gun Group. This column formation was favored during the advance to the combat zone. It was not a fighting formation, merely a traveling one. In those areas where it was uncertain precisely at what point the Squad could expect to encounter resistance, one or two men would go forward as scouts. The US Squad routinely placed two men on point for a column in front of the Leader. Prior to combat, or after coming under unexpected fire, the Squad would deploy. The riflemen would form a skirmish line, either centered around the light machine gun, or flanking it on one or the other side, depending upon the favored doctrine. To reduce vulnerability to enemy fire, this skirmish line would spread out, leaving some 3 to 5 meters between each man. In reality, movement was more dictated by terrain, conditions and enemy action. Men learned to break up the intervals between units or individuals, as well as to avoid bunching up. IMO thus keeping the foe from being able to guess location of another man based on knowing location of one in the formation. This (bunching up i.e. cluster fuck) was a cardinal sin, as to submit to the temptation of sticking close to, a friend in front meant a far greater chance of both falling victim to a single shell or machine gun burst. Men would always seek to advance under cover of trees, hedges, walls, defiles, streams, natural depressions, anything that would place a barrier between them and the enemy's line of sight. However, the ground was not always kind, and at some point would come a tract of land with no discernable cover. Only the most charitable or incompetent of enemies would fail to cover that tract with fire. Negotiating passage over ground under fire called for speed and suppression, but how was the infantryman to quell the barrage of distant artillery? Unless his own guns were mounting counter battery fire, the only solution was to wait for a pause and then rush forward.

(Reference, COE, rule # 5 and PCP rule # 11)


Echelon – Purpose; protect flanks. Probing foe lines. Pros; difficult for foe to tell your direction of travel. Difficult for foe to out flank. Cons; slow moving. Difficult to control. Odd fields of fire.
Wedge- Purpose; foe presents expected, location unknown. When in dense terrain or during bad weather, and at night. Pros; maximum separation with in minimum area. All around good fire. Good control and communication. Quick reacting. Cons; complacency and working closely with other units. A pincer is commonly used to counters a wedge.

With a three Squad Platoon, there were three offensive formations that could be used. Known by many names, but perhaps the most descriptive would be arrowhead, V shape, and line. 

Arrowhead or narrow wedge (a reverse V shaped see fig below with command unit in center) formation, with scout unit up front other squads trailing in echelons. Formation had the advantage that it kept the bulk of the Platoon from direct contact with the enemy during the initial stage. On encountering resistance, the lead Squad would shift to a fire role, pinning the enemy.
Arrowhead shaped like inverted (V) with a stick out the top. Machine Gun group/team on flank enemy expected or known to be on. It is a maneuver unit formation. Used when enemy location known. Fire team on opposite side as flanking unit.
Spearhead machine gun group/team is centered up front. Purpose as line breaker. Pros; good for machine gun team vs. fire team.
True V formation; It mimicked the arrowhead but inverted the deployment of the Squads. Now, the advance was carried by two Squads moving in parallel i.e. two squads up front. The third Squad was held back in support, while Platoon Headquarters again occupied the centre. This reversal placed the greater part of the Platoon in direct line with the enemy, it also increased the weight of fire the Commander could bring to bear against the foe. The leading Squads would cover each other using fire and movement. The third Squad was held back in reserve, or used to provide additional over watching fire. The drawback was that the only way to achieve numerical superiority in the assault phase was to throw in the third Squad, or better still use it to cover the final assault of the other two. It was a slow and deliberate advance, unsuited to a fast moving assault. It was of great benefit against a true defense in depth, where there were several lines to be breached. There was also a problem though, in that as the bulk of the company was in the leading echelon, once battle was joined it had a tendency to become engaged in the firefight i.e. if two squads, platoons or companies became pinned down by effective enemy fire, they were robbed of their ability to maneuver. There was a school of thought which reckoned units should be presented more like an iceberg, in that the majority of its strength was kept uncommitted, until the true dispositions of the defender had been revealed. A single fire team/squad/platoon/company/battalion advance kept the greater part of the over all unit under control this helped to counter the defense in depth. The Commander could now decide how to develop the attack with a far more capable reserve. The drawback was the obvious reduction in the frontage of the unit involved. IMO making it possible that two units on patrol may discover one another only after the units where near or on each other’s flanks. Leading with just a single unit i.e. fire team, squad, platoon, company, or battalion, meant now instead of the unit’s effort being dissipated across a two unit frontage, the Commander could utilize all of his available firepower to support the efforts of his single main effort unit. As a result, they had far greater potential to win the firefight, and quickly close with the enemy. The second unit would follow hard on the heels of the first, ready to exploit the breakthrough and move through the lead unit to continue the advance. The third unit would then follow in their wake to repeat the process. If the second unit had to pitch in to help the first secure the breached point, the third would still be available for the exploitation phase. By choosing to concentrate on breaching a single point, the key to success shifted to how quickly they could exploit the breach i.e. pour troops through the breach to compromise the foe’s line across a far greater length than they had actually engaged it on.

(Reference, all locations discussing “Reserves” starting with Step # 2 leadership guidelines, Company Cmdr “The Reserves”)

 Skirmishes- Purpose; for attack, mob up, or search. Pros; natural for fire and maneuver or movement. Max fire to front/bow and stern. Cons; bad control, weak flanks.
Line; each squad formed itself into a skirmish line; the instruction that the line should only be formed if the squad, platoon etc was caught by surprise seems somewhat vague. IMO by doing so if you catch i.e. happen to end up with the enemy on one side of your line that makes maxing your fire on them easy. If the enemy ends up on one end i.e. stern or bow, your unit can move away i.e. exit area quicker and easier.   

Phalanxes – defined as closed ranks of heavily armed infantry. 

Note: Equipment on port side of troops, and hence units on the port side, are traditionally considered weaker. Troops traditionally hampered by shields etc. Port side unit’s also defensive side, starboard side, offensive side. Your offensive units advanced obliquely on foes port units. Traditional term Seventh formation used when natural obstacle such as a lake, river, ocean, mountain, was available to cover one flank.

(Reference Step # 2 in planning, Leadership Guidelines, Squad leaders onward especially Company cmdr. “The Reserves”)

(Reference, PCP rule # 3, “snipers can be used”)

4) Zigzag:

On rushes, from the prone, lead leg brought forward, arms are kept in close to the body, with one movement spring up. Zig zaging, is darting to port and starboard when rushing. Mix it up, avoid patterns. Start your first zig or zag on your fifth stride then from that point decrease to every third. This is all based on time it takes unsuspecting foe to spot you, aim and squeeze off well aimed shot, 3-5 seconds. Foe and you are at your slowest at beginning and end of rushes or dashes. Overall, lateral or diagonal movement i.e. drifting is always best, even while just walking on patrol.

5) Roll when you drop:

To keep observer from being able to estimate your location from point you were last seen. Example: when you approach wooden fences or walls foe might be observing from high point or with tall grass when you drop down into it. From time to time you should drop down a little to one side of your cover, just after or just before it and roll or crawl to desired point. Right after cover helps you maintain speed, just before surprises foe. From stationary point drop strait down and kick legs out behind you. Support yourself with butt of rifle. Do not drop or fall forward. Split multiple objects of cover when not under fire.

(Reference, COE rule # 3 Formations “men learned”. PCP rule # 11)

6) Lay limbs in:

To minimize profile and keep elbows and toes from catching grazing rounds. Lay with legs crossed at ankles, this also makes for quicker rolling. You should remain motionless prior to preparing to move to another point. Playing possum i.e. faking death after ground near your position peppered. In general stay low, standing troops more likely to be thought of as a threat i.e. shot first, lying in the prone you look more like KIA, this when enemy runs upon your position. Also laying amongst Gear on the deck will look like another Marine i.e. bed roll and other items sticking out of pack look like limbs. 
You will have more difficulty using weapons in the prone with larger magazines. Break up the regular lines of your skies by throwing snow over them.

7) Don’t look, shoot, run or expose:

You don’t look, shoot or run from same side of cover and concealment you approach. Look from one side shoot from another. Right handed shooters tend to shoot from right side. You should alternate hand you carry weapon in and side you intend to shoot from. Shoot from shoulder that best allows you to stay behind cover. You don’t expose weapons or body parts from windows, doorways, corners, over hangs or objects of cover and concealment. This tells foe what you’re aiming at, how many you are and where you is. Best to observe or fire, under, around or even though cover and or concealment and over, as a last resort. Best to shoot low through walls, rather than high. With windows and doors it is best to stay low as possible when shooting threw. Avoid passing in front of them. Watch out for ground level basement types. With corners, view around them at ground level and or at a distance. Never stand to fire around corners. This exposes entire body to fire and at expected height. With two Marines, use over and under i.e. one high one low for providing cover and or just observing. High Marine should scan i.e. observe low, low Marine scans high. This can fool Foes on rooftops that will tend to think standing/high Marine should be covering them. In general (not if you are personally under fire) when peaking over or around cover or concealment i.e. if you must expose body/head do so in a slow deliberate manner. Avoid abrupt movements. Always make note of possible cover and concealment in your immediate area. Analysis according to escape plan, protection and observation properties. Select next (if not next two) positions, before leaving old one. Move from one well concealed position to the next using all cover and concealment available between them.

(Reference, COE, Armor, “The factors of cover”)

8) Use support, lean in:

Always use support lean on walls, trees, rocks, vehicles, and equipment, packs, bub’s shoulder or back. Do not place barrel or muzzle directly on support, this slows recovery and rapid shifting of aiming point. The ground is your number one means of support. In the prone visibility will be limited by vegetation and irregularities in ground and dust kicked up by muzzle blast. Lay behind piles of rubble not on them. Things may give way as you are firing. With prone in winter skies and ski poles can be placed out in front of you and laid back at an angle over one shoulder. Or placed parallel with and on knoll supporting elbows or weapons. With bipods, a strip of cloth can be tied to base of each leg, forming triangle across bottom to prevent sinking. Also legs placed on snow shoes. Setting is best for sloping surfaces i.e. river banks, roof tops and hill sides. Knelling, with high knell, initially the toe of forward foot is pointed in the direction of the target. Movement can be steadied by adjusting forward toe inward. Elbows of forward arm kept just inside forward knee. Standing, under winter conditions ski poles can be held together i.e. crossed at handles and placed out in front. Two rifles especially with bayonets fixed can be held together i.e. crossed for aircraft or other high angle shots. If no support available lean in direction of target with 2/3 weight on forward foot.
Steady Position; elements are as follows. Support; if it is not available, then the bones, not the muscles, in the shooter’s upper body must support the rifle. Using the bones allows one to relax and settle into position. Using muscles as support causes movement as muscles fatigue. Prone position to assume correctly, stand facing the target with the left hand well forward along the hand guard and the right hand grasping the stock at the heel of the butt. Feet spread comfortably apart, drop to your knees, grounding the toe of the rifle butt well forward on a line between the right knee and the target. Roll down on your left side, placing the left elbow well forward on the same line. Use your right hand to force the butt of the rifle into the pocket of the firing shoulder. This reduces the effect of recoil. Grip the small of the stock or pistol grip with the right hand, and lower your right i.e. firing elbow to the ground so that your shoulders remain level, this balance is very important. Avoid canting the rifle to one side as well. Non-firing Elbow; is positioned under the rifle for stability. The firing hand grasps the pistol grip so it fits the V or web formed by the thumb and forefinger. A slight rearward pressure is now exerted by the fingers gripping the small of stock or pistol grip to ensure that the butt of the stock remains in the pocket of the shoulder. The grip of the non-firing hand is light.
Natural Point of Aim. (NPA) when first assuming a position, point rifle in the general direction of the target. Then adjust body so rifle and sights aligned naturally on the target, to bring the rifle and sights exactly in line with the desired point of aiming. When correct body-rifle-target alignment is achieved, the front sight post well remain on target, without using muscular effort i.e. when you are relaxed.
When taking a breath, the crosshairs should move straight down through the centre of the target along 12 and 6 o'clock. If the crosshairs move down at an angle, your elbow is not properly supporting the barrel. Or your shoulders are not level.
As the rifle fires, muscles tend to flex i.e. tense, causing front sight movement away from the target toward the natural point of aim. Adjusting this point to the desired point of aim eliminates this movement. When the Marine expects multiple target exposures or is assigned a sector i.e. field of fire, as with moving targets at various ranges or elevations, the Marine adjusts his NPA to the center of the expected target exposure area (i.e. center of his field of fire). Farther more the non-firing elbow should remain free from support.

Analyzing shot group; the shooter may not notice errors during firing, but errors become apparent when analyzing a group. If group tends to be low and right; left hand is not positioned properly. Right elbow maybe slipping. With right-handed shooter, you may be using improper trigger control. If group strung up and down; you are breathing while firing.

Compact group out of the target; incorrect zero. Bad natural point of aim. Scope shadow. Group center of target at bottom; scope shadow. Horizontal group across the target; scope shadow, or bad natural point of aim.
Group scattered about the target; incorrect eye relief or sight picture i.e. ensure your constant stock weld. Check if weapon is canted. You maybe concentrating on the target and not the front sight post. Good group but with several erratic shots; Flinching or stock weld changed.

Using short burst and bipod equipped a 5.56 or 7.62 at 300 m can achieve 80 % accuracy, at 400 m 75% to 70% respectfully, 600m 60% to 50%. With the 5.56 mm, it is capable of 6-inch groups at 100 yards i.e. 300 feet and peppers area at 1km. The 7.62 mm is capable of 6-inch groups at 1320 feet. Shooting single shot, the 7.62 mm is capable of accurate fire within one-foot circle at 880 yards or 2640 feet and peppers area at 2km. Generally a Bolt action has accuracy of 1 inch at 300 feet. AS -50 cal. semi 1 ½ inches at 100 yards. Long range goal 30 inch circle at 2000 yards.

Note: with next rule, again as with rules four and five in PCP section, the detail notes became so similar I decided to combine rules. Thus again I did not renumber rules due to personal difficulty in retaining any new numerical order of the basic rules.  

9/10) Good sight alignment, and good sight picture:

Stock Weld; Assume the same cheek-to-stock weld each time. Your neck should be relaxed. Proper eye relief is obtained with a natural line of sight through the center of the rear sight aperture to the front sight post and on though to the target. A small change in eye relief normally occurs after each firing or when shooter assumes a different firing position. Thus, begin adjustments each time by touching the charging handle with the tip of your nose. You should be mindful of exactly how the nose touches and this should be consistent.  
Eye focus; Dominate eye wide open opposite eye closed 90 % this is to maintain depth perception. Ensure eye is in line with the rear sight aperture. Focus on target then focus back on front sight post. The firer places the tip of the front sight post on the aiming point, but the eye must be focused on the tip of the front sight post. This causes the target to appear blurry, while the front sight post is seen clearly. The reason for focusing on the front sight post is that only a minor aiming error should occur since the error reflects only as much as the Marine fails to determine the target center. A greater aiming error can result if the front sight post is blurry due to focusing on the target.
Lighting affects the way the sniper sees the target through a scope. This effect can be compared to the refraction (bending) of light through a medium, such as a fish bowl or prism. The same effect, although not as drastic, can be observed on a day with high humidity and with sunlight from high angles i.e. morning and evening hours especially during winter and summer solstices and or when located at latitudes far from suns zenith. Lighting affects range determination capabilities too.

(Reference, Defense, rule # 5, features of recognition, objects looking farther away or closer etc.)

Sight Alignment; It involves placing the tip of the front sight post in the center of the rear sight aperture. Any alignment error between the front and rear sights repeats itself for every 1/2 meter the bullet travels. For example, at the 25-meter line, any error in alignment is multiplied 50 times. If the bullet is misaligned by 1/10 inch, at 300 meters it causes a miss of 5 feet. With scopes the shadow crescent shows on opposite side of round impact.

     
Correct Sight Alignment

Sight Picture; Is the placement of the sight alignment on target. A technique to obtain a good sight picture is the side aiming technique. It involves positioning the front sight post to the side of the target in line with the vertical center of mass, keeping the sights aligned. The front sight post is moved horizontally until the target is directly centered on the front sight post. Placement of the aiming point varies, depending on the engagement range. For example, at 300 meters the aiming point is the center of mass.

11) Factor in all weapons, weather, terrain and target data:


SPORTS acronym for immediate action procedures, slap the mag, pull the charging handle, observe the chamber, release the charging handle, tap the forward assist, shoot the enemy.

Bore sighting:
One way to zero the rifle is to bore sight it. First separate upper and lower receivers and remove the bolt, place upper receiver on a stack of sandbags. Look down the barrel through the breech; adjust the receiver until you see the centre of the target at the centre of the bore. IMO ideally, you might adjust the targets range until the diameter of the enter most ring matches the bores diameter, you might even drawl one using a coin, that works for a given range. Then look through the telescopic sight and see where the cross-hairs fall, adjusting windage and elevation until they coincide with the view down the rifle's barrel. Now all that remains to be done is to adjust the elevation by the standard amount for the range you're covering i.e. 3 ½ minutes for 200 meters, and so on.

Mechanically Zeroing the M16A1.
Adjust the front sight post (1) up or down until the base of the post is flush with the front sight post housing (2). Then adjust the front sight post 11 clicks in the direction marked UP (clockwise which raises the strike of the bullet) thus moving the post down into the well. Any changes in elevation required during the zeroing will be made using the front sight post only. Once the rear sight is zeroed, the front sight post should not be moved. With the Rear sight windage drum; use the long-range aperture marked "L" (it is also the smaller aperture i.e hole) Figure 2-3. Adjust windage drum (3) all the way left (counter clockwise) until it stops. Then turn the windage drum back right (clockwise) 17 clicks so the rear sight is approximately centered. Once zeroed flipping the aperture back to the unmarked aperture will zero the weapon for 250 meters. Flipping it back to the (L) aperture once again, automatically zeros for 375 meters. Long range sights are used with the M-16A1 anytime over 300 yards. With A/2 375-400 yards.
The goal is to place three rounds within a 4 cm. circle.

Figure 2-2 M16A1 rifle mechanical zero

Figure 2-3 M16A1 rifle battle sight zero

Tables 2-3 and 2-4 show how one click of elevation or windage will move the strike of the round at 25-meter zero to 500 meters in exact figures.
  
Table 2-3 Point of impact for M16A1 with standard sights

Note; miss print on 25 meter elevation it should read 3/8th inch not 2 3/16 inch.

Table 2-4 Point of impact for M16A1 with LLLSS

Rounded off figures; M16A1 elevation, 25m ¼ inch, 100m 1 1/8 inch, 200m 2 ¼ inch, 300m 3 ¼ inch, 400m 4 3/8 inch, 500m 5 ½ inch. Windage, figures are the same. With the Low Light Level Sight System or (LLLSS) elevation, 25m 3/8th of an inch, 100m 1 ¾ inch, 200 m 2 ¾ inches, 300m 5 ¼ inch, 400 m 7 inches, 500m 8 ¾ inch. Windage, 25m ¼ inch, 100m 1 1/8th inch, 200m 2 1/4th inch, 300m 3 1/4th inch, 400m 4 3/8 inch, 500m 5 ½ inch.  


Mechanically Zeroing the M16A2/A3. (Figure 2-5)
Adjust the front sight post (1) until base is flush with the front sight post housing (2). To raise your next shot group, rotate the front sight post UP (clockwise). One click will move the strike of the round one square (or 3/8th inch) on the target. Position the aperture (5) so the unmarked aperture is up and the 0-200 meter aperture is down. The marked 0-2 (large) aperture is for short ranges 0-200 meters (or for night). This 0-2 aperture is used only when the rear sight is all the way down. The unmarked (small) aperture is used in conjunction with the elevation knob for most (normal) firing ranges 300 to 800 meters.
The rear sight elevation knob has range indicators from 300 to 800 meters. Rotate the windage knob (6) to align the index mark on the 0-200 meter aperture with the long center index line on the rear sight assembly. Adjust the elevation knob (3) counterclockwise, as viewed from above, until the rear sight assembly (4) rests flush with the carrying handle and the 8/3 marking is aligned with the index line on the left side of the carrying handle. Then adjust the elevation knob one click clockwise. Once flush, to place your 300-meter zero on the rifle, you must rotate the elevation knob one click counterclockwise (clockwise). The 8/3 (300-meter) mark on the elevation knob should now be aligned with the index mark on the left side of the sight. (i.e. after setting the front and rear sights to mechanical zero, the elevation knob is rotated up (clockwise) one click past the 8/3 (300-meter) mark. The elevation knob will remain in this position until the battle sight zeroing has been completed).

Figure 2-5 M16A2/A3 rifle mechanical zero

Rear sight; to adjust elevation; turn the elevation knob until the desire range is indexed at the index mark on the left side on the sight. The rear elevation knob adjusts the point of aim from 300 to 800 meters on the M16A2, and 300 to 600 meters on the M16A4 and M4.
Windage knob each click will move the strike of the round from 1/8 inch (.3 centimeters) at 25 meters to 4 inches (10 centimeters) at 800 meters. To move the shot to the left, turn counterclockwise. To move the shot to the right, turn clockwise.  Three clicks will move the strike of the round one square on the target. A windage scale is on the rear of the sight and the windage knob pointer is on the windage knob.

Table 7-7 M16A2/3 and front sight post of the M16A4

Table 7-8 M4/M4A1 and windage of an M16A4

Table 2-6 Point of impact for M16A4 MWS, M4/M4A1/M4MWS

NOTE:  The squares are numbered around the edges of the target to equal the number of clicks required to move the shot group to the circle.

.
25-meter zero target

Sight settings; your rifle sights should be kept set to a combat zero of 300 meters. When zeroed to 300 meters, all other ranges on the elevation knob are also zeroed. If you are told to engage a target at a longer range; for example, 500 meters: There are clicks between the range numbers as you turn the elevation knob. Use these clicks if you need more elevation past a certain range. When the engagement is over, return the sight to the 300-meter setting.

Mechanically Zeroing the M16A4. Front sight post is flush with the front sight post housing. Adjust the elevation knob (1) counterclockwise, when viewed from above, until the rear sight assembly (2) rests flush with the detachable carrying handle and the 6/3 marking is aligned with the index line (3) on the left side of the detachable carrying handle. To finish the procedure, adjust the elevation knob two clicks clockwise so the index line on the left side of the detachable carrying handle is aligned with the "Z" on the elevation knob. Position the apertures so the unmarked aperture is up and the 0-200 meter aperture is down. Rotate the windage knob to align the index mark on the 0-200 meter aperture with the long center index line on the rear sight assembly.

Mechanically Zeroing the M4/M4A1 and M4 MWS.  Same as for M16A4 with the 6/3 mark aligned etc.
NOTE: The elevation knob remains flush. The "Z" marking on the elevation knob used in the detachable carrying handle of the M4-series weapon should be ignored. The "Z" marking is only used when the M16A4 is being zeroed.

(Reference, Appendix COE rule # 11)

12) Aiming point lower on down hill slope or at night:

This is to compensate to counter perceptions. When shooting down hill you tend to shoot high and at night due to fact that base of target is obscured in darkness. On up hill sloop you shoot low. The previous rules of thumb hold true with general combat shooting, however for sniper firing consider the fallowing. Angles; Firing uphill or downhill (i.e. at a slanted range) causes the point of impact to be higher (relative to a horizontal trajectory) than it normally would be for a level shot at the same range. How high depends on the angle and range. This is do to the fact gravity acts on a bullet only during the horizontal component of its flight (the distance from the shooter to the target measured as if they were both at the same level). Since the horizontal component will always be less than the slanted range, gravity will not pull the bullet down as far as it would if the range were level. However the wind still affects the shot over the entire slant range. The correct method for shooting uphill or downhill is to adjust elevation based on the horizontal range, and correct for wind deflection based on the slanted range, i.e. the shooter should aim at the target as if it were 25 yards away and correct for wind as if it were 400 yards away.
Additional info to consider, hold lower than normal when shooting steeply up or down hill at long range. (At gentle angles you can ignore the problem altogether over the maximum point blank ranges of hunting rifle cartridges.)
You can infer from this that the farther from the level position a rifle is held, the less the bullet's drop will be over any given line of sight distance, whether it is fired up or down. Since your sights are set to compensate for bullet drop, and there is less bullet drop when shooting at an up or down angle, you must hold lower than normal to maintain the desired point of impact. For example, shooting up or down at a 40 degree angle and the LOS range is 400 yards, the horizontal range is only 335 yards. 335 yards is the distance you must hold. In other words, it is the horizontal or true ballistic range and not the LOS or angular range that matters. However keep in mind that perception wise, when shooting up hill you well tend to shoot low.
In general aiming point at height of mans heart for ambushes.

(Reference, Appendix COE rule # 11, External ballistics, esp. gravity)

13) Sweep against moving targets:

This is making target cross your stream of fire. Note with stationary target make note of possible cover target may seek before opening fire. Automatic weapons pull up and to the right. Lead for targets running to your right is tricky. It may be generally safer for you to make longer dashes to foe’s right. Note consider moving to Rule number four zig zag.
If engaged invaders may hide behind non-bulletproof objects like trees, just shoot through each tree. They will run if engaged in the open be ready to get off as many shots as possible..

With aircraft; if the battlefield is quit Jets can be hard 20-30 seconds away. In urban terrain it is difficult to tell direction however. Lead jets by 600’ helicopters by 150’, using the known aircraft’s length as a guide. Best chance of success is a head-on position, aiming above the aircraft. However if the aircraft is diving on your position. Do not fire at them, you well only give away your position. Wait till it has pulled up. One option is the Exact Rendezvous method, selecting a reference point i.e. concentrate fire on hilltop. Massing fire along flight path junctions. For ambushes weapons i.e. guns and RPGs should be located in tunnels, as an anti smoke tactic. With aircraft farther away, at ranges near 800 meters, try using self destruct mechanism. Another tactic used against aircraft include, mining possible landing zones. Shadows cased by low fling a/c can be more visible then a/c.

Do not look up when aircraft fly overhead. (One of the most obvious features on aerial photographs is the upturned faces of soldiers.)

Helo tactics


Try and overrun a LZ before the air assault forces had an opportunity to get organized and oriented. They also learned to “hug” soviet forces so that helicopter gunships could not fire at them.

Vary the take-off and landing directions from the helipads.
Sometimes fly in threes.
700-800 meters away and then fire, trying to catch the helicopter with the explosion of the round's self-destruction at 920 meters distance.                         

Soviet helo pilots took to flying NOE do to fact FIM -92 could not track targets below i.e. looking down. FIM -92 speed Mach two. Range 6 km. i.e. five miles.
Soviet fixed wing pilots not only gaining altitude quickly after takeoff but make very steep banking turns.


MOVING TARGETS

Certain situations, such as multiple targets at varying ranges and rapidly changing winds, do not allow for proper elevation and windage adjustments.
Leading; is establishing an aiming point ahead of the target's movement and maintaining it as the weapon is fired. With a scope it is the distance the cross hairs are placed in front of the target's movement. AKA Hold off, shifting the point of aim to achieve a desired point of impact. This requires the weapon and body position to be moved while following the target. A common error of the sniper is a tendency to watch his target instead of his aiming point. He must force himself to watch his lead point or chosen point on the mil scale, it becomes the sniper's point of concentration just as the cross hairs are for stationary targets. There are four factors in determining leads: Speed, as a target moves faster, it will move a greater distance during the bullet's flight. Therefore, lead increases as speed increases. Angle of movement, a target moving perpendicular to the bullet's flight path moves a greater lateral distance than a target moving at an angle away from or toward the bullet's path. Therefore, a target moving at a 45-degree angle covers ½ the distance as a target moving at a 90-degree angle. Range to the target, the farther away a target is, the longer it takes for the bullet to reach it. Therefore, lead must be increased as range increases. Wind effects, when using lead, the sniper aims into the wind. If the wind is moving from the right to left, his point of aim is to the right. A wind blowing opposite the target's direction of movement requires more lead on target, than a wind blowing in the same direction as the target's movement. Also with wind blowing in same direction, if it has a much greater speed than target, lead would have to be reduced accordingly. Note; I do not have the math skills to confirm the fallowing examples, or formulas. The following formulas are used to determine moving target leads: TIME OF FLIGHT x TARGET SPEED = LEAD. Time of flight in seconds. Target speed in fps. Lead = distance in feet. Average speed of a man crawling 1 fps/0.8 mph, walking = 2 fps/1.3 mph, double time = 4 fps/2.5 mph, jogging = 6 fps/3.7 mph. To convert leads in feet to meters: LEAD IN FEET x 0.3048 = METERS. To convert leads in meters to mils: Lead in meters x 1,000 over range to target equals mil lead.

THREE METHODS OF LEAD;
Exact Rendezvous; Preferred method of engaging moving targets. The sniper must establish an aiming point i.e. stationary point, ahead of the target and pull the trigger when the target reaches it. This method works best on targets with less lateral movement i.e. less movement from left to right. It allows the sniper's weapon and body position to remain motionless. Determining/holding exact (sight picture) using the horizontal stadia lines in the mil dots in the M3A.
Estimate Rendezvous; Used to engage an erratically moving target (fleeting) i.e. one that only presents itself briefly and then resumes cover. As the target moves, cross hairs are centered as much as possible with the target. This involves establishing and maintaining an aiming point in relationship to the target and maintaining that sight picture (moving with the target), while squeezing the trigger. When the target stops, reappears or inters the sights the sniper fires. This technique puts the firer in position for a second shot if the first one misses.

M3A scope, when using the scope, the sniper uses the horizontal mil dots. The mil scale can be mentally sectioned into 1/4-mil increments for leads. For example, a target at 500 meters that requires a 10-inch lead, he would place the target's center mass halfway between the cross hairs and the first mil dot (1/2 mil).

Tracking method with single lead?
Single lead method;
Note; I do not have the math skills to confirm the fallowing examples, or formulas.
On the method, the trailing edge of the front sight post is centered on target mass. Note see figure 7-29. This causes lead to automatically increase as range increases.

Figure 7-29 Single-lead rule

The rule provides for many speed-angle combinations that places the bullet within 2 inches of target center at 100 meters, the rule begins to break down for targets moving at slight and large angles. If applied on targets moving at a slight angle-for example, 5 degrees at 100 meters-the bullet strikes forward of target center, about 4 inches with standard sights and about 7 inches with LLLSS sights. In fact with targets moving at an angle less than 30 degrees, the bullet strikes somewhat in front of target center. With targets moving at an angle of more than 30 degrees, the bullet strikes somewhat behind target center. In the worst case (i.e. 90-degrees, moving 8 mph IMO we are assuming 100 m range) the shot-group center is located 9.8 inches behind target center. If bullets were evenly distributed in a 12-inch group (recall 5.56mm equipped with bipod is capable of at least 6 inch group at 100m range) this (12 inch group) would result in hitting the target 40 % of the time.

The angle of target movement is the angle between the LOS and the target's direction of movement. Figure 7-31 reflects the differences in lateral speed for various angles of movement for a target traveling at 8 mph at a distance of 150 meters. At 90 degrees an 8-mph target moves 24 inches during the bullet's time of flight. If it is moving on a 15-degree angle, it moves 6 inches (the equivalent of 2 miles per hour). Note list figures in figure 7-31.

Figure 7-31 Target movement (distance) at various angles

More Example information; 8 miles per hour at a 90-degree angle and range of 300 meters, target covers 4 1/2 feet during time of fight. 10 mph is 14.6 feet per second. Common muzzle velocities 2640-3k plus fps. The front sight post covers about 1.6 or 1.5 inches at 15 meters and about 16/15 inches at 150 meters. Since the center of the front sight post is the actual aiming point, placing the trailing edge of the front sight post at target center provides a .8 or ¾ inch lead on a 15-meter target and an 8 or 7 ½ inch lead on a target at 150 meters. This rule provides a dead-center hit at 15-meters with target moving 7 mph at a 25-degree angle because the target travels .8 inches during time of fight. At 150-meters with target moving 7 miles per hour at a 25-degree angle moves 8 inches during time of fight.


A walking target at 250 meters is hit dead center when moving at 45 degrees. Hits can be obtained if target is moving on any angle between 15 and 75 degrees. When target is running, a center hit is obtained when the target is on an angle of 15 degrees; misses occur when target exceeds an angle of 30 degrees.

Note so after all that, IMO i.e. SWAG, rule of thumb, I say a 45 degree angle reduces lateral movement by one ½ to 1/3 and 60 or 75 degrees about 25% either which away, 15 or 30 degrees 75% either which away. Then there is this; Marines must be taught to fire at targets as though they are stationary until lateral movement exceeds (15 degrees). Marines should be taught to increase their lead if they miss, which increases their probability of hitting all targets. Furthermore, impact points and aiming points generally coincide at 100 yards or less, weather target stationary, walking or running. So IMO rough estimates are as fallows, at 300 yards range, aiming point is the leading edge for walker, one body width for runner. At 400 yards range, one body width for walker two or three for runner. With vehicles start at leading edge of body, add one body width for every 10 mph. Remember to consider angle of vehicles movement. Adjust lead as you would for wind values. 90 degree angle equals max speed and there for max lead, less than 45 degrees reduces both etc. This emphasizes the need for knowing bullet/muzzle velocities i.e. time of flight and how it relates to the range, angle, and speed of the target.

14) Trigger techniques:

Use just the tip of your finger, just breathing, just squeeze. B.R.A.S. breath, relax, aim and squeeze. The trigger finger (index finger on the firing hand) is placed on the trigger between the first joint and the tip of the finger (not the extreme end) and adjusted depending on hand size, grip, and so on. If the trigger is not properly squeezed, the rifle will be misaligned with the target at the moment of firing. The proper trigger squeeze should start with a slight pressure (aka first pressure) on the trigger during the initial aiming process. The firer applies more pressure after the front sight post is steady on the target and he has proper Breathe Control; learn to control breath at any part of the breathing cycle. There is a moment of natural respiratory pause when most of the air has been exhaled from the lungs and before inhaling. One should pause your breathing at this point and increase trigger squeeze. The shot must be fired before any discomfort is felt. Gurkha weapons instructor; Never snatch the trigger; always squeeze it gently, as if you’re stroking a cat/pussy. “Take the first pressure, pause your breathing, squeeze the trigger, and shoot to kill”. These techniques are used during zeroing (and when time is available to take a shot). During combat if winded you can exhale on to targets. In other words, aim in general direction of target, take deep breath, position sights over target and exhale, shooting as sights drop across target. 

15) Quick kill:

An instinctive method of shooting, aka Reflexive shooting; Used against fleeting targets at close range or during the night and in dense terrain. Also when wearing gas mask. Precision room clearing allows little or no margin for error. Too fast of a shot at a noncombatant, too slow of a shot at an enemy or inaccurate shots can all be disastrous.
Weapons Ready Positions; The two weapons ready positions are low ready and high ready.
Low Ready Position, Butt of weapon placed firmly in the pocket of shoulder with the barrel pointed down at a 45-degree angle. Considered to be the safest carrying position. It should be used by the clearing team while inside the room, except when actually entering and clearing. High Ready Position, Butt is held under the armpit, with the barrel pointed slightly up, keeping the front sight assembly under the line or plain of sight. To engage a target, the gunner pushes the weapon out as if to bayonet the target. When the weapon leaves the armpit, he slides it up into the firing shoulder. This technique is used when moving in a single file. General techniques, Butt of weapon in pocket of shoulder. The head is up and both eyes are open. Chin resting on top of stock, if to one side weapon will pull. Nose and eyes centered over stock and behind sights. Forward hand grasping front sight assembly near muzzle. Stance; Feet are shoulder-width or slightly wider apart. Toes are pointed to the front (direction of movement). The firing side foot is slightly staggered to the rear of the non-firing side foot. Knees are slightly bent and the upper body is leaned slightly forward. Shoulders are square to the LOS and pulled back, not rolled over or slouched. When engaging targets, the butt of the weapons remains in the pocket of his shoulder.
Principle: what ever you aim/point at, you should be able to hit. Effective range 50 meters. Shift your entire body at the base i.e. your feet, to make adjustments. Best to under shoot than over shoot. Better chance to see corrections needed and better chance of ricochets hitting target. If it’s worth shooting, shoot it twice. Shot Placement; as each round is fired the weapon's recoil makes the front sight post move in a small natural arc. Do not fight this recoil. Let the weapon make the arc and immediately bring the front sight post back onto the target and take another shot. This two-shot combination is known as firing a controlled pair at center mass i.e. two shots to the upper chest, then one to the head. This shot placement increases the first round hit probability and allows for a second round incapacitating shot. This center of mass, engagement technique is more reliable than attempting head-shots only.

Aiming with Iron Sights;
The four aiming techniques all have their place during combat in urban areas, but the aimed quick-kill technique is the one most often used in precision room clearing.
(1) Slow Aimed Fire. This technique is the most accurate. It consists of taking up a steady, properly aligned sight picture and squeezing off rounds. It is normally used for engagements beyond 25 meters or when the need for accuracy overrides speed.
(2) Rapid Aimed Fire. This technique features an imperfect sight picture in which windage is critical but elevation is of lesser importance. When the front sight post is in line with the target, the gunner squeezes the trigger. This technique is used against targets out to 15 meters and is fairly accurate and very fast.
(3) Aimed Quick Kill. This technique consists of using a good spot weld and placing the front sight post flush on top of the rear peep sight. It is used for very quick shots out to 12 meters. Windage is important, but elevation is not critical with relation to the target. This technique is the fastest and most accurate.
(4) Instinctive Fire. This technique is the least desirable. The gunner focuses on the target and points the weapon in the target's general direction, using muscle memory to compensate for lack of aim. This technique should be used only in emergencies.
M68 Close Combat Optic.
The M68 Close Combat Optic (CCO) note remember, the M68 is not a telescope sight.
(1) Aimed Fire. This technique requires looking through the CCO with both eyes open and focusing on the target. An optical illusion places a red aiming dot in front of the firer. The dot is placed on the target then the target is engaged with fire. The aiming dot does not have to be centered in the optic. The CCO is used in the same manner at all ranges. Therefore, there is no distinction between slow aimed fire, rapid aimed fire, and aimed quick kill techniques.
(2) Instinctive Fire. This technique remains the same with the CCO.


Aiming M68 Close Combat Optic (CCO); Note remember the M68 is not a telescope sight. Look through the CCO with both eyes open and focus on the target. An optical illusion places a red aiming dot in front of the firer. The dot is placed on the target then the target is engaged with fire. The aiming dot does not have to be centered in the optic. The CCO is used in the same manner at all ranges. Therefore, there is no distinction between well aimed or quick kill techniques. And now SDO squad day optic. 
AN/PAQ-4 and AN/PEQ-2 Aiming Lights; when using IR aiming lights in conjunction with (NVGs) use the instinctive fire technique to point the weapon at the target while activating the aiming light. This technique should place the aiming dot within the field of view of the NVGs and on or near the target. Adjust placement of the aiming dot onto the target and fire. Note that target discrimination is more difficult when using NVGs. IR illumination provided by flashlights with IR filters, or the illuminator that is integral with the PEQ-2, can aid in target identification and discrimination. IR illumination is also required inside buildings with little or no ambient light. Note IR illumination is also available with Artillery rounds. 

Three types of weapons carries
TAR: Tactical, Alert, and Ready






16) Scatter:

Whenever surrounded and out gunned it is best for group or unit to run in all directions. Less chance of all being killed or captured.

(Reference, Step 3 Concept of operations, Part (D) patrol order, # 8 Rally points and final rally point)

(Reference, PCP rule # 3, “snipers can be used”)

17) Five (S) and a (T):

Silence - POWs kept quiet, but aloud too talk to you. Blindfolded POW less likely to cry out. Empty sand bag over heads of POWs. Positive Intel, good sources are owners of licensed premises, cabs, bartenders, pawn broker, gamblers, criminals, prostitutes and anyone who has contact with public especially at late hours. All can be employed as undercover agents. They report to contact agent /officers. Signs and suspicious activity, some one lavishly spending money, frequently wounded, always tired or sleepy. Insiders can solve past crimes, or for tell of future crimes too. Statements are looked upon as a source of leads to substantiate evidence, locate items, and other material facts. Note an enemy may feed information about the whereabouts of clues to those suspected of being informants. Then watch to see if authorities go looking for the clues. From the perspective of the enemy, it would be best if the clue were perishable. Note undercover agent hiding note in corps to be found by authorities during autopsy.  Interrogations: Interrogator should avoid duress and coercion. Interrogator can experimentally assume different attitudes i.e. good cop, bad cop i.e. very procedures to determine most effective technique. Evasive or deceptive manner, counter with leading questions, trap suspect with contradictions inconsistencies and improbable statements. Ask questions you already know answers to in order to check honesty. POW: If the arrest is based on the flimsiest grounds or suspicion, one should summit with loud protestations i.e. you most protest that you are unarmed, and ran out of fear. Once in custody relax, remain calm, familiarity breads security. Speak in court only if in position - through alibi for example, to regain freedom immediately. Other wise refuse to make statement of any kind. Always appear tired, no interrogator wants an unconscious prisoner. You should make eye contact with captor, talk about family no politics or religion. You should keep lies close to the truth. When all else fails tell the truth it wont be believed anyways. Violent resistance is to be recommended only when there is a chance of destroying the foe or when it is already a mater of life and death. Search - Watch the hands, hands kill. Have POW turn back to you immediately. Permit only one of a group to approach you at a time. Never walk between POWs or POW and Marine covering you. Search for weapons and documents. Ideally, i.e. ultimately check between toes, checks, and run comb though hair. Take uniforms for closer examination later, also with the dead. Marines should keep letter from home on them, with false misleading information i.e. parents just died, keep photo of kids you don’t have. Photos of proper, not sexy looking wife. Fleeing discard weapons in the shrubs. Striping the body (of enemy KIA or body of member of your unit that must be stored behind enemy lines) of its equipment, hide items or weapons in one place, body in another. S.A.T.; Save everything, Add to, and Take care of. Save everything; clothing, pieces of metal, paper, string. Hide items separately, if they’re discovered they’ll appear harmless. Add to; always improve, improvise, see how many ways a piece of equipment can be used. You must alternate frame of mind/reference i.e. a tree becomes shelter, weapons, food, fuel and clothing. Equipment will wear out but not your imagination. None perishable foods; boil sugar down to hard candy, if canned goods are punctured reseal with wax. Take care of; wear as little clothing as possible. Conserve wear and tear. Placing cardboard inside shoes to save wear on souls. Become gray man, blend in, and don’t ware crosses or loud clothing. Avoid first class seating, setting up front, and volunteering. Safeguard - Protect POWs against injury from others and their selves. Don’t allow items to be given to POWs. Defectors and stragglers are in more danger and more willing to cooperate. Treat POW well to nurture them for our uses. You most be able to provide food, water, clothing and shelter for POWs. Note: In general, POWs are not usually taken during attack, especially individuals or small groups. Attacker dose not won’t to spare troops needed to complete attack. Attackers own WIA need care. You might consider becoming useful to the attacker as medic etc. 50 % of POWs don’t survive. When POWs survive it’s in large numbers and or by negotiation. Best to try to hide or sneak away.

(Reference, see Appendix Safeguard.)

Segregate - POWs into groups i.e. by sex, rank and age. So no master plan can be made and known by all. POWs kept by irregulars are often treated as guest, made to wear traditional tribal cloathing, free to roam around area, can be difficult for recue personal to spot among locals.
Speed - Every thing done as quickly as possible. POW gotten out of area of capture ASAP. Less likely to be rescued or attempt escape. As a POW, you can fake sickness, injury, play hard of hearing. This is to slow things down, delay your transportation to stern areas. Information gathered, needs to be gotten to people that need it.
TAG - every POW with an ISaluteRWP report. One last use of the acronym. Note some changes of infuses include (S) dimensions and statements. The (U) who and unit etc POW was arrested with, might include Lawyer’s name. (LOL). (E) would note any documents on POW at the time of arrest. (R) reason for arrest. (W) witnesses. (P) Brig /prison being held in.

That's when you pull out your GPS flare gun. Even better: A satellite-guided flare that automatically travels toward the closest populated area. I'm sure the Pentagon has this already.

But what if you're injured, maybe stuck in a ravine without cell service? A lot of good that GPS device will do you.

(Reference, Planning, Step # 1, Psychological operations, Types of personalities. Also Planning IPB, “sponsor a local T.V. program”.)  

Over all tips

Joke: try to look unimportant, your foe maybe low on ammo. If you’re short of everything, except the enemy, you’re on the front. If your attack is going well, it’s an ambush. Incoming fire has the right a way.

Characteristics of (military operations in urban/ on urbanized terrain) MOUT;

German term; Rat-n-creeg meaning rat warfare. MOUT operations may be conducted to capitalize on strategic or tactical advantages which control of an area gives to you or denies to the enemy. Major urban areas represent the power and wealth of a country in the form of cultural, economic, industrial, political and transportation, centers. The control of these centers well yield decisive psychological advantages which determine the success or failure of the larger conflict. It is more difficult to recover from an erroneous decision in MOUT. Commanders may decide to by pass if speed is essential to their mission, enough forces are not available, and logistically the attack cannot be supported. Or if no substantial threat exists in the area. Civilian casualties and significant collateral damage to structures, require commanders to consider the political and psychological consequences of attacking. The fact that the defenders are resisting indicates that they will fight hard. The first thing you do when approaching a defended city is attempt to get it to surrender. For riflemen and team leaders, the fight is to seize a foothold in a given building and clear individual rooms. At the squad level, the fight is for a floor or a single small building. The platoon fight involves larger buildings and small complexes. Troop requirements are 3-5 times grater. The necessity to provide life support and other essential services to civilians can siphon off resources and manpower. Troop strength depends on surprise and Intelligence (Cmdrs. rely primarily on human lntel for information). Troops are needed to prevent reoccupation and refuge control. Civilians fleeing will block roads. Conduct operations around civil evacuation plans. Enemy will try to blend in with population, curfews can help. In Somalia Marines noted, guerillas almost always slept between 04-08 hours. A hostile population is a serious security problem. Possible cons, robbery, sabotage, protest, children shadowing patrols; they not only can get killed but can provide information to the foe. Crowd control; Show, Shout, Shove, Shoot. The unit commander has one or two snipers who can shoot key individuals (those with weapons, those who appear to be orchestrating the riot). Helicopters hovering low over a mob, especially in a dry and dusty environment, stirs up a wind storm of dust, sand, and noise. If you have an M-1 tank, back it up to the mob thus utilizing the hot exhausts. Such vast areas are difficult to defend or attack in their entirety. On the urban battlefield, advantages and disadvantages in the areas of mobility, cover, and observation tend to even out for attacker and defender. Initially, however, the defender has a significant tactical advantage over the attacker due to defender’s knowledge of the terrain. The defender can prepare the ground in advance, build and reinforce obstacles, and select firing positions and observation posts. He can reconnoiter and improve routes between positions to supply and shift forces quickly.

(Reference, Def. # 12)


With MOUT, the attacker must forfeit, at least in part, the advantages of cover and concealment in order to move and concentrate forces; every action by the attacker is made more difficult because he must feel his way through a complex of manmade and natural terrain features. Attacker’s routes of advance are limited and more clearly defined, enhancing the defender's target-surveillance capability. The attacker must use increased communications to coordinate his forces, which reduces his ability to achieve surprise. Although the built-up area may not occupy dominant terrain, it normally has dominant terrain adjacent to it on at least one side. Doctrinally, the attacker will attempt to bypass and isolate a built-up area by securing the adjacent dominant terrain before the built-up area itself is directly attacked. Isolated positions can be left to small holding units. Therefore, the defender always attempts to establish his defense well forward of an urban area and well integrate surrounding dominant terrain, natural and manmade obstacles, as well as the smaller rural towns and villages into the defense as strong points, in order to engage and defeat the attacker on the approaches and flanks and limit the advantages of being bypassed and isolated. The key defensive concept is to draw the attacking force into preplanned kill zones. Engagement ranges are greatly reduced by urban features. Targets will generally be exposed for brief periods, frequently at ranges of less than 100 meters. These limitations induce close, violent combat. The depression and elevation limits for weapons may create dead spaces. To deal with target masking by increased dead spaces caused by buildings or rubble, the artillery batteries are positioned away from tall buildings and other masks. The use of field artillery in the direct fire role may be required to suppress gunners in hardened positions. Greater reliance must be placed by the attacker on indirect and long-range weapon systems or air. The attacker is most vulnerable to enemy fires during the initial phase of securing a foothold within the built-up area. Initially, artillery is located on the outskirts facing the attacker’s approach. From these locations the artillery engages the attacker at maximum ranges. The defenses mutually supporting strong points are echeloned in depth. Operating from positions in depth complements electronic warfare support measures and observation activities and limits the attacker’s ground reconnaissance and infiltration capabilities. The defense reverts to the conduct of defense only when; attacking forces break through defenses on the approaches. At the appropriate time, artillery displaces rapidly along predetermined primary and alternate routes to alternate or supplementary positions. Attacks are often launched at night or under other conditions of limited visibility. Added to weather conditions that limit visibility are the urban factors of smoke and dust, and concealment offered by shaded areas of varying intensities. On the approaches to urban areas, visibility is frequently less than 3960’ i.e. ¾ of a mile. The attacker may use such conditions to extend his reconnaissance, re-supply positions, cross open areas, or secure objectives. To counter this, the defense may shift defensive positions and crew-served weapons to alternate positions just before dark. He occupies or patrols open areas between units which are covered by fire during daylight. Employing noisemaking devices, tangle foot and or tactical wire, outside of buildings. Mines, LPs and OPs, with NVDs, remote sensors, and radars on the most likely to be used nighttime avenues of approach. Heat, seismic and acoustic (glorified microphones) for early warning sensors, have been used since Vietnam, and acoustic sensors were used during WWI. Current heat sensors can let you look inside a building for the presence of people. Seismic (microphones that listen through the ground) and lasers that can listen inside after hitting i.e. painting windows as well as acoustic sensors can be fired like tear gas grenades into buildings to detect the presence of defenders, for monitoring until the enemy, or the sensors, are discovered and destroyed. Also airborne or ground lasers that paint/use windows as contact points. Another innovation is the remote control robots. And so the battle will proceed with the attack of smaller built-up areas leading to the central complex. Fighting, will involve a series of coordinated actions at small-unit level. Elements are required to conduct a whole range of military operations. Funneling of forces favors the defender by limiting the number of maneuver elements that may be applied against a series of hubs that must be confronted in succession. Unlike deserts, forests, and jungles with a limited variety of fairly uniform, recurring terrain features, the urban battlefield is composed of an ever-changing mix of natural and manmade features. Frequently, larger forces will have units fighting on open terrain, on terrain within built-up areas, and in complexes where these two distinct terrain forms merge. Fighting is characterized by a multidimensional battle. It may be fought simultaneously above the ground, in the upper stories of buildings, on roofs, in buildings at street level, in the street, and below street level in sewer and subways systems. Sub terrain areas become contaminated hot spots after power goes out. Rain also makes storm and other sewer systems hazardous or impassible. Chemical agents are washed into drains as a result system contains agent concentrations much higher than surface. These effects become more pronounced as agents are absorbed by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls. Under ground routes are of primary concern when considering guerrilla avenues of approach and lines of supply and communications. Sewers, subways, tunnels, cisterns and basements provide mobility, concealment cover and storage sites. Over pressures are magnified greatly.

(Reference, Appendix, overall tips, Sub terrain)

MOUT; overall maneuvers well be more methodical and synchronized. Isolation degrades C4I. Combat is more non stop, much more physically demanding, more hand to hand, lots of fatigue. High casualty rates due to falling debris and lots of sharp items around. Explosions produce more flying debris especially glass. Casualties may occur on any level of buildings, though most occur out side. Troop density and close proximity of combat makes it difficult to provide supporting fires. MOUT consist of ready made cover and concealment. Back door inters generally provide better cover than front. Usually structures must be attacked before enemy in side can be. There will be more damage by fire. High rises can take 24 - 48 hours to burn out and cool down enough to be reoccupied. Destroyed buildings change topography of area, making rally points hard to recognize. Use phase lines (face of buildings not streets or allies) thus keeping your units from over advancing. When possible move along main streets parallel to buildings, i.e. no crossing main streets. Best to cross streets in the middle of the block. Right sides of streets are generally safer to move down. Remain on same side of street as foe. Move across danger areas one at a time, however once the area comes under fire it is best to cross as a group, all the while opening fire on suspected enemy locations. While crossing danger areas or while on patrols in general, each Marine is detailed to observe and or cover a certain area, such as second-floor windows on the opposite side of the street. When a street is narrow observing or firing into windows across the way can be difficult, because observer is forced to look along the buildings, rather than into windows or doors. When streets are wider observation throw openings is better. Engagement ranges MOUT; may vary from point-blank to the maximum effective range of a weapon. Minimum arming ranges must be considered. Engagement ranges average 300 feet, 90% of engagements are at 100’or less. Few personal targets visible beyond 150 feet. 5% at 300’ or more. Even snipers rarely take a shot farther than 1000’. If you spot foe some distance away, take him out. If close up, aim in and allow the rest of your unit to react thus maximizing firepower in direction of possible foe unit, this is especially true in jungle combat. Also in jungle “if in doubt, don’t shoot”.

(Reference, COE General combat tips “characteristics of military operations in Jungle warfare” and “Fighting at night” below)

With two or more troops running for cover, shoot closest one to cover firsts. A foe in the open is worth two in the bush.  If your unit has group under fire, shoot troops farthest away from you first. They well be the ones going for the flanking moves. Units under fire tend to make a stand or retreat vs. attacking into unknown terrain. Do not retrieve your first expended magazine during contact because it will consume valuable time. As for locations of the shooter and the target. Both the shooter and the target may be inside or outside the same or separate buildings. Either one may be inside while the other is outside. Target angles can be either vertical or horizontal, or a combination of both. Spotting shooters; by analyzing impact points. Snow can give more indication of the direction of enemy fire. Spin of bullet vs. ricochet direction? Flat trajectory indicates elevated firing position. Direct fire round will sail right by you if it misses but falling (HE) round kills if it misses by yards. Direct fire sounds like ripping canvas, howitzers a two tone whistle. Direction of sound, bullets passing by your ear well sound like a bumble bee. Smoke from initial shot’s, due to excess oil in barrel. You might want to swab barrel before shooting. Dust from muzzle blast. Black smoke from surface of barrel can be seen by observer. Also steam from human bodies. Brass casings being ejected may reflect sunlight. Shoot at possible cover and concealment points, shooters tend to be located high; foe may use one high shooter to drawl your unit into area of multiple low shooters. Periodically expose items to drawl fire, i.e. “the old helmet on the bayonet”. Lastly you may have to advance under fire and have spotter (otter) watch for enemy. Spotters should not provide cover, so vision is not obscured by smoke.

(Reference, COE rule # 1)

Orange smoke/dust indication of impact of armor piecing (AP) incendiary rounds. With tracers, impacts can be indicated by ricochets (or lack there of incase of hitting a human body). Most impact points cannot be spotted beyond tracer burn out range; around 3000’ for 7.62 mm, beyond that range you need visual aids. Scopes and binoculars ¼ out of focus can see thermal signature of rounds (aka Swirl) going down range. Swirl caused by pressure differences in air that reflects light differently. Also I.R. at night or day and for spotting muzzle flashes too. Modified suppressers that can ID units.

Vehicle commanders and drivers can walk gunners on target using ADDRACS, target reference points and the field expedient mil system (one finger, four fingers from the hay stack).  The impacts from MK-19 are easily seen and can be used to orient the other gunners.

Note add Support Group/element or cell, to assault unit; i.e. CAS, transportation, air, motor and sea or river craft. To also include communication etc.

(Reference, COE rule # 1)

Organizing the assault unit:

it well always have two basic elements, first an assault element (A.E.) the unit may include demolitions experts, electronic technicians, and whatever specialists that may be needed i.e. pilot, if the objective is to steal a specific enemy aircraft. Secondly, there is a security element; (S.E.). Each Marine must know the responsibilities and roles in either element. S.E. responsibilities, are securing the area or building in the case of MOUT and stopping enemy reinforcements from becoming involved, or to stop any would-be escapers and to cover the withdrawal of the A.E. and or entire assault unit.  Like with Cordon and knock missions, Outer circle keeps people out, inter keeps people in target buildings. Finally, they may provide the suppressive fire on objective. Immediately prior to the assault, suppressive fires are increased on the objective and continue until A.E. has entered the building. Isolate buildings by fire, layaway avenues of approach to building and its exits. Suppressive fires located outside adjacent to entry on the upper floor of previously cleared building. As unit inters supporting fire shifts to upper levels then to exits and adjacent buildings to cover enemy withdrawal or reinforcement routes. If your unit most retreat vacate two or three houses down the road at a time, burning first one for concealment. Burning out buildings is best at night, smoke can interfering with daytime combat. Conventional smoke screens in MOUT can drawl fire. The A.E. responsibilities are to secure the objective. The following fundamentals are to be considered when assaulting buildings: You should always try to attack buildings from top down. Know strength of roofs. Give the enemy an escape route. Enemy usually not very motivated to make a stand in someone else’s living room, lol! Attacking form the top also avoids enemy heavy-weapons positions, which will usually be located on lower levels. Considerations which will affect the decision on the point of entry; identify the route to the building from the last covered and concealed, or assault position. This is usually the shortest distance, immediately across the adjacent street, back yard, or alley. Ask yourself; from what enemy-held buildings can the enemy observe my avenue of approach? Then orient observation and fires on those points to break the mutual support between enemy positions. Being able to predict suspected enemy positions by reading the terrain is an important skill to develop. The assault element (AE), regardless of size, well attempt to close on the stern or flank(s) of an objective building, which well have more and better cover. If the building is located on a street with numerous adjacent buildings under enemy control an envelopment is not feasible, a stern attack is required. Alternatively, the attacker can initially clear nearby buildings and then attack the final objective simultaneously from the stern and flanks. Other considerations are the availability of access means to upper stories; again A.E. may seize an adjoining structure. Also consider the cover and concealment in the area. Often you will have to evaluate the relative risks of scaling the side of a building or clearing upward from the ground floor. Clearing from the bottom up may be the most frequent method in isolated, detached areas. Assaulting the bottom floor and clearing upward is a common method, except where buildings form continuous fronts. In this situation with ground level entry, the attacker attempts to close on flanks or stern of the buildings. When attacking from ground up, unit has better option of burning out enemy on upper floors. Shots fired up through floors can cause enemy to surrender quickly. First establish foot hold inside, than fight quickly to top floor and then down. If your mission requires long ropes, consider the use of 1" nylon tubing instead. It is lighter, more compact, and just as strong. Also garden hoses. Wire (communications) can hold up to 90 lbs. per cable. Black wire may have current going though it. Grappling hooks make sure there is enough rope to reach anchor point. Stand as close to building as possible assuring less exposure and horizontal distance hook must travel. Coils, one in hand with hook few in other, the rest coiled on ground. Throw gentle even lob, once the hook is in window, pulling it to one side ensures good bite. Keep tension on rope after securing bite. Scaling walls, you can climb pass windows at first, on your way to the rooftop, when repel back down. Clear rooms first before climbing to close as you past windows. Use grenades, keep weapon at the ready. Avoid initial entry at middle floor windows; if a middle floor is breached, it is used as a foot hold only, you still clear upper floors first. Each A.E. should, keep the procedures simple. Each member must know his entrance point. Set selector lever to full automatic. Fix bayonets or ready K-bars, for close encounters. Attack right behind prep fire and or percussions. Preferably, entry is gained through walls breached by explosives or gun fire. AE should avoid windows and doors as entry points because they are usually covered by fire or booby trapped, avoid obvious gates or holes in fences or walls. Move from room to room through walls. Walls can usually be breached with axes. House holing/mouse holing methods. Look though (can be as small as ice pick), also throw or drop though and go though types. Select rooms that have ceilings intact and Place an explosive charge against the ceiling and or floor wall juncture. Pros i.e. advantages, wall can provide climbing aid to ceiling hole. Charges placed at corners might provide access to four or eight rooms. Cons- i.e. disadvantages, this may weaken structures too.  In general, the resultant explosion should kill or stun defenders providing uncontested access to the next floor. Charges used for breaching outside walls are placed at fire places or brick walls better to prevent walls or buildings from collapsing. Box wall building designs have reinforced concrete walls exterior and interior difficult to breach. Inter wall 6-8”. The floor plans are predictable. Hallways circle around stairwells or elevators. Brick designs, exterior walls of buildings are at least 3 bricks thick. Total of 6 bricks between buildings. The floor plans are different on ground floors than upper levels, but over all similar in area. Holes made in outside or inside walls should be staggered, so enemy cannot shot through more than one at a time. Ideally, you should start on blind side of buildings that is the side without windows. House/mouse holing can be used offensively or defensively. Not possible after buildings reduced to rubble. Again never use obvious gates or holes in fences or walls. Clearing downward, stairs are covered by posting guard, they are not used. Enemy mouse holes to lower floors should never be used. Entrance to lower floors is gained by breaching the floor/ceiling with explosives and/or using lowered rope. After entry cover entries to basements or attics first. If there is a basement or attic it should be cleared first. Never stand in front of or near a closed door; never hide by the prominent window of a house. While inside buildings continue to watch outside. Hug inside walls. Clearing is usually done in circular pattern, from one main hallway. Secure the central stairwell. Stairwells, access ladders/fire escapes, usually are located at ends of hallways too. These plus large open rooms or areas or rooms with a view, i.e. balconies or roof tops over looking these areas and other points of interest are your prime objectives. All these locations provide mobility, concealment and can serve as relatively good fighting holes or sniper positions. Use extreme caution when in these areas during clearing phases.
Note check for this note in Tri-F, a too heavy charge brought the entire building down into the basement, leaving an unnecessary obstacle. One solution to this problem was to set the charges in fireplaces where the heavier side walls of the fireplace would prevent collapse of the walls.


Securing rooms do not open doors by hand or attempt to kick them open. Shoot the door open by firing several rounds through the lock or blast the hinges, use battering rams or blow the door in with explosives. One Marine is positioned to cover inside and out side of the room. Interring rooms first Marine in, decides where next Marine goes. Example; next Marine left/right, second Marine repeats as he inters. Very tactics to avoid patterns. When possible tactics for adjacent buildings should be just opposite previous tactics. Always wear your load bearing equipment (LBE) buckled. If you're wounded, fellow Marines can drag you by the shoulder straps.

New, lighter, body army (with its quick release feature, which saves troops from drowning when they fall into water, or burning if their armor is caught on something during a vehicle accident or attack.


The stack/stick tactics;

The stack term P.O.D. point of dominance, no trooper land, fatal funnel.

Ex of stack, first Marine enters moves to far corner covers back five feet to left. AKA strait long. #2 secures door over back. Left note cover 5 # 2 door way moves two closet corners depends on hinge cover back lets back right cover bottom hooks rides door. #3fallow #1stays short covers front left corner 5’back right corner #4 fallow #2 secures door covers back left note cover five feet from back right explosives Marine.
A Spartan mother’s advice to her son who complained that his sword was too short. Take a step forward.
pausing in doorway to check stern.

1.) Stack Up In this example the element stacks up on one side of the door (where the door handle is
located). R1 is in the prone position, R2 is covering R1 and the opposite side of the door (i.e
hallway). The element leader is between the two teams, and also covers the hallway. B1
covers the right hand side of the stack, while B2 is guarding the rear (i.e. hallway).

2.) Open the door, deploy flash bang While R2 is covering the door, R1 (still in the prone position) opens the door, weapon at the ready. If no immediate threat is encountered, R2 throws in a flash bang.

3.) The fatal funnel R1 enters first, an covers the right half of the room. R2 is following
immediately and covers the left side of the room. B1 and B2 are covering
from the outside, getting ready to enter behind RT. Clear the doorway right
away!

4.) Clearing the room R1 goes to the right far corner, pointing his weapon to the opposite corner.
R2 clears to the near left corner, pointing his weapon to the opposite wall.
The far left corner is called "No-Man's-Land". Never point your weapon to the
direction of a team member

5.) Secure! R1 goes to the right far corner, pointing his weapon to "No-Man's-Land". R2
clears to the near left corner, pointing his weapon to "No-Man's-Land". Never
point your weapon to the direction of a team member!
B1 follows and goes to the near right corner, followed by B2 who stays near
the door and covers it. B1 will cover upper areas (like balcony’s etc.), if there
are any.

The element leader is the last one who enters the room. He then may issue
further orders?

This is proven more effective than the V tactic most SWAT teams up. With the V tactic you stack up on both sides of the door.



Reorganization and exploitation; cleared levels/floors and rooms should be marked (chalk, tape, spray paint or other aerosol sprays that may show with certain sensors), doors should at least be left open. At minimum secured areas or rooms are reported. As rooms are cleared attacker should fortify places as soon as occupying them. In a cleared building, reorganization to repel enemy counterattacks must be rapid. Initially (until S.E. member takes over) selected members of the AE will be assigned to cover potential enemy counterattack routes to any floor or building. The requirements are determined by the type of building and by the nature of adjacent terrain. For example, numerous open spaces require increased fire support to suppress/obscure enemy gunners while reinforcement units move across open terrain. Conversely, areas with numerous covered routes will decrease fire support requirements. On the other hand open areas are easier for one Marine to cover if the only concern is repelling enemy forces.  Deconstruction lumber is used to build later wells. They are pulled up stairs during attack. Have a pre-mission and post-mission checklist to ensure that nothing is left behind. Avg. 30 minutes to clear structure. Thus having taken an enemy position, the Squad cannot relax. They need to regroup, assess the cost of their attack, prepare for possible counter-attack, tend to their wounded and see too any prisoners they may have taken. If swift reinforcement by fresh troops is forthcoming, you can use the newly acquired position as a springboard for your own advance, allowing the original unit’s time to regroup before moving in behind them to take over in turn. If such is not the case, and further advance is necessary, the Squad would have little time to make its preparations before resuming. It is during this point the Squad is most vulnerable to counter-attack, occupying unfamiliar ground the enemy knew well, having expended ammunition, energy and quite likely blood to get there. During WWII, the second most important item of equipment to any Marine, after his weapon, was his entrenching tool. Troops learned to dig at least shallow pits the moment they halted in expectation of the coming barrage. Troops were trained to begin to dig even if the objective they had taken was but one of several they were tasked with that day. This was the only response to the inevitable bombardment they would shortly endure from the defender's artillery and mortar, excepting a night raid. The only way to survive its effects was to dig, deep. Digging in also gave some added protection in case of a feature withdrawal. If no immediate advance was to be ordered though, a more thorough reorganization could begin, shifting quickly from attack to defense. An ideal position would enable the defense to take the approaching enemy from one flank, rather than simply head on. The situation around the unit i.e. Battalion etc. would also need to be assessed. Circumstances could arise where one Battalion had made far better progress than those on its flanks in a major assault. Any feeling of pride in such an achievement would be tempered by the knowledge that the Battalion was actually more vulnerable as a result. It could find itself occupying a ‘bulge’ in the line, meaning instead of there being friendly troops on both flanks there were in fact enemy units. The commander would also be trying to find out what had happened to any units covering his flanks, in case they had faltered and he needed to protect a vulnerable approach by redeploying his own men. The Battalion Commander would also have to decide whether all the gains his troops had made were in fact defensible. It would be highly unlikely that all his subunits had advanced to the same depth. Some units would undoubtedly be pushed further out than others, making for an uneven perimeter. Some units may have to be pulled back to remedy this, a galling prospect for men who had fought hard to take a particular feature only to be told to abandon it shortly afterwards. There was an equally unappealing converse to this situation. His troops may have gained a tenuous hold on a particularly important piece of terrain, pulling back from which would offer the enemy a notable advantage, such as high ground for artillery or other observers. A renewed localized assault could be required to improve the position, or the Marines in place could simply be ordered to hold on until relieved. Senior commanders were always aware that an enemy who had been decisively repulsed and had no extensive lines of defense on which to fall back himself was acutely vulnerable to a rapid counter stroke. Following assault mortars were on call to deliver a salvo against any enemy counterattack delivered against the riflemen in this most vulnerable stage as they shifted from assault to defense. 

(Reference, Step # 2, leadership guidelines, Company Cmdr, “The Reserves”)

Terms; Plumb card and search ticket cards? With the term “search ticket card” IMO it would not be much more info than you would find in my Tri-F under “vehicle check point” section. Rule # 3 defense. Can anyone list these items on a search ticket?

(Reference, Defense, rule # 3, “Vehicle check points”)

Cordon and knock man of house asked out first to give permission for search. More places you search less likely enemy to hide things there again. Longer search time more by standers gathering around area.

(Reference, Step # 3, concepts of operations, part D) general phases of attack, phase four consolidation/exploitation.)

Weapons Conduct;

Small arms as for prepping your weapon for action you should smoke Iron sights, thus insuring a uniform flat black surface to maximize contrasts. However, a black uniformed enemy well blind in with the front sight post of your weapon at a distance. Always work action, to verify functioning of weapon and check ammo. Marines usually carry no more than 12, thirty round magazines. Magazine weight 1¼ lbs each. Place magazines upside down in your pouches to keep dirt out. First few and next to last few rounds in magazine are tracers. First few to indicate aim, next to last few to indicate low on ammo. Use one magazine full of tracers during infiltration and extraction, so the tracers can be used to identify enemy positions to air support. Never chamber round into hot weapon until you intend to fire. Heat expansion causes cook offs and jamming. Ammo cool enough to hold is safe to fire. Average barrel temperature 200-700 degrees. Light rifles have lighter barrels than machine guns, can over heat with 100 rounds in less than a minute. Minimum sustained fire considered to be 36 rpm or 12 three to five round burst per minute. Barrel over heating depends on weather and exposure to sun too. Water cooled systems; a steady steam from jacket meant system was working. Do not let hot parts of weapons contact snow. With rapid cooling barrel will warp. Cold metal becomes brittle. Most braking parts are moving ones i.e. sears, firing pins, operating rods, recoil springs and magazine springs. Damage accurse mostly in beginning stages. When you first open fire, it helps to fire at a low rate of fire. Snow on weapons melts, seeps inside and freezes. Hands can be cupped over breeches to prevent and protect from cold in general. Infantry units should have more pistols for MOUT. There are many situations in buildings where a pistol is better than a rifle. Pistols provide back up weapons when rifles or MGs brake down. Improvised lanyards for the pistols using phone chords. These automatically retract when the pistol was holstered, unlike the straight issued chord. Note; the issued cord would be better for retrieving weapon especially from enemy who might have taken it, i.e. the cord instantly response to your jerking on it. Revolver pros; they can be fired from the holster. Better for using ammo that is not specifically for it, by rapping cartridges with tape to fit snug in the cylinder. Would only be good for close shot. By design, revolvers already leak gas from cylinder and barrel which slows muzzle velocity. In addition leaving more powder residue behind that can be detected by forensics. Revolvers can be cocked with one hand, with out the aid of a table or other corner edge needed with an automatic slide action pistol. No ejected empty casings, thus position of shooter difficult to determine. Cons; are bulky, take longer time to load, especially without quick loads, fewer rounds available too. The 9mm pistols cons, weak springs in the magazines, which tended to cause failure to fire and the tendency of bullets to fall out of magazines not fully loaded.
When moving, use a 30-round magazine in the SAW. Attach a drum in the ORP or once in position in a hasty ambush. SAW drum pouches are tightly fitted and tend to pop open when you drop into the prone. Use cloth tape with quick-release tabs to prevent this.
In MOUT munitions consumption is grater. During first day it can be five times grater than other types of combat.

SP 2000; The Army notes that a rifle company may fire 50,000 rounds in a two-hour battle, and that 95% of this will be suppressive fire intended to keep the enemy's head down, not to hit him.
After this battle the Marines reevaluated their combat load and reduced the amount of ammunition that they carried.  After the battle, Marines normally carried no more than 4 to 6 magazines and one grenade.  In the Company ambush in Bala Baluk no Marine fired more than four magazines in the eight hours of fighting despite the target rich environment.


There is more recon by fire, as well as many glancing blows on hard flat surfaces, 25% of impact fuses will fail. Rounds can be purposely ricocheted, especially on stone streets or sidewalks. Delay fused rounds are better for ricocheted fire. Aim fragmentation round at closed windows or at back wall of opened one, (AP) round at surrounding framework. Bunker apertures/port holes usually weaker then surrounding area. With impact fuse rubble occurs into room, delay fuse rubble out side room thus producing more sprawling. High explosive impact fused rounds achieve excellent results against troops in the open. HE, variable timed fuses, are recommended for discouraging movement in the open. HE, fuse delay, (bursts .05 seconds after impact) are good for penetrating rooftops of structures and causing casualties within structures. The round must penetrate the roof and top floor since experienced city fighters or snipers do not fight from the top floor. Proximity fuses for keeping OPs off rooftops. Mortars are well suited for combat in built-up areas because of their high rate of fire, steep angle of fall, and short minimum range. If the mortar is firing in excess of 885 mils to clear a frontal mask, the enemy counter battery threat is reduced. Chemical munitions are area coverage weapons, smoke or CS is used to clear a built-up area to drive enemy out of fortifications or to canalize the enemy, also to limit collateral damage or civilian casualties. Smoke employed in the defense obscures enemy air and ground observation, thereby limiting the accuracy of weapons and target acquisition. Smoke placed on roof tops i.e. along the horizon, by attacker can prevent defensive observations. Sometimes screening with smoke pots, generators, or artillery smoke munitions should be considered to cover the withdrawal of defending forces or the movement of attacking forces, or indeed the lack there of. Or to conceal attacks with white phosphorus rounds. Phosphorus wounded as shares of phosphorus is exposed to air it would burn again, keep victims rapped up. When covering a built-up area with a smoke haze or blanket, it is essential that all buildings be covered. Failure to obscure tall buildings, towers, and steeples will provide enemy observers with reference points for placement of rounds. Illumination or smoke rounds can be used to reorient maneuver forces.
Grenades: Joke, aka infantry personal artillery. Frag grenade wt one lbs Avg. 4-5 oz of explosive. 3-5 second fuses. Terms of nomenclature, powder train / fuse striker / firing pen igniter or detonator at end of fuse. WW1 frag 22 oz wt, two oz black powder. TNT shattered fragments to much but it was used in WW1. U.S. produced 50 million in WW11. Avg. Battalion used 500 per day. MK-19 40 mm, note rpm fast enough and muzzle velocity slow enough that a belt could be fired before first round impacted. (1960s) wt 140 lbs 9 oz shell, 2km range 17 second flight time. AP round could breach 60 mm of armor. 100 rpm, jammed every 5k rounds. U.S. Battalion equipped with ten weapons. USSR (1970) copy MK -19 the AGS-17 30 mm, wt. 90 lbs, 6 oz shell, 1700 m. max range 100 rpm, jammed every 1k rounds some times exploded. USSR Battalion equipped with eight weapons. M203 DUAL PURPOSE WEAPON (DPW) Significant characteristics of the M203, 40-mm Grenade Launcher, are; Maximum Range 400m, Minimum Safe Firing Range 31m, Minimum Arming Range 14-28m. This must be considered in close-in firing to insure that round will explode. Range at which a .5 i.e. 50% probability of target hit can be expected: Area Target (fire team size unit) 350m, Area Target (Vehicles/Emplacements) 200m, Point Target-Window 125m, Bunker Aperture 50m, Rounds; M651E1 Tactical CS; Effective in driving the enemy from structures, the round has some incendiary characteristics. It could be a fire hazard when used in buildings. M583 White Star Parachute; Is an effective signal and a battlefield illuminant that can be placed 300 meters forward of the squad position to illuminate an area 200 meters in diameter for a period of 40 seconds. XM585 Star Clusters; Are red, white, and green; used for signaling. CAUTION; the green star cluster may appear white in bright sunlight, so save green for night. XM635 Ground Smoke; is used for marking locations; not used for screening. Available in red, yellow, and green.

Hand grenades; AN-M8HC White Smoke and M18 Colored Smoke Grenades. These grenades are used for screening; to supplement screening provided by artillery, mortars, smoke pots or generators; and to mark locations or provide visual signals. Smoke grenades should be carried in or on the pack and not on the LBE (load bearing equipment) you do not fight with smoke grenades, and if you need one, 99 times out of 100, you will have time to get it from your pack. Rap paper tape through the rings of grenades and then tape the ring to the body of the grenade, making at least one rap around the entire ring. The paper tape will tear for fast use, while cloth tape is more difficult and plastic is too difficult. This also reduces noise, and covering the ring hole prevents snagging. However, your finger can still rip threw to grasp the ring for pulling. CS gas grenades are ideal for stopping or slowing down enemy troops and dogs pursuing your team and are effective in damp and wet weather, whereas CS powder will dissipate. WP grenades have a great psychological effect against enemy troops and can be used for the same purpose as CS grenades. The use of CS and WP at the same time will more than double their effectiveness. Keep pilots informed as to the use of smoke and especially WP. They may mistake them for marking rockets indicating an enemy position and attack you. Each team should carry one thermite grenade for destruction of either friendly or enemy equipment. M-34 WP/aka Thermite or incendiary hand grenade, the flame agent ignites when exposed to air, attaches to skin, clothing and continues to burn including the metal casing. Its smoke is not toxic but concentrated in small areas can cause choking and suffocation, smoke grenades too. M34 WP often used to destroy flammable objects, to drive the enemy from structures, or to create smoke screens to conceal movement. CAUTION: The M34 has a 35m bursting radius. MK 33 aka concussion/stun/flash bang grenade 178 decimals four times as high as shot gun. Concussion much greater than frag type. Very effective against troops in enclosed areas this holds true for fragmentation grenades too. Over all MK 33 reduces over all casualties. Minimizes friendly WIA. Stun grenades produce less smoke, fragmentation smoke is light black. MK3 A3 can be used for light demolitions. The MK3A2 offensive hand grenade, commonly referred to as the concussion grenade. The MK3A2 has an effective casualty radius in open areas of 2 meters. In winter or at altitude self-propelled grenade ranges maybe reduced due to slower burning of crimp charges and propellants. Throwing range max 40 m, 10-20 m is common. When throwing during winter hands most be completely dry, heavy mittens reduce range and accuracy. Vigorously throw grenades into rooms or bunkers so they kareem about, denying the enemy an opportunity to throw them back. In addition, at night grenades should only be thrown into these areas. M67 Fragmentation when used with the M213 time fuse, the grenade should be "cooked off" for two seconds to deny the enemy time to throw it back. Use extreme caution when throwing in thick vegetation, up hill or up stairs with upper windows brake glass first, always have cover chosen before throwing. Exploding on floors made of wood will sprawl splinters down to lower floors. (At night, throwing rocks at foe as rouse grenade ploy, the third time you throw a real one). M-34 fragments 35 m from point of det. For the M67 fragmentation grenade the effective kill zone five meter radius, while the casualty-inducing radius is approximately fifteen meters. Explosives 6 oz. wt 14 oz. fuse 4 seconds. Shrapnel cannot penetrate books, bricks, cinder blocks, doors, or sand bags. Causalities 100% with in 2m, 75% with in 4m, 50% with in 6 m, 25% with in 10 m, 5-10 %  15 m, and less than 1% 20 m away. Over all less than 10 % of causalities are KIA.WW11 grenades less effective.
Flash bang Grenade using aluminum powder i.e. when it is exposed to air it burns. Same tech that is behind FAE bombs.

Flame throwers have both physical and psychological effect. They do not require pin point accuracy, but fire most not spread to structures needed by friendly forces. “Blind angle burst” to exploit splattering effects of the thickened fuel, with out exposing gunner (i.e. ricocheting off walls around corners) also “traversing burst” to cover large front. “Wet shot” unlit burst of fuel, lit by subsequent shot. Effective for destroying vehicles, equipment, or troops in basements/caves. Or to booby-trap an area. With a tank, fuel is allowed to seep into crevasses, vision ports or gun ports before it is lit. Flame throwers require no special back blast preparation. Operator most be provided cover while being brought forward. The British were not much taken with the backpack flamethrower, reasoning the operator was extremely vulnerable and had to fire at particularly close range. A vehicle-mounted weapon offered the possibility of much improved range and sustainability. Tank mounted systems had a range of 100 yards with a 60 second stream. Normally multi short bursts are used not a long single stream. Korean era flamethrowers; range 45 yards, 10 second continuous stream (fuel supply). Remote control vehicles can be equipment with flame throwers. No concern for operator, Video images are less detailed and there is no smell. Sound could be turned off too. Over all results less remorse by operators. Flamethrowers first used in WW 1 by Germany than French. British napalm fuel had greater range than gas liquid. M2A1-7 portable flame thrower effective range 20-50 m. M202 and M202A1, Multishot Rocket Launcher (FLASH), range for area fire out to 500 m. bunker aperture 50 m. Warhead a thicken flame agent ignites when exposed to air. Minimum safe combat range 20 m. which is the burst radius of warhead. Has a back blast which must be considered. Operator must still be provided cover. Used to knock out bunkers or fortified positions should be aimed directly at the aperture. Even if the round or burst misses, enough of the flaming material will enter the position to cause casualties. In Chechnya the Russians deployed RPO-A Shmel rocket-powered flamethrowers with a ‘capsule’ warhead containing 4 liters of liquid that produced a flame 4 m wide by 40 m long. It was first employed during the Soviet Afghan War against Mujahideen cave complexes, where it earned the ominous nickname, the ‘Devil’s Tube’ (IMO not tube but DICK). The 2.1 kg thermobaric warhead of the rocket-powered flame has the equivalent power of a 122 mm shell.

The Chechens were also very interested in capturing or obtaining any Shmel thermobaric weapon system available.  The Shmel is a 93mm caliber Russian flamethrower that is 920mm long and weighs 12kg.  It has a maximum range of 1,000 meters, a sighting maximum of 600 meters, and a minimum range of 20 meters.  The Shmel strongly resembles the U.S. Army’s light antitank weapon (LAW) of the 1970s.  The Russian force, to explain extensive damage to buildings in Grozny, stated that the Chechens had captured a boxcar full of Shmel weapons and were now using them indiscriminately. The Shmel was important because both sides realized a "heavy blast" direct-fire weapon system was a must for urban warfare. They also could be used against vehicles and fortified positions as a breaching device.
It was also reported that the Chechens would fire a "fuga" into a window before attacking. A "fuga" was an RPG-7 round with two 400-gram pieces of trotyl explosives attached with adhesive tape. The Chechens also attached napalm to antitank grenades, which would help damage the turret of the target.

RPGs could be used in the direct or indirect (that is, set up like a mortar) fire mode and was effective against people, vehicles, or helicopters as area or point weapons.  Russia used the flamethrower to drive snipers from their nests and clear buildings for the initial entry of Russian forces. 

Machine gun sections;
A four or five man team could realistically transport a gun, tripod and some 1000 rounds, which would enable the weapon to operate for a reasonable duration while further supplies were brought up. Note 1 thousand rounds divided by six round burst equaled 166 burst times three seconds between equals eight minutes of fire. The machine gun was capable of high angle fire against targets beyond obstacles such as trees or buildings, but such fire was largely speculative and judged wasteful of ammunition. The strength of the weapon was that it could literally sweep an area with automatic fire, completely dominating a whole expanse. MGs were not naturally offensive weapons. To operate effectively they needed a fixed position and access to a ready supply of ammunition. That largely limited their use in the ideal fast moving infantry attack. The infantrymen themselves represented something of a problem in that they placed a notable restriction on the gunners’ field of fire. A two gun Section supporting the advance of a Rifle Company in either V shape or arrowhead was faced with a peculiar problem. Once the riflemen left the start line, at which the MGs were located, they would quickly begin to obscure the field of fire. Unless the guns could be sited in some elevated, and by definition vulnerable position, their fire would have to be restricted to certain ‘lanes’ i.e. sectors.  These would mark the boundaries between the advancing Rifle Platoons, and would have to be kept completely clear if the gunners were to operate. Such circumstances notably compromised the effectiveness of the MGs. The solution was flanking fire. This harks back to the basic fire and movement techniques

(Reference, Step # 2, leadership guidelines, Light Machine gun group and COE rule # 3.)


The Section would set up a position to either the left or right of the Company it was detailed to support for an attack. However, it was in the defensive that the MG truly came into its own. A key principle in resisting an enemy assault was to keep his riflemen at bay. That was precisely what the MG was designed for. When deployed as part of a fixed line of defenses, the crews were relieved of the necessity to ‘shoot around’ their own troops. They could then exploit the weapons ability to saturate a whole area with automatic fire, making it impossible for any living thing to move within this sector of fire. Such an area could extend for a depth of 500 - 1000 meters and a breadth of several hundred. That a single gun team of three or four men could accomplish this released at least a Squad to bolster either the line or reserve. MGs operate best in pairs. In the defense, their placement was such that any attempt to outflank one gun brought the assault troops into view of its partner, and vice versa.

(Reference, Step # 2, leadership guidelines, Light Machine gun group and COE rule # 3.)

CIS Army lessons from Grozny

These include:
Culturally orient your forces so you’re not your own worst enemy out of cultural ignorance. Once insulted or mistreated, they became active fighters or supported the active fighters.
You need some way of sorting out the combatants from the non-combatants. The days of uniforms and organized units is over. The Russians were forced to resort to searching the pockets of civilians for military equipment and used dogs for sniffing for gunpowder and gun oil.
The psychological impact of high intensity urban combat is so intense that you need a large reserve to rotate units in and out of combat.
The Russians were surprised and embarrassed at the degree to which the Chechens exploited the use of cell phones, Motorola radios, improvised TV stations, light video cameras, and the Internet to win the information war.
Russians faced lots of snipers, these were dealt with massive fire power.
They found that boundaries between units were tactical weak points, and horizontal boundaries, in some cases, the Chechens held the third floor and above, while the Russians held the first two floors and or roof. If a unit holding the second floor evacuated parts of it without telling the unit on the ground floor, the Chechens would move in and attack the ground floor unit through the ceiling. Often this resulted in fratricide as the ground floor unit responded with uncontrolled fire through all of the ceilings, including the ones below that section of the building still occupied by Russians. Entire battles were fought through floors, ceilings, and walls without visual contact.
Ambushes were common. Sometimes having three tiers. Chechens would be underground, on the ground floor, and on the roof. Each group had a different task in the ambush.
The most common response by the Chechens to the Russian indirect and aerial firepower was hugging the Russian unit. If that halted the support it became a man on man fight if they didn't cease the supporting fires, the Russian units suffered just as much as the Chechens, sometimes even more, and the morale effect was much worse on the Russians.
Chechens weren't afraid of tanks and BMPs. They assigned groups of RPG gunners to fire volleys at the lead and trail vehicles. Once they were destroyed, the others were picked off one-by-one. Chechens chose firing positions high enough or low enough to stay out of the fields of fire of tank and BMP weapons.
Russian wounded and dead were hung upside down in windows of defended Chechen positions. Russians had to shoot at the bodies to engage the Chechens.
Russians were satisfied with the combat performance of most of their Infantry weapons. T-72 tank was dead meat -- too vulnerable, too awkward, not agile, no visibility, poor weapons coverage at short ranges. They were replaced by smaller numbers of older tanks and more self propelled artillery, more ADA weapons, and more BMPs. Precision guided weapons and UAVs were very useful. There was some need for non-lethal weapons, mostly riot gas and tranquilizer gas, not stuff like sticky foam. The Russian equivalent of the M202 Flash flame projector and the Mk 19 grenade launcher were very useful weapons. Ultimately, a strong combined arms team and flexible command and control meant more than the individual weapons use.

Quotations from Timothy Thomas’ paper, Battle for Grozny:  “Mobility was the key to success against the slower and heavier Russian force…  The Chechen force exploited Russian disorientation by moving behind and parallel to the Russian force once it entered the city… Chechens used civil defense as well as underground sewage and water tunnels both to flank and to get into the rear of military units…  Female snipers were rumored to be fighting for the Chechens…  The Chechens fought in a non-traditional way, with rapid mobile units instead of fixed defenses.  One key lesson was the importance of the sniper and the RPG gunner, or a combination of the two.  For example, snipers were employed to draw fire from a Russian force, and then a Chechen ambush position overlooking the activities of the sniper would open fire on the Russian column fighting the sniper.  Additionally, forces could operate successfully in an independent mode.”

However, I can say very briefly that the snipers pin down the supporting infantry while the vehicles are engaged with missiles. Also, anti-tank gunners must signal snipers (with flares or smoke) when they disable a vehicle. The snipers should use dice to determine which quadrant around the vehicle to snipe from to avoid bunching up. The Mongol technique of having horse archers attack and then retreat, staying just ahead of their pursuers while turning to fire over their shoulders, all the while drawing them into an ambush set by concealed lancers, can be duplicated in modern times with motorcycle-mounted snipers in the role of the horse archers and anti-tank gunners in the role of the lancers.



HRT hostage rescue tactics;

Research this subject.

Taliban infantry tactics

Why don’t Taliban use pistols i.e. where are the Jessie James of Afghanistan?
Have the Taliban used the D.C. sniper tactic of Mobil/vehicle shooting platforms?

They are extremely disciplined with all weapons and only engaged targets who were within the effective ranges. Firing their AKs on single shot. Machineguns fired in bursts to conserve ammunition.
This is a dedicated enemy that is not easily frightened: Ineffective suppression is absolutely ineffective. The enemy is not scared by noise. During the fight we observed a fighter calmly aim an RPG while 50 cal rounds were kicking up within a meter of his position. Typically crew served weapons do not dislodge enemy fighters the enemy is unnerved by HE 40mm HE, mortars, and CAS. 

Taliban verses Iraqi’s


Marines say the heavy armor added for protection in Iraq is too rough on the vehicles' transmissions in Afghanistan's much hillier terrain, and the vehicles frequently break down.


The Marines have found other differences:
In Iraq, American forces could win over remote farmlands by swaying urban centers. In Afghanistan, there's little connection between the farmlands and the mudhut villages that pass for towns.

In Iraq, armored vehicles could travel on both the roads and the desert. Here, the paved roads are mostly for outsiders -- travelers, truckers and foreign troops. To reach the populace, American forces must find unmapped caravan routes that run through treacherous terrain.
In Iraq, a half-hour firefight was considered a long engagement; here, Marines have fought battles that have lasted as long as eight hours.

When the Taliban does take on the Marines, it's a different kind of fight, Marines said.
For one, the Taliban will wait until they're ready, not just when an opportunity appears. They will clear the area of women and children. And when the attack comes, it's often a full-scale attack, said one Marine captain and Iraq veteran who asked not to be identified because he wasn't sure he was allowed to discuss tactics.
Afghans "are willing to fight to the death. They recover their wounded, just like we do," said the captain. "When I am fighting here, I am fighting a professional army. If direct fighting does not work, they will go to an IED. ... To fight them, you are pulling every play out of the playbook."



Taliban normally utilize RPGs on mounted forces and small arms on dismounted troops. Often engaged the dismounted at 150 m, vehicles at 200-300m with RPGs and PK MGs, They would suppress the turret gunner with PKs and use volleys of RPGs on the vehicle fronts to start fires, not the troop compartments then wait for the dismount. Outside 300m attacks were with rockets and mortars. They focused fire on heavy weapons or radios.

They have maneuvered on platoons but generally preferred to keep the platoon at a distance and maneuver about the battlefield in defilade i.e. irrigation ditches (karez irrigation ditches) to attack the flanks. These ditches ranged from four to seven feet deep and made any frontal attacks very difficult. They well fight to the death when fixed by fires. The platoon has had great success using vehicles to deceive the enemy into expecting a mounted attack from one direction while attacking them from another direction with dismounted forces.

First the terrain often presented poor off road traffic ability. Use dismounted infantry or air assault. The mujahideen learned to take out command vehicles early in the battle. Command vehicles were always distinguished by extra antennae, and may often come to a stop first and maneuver in a different manner than the rest of a patrol.

The Mujahideen formed special armored-vehicle hunter-killer teams where 50 to 80% of the personnel were armed with RPG-7s. This could be up to 15 RPGs. When there weren't mortars available, these groups also used their RPG-7s as a form of pseudo-artillery and conducted RPG preparation fires. The Soviets tried to stay at least 300 meters away from the Mujahideen--out of AK-47 and RPG- 7 moving target range.

The Mujahideen did vary ambush positions in the same ambush site. Their primary concern was to hit the column where it was the weakest ‐ usually in the middle or rear ‐ unless the purpose was to bottle up the column.

Mujahideen received airline meals in the field.
Airstrip ? looked like a bandaid was used to fix wires to rocket casing for firing.

Deciding where to ambush a long convoy is usually driven by geography, intent and escape routes. If the terrain at the ambush site is very constricted, the guerrilla may want to attack the head of the convoy and block the route with a combination of a road block and burning vehicles.

The Soviet surrendered the initiative in movement control to the Mujahideen and never regained it. Consequently most of the Soviet actions in the area were reactive. In a guerrilla war, the loss of the initiative becomes decisive in the outcome of the tactical combat. What mostly contributed to Mujahideen success in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy was their elaborate planning, secrecy in movement and coordinated action. This became possible through detailed information about the enemy including the size, direction of movement and estimated time of arrival of the enemy convoy to ambush site.


Russian tank barrels were incapable of dealing with hunter-killer teams fighting from basements and second or third-story positions.
The Russians attached ZSU 23-4 and 2S6 track-mounted antiaircraft guns to armored columns to respond to these difficult-to-engage hunter-killer teams.
When the Soviets moved through heavy vegetation in Afghanistan, they would sometimes walk a wall of high-explosive fragmentation rounds in front of the vehicles to keep the RPG gunners at bay--or at least to ruin their aim. This is an expensive option in terms of artillery or mortar rounds, but it does work.
When practical, the best way to protect ground vehicles from the RPG is to put infantry well forward of the vehicles to find and destroy the RPG gunners. Combat vehicles should stay out of urban areas or areas dominated by overwatching terrain and tall trees until the infantry has cleared and posted the area. Moving under smoke or at night also helps. Convoys should have a security escort, smoke laying capability and helicopter coverage. All vehicle drivers should have several smoke grenades.

The Soviet's five divisions, four separate brigades and four separate regiments, and smaller support units of the 40th Army. Soviet strength varied from 90-104,000 troops.
The guerrilla mastery of the roads strangled the Soviet efforts. Soviet equipment losses included 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces or mortars, 1138 communications or CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles and 11,369 trucks. Many of these losses were on the highways, and a key loss was the large amount of cargo carrying trucks.
Soviet dead and missing in Afghanistan amounted to almost 15,000 troops, a modest percent of the 642,000 Soviets who served during the ten‐year war. And the dead tell no tales at home. Far more telling were the 469,685 casualties, fully 73 percent of the overall force, who ultimately returned home to the Soviet Union. Even more appalling were the numbers of troops who fell victim to disease (415,932), of which 115,308 suffered from infectious hepatitis and 31,080 from typhoid fever. Beyond the sheer magnitude of these numbers is what these figures say about Soviet military hygiene and the conditions surrounding troop life.

Approximately 620,000 Soviets served in Afghanistan. Of these, 525,000 were in the Soviet Armed Forces while another 90,000 were in the KGB and 5,000 were in the MVD. The Soviets invested much national treasure and lost 13,833 killed. Of their 469,685 sick and wounded, 10,751 became invalids.

Soviets refered to the Muj. As (Doosh-manh). Muj. Called the Kalashnikovs (Khali-kovs or Alah-kovs).

Mechanized forces usually fight effectively only when dismounted and when using their carriers for support or as a maneuver reserve. Ample engineer troops are essential for both sides.

The Soviet Ground Forces developed the bronegruppa concept to use the firepower of the personnel carriers in an independent reserve once the motorized rifle soldiers had dismounted. It was a bold step, for commanders of mechanized forces dislike separating their dismounted infantry from their carriers. However, terrain often dictated that the BMPs, BMDs and BTRs could not follow or support their squads. [The bronegruppa is a temporary grouping of four-five tanks, BMPs or BTRs or any combination of such vehicles. The BMPs (tracked combat vehicles) or BTRs (wheeled combat vehicles) are deployed without their normally assigned infantry squad on board and fight away from their dismounted troops. The grouping has a significant direct fire capability and serves as a maneuver reserve.] The bronegruppa concept gave the commander a potent, maneuverable reserve which could attack independently on the flanks, block expected enemy routes of withdrawal, serve as a mobile fire platform to reinforce elements in contact, serve as a battle taxi to pick up forces (which had infiltrated or air landed earlier and had finished their mission), perform patrols, serve in an economy of force role in both the offense and defense, and provide convoy escort and security functions. APC gun turnets lacked elevation to engage Muj. On steep cliffs along roads.

In general, the Soviet ground soldier remained tied to his personnel carrier and to the equipment which was designed to be carried by that personnel carrier. Consequently, the standard flak jacket weighed 16 kilograms (35 pounds). This was acceptable when dismounting a carrier and assaulting for less than a kilometer. However, a dismounted advance of three kilometers in flak jackets would stall due to troop exhaustion.
Armored vehicles were restricted to the roads and valley floors.

Without the ton or more of added armor, American hummer vehicles can speed across bad roads, or open terrain. But the weight of armor makes the hummer more difficult to maneuver cross country, or on bad roads, and requires driving at slower speeds to avoid damage to the suspension or other mechanical components. The Taliban prefer unarmored pick-up trucks or SUVs, which can quickly get away from the lumbering American vehicles.
If the Taliban take off on foot, they are also faster and more agile, because they are not carrying 30 or more pounds of body armor (vest and helmet). If the chase is close, the Taliban will drop most of what they are carrying (except their weapon) in order to get away.

The Afghans also fight differently than the Iraqis. For one thing, the Afghans are not as suicidal, and plan more carefully. The Iraqis favored the ambush, using fewer than a dozen people and a roadside bomb. The Iraqis were also enthusiastic about suicide bombers and using civilians as human shields. The Afghans prefer large scale attacks, carefully planned, and away from civilians.
But the Afghans will not shoot and run, like the Iraqis. The Afghans will shoot it out for hours, trying to drag out the battle until nightfall (when they have a better chance of sneaking away, in spate of U.S. night vision equipment.)
The Afghans are clever in that they will observe an American unit for days, weeks, or months, trying to find a weakness they can exploit. You cannot afford to get sloppy around the Afghans, because if they catch that lapse, they will exploit your mistake.

RPGs tactics

Firing RPG from prone laying perpendicular.

IMO RPGs being used as anti little human tank tactic, solider mentioning how he could not roll back over in a trench etc after he had fallen down. IMO way to much gear.
The Soviet Army assigned one RPG-7 per motorized rifle squad. Forces involved in regional conflicts tend to add more RPGs to their organizations. In the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian 11-man squad had two RPG-7 gunners. In the Soviet-Afghan War, the Mujahideen averaged one RPG for every 10-12 combatants in 1983-1985 by 1987, two RPG-7s for every 10-12 combatants.
The Spetsnaz were not authorized RPG-7s in their TO&Es. Instead, they were issued RPG-16s or RPG-22s. The RPG-16s and RPG-22s lacked the range and punch of the RPG-7, so Spetsnaz used captured Chinese and Pakistani RPG-7s. They preferred these RPGs to the Soviet model since they are lighter, and have a folding bipod and a carrying handle. 
The antitank round has a lethal bursting radius of 4 meters.
The Mujahideen learned that the best way to destroy a vehicle was to engage it with two or three RPGs simultaneously from a range of 20-50 meters. The chances of hitting the target with a lethal shot are greatly increased by firing a number of shots at close range. Further, the vehicle has fewer counter options. Rpg gunner’s operated with an infantry i.e. assistant crewman, and changed positions after every shot.

The current RPG 7 weighs about 17 pounds, with most grenades weighing five pounds each.
The real damage from RPG fire was the fragments from the exploding grenades. Even the anti-tank round (the most common fired by the RPG) would throw out wounding fragments for 10-15 feet. These rarely killed, but troops were often wounded
Most RPG anti-tank rounds can penetrate 12-20 inches of ordinary armor.
Without much practice, a user can hit a vehicle sized target most of the time at ranges of 50-100 meters. As an operator fires more rounds, he becomes capable of hitting stationary targets at up to 500 meters, and moving targets at 300 meters. It's this last skill that has made the RPG dangerous against helicopters.
Irregulars also like using the RPG as a form of artillery. Get a bunch of RPGs firing at the same area say, a kilometer away, and you will do some damage to any people walking around. The rather more rare (and expensive) anti-personnel RPG rockets will spew out fragments up to 30 feet or more.

The RPG launcher costs anywhere from $100-$500 (lots of second hand stuff out there.) The most common RPG ammo is the anti-tank rocket and these go for $50-100 each.
Actually, many troops have expressed an interest in just getting the RPG, which has a larger (6 pound) warhead, and is a lot cheaper (the RPG launcher goes for about $500 each, brand new, and the more advanced rockets can be had for under a hundred dollars each).

The RPG-29 is the most common recent development of the RPG line. It entered production just before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. It is available through legitimate, or black market, arms dealers and is more expensive than the RPG-7 (which is manufactured by many countries.) RPG-29 launchers cost over $500 each, and the rockets go for about $300 each.
With a ten pound launcher firing a 14.7 pound 105mm rocket, the RPG-29 warhead is designed to get past some forms of reactive armor (ERA). The larger weapon (3.3 feet long when carried out, six feet long when ready to fire and 65 percent heavier than the 85mm RPG-7) is more difficult to carry around and fire, but has an effective range of 500 meters. The warhead can also penetrate five feet of reinforced concrete.

Soviet equipment
losses included 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces or mortars, 1138 communications or CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles and 11,369 trucks. Many of these losses were on the highways, and a key loss was the large amount of cargo‐carrying trucks.
Soviet strength varied from 90‐104,000 troops. The Soviet's five divisions, four separate brigades and four separate regiments, and smaller support units of the 40th Army.
However, terrain often dictated that the BMPs (tracked), BMDs and BTRs (wheeled) could not follow or support their squads. BTKs?
Forces were up‐gunned with extra machine guns, AGS‐17 and mortars.
[The bronegruppa is a temporary grouping of four‐five tanks, BMPs or BTRs‐or any combination of such vehicles. The BMPs (tracked combat vehicles) or BTRs (wheeled combat vehicles) are deployed without their normally assigned infantry squad on board and fight away from their dismounted troops. The grouping has a significant direct‐fire capability and serves as a maneuver reserve.]

The bronegruppa concept gave the commander a potent, maneuverable reserve which could attack independently on the flanks, block expected enemy routes of withdrawal, serve as a mobile fire platform to reinforce elements in contact, serve as a battle taxi to pick‐up forces (which had infiltrated or air‐landed earlier and had finished their mission), perform patrols, serve in an economy‐of‐force role in both the offense and defense, and provide convoy escort and security functions.
The soldier was never supposed to be more than 200 meters from his carrier. Consequently, the standard flak jacket weighed 16 kilograms (35 pounds). This was acceptable when dismounting a carrier and assaulting for less than a kilometer. However, a dismounted advance of three kilometers in flak jackets would stall due to troop exhaustion.

Senior leaders may find invaluable insights into the dangers and opportunities tactical units under their command may face in limited wars. Above all, the lessons in this book should help small unit leaders understand the need for security, deception, patrols, light and litter discipline, caution, vigilance, and the ability to seize the initiative in responding to unpredictable enemy actions and ambushes.

Soviet dead and missing in Afghanistan amounted to almost 15,000 troops, a modest percent of the 642,000 Soviets who served during the ten‐year war. And the dead tell no tales at home. Far more telling were the 469,685 casualties, fully 73 percent of the overall force, who ultimately returned home to the Soviet Union. Even more appalling were the numbers of troops who fell victim to disease (415,932), of which 115,308 suffered from infectious hepatitis and 31,080 from typhoid fever. Beyond the sheer magnitude of these numbers is what these figures say about Soviet military hygiene and the conditions surrounding troop life.

Units us corps x two divisions 1 armor cavalry regular and sup units. USSR army time four division and sup units each division of US and USSR time 12-16 Bn

ww11 average west division 10 AFV per 1k troop today 100 per 1k troops.

OEF Gazette Oct. 2010

The Taliban leaders quickly learned through spotters that the platoon had left the FOB, and they monitored the platoon’s route via additional spotters. Several leaders were to meet in the village that day, and as a result, over 100 insurgents were in the village.
During an ambush the Taliban were expecting the large irrigation canal west of the road to prevent vehicles from moving in their direction. They were surprised to see the tanks cross the 7-foot gap, followed by the infantry.
Tanks fire control system can provide accurate target location information for rapid cueing of other weapons systems, with the provision of 10 digit plus elevation coordinates for GPS guided munitions.
Scanning their sector with the tanks thermal sights, the section of M1A1s indentified the mortar firing point just after the first rounds impacted at a range of 3900 meters.
For counter mobility and mobility operations, every tank platoon will have one track-width mine plow and one dozer blade. There are also plans to fit tanks with mine rollers, giving every tank platoon and tank company mobility support.
Leopard 2 tanks have proven extremely capable of operating in areas where wheeled vehicles could not travel and have made it far more difficult for the Taliban to predict likely avenues of approach for friendly coalition forces. Taliban fighters seem reluctant to attack targets that had attached tank escort.
The latest rounds M1028 Canister round 1100 tungsten steel balls or the multipurpose high explosive MPHE round with air burst fuse settings can engage targets accurately out to 4000 meters.
A Marine tank company deploying to Afghanistan would be less than 100 Marines but would be equipped with 14 M1A! tanks and 2 M88A2 Hercules tank retrievers.

End of added notes.

Characteristics of military operations in cold climates and or mountains (MT):





Mountains are generally classified as low (600 to 1500 meters), medium (from 1500 to 3500 meters) and high-altitude (above 3600 meters). Siachin Glacier has the distinction of being the world's highest battlefield at 19K’. The Indian and Pakistani armies facing each other on this battlefield have been credited as being the foremost experts of high-altitude warfare. Casualties 80 % have been directly related to either cold or high altitude.
Five categories of altitude; Low altitude sea level to 5K’. Here, arterial blood oxygen saturation is 96 %. Moderate altitude from 5K to 8K’. No special conditioning or acclimatization require. Arterial blood oxygen saturation 92 %. High altitude extends from 8K to 14K’, arterial blood oxygen saturation ranges from 80-92 %. Altitude illness is common. Very high altitude from 14K to 18K’, altitude illness is the rule. Areas above 18K’ are considered Extreme altitudes. Altitude effects on available oxygen in air, at 100 meters or 328’ there is 99% as much oxygen available compared to sea level, 1000 m or 3280’ = 89%, 1500 m or 7921’ = 84%, 2000 m or 6561’ = 79%, 3000 m = 70%, 4000 m = 62%, 5000 m = 54%.

High altitudes are characterized by extreme cold, strong winds, thin air, intense solar and ultraviolet radiation, heavy fogs, deep snow, rapidly changing weather, including thunderstorms and blizzards the later can cut off outside contact for a week or longer. Avalanches and rockslides are not uncommon. Although jungle or forest may hug the mountain base, trees do not grow past 10K to 11,500 ft. depending on the latitude.

(Reference, Step # 3 concept of operations; Part B)


Medical concerns;
Acute altitude sickness (AMS) can occur at altitudes higher than 2,500 to 3,000 meters, which is lower than Pikes Peak. Disappearance of the symptoms of AMS (from four to seven days) does not indicate complete acclimatization. The incidence and severity of AMS symptoms vary with initial altitude, the rate of ascent, and the level of exertion and individual susceptibility. Athletes are no less likely to experience AMS than sedentary individuals. Some people just can’t adapt readily to high altitude. Occasionally Marines who originate from below 18k’ may suddenly lose adaptation know as chronic MT. sickness. Marines can also fall victim to High-altitude pulmonary edema (HAPE), or high-altitude cerebral edema (HACE).

(Reference, acclimatizing hypoxia hypoxemia)


Rules to avoid dying form altitude sickness;
Learn the early symptoms and be willing to recognize when you have them. Keep in mind your Judgment and thus self-evaluation well become impaired. The diagnosis of altitude sickness requires a high index of suspicion. Be advised: "If you are not doing well at altitude, its altitude illness until proven otherwise." Some of the behavioral effects are the same as a person who is intoxicated; irregular breathing, rapid hart beat, shortness of breath, slurred speech, headaches, loss of appetite, nausea, vomiting and loss of balance i.e. can’t walk a straight line. Decreased vigilance or concentration and memory. Increased errors in performing i.e. simple mental tasks. Increased lethargy or irritability, depression. Severe fatigue, sleep disturbances i.e. sleeplessness. Virtually all people who sleep above 10K ft. have an alteration in the control of their breathing during sleep. The result is a form of periodic breathing in which increasingly deep breaths are followed by a brief (5-30 second) period of apnea. The cycle then repeats itself. If the apnea episode is prolonged, the person may awaken suddenly with a profound sense of dyspnea. Awakening suddenly in a tent at high altitude feeling that one can’t breathe can be a frightening experience, and is often mistaken for the onset of HAPE. An immediate improvement upon awakening usually means that pulmonary edema is not present. Nocturnal awakening with dyspnea has triggered panic attacks. If periodic breathing at altitude is disturbing to the Marine, medics may prescribe 125mg of acetazolamide before bed. Also for AMS acetazolamide and dexamethosone, but only under medical supervision. Indigenous populations at high altitude often use narcotics, such as coca or hashish, to help manage the pain and stress of high altitude. Other treatments include evacuating to a lower altitude (a descent of at least 1,000 ft. for at least 24 hrs). Never ascend to sleep at a higher altitude with any symptoms of altitude sickness. Descend if your symptoms are getting worse while resting at the same altitude.

Acclimatization to altitude;
Deployments in mountains requires acclimatization before undertaking operations. Immediately upon arrival at high elevations, only minimal physical work can be performed because of physiological changes. Vigorous activity during ascent or within the first 24 hrs after ascent will increase both the incidence and severity of AMS symptoms. Acclimatization to height varies much more among individuals than that for heat. Some people adjust very easily others cannot get above 10K ft. The process of adjustment continues for weeks or months. Both acclimatization and the onset of altitude sickness take time, generally from 6-48 hrs to occur. So, visiting a high altitude for a few hours will not necessarily predict what will happen once one spends the night at that altitude. No reliable screening methods exist to determine who will be a good acclimatizer or not. History is best indicator. The ease with which someone can acclimatize is fairly consistent from trip to trip. For example, someone who dose well on a ski patrol at 10K ft. will not necessary do well if he or she flies to 10K ft. and spends the night. However, someone who has flown to 10K ft. in the past and done well will likely do well the next time. Someone who flew to 10K ft. and woke up with a headache the next day will probably have the same result the next time, and maybe a candidate for acetazolamide prophylaxis (see medic for medication advice). Acclimatization seems to have lots to due with genetics. Indigenous people can adjust to living at 18k’ for long periods of time and can make short visits to 28k’ with out sickness. These physiological changes i.e. adaptations are pronounced among mountain people who have lived in cold, high altitudes for generations. Compared to lowlanders, their bodies are short, squat, stocky, and barrel-chested, and their hands and feet are stubby. Their hearts are bigger and slower beating and their capillaries are wider. Their bodies contain 20 % more red blood cells (and hemoglobin in the blood) than lowlanders' do and these red blood cells are larger. The alveoli in their lungs are more open for oxygen absorption. Many develop a fatty epithelial pouch around the eyes to counteract cataract and snow blindness. They also consider 20/15 vision the bench mark for best vision where 20/20 is considered best vision in a modern western orientated population were much less time is spent out doors, exercising eye muscles.

The altitude at which complete acclimatization is possible is not a set point but for most (with proper ascent, nutrition and physical activity) it is about 14K ft. Despite all training and efforts, acclimatization is not possible at heights over 18K ft. (5418 meters) in fact attempts to acclimatize beyond 17K ft. results in a degradation of the body greater than the benefits gained. Thus exposure at these heights must be limited and closely supervised i.e. Marines at high altitudes need to be rotated out every 10 to 14 days. The indigenous populations can out-perform even the most acclimatized and physically fit Marine. The expectation that freshly deployed, unacclimatized troops can go immediately into action is unrealistic. Troops can acclimatize by appropriate staging techniques. Exposure should be conducted at progressively higher altitudes, starting at about 8K’ and ending at 14K’(no more than an additional 300 meters per day above 3,000 meters) is also a general rule. The Indian army acclimates its troops over a 14-day schedule with increases in altitude at 6 days, 4 days and then another 4 days.
Other rules of thumb to consider; if the change in elevation is large and abrupt AMS may begin at 8K ft. 10 to 20 % who ascend rapidly (in less than 24 hours) to altitudes up to 6K ft. Non-acclimatized can lose up to 50 % of their normal physical efficiency. Rapid ascent to elevations of 10K’ causes mild symptoms in 50 %, 12K’ to 14K’ will result in moderate symptoms in over 75 % and 12 to 18 % may have severe symptoms. Rapid ascent to 17,500’ causes severe, incapacitating symptoms in almost all individuals. Understanding acclimatization with a concept known as the "acclimatization line." A unit’s Marines standing at sea level would each have a hypothetical line of around 9K ft. below which they will feel fine, and above which they would experience symptoms of altitude illness. The height of this acclimatization line would vary genetically with each Marine. If a Marine ascends to altitude, but stays below the acclimatization line, there will be no symptoms, and the process of acclimatization can take place. After a night at 9K ft. one’s acclimatization line will rise, perhaps to 11K ft. If one moves up the next day to 11,300 ft. one would remain asymptomatic and continue to acclimatize. However, if the Marine moves up to 11,800 ft. symptoms of AMS would ensue. It appears that if one’s symptoms begin to occur very near to the acclimatization line, the body can continue to adjust, and a day’s rest at the same height will result in resolution of symptoms. If the symptoms at 11,800 ft. are ignored however, and the Marine moves up another 1500 ft. or so, the symptoms will continue to worsen and further adaptation will not take place. It is then necessary to get below the point where the symptoms began in order to start seeing improvement. This last point illustrates why it is so dangerous to ascend with any symptoms of altitude illness.

Acclimatization to temperatures;

Recognition of heat illnesses at higher altitudes may not be as apparent as at lower altitudes, because sweat evaporates very quickly. Measures to avoid dehydration and salt loss are extremely important. The risk of sunburn, particularly to the uncovered face, is greater in mountains than on the desert floor due to thinner atmosphere. Troops who have been sweating heavily before the temperature starts to drop, should take their wet shirts off and place them over relatively dry shirts and sweaters. This may have to be leader supervised and disciplined in the same manner as water consumption. Daily temperature variations make layering of clothing essential.
Basic Principles of Keeping Warm
Remember C-O-L-D to keep warm in winter.
Keep clothing Clean.
Avoid Overheating.
Wear Clothing Loose and in Layers.
Keep clothing Dry
Heat Production
The body's three main physiological means for producing heat are metabolism, exercise, and shivering.
Metabolism; Biochemical reactions which keep us alive produce heat as a by-product. Our basal metabolic rate is a constant internal furnace. When we are exposed to cold, for long periods, metabolism by itself does not produce enough heat to satisfy our body's entire heat requirements.
Exercise; muscles, which make up 50 % of our body weight, produce most of our heat during work. Short bursts of vigorous, physical effort generate heat. Moderate levels of exercise can be sustained for longer periods, there are limitations, however. Physical conditioning, strength, stamina, and fuel in the form of food and water are necessary to sustain activity.
Shivering; is a random, quivering of our muscles. It produces heat at a rate five times greater than our basal metabolic rate. It is our first defense against cold. Shivering occurs when temperature receptors in the skin and brain sense a decrease in body temperature and trigger the shivering response. As with work and exercise, the price of shivering is fuel. How long and how effectively we shiver is limited by the amount of carbohydrates stored in muscles and by the amount of water and oxygen available.
Heat Loss; There are five mechanisms by which our bodies lose heat. Note recall RRCCE pronounced R-see.
Respiration cools the body. As a Marine breathes in cold dry air, it is warmed and humidified in the lungs. As it is exhaled, as much as 25 percent of the body's heat can be lost. Placing a wool scarf or mask over the mouth and nose warms inhaled air and assists in keeping the body warm. NOTE A/c breather to cool the body?
Radiation is the emission of heat energy in the form of particles or waves. Energy is emitted by one body, transmitted through an intervening medium, and absorbed by another body. Infrared, or heat radiation, is transferred from a relatively hot to a relatively cold object. In winter, we lose heat to the environment through radiation. We receive radiative heat from the sun, fires, and reflections off snow, water or light-colored rocks.
When exposed to the environment, the skin serves as a radiator. Unlike the rest of the body, the blood vessels in the head (feet and hands?) do not constrict and reduce the blood supply flowing to the scalp. The head is, therefore, an excellent radiator of heat, eliminating from 35 to 50 % of our total heat production. In cold weather operations, dry insulation, especially on the head, is essential in minimizing heat loss. Hence the primary means of heat loss is through the skin.
Conduction; is the transfer of heat through direct contact between a relatively hot and a relatively cold object. Heat moves from the warmer to the colder object. We lose heat when we lie on snow, ice, and cold or wet frozen ground or sit or lean against floors and bulkheads in unheated interiors of vehicles. (Bird chicken bones and feathers to cool the body)
Convection; is the transfer of heat by the circulation or movement of relatively colder ambient environment (air or water) around the body.
Evaporation; is heat loss in the form of vapor. Heat is necessary for the evaporation of perspiration from the skin's surface. Evaporative heat loss accounts for 20 % of the body's normal total heat loss. When we become overheated through physical exertion, evaporation becomes our major mechanism for heat loss. Sweating accounts for roughly two thirds of our evaporative heat loss; the remaining one third is lost through breathing.

Note on dehydration; the tissues in the lungs are wet and warm. They have to be in order to work. No liquid there, no breathing. It's as simple as that. Cold air can still hold moisture, but not a whole lot. The amount of water vapor that can be held in the air decreases with temperature decrease. That means when you take a parcel of air and warm it up, it's capacity to hold moisture increases. It actually doubles for every 10 degree Celsius increase in temperature. The Relative Humidity greatly affects the rate of evaporation. Relative Humidity is defined as "The amount of water vapor an air mass can hold compared to the amount of water vapor it is currently holding." So a relative humidity of 80% means the air is holding 80% of the water that it can hold. Let's now look at what happens to the cold outside air as it enters the lungs. When you breathe in cold air, its capacity to hold moisture increases dramatically as it warms up. Air that went in at a relative humidity of 80% at freezing may now have a RH of 10% which means it can now hold 70% more water than when it came in to the lungs. The air draws the water out of your lung tissue like it or not. This dries out the inside of your lungs and your body replaces the moisture as fast as it can. This means you now have to drink more water to keep up with the loss. It is way too easy to dehydrate in the winter. Co-incidentally, when you breathe out again, the air cools off and looses its ability to hold moisture, reaches 100% RH and forms a cloud.
Eating snow to replace the water lost by breathing and working can be dangerous. When the snow melts in your mouth, it cools off the body. Ever eat ice cream to cool off on a hot day? Same thing happens in the winter. If you're shivering, (first stage of hypothermia) eating snow will cool you off even more and make the situation worse. However, if you're starting to overheat, by all means, go ahead and eat clean snow. It will cool you off and solve the pesky overheating problem.

Other medical concerns;
UV eye protective goggles should be used when the sun is shining through fog or clouds; a bright, cloudy day is deceptive and can be as dangerous to the eyes as a day of brilliant sunshine. The sunglasses are worn to shade the eyes from the rays of the sun that are reflected by the snow. Snow blindness is similar to sunburn, in that a deep burn may be received before discomfort is felt. To prevent snow blindness, sunglasses must be used from the start of exposure. Waiting for the appearance of discomfort is too late. The condition heals in a few days without permanent damage once unprotected exposure to sunlight is stopped. The risk of snow blindness is increased at high altitudes because the clear air allows more sunlight to penetrate the atmosphere. If sunglasses are lost or broken, a substitute can be improvised by cutting thin (IMO 1/16 inch) by 3 cm (l") long slits through a scrap of wood or cardboard approximately 15 cm (6") long and 3 cm (1") wide. (This works because the suns rays are vertical vs. horizontal slit of Eskimo goggles).
Everyone well experience an impairment of night vision and constriction in peripheral vision (up to 30 % at 6K’). Personnel who have had radial keratotomy corrective eye surgery should not go to high altitudes because their vision may permanently cloud.

Superficial bullet and shrapnel wounds can quickly turn fatal at altitude. Soviet experience in the mountains of Afghanistan proved that 13 to 15 men might be involved in carrying one patient. Exertion at altitude is difficult and the stretcher party has to provide its own security as well. Patients cannot be effectively treated at altitude, but have to be evacuated to lower altitudes to survive.

General combat tips

Employment of the local population is most advantageous. Units will make more use of local populations, for intelligence about terrain and weather. Aircraft well be used more for weather, recon, and messages. Aerial photos oblique as well as vertical must be studied. In winter, short hours of daylight, fog, snowfall, blizzards, whiteouts, and drifting snow, especially above tree line, drastically limit visibility. At times, an overcast sky and snow-covered terrain create a phenomenon called flat light, which makes recognition of irregularities in the terrain extremely difficult. Heavy snow can change topography making rally points difficult to recognize, shadows and dark objects appear darker than usual. Snow and ice on crest blasted by the winds will be sculptured into odd- shaped drifts. It is relatively easier to conceal troops in barren mountains than on the desert floor due to rugged ground, deep shadows (especially at dawn and dusk), and the difficulties an observer encounters when establishing perspective. (Sinai) With barren mountains, the normal type camouflage net, which breaks up outline by shadow, maybe used rather than the overall cover normally used in the desert. NOTE one Marine moving out from under netting carrying tether rope for extension netting. Rope shot out in front of patrol over a tree branch or some anchor to secure rope to be used to string netting across route. Carefully placed rocks can be used to hide equipment, however rocks well chip and splinter under small arms fire.

Keep in mind Marines must be in peak physical condition. And will require additional stimuli and energy. Calorie intake of up to 6K calories per day. Short, wiry Marines are preferred to tall, muscular Marines. Those selected should have above-average intelligence to allow them to more-readily adapt to the trying terrain. Even the physically fit Marine experiences physiological and psychological degradation when at high elevations. During the first few days at high altitude, leaders have extreme difficulty in maintaining a coordinated unit.

Air transportation may be limited by scarcity of landing sites. Marines delivered by helicopters are less fatigued for fighting. Helicopters are inhibited by altitude and rugged terrain. Payloads and endurance are degraded due to thin air at attitude. Winds are turbulent with considerable fluctuations in air flow strength and direction, particularly on the lee side of mountains. These winds, combined with the terrain, produce extra strain on crews as they have little margin for error. Air assaults from 8K-10K ft. are best conducted by the CH-47. Helicopters providing excellent mobility but no surprise. NOTE pilots oxygen required? Fuel tanks are completely filled with the correct fuel and oil mixture to eliminate condensation. Pilots should never follow a predictable route, including rivers, canyons, streets or roads, for any length of time. Keep intervals of at least 500 yards so all aircraft are free to maneuver and fire guns. Avoid ground lights at night even a trash barrel fire can illuminate the rotors. If aircraft not available, reserves may have to be split up and placed behind key terrain, immediately available. Infantry must seek restrictive terrain to naturalize an enemy's mounted or air mobility advantage. If retrograde (moving backwards) operations are necessary, mountainous terrain is as good a place to conduct them as anywhere. More time is required to reconnoiter and prepare rearward positions. Unlike the desert floor where movement between positions is likely to cover relatively great distances, movement in these conditions is usually from ridge to ridge. Routes must be covered by flank guards, especially at defiles.

Terrain and weather gives battle a piece meal character. There are few approach routes and most of those are along valleys, which are covered by air defense and infantry forces using massed fire. Mountains restrict effective bombing and strafing by jet aircraft.
Time and space factors are extremely fluid. Varying sharply in response to weather and altitude, distance is measured in terms of time and energy. Distance between two points is as much vertical as horizontal. Up hill very slow, down hill can be very fast. This can be important with calculating return tip. More time required for Medical evacuations and all phases of operations. Extreme northern latitudes/Tundra terrain permits unrestricted maneuvers.
Patrols are used extensively to harass the enemy and prevent infiltration. With both environments, it is common to have small units widely dispersed, operating at great distances from other small units or there Command organizations. Requires extra radios, radars/sensors for the numerous OPs or LPs and other positions. Decentralization leads to poor control, more of a problem for offence.
In extreme north, tundra or mountains objectives should be limited, operations are conducted for specific goals, and this is true for Desert ops too. Strong points are easy to isolate and are buy passed more. Key objectives dominate terrain; vantage points for artillery and observation are a must.

Assaults; raid basics apply i.e. normally incorporate an assault element, a security element and a fire support element.
Modifying the TOE of units is likely. Example, an antitank platoon may not be necessary. The mobility, versatility in weapons and the self sufficient nature of the infantry unit, means they well do most of the fighting. In mountain, warfare (MT) mass is not as important as speed, where numbers are often a con, along with road bound vehicles. As a rule of thumb skies are left in a pre-assault position, as close combat on foot is easier to execute. Conversely deep snow may force unit to close on objective on skies. You can advance or retreat with fogs on MT. slopes, attack right behind storms. During blizzards or blowing snow the attacker should if possible keep 3200 mils, 180 degree arch to enemy unit’s stern or flank. Attack out of sun. Units well conduct more Night operations, the best opportunities are at night or during very poor visibility. Day time mostly spent in defense on reverse slopes. In extreme northern latitudes there are lots of flanking and frontal attacks on broad fronts. MT. Flank attacks on foot take a lot of time. Frontal attacks in day light through narrow sectors have little chance.
“Move alongside a column of troops 300 to 500 yards from them. Inside 200 yards you are vulnerable to SAWs and RPGs. Outside 600 yards you are vulnerable to artillery and air strikes. Stay in the safety zone; fire when there is an obstacle to shoot over such as a ditch.” And or when there is cover and or at least concealment. MT. particularly well suited for surprise ambushes lots of cover. Under favorable circumstances, the enemy can only see as far as 100 yards into open woods. (Note capabilities of sensors at angles to forest while in flight). In woods, Marines can be equipped with armor piercing ammo. Unnecessary vertical foot or vehicle movement should be avoided. Do not easily i.e. readily give up elevation gained. Make every effort to secure ground higher than enemy positions to allow the attack to be downhill. It may be possible to infiltrate to a position behind the enemy, preferably using the most difficult and hence unlikely route. Although this is very slow, it normally has the advantage of surprise. Positions in the enemy's stern might provide opportunity to kill the enemy as they reposition for or during their counterattack. The importance of dominate terrain, together with the enemy's knowledge that troops on the objective will be physically tired and dehydrated, makes an immediate counterattack lucrative. Reserves should be kept centrally located and or deployed by air to block or counterattack.

Weapons employment


Field artillery observation posts are emplaced on the highest ground available, although in low-cloud conditions it will be necessary to ensure that they are staggered in height. Predicting fire (i.e. firing tables) may be inaccurate due to rapidly changing weather conditions also making observed fire the best method. It may be difficult to find good gun positions at lower altitudes due to crest clearance problems so high-angle fire is often used. Artillery positions should be on reverse slopes and as close to the crest as possible-considering crest clearance and flash-cover. Individual guns should be sited in terrain folds and other places where they are naturally concealed. Artillery cannot be readily moved where there are not roads. Artillery positions are usually located where ammunition can be delivered-in valleys, villages, and near road heads.  Mortars are frequently more effective than guns or howitzers (due to high-angle fire). They are easier to shift around, can better engage reverse slopes and can be moved closer to the forward posts. In general, the best weapons are light artillery and mortars that are airmobile and can be manhandled so they can be positioned as high as possible. There is limited use for self-propelled weapons, although they may be used in valleys. It’s difficult to provide cover fire, especially for troops attacking down hill on reverse slopes. With snow and soft ground the effects of supporting fires over all is lessened.


(Reference Defense, over all tips, “There is considerable divergence of opinion” with reverse slopes etc.)



Mobility;
Because of difficulty in re-supply, the supply points will become especially lucrative targets. Bridges tunnels and passes are very important.

Because of the frequent interdictions of mountain roadways, military police are used to expedite traffic movement to the front. More engineer troops are needed, major tasks for engineers; Assist in selection, construction, improvement, and route repair, bridging or drainage to counter the problem of flash flooding and the denial of all to the enemy. De-mining is important due to the limited number of routes.

Vehicles;
Wheeled-vehicle transportation (trucks, mules, snowmobiles) should be employed as far forward as possible.
In Afghanistan, Canadian Army used small unit support vehicles (SUSV) i.e. quad runners to move over the terrain at high-altitude, allowing the infantry to ride or transport their loads into battle. These vehicles afforded some small arms protection.
Trucks, helicopters, mechanical mules, and snowmobiles (snow mobiles are capable of climbing 40 degree slopes) are key to mountain logistics, but above 13K ft. the logistics effort shifts to the backs of mules and porters.
Gasoline-powered trucks are clearly preferred over diesel. As the truck ascends the amount of oxygen available is reduced and the engine efficiency drops off. Cross-country and climbing capability decline as fuel usage soars. Gasoline engines may need their carburetors adjusted and Diesels may need to be fitted with turbochargers. In the mountains on average, vehicles lose 20 to 25 % of their rated carrying capability (i.e. vehicle engines lose 10-20 % of the horse power at 7k’, gas dose better) and can use up to 75 % more fuel. Military generators and vehicles are often diesel-powered, but standard diesel engines lose efficiency at 10K ft. and eventually stop functioning altogether because of insufficient oxygen.

Average increase in fuel consumption at altitude; (keep in mind head winds can increase consumption by 10%). Figures are for the number of gallons used per 100 km.
Conditions; with good maintenance, good roads.
Low Altitude (below 3km); 3 to 5% slope light vehicles (gas) average load uses 16 gallons. Trucks 3 to 5 tons (diesel) loaded 25 gallons, unloaded 20 gallons.
Low Altitude; 6 to 8% slope light Vehicles (gas) average load uses 17 gallons. Trucks 3 to 5 tons (diesel) loaded 30 gallons, unloaded 25 gallons.
Medium Altitude (up to 3km) ; 3 to 5% slope light vehicles (gas) average load 17 gallons, Trucks 3 to 5 tons (diesel) loaded 30 gallons, unloaded 25 gallons.
Medium Altitude; 6 to 8% lt veh. Avg. 18, Trucks loaded 32 gals. Unloaded 27 gals.
High Altitude (3km to 4km); 3 to 5% slope, lt. veh. 18 gals. Trucks loaded 32 gals. Unloaded 27 gals.   
High Altitude; 6 to 8% slope lt. veh. 20 gals. Trucks loaded 35 gals. Unloaded 30 gals.
High Altitude; (above 4km) 3 to 5% slope lt. veh. 20 gals. Truck loaded 35 gals. Unloaded 30 gals.
High Altitude; 6 to 8% slope lt. veh. 25 gals. Truck loaded 38 gals. Unloaded 33 gals.

Animals and porters;
Beyond the limits of wheeled transport, the only alternatives are animals or porters (which may need to be acclimatized). Many ungulate (having hoofs) species are traditional pack animals, including elephants, camels, the yak, reindeer, goats, water buffalo, llama, Alpacas and mules used to pack loads on the back, pull wagons, and or some could be ridden. Camels can smell humans 4 miles away and see them 2 miles away. Camels in Arabia can brink 50 gallons of water. The Bactrian Camel most eat snow (this in Mongolia) limiting its self to two gallons a day to prevent to much cooling of the body. Oxen can be slaughtered and eaten when meat is low and wild game impossible to find or tactical situation prevents hunting (horsemeat is eatable but tuff). Mules have more stamina and are more sure-footed than horses and have more resistance to disease. Summed up by George Washington; "Horses eat too much, work too little, and die too young." However, mules are subject to colic, heat exhaustion, injuries, and wounds. Most injuries and wounds result from poorly adjusted saddles, pack frames and harnesses. Stones, rocks, and debris on the trail can also wound a mule's hoof. Local mules are more immune to disease at altitude than humans and all mules have a keen sense of self-preservation that keeps them alive in mountain storms. Mules require a great deal of daily care and training. Muleteers, farriers, blacksmiths, and large animal veterinarians, who have been absent from many armies for decades, are essential for mule-borne logistics. Mules need new shoes every 30 days and there are special mule shoes for snow and ice.

Mules; are 12 to 17.5 hands (50 to 70 inches in height and weigh 600 to 1,500 lbs. The average donkey stands about 40 inches in height at the shoulders, but breeds range from 24 to 66 inches. Mule’s travel at 2½ mph. Oxen are slower, at 2 m.p.h. The ½-mile faster speed can save a week or more over long distances. Oxen can graze along the trail, but mules must be fed grain to supplement the grazing. American mules require 10 lbs of grain and 14 pounds of hay per day, which also becomes part of the logistics load therefore, less paying/combat freight can be hauled. The smaller mules of Argentina require 8 lbs of grain and 8 lbs of hay per day. Mules could go 24 hrs without water when they had a light load i.e. under 300 lbs. Mules can consume 25 to 30 liters of water a day and up to 50 liters in desert terrain. They also require a daily ounce of salt.
In WWI or II the standard army mule load was about 150 lbs. American mules can carry up to 20 % of their body weight (150-300 pounds) for 15 to 20 miles per day in mountains. Smaller mules in other locales will carry less. The maximum carrying weight for an Argentine mule is between 200 and 250 lbs. However, this is for low- and medium-altitudes. At high altitude, the maximum carrying weight drops below 200 lbs. Like humans, mules require time to acclimate to altitude. Muleteers and mules require about a month's training to get them ready to work above 3,000 meters. Like humans, mules tire easily above 4,000 meters and need to be rested frequently. Mules also have to be trained not to fear the noise of firearms and explosives so that they do not run off during a patrol.

Organized mule cargo units, rather than ad hoc teams led by local teamsters, are the preferred option, but local mules are always preferred over deployed mules. Equipage is a horse drawn carriage usually with its attendant servants. Since much of the material will be kept in dumps and moved in stages, the commander has to keep his transport requirements in hand. Energy conservation requires additional routines to deploy the logistics (like rations to the platoon, mortar rounds to the mortars).
General load information to consider;
Requirements for Infantry Company (180) planning a mountain march, attack and defense lasting for a total of 6 days. Note these figures do not include supplies carried by each Marine. Rations 1620 kilos, water (drink and cocking) 2,262 kilos (2565 liters). Ammunition 1,021 kilos.
Small mules carry 80 kilos, big mules up to 150 kilos.
Mule total 60 – 80. mules to carry 5,620 kilos of fodder, 4060 kilos of grain, 348 kilos of salt, and 18,416 kilos of water.
Consumption of water and wood; low and medium altitudes, man drinking 1.5 to 2 liters, cocking 5 liters. Animal summer 15 liters winter 10 liters. High altitude man drinking 2 to 2.5 liters, cocking 8 liters. Animals summer 15 liters, winter 10 liters.
Wood cocking uncovered at low altitude, 1kg per man, same for heating tent or shelter and in open.
Wood cocking uncovered at high attitude, 1kg per Marine, heating tent or shelter 1kg per Marine every 6 hours, in open 1kg per Marine every two hours. 

Porters; Mules cannot reach the higher elevations, and porters must haul the supplies forward. Although a porter cannot carry as much as a mule, they can move in places where mules cannot. However, porters will probably be reluctant to work too far away from their homes and villages. There is always a security consideration when using local porters. Short, wiry porter are preferred to tall, muscular porters. Selected porters should have above-average intelligence to allow them to more-readily adapt to the trying terrain.
Cargo capabilities; on foot up to 3kms Porter 20kg at 3-4km 20kg above 4km 15kg or less.
Marines up to 3km 15kg 3-3km 10-12kg above 4km 8-12kg.
On skis up to 3km porter 20kg 3-4km 12-15kg above 4km 12kg or less. Marine up to 3km 12kg 3-4km 12kg above 4km 10kg or less.
Physical performance; starts to be affected at about 1,000 meters altitude; the effect is not linear and the drop in performance is quite different for acclimated versus unacclimated individuals. A runner who is not acclimated will lose 10 to 12% in VO2max at an altitude of about 6,500 feet and 12 to 15% at 7,500 feet. However, performance will not be to the same degree because running economy is better at altitude (due to the less dense air resistance). Research at 6,500 feet indicated a 12% loss of VO2max, but 6% improvement in running economy resulting in 6% loss in performance. The duration of a run is also a factor. An 800-meter run is so anaerobic that little performance difference exists. A 1,500-meter run may be 6 to 10 seconds slower, but over 20 seconds slower for unacclimated runners. An unacclimated runner could expect to lose a minute in 5K and as much as two minutes for a 10K. Average for a 5k run 13 min. 10k run 27 minutes.

Characteristics of military operations in Jungle warfare:

Panic and phobias are magnified, fratricide dangers are high. During the night there are many more natural noises. Ambushes are used extensively they are multi-phase operations and are planned in some detail. First a suitable killing zone (K.Z.) is identified. It is a place where enemy units are expected to pass, and gives cover for the deployment then waiting and execution then extraction phases. The patrol must deploy into the area covertly, ideally under the cover of darkness, and will need to leave the area as soon as practical by a pre-determined route. Usually, two or more S.E. will be sent out a short distance from the K.Z. Their job is two fold; one to give early-warning of approaching enemy, and secondly, when the ambush is initiated, to prevent any enemy from escaping. Having set the ambush, the next phase is to wait. Executing an ambush, initiate it with an explosive device (such as a claymore mine). Note most crew serve MGs with open bolts give warning of opening fire. Afterwards clear the K.Z. by checking bodies for intelligence. Attacking troops in a thicket. First post Marines at corners. Machine gun small sections. Adjust/shift Marines and fire etc. In the jungle you must operate with combatant units at close ranges and possibly in all directions. It’s almost always best to be in line/column formations. When in doubt don’t shoot. Helicopters provide excellent mobility but no surprise. Inspect foliage closely, broken leaves, twigs, etc., often indicate when and in what direction the enemy has passed and how many were in the group. The amount of sap oozing from a broken limb can indicate time of passing. The steep hills and the dense vegetation and swamps tend to ‘canalize’ our advance. It is next to impossible to have flank security patrolling abreast of a moving column. It is difficult to send units more than a hundred feet to a flank and maintain contact with them. If we try to make any headway we have to risk exposed flanks. Patrols tend to try to reach objectives too quickly, moving too rapidly i.e. nosily through the brush. Maneuver option, a base of fire should be advanced along the ridges. “When encountering enemy on the move, our units had more success and suffered fewer casualties by opening fire and rushing through, than by trying to take cover and envelope the enemy. Grenades are more useful than rifles in patrol work. Any equipment which must be abandoned should be buried and camouflaged. Rifles can be kept perfectly dry at night by placing them on sticks, several inches off the ground and covering them with banana leaves. “It is noteworthy” that in the defense, each unit, even the squad established itself so as to provide all around security during darkness. With positions make use of varying elevations. In organizing the area defense all automatic weapons were sighted on sectors of fire coordinated with adjacent units. However, it was a standing rule that weapons never be fired at night, except to repulse a major night attack. In order to safeguard personnel and to avoid disclosing the position of automatic weapons, only knives and bayonets were used to take out small infiltrating parties. To guard against attacks after dark, we would set up the machine gun at one place, and then immediately after dark the gun would be moved to another prepared location. It was required that every telephone/radio be manned continuously from dark to daylight, eliminating the necessity of ringing. Therefore, whenever anything occurred, all leaders within the position instantly knew the situation.”

(Reference, Night Fighting below)


V/C not yelling at all when wounded or dying. Me what about Tali ban, or most any other foreigners?

Medivacs; total 406 thousand patients including 168 thousand combat casualties. Between 65-73 high velocity round effect i.e. wound track, tissue damage to organs and blood vessels too. And explosion victims with large fragments and very dirty wounds meant the victim was close to explosion.

Causalities Vietnam, small arms 51% of KIAs, 16% of WIA. Fragments 36% KIA, 65% WIA. Booby traps/mines 11% KIA = 4000, 15% WIA. Punji stakes only 2 % WIA. Others cause 2% KIA, 2% WIA.

WWII small arms 32 % and Korea 33%.

Vietnam, impact points of rounds on body; KIA, 16% muti-sites, 1% arms , 7% legs, 18% growing /abs, 19% upper torso , 39% head. WIA 20% multi site, arms 36%, legs, 5% groin, 7% upper torso, 14% head.

I don’t know the timeliness of the fallowing info I checked the site last mouth, OEF 175 KIA by small arms fire, total of both wars 1373 with 257 US Marines. This according to icasualties.com.

Fighting at night,

Night ops, radios are turned down. Make use of ear phones if available. Note in MT or cold weather warfare of WWII “fighting for the little kingdoms”/fighting holes, to retreat into the country side meant death by exposure. Close in night fighting combatants have instinctive tendency to form groups under low light conditions. You should move more frequently, farther and faster at night especially after contact with foe. Silence voice wise will make foe nervous, cause foe to shoot more. Muzzle flashes will give away locations, that’s were you though grenades, or attack with bayonets. Use extreme caution when throwing in thick brush or up hill. Throwing rocks at foe (especially down hill) as rouse grenade attack, the 3rd time you use real grenade.

(Reference, COE Over all tips, “if you spot foe” and Jungle warfare “It is noteworthy” above)

Knife fighting, Romans taught to thrust not slash. With swords/knifes slashes with the edge, though made with ever so much force seldom kill. As vital parts are defended by armor and bone. On the contrary a stab although it may only penetrate 2” is generally fatal. Besides with the attitude of striking, it is impossible to avoid exposing the right arm and side of the body, which is covered during a thrust. With thrust a foe receives the point before sword is seen. It must be observed that when engaging with spears/javelins/grenades, the left foot is advanced increasing throwing force. On contrary at close range with sword, right foot extended so that the body may present less a target to foe and right arm be ready to thrust with max force and reach and to counter enemy that may have broken line gotten behind you. Stabbing; blades edge held horizontal to ground (i.e. parallel) well penetrate between ribs. Stabbing heart via stomach less blood is spilt. Also arm pits, crotch or inter portion of the thigh are locations of vital arteries. Stabbing Pelvis hands width below navel, just above genitals. Axon (base of the back of head) also at end of spinal column just above buttocks. Slicing throat, tip of blade used just to one side of trachea. So the trachea is not cut, which would allow blood to inter airway and cause load gurgling sound.


Characteristics of military operations in Desert warfare

Illumination or smoke rounds can be used to reorient maneuvering forces.
Distances require longer lead times for reconnaissance and surveillance planning. Effective reconnaissance takes time.
Scouts are reconnaissance patrols, not combat patrols, and should attempt to gain information through stealth.
Consideration should be given to conducting reconnaissance during periods of limited visibility.
Very few civilians are encountered in desert operations, and information they give should be treated with caution.

Because there is little vegetation in the desert, strong shadows are readily observed from the air. Disrupt shadows by altering the shape of equipment, using the correct angle to the sun to minimize shadow size i.e. largest vertical surface perpendicular to the sun and to cause shadows to fall on broken ground or vegetation whenever possible.

(Reference, Defense rule # 5 Features of Recognition, shadow)

Open terrain and predominantly clear atmosphere generally offer excellent long-range visibility, but at certain times of the day it may be limited or distorted by the effects of heat. Visibility can be better during the night than day. 
The ideal observation should have the sun behind it and be as high as possible to lessen the effects of mirages and heat radiation from the ground.
Stake out your target line/engagement area (trigger point). This will prevent soldiers from engaging targets beyond the maximum effective range of the weapon system.
Observation of fires may be difficult. The lack of visible terrain features distorts the ability to make range estimations.
When preparing defensive positions, use every available means to know how far you can observe in front of your positions.
The enemy can see just as far as you can. Inspect your position from an enemy point of view.
Light and noise at night may be seen or heard from miles away, so strict light and noise discipline are necessary.
Sand and dust reveal movement in the desert. It is best to move at night or during periods of predawn morning dew. This includes resupply as well as tactical movements.
There are fewer terrain features in the desert. This hinders navigation and exposes friendly forces to the enemy. Take advantage of the least considered features, such as wadis, to conceal movement.
The enemy will try to attack with the sun low and behind him.

When natural obstacles are not available, units should use linear obstacles to stop enemy movement. Minefields must be rapidly laid over large areas to be effective. Employ “basic loads” of Class IV (sand bags, pickets, etc.) with all vehicles to expedite digging in. In the desert environment, camouflage and dispersion are a necessity for all forces.

Employ reverse slopes as much as possible and camouflage frontal parapets for individual/crew positions by making use of reverse slopes of natural drifts. This avoids obvious bunker positions being easily seen.

Extended depth and dispersion of vehicles will enhance survival. Dug in vehicles survive longer. Use of dummy positions is more important.

Air instability is most likely to cause quick, vertical, and irregular dissipation of an agent, leaving the target area relatively free of contamination quickly. Chemical weapons used during the heat of day are normally persistent nerve or blister agents.

Combat Service Support;

Medical support in the desert environment is challenged by remote locations.
In a non linear desert defense, enemy and friendly units may be intermingled, especially in poor visibility.
Medical treatment and evacuation will become more critical in the desert. The effectiveness of the combat lifesaver program has been proven.
Medics must constantly re-certify and train those who are designated as combat lifesavers. The standard should be at least one lifesaver per squad.
Rehearse how your unit will identify, treat, and evacuate casualties. This is as important as how you will fight.
When not in use, keep weapons, covered. Even though weapons are coverd, they may still have sand on them. Clean the weapon frequently so it will be ready when needed.
PMCS in the desert is absolutely essential. Left unattended, sand and wind will rapidly destroy the most basic piece of soldier gear.
Sand clogs fuel lines and wears out tires and other rubber and plastic parts faster. It also seeps into engines and cooling systems. This results in overheated engines that can cause sudden and catastrophic failure.
Food service organizations require intense supervision. Current menus must be augmented with fresh fruit, vegetables, and breads to provide soldiers the roughage and nutrients they need.

Command and control;

Desert evenings can be extremely long or short. Leaders should be concerned with EENT, BMNT, and percentage of illumination. These factors will be extremely important when conducting night operations.
Dry desert conditions can, at times, reduce radio signal strength and create unforeseen blind spots, even in aircraft FM communications may be degraded due to dead spots caused by  heavy concentrations of minerals close to the surface. Establish firm procedures for constant control, either by radio or through liason.
Ensure that all know the commander’s intent and rehearse battle drill so that actions are understood even in the absence of orders.

I know that you have warned against climbing to the top of the only tal building in a neighborhood or firing down the long axis of a major street.

Teamwork. Most of the advantages of teams apply only to the invaders. Crew served weapons reduce willful misses by reluctant killers. In static positions teams have more endurance.

Divide. Engage the invaders when they are crossing a boundary. Fire when half the invaders are inside a building and half outside it. Fire when half the invaders are in open and half in rough terrain. Fire at dawn or dusk when neither infrared nor visible light is optimal. Fire from one unit's area of operation into another's AO.

Armor



Tanks stopping on trench and spinning to crush troop’s

Threat attacks are based on two principles, speed and mass. Air land battle doctrine four basic tenets of initiative agility, synchronization and depth are constant. A heavy mechanized unit usually plans to win by sustaining a high rate of advance 20 mph i.e. 2-3 minutes per km. Generally 60 miles of range equal 3-5 hour’s time. Egyptian chariot speed 25 mph equal to modern tank. Note house power wt ratio hp divided by vehicle wt. Higher Hp. makes for move lively vehicle more important for acceleration and moving up hill, than for pure speed. Tracked vehicles on flat road surface will slide around corners like auto. Heavier vehicles more stable same as Cadillac vs. compact. Because APCs are lighter they can’t move across open ground as fast with out injuring Marines in side.
Tracked vehicles better two negotiate obstacles in MOUT, also do better off road, wheeled vehicles get stuck.

Over 60 tons tank becomes handicapped, lots of bridges cannot be used. Most tanks barely float if equipped to due so and cannot manage rough water.
MT drivers and crew passengers of open vehicles are very venerable to cold injuries. MOUT Dusts wares out pistons. Dust, rough handling character, places great strain on drives, communication equipment and night vision equipment. Vehicles use less fuel in MOUT than open. In open terrain vehicles that run out of fuel can be recovered later. Noise reduction with ear plugs etc. more important with tracked vehicles, over time adds to fatigue.
USSR wider tracked vehicle did better in mud. Vehicle used more fuel. Over all operationally 20% on road,40% off road, 40% stationary, engine running this well very with season more time off road summer when ground is dry and firm less when hot ( air con- no) cold snow or muddy more time for heater benefit.

Tank drivers main job keep tank covered/concealed, don’t move strait out of hull down position.
Narrow street were only one tank can proceed should be avoided.
Bridges and other prominent features may have indirect fire sighted on them.

The factors of cover, concealment, fields of fire, etc. considered in selecting other defensive positions are also applicable when selecting positions for combat vehicles. Utilizing any physical barrier available, such as low walls or piled-up rubble, brush or locating it within a building to gain additional cover and concealment. Tank and APC positions can be classified in general terms as hull-down or hide positions. Hull-down positions are dug in, to protect the vehicle by reducing its silhouette. Hide positions, as the name implies, deny the enemy direct observation of a tank or APC.
Maneuver unit at disadvantage do to lack of concealment. Tanks need only move 50-100’ to find ground cover, undulations. Tanks average 300 feet apart.

(Reference, COE rule # 7 and Defense rule # 6)


Ideally tank support infantry the exception is when combat is on flat open ground. In open terrain you are more likely to be attacked by horses/vehicles/helicopters than by infantry.
Featureless terrain troops in front of tanks to provide better information to tanks.
If cavalry is not strong enough to compete with foes inter mix it with infantry. Cavalry and infantry the later is more important to analyze.
For a last ditch direct assault dismount infantry first, to limit casualties. Dismounted infantry checking routes should clear high ground first. Make sure your forward infantry can be covered by tank crew behind you.
If infantry dose not fallow armored units within reasonable time, a section should be sent back to investigate. Tanks that get separated from infantry can not fire at bypassed enemy. In turning to withdrawal all tanks should turn about as right face to limit confusion as to the danger zones for infantry.
"We have saved our wire crews much work by carrying on each vehicle two poles with hooks on the ends so that we can quickly lift field-wire lines and run under them." After withdrawal paths closed with wire to prevent easy use for travel. No fighting positions are placed in tanks path that were made during assault.


Troops operating with tanks beware of debris from APDS rounds. 60 degrees ark during firing danger zone for APDS. Gun muzzle blast in MOUT can last 1-2 minutes. Troops can use for smoke screen. Smoke screen canisters danger when fired and can cause fires. Gunner “if driver says he has target. I knew to swing to the right”. Commander has over ride to turret if gunner fails to point gun. Hatches closed when firing gun or tow from concealed room or area. Tanks directing hot exhaust into manholes, fighting holes etc. with deflectors.


Killing tanks; the presents of tanks should not be exaggerated, the primary aim in training is to over come any inherent feelings of inferiority, when faced with enemy armor. No attempt should be made to turn training into a drill. This is pointless for there is neither a standard group of fighters nor a single tactic for fighting tanks at close range. Skill and imagination are the only answers.
The Chechen hunter–killer teams, like wolf packs searching out an isolated member of a family of deer, frequently attacked a single armored vehicle simultaneously from several different directions.
Chechen forces employing three- or four-man fire teams composed of a sniper a machine-gunner and a RPG gunner. IMO the teams system should have worked like this, first the sniper would force to crew to button up, then the machine gunner with armor piecing rounds would breach the reactive armor then would come a salvo of RPGs concentrated on the exposed area.

WWII tank vs. tank was rare more common to have tank vs. infantry. Try to separate them allow tanks to sweep over positions, separate fallow on infantry. Which can hold ground. Destroy armor at (T) intersections. Some armor used plows to forge paths. Plow vehicles move slowly and are prime targets, vehicles had to fallow predictable path.

Tanks weak point is with its tracks. Target tanks as they are exposing underside at crest.

Force crew to bottom up. Difficult for crew to observe or keep track of the direction of vehicle (orientation). Vehicle blind spaces most cars 15-20’ RV./van 20-30 ‘trucks 30-40’ short driver 50’.

Unlike the mortar or machine gun which usually target an area, the AT gun had to hit a very specific object, namely an armored vehicle. The AT gun was a purely line of sight weapon.  Its round flew on a flat trajectory so the gunner had to have a uninterrupted view of the target. 
A Rifle Company in the vanguard of a cautious advance would normally expect a number of guns to support it.  The only way to ensure there was always one gun capable of delivering immediate support was to advance them by bounds, one gun covering while another moved to a new position.  
To be at their most effective, the first few rounds of AT fire had to come as a complete surprise to the enemy.  Concealment and camouflage were vital tasks for the gun crews, perfectly attainable when operating from a well prepared defensive position, less so when deployed to protect infantryman who had just seized their objective.  
In open country, the guns were particularly susceptible to fire from the very tanks they sought to destroy, which could pitch HE shells at them from longer range than the crews could respond to with their amour piercing ammunition.  In close country, the threat came as much from enemy infantry accompanying the tanks to deal with just such an obstacle.  The only defense was to site the guns within the localities defended by friendly riflemen who could repulse the infantry with small arms fire while the gunners engaged the tanks. The guns could also fire high explosive ammunition against infantry targets. Chief among these was the reduction of strong points or fortified buildings were amour piercing rounds proving effective even at their longer ranges. 


Tanks vs. ATGMs; never point RPG or other back blast weapons upward or fire from prone (lose limbs). Anti tank weapons placed on elevated position to fire down at tank, 20 degrees angle increases hit 67% at 600 feet. 45 degree doubled odds compared to a surface level shoot. Four inches of vertical clearance over obstacles for muzzle of crew served weapons. Power lines, antennas and poles interfere with lead shots or shots from roofs. If electricity still on may shock operator or burn up computer and sensors. Some ATGMs may have trouble firing over water.

Direct fire weapons may need flank observer due to visibility obscured by dust round falling short, best to over shoot so observer dose not loose site of target. Concentrate indirect fire on lead element. If you try to pick them off one at a time you will be over run before you know it, mass combat power at right place and time. With average country side you well spot tank 1760 feet of range 40% of the time. 1/3 to ½ of a mile range 25% of the time. ¾ to 1 mile 20%. Over one mile 10%. Even in open areas the longest range figure is the rule. Tanks travel in undulations in terrain. Watch for dust esp. after long dry spells.

AT crews should not respond to enemy small arms fire. "At night, we placed a machine gun on both sides of a tank destroyer. When hostile tanks were heard approaching, the machine 'guns fired tracers until ricochets indicated that a tank was being hit. Both guns would then fire at the tank and the ATGM can fire at the point of the "V" formed by the converging tracers."

A number of vulnerable points were identified on machines, notably the vision ports, engine deck plate and the tracks. 

The Germans also deployed blocks of explosive which could be hung over the barrel of the main gun, mangling it on detonation.

Smoke grenades or generators (pots filled with chemical compounds) or any available materials including vegetation, were all used.
The hope was the smokescreen would be sufficient to degrade cooperation and mutual support between the tanks, forcing each to fight on its own and be defeated in detail. It should be noted, there was nothing to prevent one tank from machine-gunning the hull of another to clear it of enemy infantry, knowing the crew would be immune.

Germans developed Zimmerit coating. This was applied to Panzers to prevent magnetic charges being fixed to the hull, which proved quite effective.
Molotov cocktail or fire bottle in Red Army parlance.
A group of mines could be laced together and pulled into the path of an oncoming tank, (rather like the 'stinger' beloved of police forces for stopping stolen cars). 


SP 7/2000; Russia has developed a motorcycle sidecar that is equipped with an anti-tank guided missile launcher. The sidecar is designed to be equip cross country motorcycles used by reconnaissance units and Special Forces

SP member not a lot of even modern MBTs are built to withstand that many 30mm armor pircing shells across their upperworks. Things like hatches, optics and sights, those roof blow-out panels over bustle-mounted ammo magazines, and especially the radiator grills over the top of the engine decking, those are pitifully weak compared to actual turret faces and side armor.

Using hot tar to coat tanks vision posts etc.

(Reference, Step # 3, General phase threeThe assault, phase four Consolidation/Explotation)




Fighting spirit


Ancient Zulu motto if we go forward we die, if we go backwards we die, best we go forward.
Max Hastings the principal problem in any attack is to maintain momentum. Every instinct especially among the inexperienced is to take cover under fire. Instinct is reinforced when the bodies of others who have failed to do so, lie all around you. Inexperienced troops find it notoriously difficult to assess the extent of the resistance and risk. Marshall it is beyond question that the most serious and repeated break downs on the battle field are caused by the failure to control fear, causing a shrinkage of fire. In the grater number of instances this shrinkage is the result of troops failing to carry out task which are well with in there power.

William Hauser the will to fight four elements: Submission the process through which the solider is made to do over and over again, the things he dose not wont to do, until he understands that the fundamental rule of his existence is to obey. (Epiphany Pavlov’s dogs conditioning though rules repeatedly, dog things that have no meaning). If this conditioning process has been effective the soldier well continue to submit to the orders of legitimate authority even though the orders are contrary to his fundamental instinct of self preservation. For even the gods have feet of clay. Para’s equipped to last 48 hours. In that time a modern war well be won or lost after two days you are written off. We listened to the talk quietly and with swelling pride. We had never reckoned on being cannon fodder. But the way he told it, it sounded like the highest honor. We had been chosen to die. (Dulce et decorum est pro partria mori.)

(Reference, Appendix, Training)


Fear although it makes some flee the battle field that same fear is a major factor in sustaining the will to fight. If the soldier knows and trust his comrades, he well probably perceive more safety in continuing to fight along side of them, than in rearward flight away form them and the enemy they face.
Courage a soldier always has a choice about taking a risk. He can lie there behind a log and theirs nothing you can do about it. No one can make him get up. The risk he must take is a total loss risk, and deciding to take that risk is courage, it is the ultimate definition of a warrior. Courage is contagious, he did it, and I can do it too. Its not that they won’t to do it, but they well do it. Gurkha weapons instructor; He taught us to cock the mechanism, to peel the working parts back and feel them wheeling in perfect harmony-the superb precision of the killing machine. Never go for the limbs or head. Always go for the trunk, the big target. Shoot to kill. The rifle became an extension of our arms, we felt naked without it. Familiarity was what our training was about. Handling your weapon had to become so instinctive that you could kill automatically with out any intervening moment of thought. That’s the measure of a real warrior, accuracy under fire. One day we would sense a kind of fusion between ourselves and the weapon, and on that day we would become real soldiers. On the surface it seemed like oriental mysticism but later I sensed the truth beneath his words. The army had learned over centuries how to harness the savage horse of aggression in every man. Show aggression, courage, endurance, strength and lack compassion, pity and remorse. Anyone could shoot at a target on the range on a sunny day, but making your fire deadly, when you were in someone else’s sights was much harder. In most ordinary units, especially conscript units, half of the soldiers froze during a contact and were unable to fire. There negative instincts had taken over. You had to conquer that fear, to lay down a solid wall of fire, to sting like a cornered bee, to take out the enemy, an aggressive, determined response was the only way to win the firefight.
Pride the knowledge on the part of a man with a specific function that others depend on and value this particular contribution to their safety and to the unit’s mission. John Boyd in his theory of conflict says that successful forces are held together by a since of mutual trust and sowing distrust is one of the fastest ways to destroy an army. A common saying is… no solider takes a hill for his nation, he takes it for this bodies.
Characteristics of Combat time dilation, a sense of time slowing down or speeding up. Vividness, a heighten awareness of detail. Random thoughts – the mind fixating on unimportant sequences, memory loss.


Epilogue


I wish to make sure no one thinks of me as a terrorist. If anyone, was to line up everyone, who has every known me, and asked them the question-“has (My name) ever talked to you about military matters”? All would laugh and reply all the time! My history is the proof of my stability. I don’t have any comrades, underworld contacts, or dilutions of becoming a rebel with a cause. I absolutely believe that the next civil war, which may have already started. Well be an elite/corporate one. The days of grass roots revolutions are over. The masses are nothing more than fuel now. Kind of like in the movie Matrix, HA!  I now live with a WW two veteran. He is 84 years old. And a wonderful human being. We love and need each other! He is my mission in life. Seeing to it that he lives as long and as best a life as possible, is what I intend to accomplish. He saved me from a life on the streets.  I invite anyone who wishes to know more, to ask me. What fallows is a poem that can also serve as an insight to my mind set. People are entitled to their opinions. But I have yet to meet anyone with facts to prove me wrong about anything much at all.


WAR
War, you just can’t call it war anymore
nor can you say it well last x amount of days
Advanced technology has brought about scientific criminology
Logically speaking, we can only surrender, to that which well ultimately render.

NJD 1995












THE END

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