Welcome Aboard!

AHOY,


UPDATE 12/21/13, 11:42 HOURS

I am revealing who I am today i.e. posting my name, I am Keith Oeffinger, I was born in San Antonio Texas in 1963. See today's post 12/21/13 .


Update, 01/11/14 12:30 hours;

I would like to say, with only one reply, like three years ago, this blog seems too much like a mirror site to me. And it appears very few patriots are looking back at past posts.

The new “Fragmented Fighting Facts” series of posts that dedicates one post to each Basic rule has now been completed. This series starts with the post tilted “Post # 1, Planning, Preface” that posted on 05/12/13. This series is under the label “Tri-F in progress”. Posts well be updated as I edit or discover additional knowledge thus the series is the most current version of my "Fragmented Fighting Facts" manual. For an old but complete version i.e. all in one post copy. Patriots are welcomed to try viewing one of the “pages” listed in the “special word section” on the starboard side of the blog. I say try due to the fact I’m not sure if they are published i.e. viewable to the general public due to all the issues or HACKING with my blog. There is also a complete copy posted, that is titled, “Tri-F in progress” too, it was posted 11/13/10.

And feel free to fire away with a reply, (sarcasm on).


FLASH REPORT; the “TERRORIST ARE NOT AMONG US, AND NEVER WERE I.E. AL QAEDA IS A STAWL MAN, GHOST”.

The most important lesson that everyone should have taken away from the Boston Marathon bombings was that those young men proved that no al-queda members are in the u.s. Otherwise they too would just go get some presure cookers and had to a parade.

“I AM NOT A TERRORIST” this nation’s worst enemy is FEAR. This fear is being promoted mostly by the back woods, right wing, Christians of this nation. We need to separate church and state, period. And that is of course for the States sake.


I would like patriots to understand that I use the terms "official revealed fact" to mean what everyone is being told by officials, media etc. I use the term "kings truth" to mean what I know or believe to actually be the actual facts. I DO NOT MEAN IT IN A RELIGIOUS WAY. I.E. the term Kings is plural as in those running the show.


Preface for the Fragmented Fighting Facts

Note pink highlighted material is that, that IMO is questionable factually, it maybe an “official revealed fact” that I am questioning. The material may need to be defined i.e. explained more or it could be a personal note. Yellow is location undecided or unedited material i.e. unread that I have not decided on what to keep or not. Green means a change has been made i.e. an update. By noting the green updated highlights a Patriot well not have to read the Fragmented Fighting Facts in its entirety to stay current. Red is important, perhaps the "kings truth".

Newjarheaddean; this is my collection of combat notes. One might call it my anthology of combat tactics, techniques, methods and skills. The note taking began about fourty years ago (I was around 13 years old) with the observation of 10 rules listed with in a book covering the French and Indian i.e. Native American, wars, entitled “Roger’s Rangers”. That’s right the rules that started all this are “Army Ranger” rules, this book was located in the “Westfall” library in San Antonio Texas off of Vance Jackson. I get a kick out of the libraries name due to the general agreement that modern or state vs state warfare started with the singing of the peace treaties at Westphalia. I could not read at the time; however I knew that a list in a book on war would be important. I copied those rules down like a scribe might have written hieroglyphs and had my dad read them to me. . This discovery preceded numerous sources including approximately one hundred books and about a dozen field manuals, of which a few were of WWII era. These were found at libraries, half price bookstores and garage sales. Since going on line in 2007, I have found material on web sites such as “Defense and National Interest” (DNI), “Global security”, “Strategy page” , “Wikipedia” and “Bayonet strength” and “Efour4ever” in the combat lessons learned section. These last two sites cover WWII.

Previously referred to as K.O.O.L.N. (acronym definition, top secret), FLASH REPORTS; I NOW AM TELLING EVERYONE IT STANDS FOR KEITH OEFFINGER'S ORGANIZATION OF LEARNED KNOWLEDGE the joke on me here was I believed Knowledge was spelled with an (N). I was a special education student and did not learn to read until my last year of high school. I have now titled my work “Fragmented Fighting Facts” or “Tri-F”; the name derives from the computer grammar function always alerting me to the fragmented nature of my sentences. This is due to the “just the facts, ma’am” manor the material is written i.e. there has been little if any effort to write in whole sentences or provide context. This is not to say there is no order with Tri-F, in fact there is a theme. I have laid out the information as one might expect a commander or members of a unit to recall it thus utilizing it to conduct a mission.

We start with “Planning”, followed by the section on “Defense”, then there’s “Preparations and conduct of patrols” or “PCP”, and we end with “Conduct of Engagements” or “COE”, i.e. engagements being the term used here for shootouts. Each section of Tri-F consists of numbered “Basic rules”, each basic rule followed by detailed notes that either relate to, explain, or give examples pertaining to the basic rules. As with the general format of Tri-F, each section’s basic rules are laid out as one might need to recall them. This is most obvious in the last section COE starting with basic rule number one, “Flash report”, i.e. actions to take upon contact with the enemy. This sections last basic rule deals with handling POWs.

Keep in mind this is a work in progress; I’m constantly discovering new information to add which in turn still at times requires rearranging things. At the same time, interestingly enough to me, I have not needed to rearrange my original order of the basic rules for quite some time. There are however, two instances where the detailed information fallowing a pair of basic rules became so similar I decided to combine the pair into one basic rule. These two occurrences are noted in footnotes.

Now heed this, out of all the information contained within this work, only an estimated 1% was taught to me while I was serving in the U.S.M.C. Moreover, to put a fine point on it, it’s worth noting I served in Charlie Company, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, i.e. an Infantry unit. Before my discharge (after only a two year cruse), I attended Jungle Warfare School in the northern training area of Okinawa (for two weeks), Mountain Warfare School in Korea (for one week) and Combat Town Camp Pendleton for MOUT training (for one day). I did not take part in any amphibious training nor did I ever go to Twenty Nine Palms for Desert Warfare training. We did ride around in AAVs once at Camp Pendleton. All in all I would say the only things I missed out on were a beach landing (at Coronado I believe) and a little sun burn, due to the fact that those twenty nine palms, I was told in the early eighties were all located at the front gate of that base. Needless to say, the training did not impress me, and I now know it was not going to get any better as some suggested to me at the time, and still others later claimed that I should have just stayed in longer.

With my position on the lack of training, I do wish to make it perfectly clear that I do support the service women and men in the U.S. armed forces. I also believe them to be as brave as any people on earth, (with the exception of the (Y) generation). My concern is in the way the Infantry especially is being mislead and used. I want people to understand my experience and IMO a lot of evidence suggests Uncle Sam intends to use his infantry in ways that does not include training any generation in the art of “traditional Guerilla combat tactics” i.e. as a “Traditional Commando” would be. I am not talking about “SWAT” team “Close quarter” tactics, like the “Stick dynamic entry”. That tactic should be called the “cluster f**k”. Just call that sort of tactic what it is NYPD (Cops T.V. show bad-boys, bad-boys) in Afghanistan.

The problem is that that tactic was developed by police departments to deal with an objective occupied by drugged up party animals, i.e. untrained civilians. The police never use it in a spur of the minute situation. They use it when the house/objective has been under constant surveillance for mouths in some cases and the police know all manner of information about everyone in the house and the structure and neighborhood in general. The cops choose a time when everyone is pasted out from partying the night before and have long lost any weapons (between the cushions or under the bed) they might have had on them as show pieces during the party. The primary reason for the large numbers of police in close proximity is to make sure the gang does not think the raid is a rival gang “brake in” and thus resist in any way. There is lots of yelling too, thus reinforcing the message that no one is trying to be covert, like one would be to get away with a crime.

This brings up an intriguing observation of mine; that being that by the book an assault should be made from the top down, yet the troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere use the Stick dynamic entry and usually enter from the front door, like a SWAT team. However resent high profile raids show the SWAT teams attacking from the top down. Examples you may recall are the raids on the Shinning path group in Peru in 2000 and the Mumbai raid by Indian forces on the Jewish center in 2008. IMO this proves the existence of what I’ll refer to as a “need to know” training policy, being followed by various governments, the purpose being to limit the number of true Commandos that could become tomorrow’s rebels, apposing corrupt governments. One last thing about the Stick, IMO every single time the regular forces unit conducting one of these foolish Stick dynamic entries comes under fire i.e. runs into resistance, the Stick brakes i.e. the whole unit evacuates and awaits some kind of support form tanks, guns, tubes or air. Bottom line IMO the Stick is used as a probing tactic and is meant to be a moral boosting show peace tactic to make the unit feel as if it has taken a hill, which was nothing more than another empty building, that IMO Intel suggested, was the case before the entry was ordered. Recalling the police policy of long periods of surveillance prior to raids.

It also seems to me that in light of the old saying “you can fight a war with bombs and blockades but only boots on the ground can win it” ( IMO, Uncle Sam has now revised that saying, as fallows) “you can win a war with bombs and blockades, but only the infantry can end the war”, farther more IMO Uncle Sam has gone one more step and decided to use private security companies and local i.e. indigenous people for the infantry role. All this fear of true commandos is all very similar to the “Mujahideen” not being allowed by various governments, to return to their homelands i.e. native nations, after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

And as for the U.S. and other Western nations, training foreigners to fight a counter insurgency goes. IMO this training includes nothing more than police procedures i.e. conducting investigations, forensics, searching individuals and buildings to collect evidence and yes serving warrants, if necessary, with those all mighty “stick” tactics. And of course, lots of “new innovative techniques and tactics” involving CAS and IMO (Old) so called high tech equipment the U.S. Military Industrial Congressional Complex wants to clear out of the warehouses.

All in all IMO Uncle Sam has chosen to put just about all his eggs in one advanced technology system, think Star Wars Storm Troopers or Matrix i.e. the Operator or Morpheus trying to guide Neo and others to safety. IMO it looks something like this; (x) unit go to (x) address, kick in front door, use stairs to your right, go south down hallway to (x) door, it is unlocked, interning room go to (x) window looking out window to the north you will see your target running east though the neighbors garden. All this information and the “live” feeds of target and area of operations would be provided by a fleet of satellites as well as Near space assets that are never mentioned by the media as current military assets and of course there’s the robots, UAVs and a flood of other covertly deployed sensors as well as covert eves dropping of any civilian electronic devices in the Area of operations.

Thus in light of these and similar so called “new innovative, techniques and tactics” (notice the media and governments choice of words “techniques and tactics” as if we’re talking Commando training i.e. why not use some modern high tech terms the system is so eager to introduce us all to normally as a matter of routine), IMO Uncle Sam has placed the traditional Guerrilla combat tactics, on the back burner and is hoping they all go the way of other black arts.

This is not just true of the infantry; let us take a peek at aerial combat. Does anyone out there actually think today’s U.S. pilots are turning and burning, pulling high (G) maneuvers trying to hit the entry windows and get inside the bandits turn. Think any pilot has conducted a yo-yo or split S maneuver lately or made the choice between a single or two-circle fight. Now days its all about stealth, ECM and Smart even autonomous weapons, missiles especially BVR tech. IMO this explains why the U.S. Navy is not concerned with not having a front line fighter equal to the USAF F-22 Raptor. An article I recently read on “Strategy page” mentioned a lot of talk about a Navy F/A-18E at an air show, displaying a little F-22 silhouette decal i.e. a simulated Kill credit symbol/icon. IMO the F/A- 18E did not gun down that kill.

And then everyone knows that just about all now and IMO soon all weapons systems including the bayonet well have a chip in it.

So if the electronics ever fail (maybe due to a shift in the axis of earths electromagnetic field, passed a certain point or perhaps a record size solar flare) IMO it well be the masters of the age-old Guerrilla combat tactics i.e. The Fragmented Fighting Facts Basic Rules that survive, keeping in mind “no one wins”.

I also wish, that those who join the various services where told all this up front i.e. “we do not intend to train you as a traditional Commando”.

Another thing I would like everyone to consider is that; what makes a Marine special is not the training she or he receives, no it’s the steel the youth demonstrates when they choose to join the Marines. Even when compared to the Special Forces, who IMO are only specialists in their particular field, once again mostly high tech specialties and whose ranks are filled with older personnel that have already been serving and have graduated from a boot camp i.e. are aware of the hoop and hype hurry up and wait tactics. And who are then usually chosen i.e. coached into changing their MOS. I am aware of the change in recruitment policy after 2001 allowing for direct entry into the S.F. community. IMO a rarity and IMO it is still not the same as just choosing to go to a Marine Corps Recruit Depot from the start.

Furthermore, to those who just well not accept the truth about the lack of training along the lines of traditional Guerrilla combat tactics. I can now say that I have exchanged comments with a number of Iraqi and Afghanistan combat vets. These comments can be found on the internet if you Google up my call sign, Newjarheaddean also spelled with one (D). IMO it is obvious that the tactics I speak of are news to the vets, some have made commits that proves in combat they were just winging it. And no, I don’t believe that all the vets are observing some kind of code of silence on these tactics including the vets who are against the wars. Unless everyone wants to say that YouTube and other internet companies are conspiring to edit all combat footage that shows these tactics being used and that, the vets are staging other videos that show them (albeit with great bravery) as armatures without a clue and winging it. If anyone ever sees video, showing the tactics listed in Tri-F being used, be sure and provide a link with your comment. I once saw a flash of film on CNN showing combat in Lebanon during the 1980s that showed some of these tactics being used by a Guerrilla fighter. I well also say I do believe that UAV footage is edited by the Pentagon to keep the public from seeing the few but well trained Taliban and other Guerrilla fighters that are using these tactics. Alternatively, maybe people think our professional highly trained well-equipped military is unable to defeat 10 – 20 thousand religious extremist amateur thugs in almost a decade of fighting. All the while killing at least by some estimates 100 a mouth including dozens of top commanders.

Let me also say, on the numbers of U.S. PTSD casualties, i.e. IMO, WIA, (And IMO deserving of a Purple Heart). The Government portrays these cases as a result of fighting a war that is “unlike any other war we have fought before” (LOL). Facing an enemy that is fighting in some mysterious and or cowardly manor that simply cannot be countered by military means. I believe the high numbers are a result of US forces fighting in a manner that is suicidal i.e. pointless and counterproductive to the real world situation. Example; you have a young brave American ready to fight for the nation, while on one of these IMO “Russian roulette parades” someone shoots at the unit from some building, everyone scrambles for cover, as some spray and pray, then after determining the location using SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems) sniper detectors, or one of the many similar vehicle mounted systems the commander calls in some sort of CAS, if someone’s brains have been blow out especially if it was an officer or the location is vague, a real “crowd pleaser” maybe used i.e. 2000 pounder.

IMO this is how 90% of engagements (fought by regular infantry units) are resolved. Special Forces are now and in the feature more and more regular infantry well be using the Matrix. And to those that think this is the exception I say show me the number of WIA or KIA (On either side) by small arms fire i.e. during traditional firefights. Even if one includes sniper fire those figures are really low. So IMO after witnessing all the carnage and innocent civilian life being lost and receiving all those looks from the witnesses, it is the American that realizes it is his unit that is not fighting right.

This is reinforced and really sinks in back in the states when the vet is asked to tell the Commando stories that never occurred and thus the vet must tell the truth i.e. give up the Commando reputation, keep it all inside or start lying. If the first option is chosen that unveiling reality is demoralizing and makes it all not worth it. If either one of the other chooses are made IMO the vet becomes the ticking bomb. And I can tell you all that many times, I have recalled being told once that “when you go home keep your mouth shut about the things we did. If you don’t you well be thought of as a liar or crazy and either which way your life well be over”. That First Sergeant was right, but like my daddy use to say, “He’s right but he does not know why he’s right” i.e. IMO the First Sgt. thought of what we did in terms of remarkable heroic feats. However, IMO certainly since the beginning of the Vietnam era, it is the lack of training i.e. the manner in which our service women and men are fighting that keeps this tragedy going.

I would also suggest the vets of today are just like I was 25 or so years ago in the sense that they know there training is lacking, however, they just cannot explain what’s missing. However unlike me they refuse to accept that old fashion “black arts” are the answer i.e. should be the basis of basic training. And I now know the “Black art” tactics they and I should have been trained in and I can now say, “The PFC that told the Corp it was out of step, now has provided the proof”. What surprises me is that most vets it seems don’t care at all about the tactics I speak of and seem to view me as an unpatriotic “party pooper”, when I’m just a U.S. Marine trying to improve the Corps and save lives. Bottom line IMO the infantry needs to consist of unmarried i.e. undistracted, NO CHILDREN, dedicated true professionals, trained in the tactics listed in Tri-F and many more I am sure exist.

And to those that say “chivalry is for the museums” I say “first we must have peace on earth”.

One Newjarheaddean

“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!

Update; 12/19/14 09/53 hours




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Tuesday, July 19, 2011

Fragmented Fighting Facts, Applied! II


AHOY,

Here I have posted the original article as it appeared in my Marine Corps Gazette magazine and then followed that with a rewrite including my replies. I am in the posies of using some of this info in Tri-F and it well all be in the Tri-F updates if I ever get to posting an updated version. But it’s so difficult to maintain any motivation to update with no followers or even a go to hell reply. NOT! Do to the fact I have not used any of this info yet in Tri-F, I have not made but one reference to Tri-F in my reply. The info well most likely be used in Conduct of Engagements, Rule # 1.   






(Newjarheaddean; My rewrite)...

Reporting became a Units critical vulnerability or center of gravity.

He (the commander) understands the basics of “you, this is me” reporting. “Pretend you are on a radio and pass me your size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE) report [which is now a size, enemy activity, location, time, friendly activity (i.e.) (SALTA) report in-country] or a call for fire.

(Newjarheaddean; here imo we could just use the first A i.e., Activity enemy and then include the Activity friendly info too. Because you’re going back and forth with the L and T when you get to the second A already.)

Within the first initial minutes of contact the unit leader or radio operator needs to call with a position report and an estimated direction and distance to the enemy. This initial call to the COC (combat operations center) alerts the COC that a unit is in contact and starts their battle drill, which should include pulling in key leaders from the fire support team (FiST) and other agencies to support the element.

(Newjarheaddean; here is a good example of what I have pointed out before about the officers being trained in traditional combat tactics but not the enlisted. The officer here is using my Tri-F Conduit of Engagements rule # 1, Flash report. That is to say a small unit tactic in an operational doctrine for a larger unit tactic if you well).

Giving a rough direction and distance or basic ADDRAC (alert, direction, description, range, assignment, control) begins to focus the COC and its supporting arms.

(Newjarheaddean; here I’m wondering if the cart is not before the horse, with today’s U.S. units and the total UAV coverage etc. the COC should be “pushing” info, LOL i.e. informing the boots down range i.e. combat element were Charlie i.e. the enemy is etc.)
 
Next, the unit leader needs to develop the situation. This is going to take a few minutes due to the internal and external friction put on the leader in contact. The COC needs to give the unit leader this time to develop the situation before passing up a SALTA report in order to ensure that accurate information is given the first time.

For instance, an extra minute allows the unit leader to obtain a defense advanced global positioning system receiver (DAGR) grid vice a cardinal direction and rough distance.

(Newjarheaddean; is it being suggested here that the commander is going to first of all be close enough to see the enemy and then he is going to hold up this device and take readings? And I love the precise location DAGR with “rough distance”, no laser range finder here)

The SALTA report is the newly developed reporting procedure utilized in Afghanistan.

(Newjarheaddean; imo it is the latest reinvention of the wheel).

SALTA Report;

S) Size of the enemy. The number of enemy elements and number of fighters in each element is a very important detail. If there is only one element with a few fighters it may not be a deliberate ambush, more likely the enemy is attempting to harass the element or bait them into a larger ambush. When there are multiple firing positions and multiple fighters in each, you immediately know you are in a deliberate ambush where the enemy has done some type of planning and coordination.

(Newjarheaddean; that’s some good info).

In the COC, this helps determine if a troops in contact situation needs to be declared or if other assets, such as a quick reaction force or supporting agencies, need to be prepared to support.

(Newjarheaddean; is this QRF (quick reaction force) coming out in CH-53s or MV-22s imo no, so your unit in contact, must be close to base or they had better be able to circle the wagons, armored panic rooms on wheels and wait it out).

A) Activity of the enemy. When the unit leader is in contact with the enemy an immediate evaluation needs to take place—observe, orient, decide, act.

(Newjarheaddean; this ooday i.e. Boyd system is okay her but I think the five Ws and an H (who, what, where, when, why and how) that I have suggested maybe better for the tactical situation Refer to Conduct of Engagements rule # 1 Flash report. OKAY! LOL i.e. observe, kinetics, arriving yet again).

What type of fire are you taking? This is similar to Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER. Many times over the radio you hear that an element is taking? pop shots.? This tells the COC nothing.

(Newjarheaddean; how long has that been allowed to go on, while life’s were being lost? And here I would like to point out that imo THE COC SHOULD BE MONITORING THE NET AND PUSHING THE AGENDA, NOT BEING TOLD ANYTHING).

In my opinion there are four types of fire and every unit leader needs to understand what they are and what they mean.

(Newjarheaddean; here he should have clarified small arms fire)

 “Sporadic ineffective fire”. This tells the COC that the enemy is engaging the unit every few minutes with a few bursts or single shots. The effects of the fire are not deterring the unit from maneuvering or returning fire. The fact that it is ineffective can help determine whether the enemy is trying to bait the ground force into an ambush; wants to see their tactics, techniques, and procedures; or is just harassing the unit. The ineffective fire also shows the level of marksmanship of the enemy and may help determine their range.

“Sporadic effective fire”. This tells the COC that the enemy is engaging with a purpose, from closer range, or is a skilled marksman. On numerous occasions in Marjah, the enemy would engage an element in a compound every few minutes with a single accurate shot or burst. Effective fire means it is affecting the element’s ability to maneuver or return fire.

Sustained ineffective fire. This type of fire will mostly come from inexperienced fighters who are not aiming but rather making noise with their weapons. The sustained rate of ineffective fire shows the enemy element’s lack of fire discipline, ineffective range at which they are trying to engage a unit, or lack of training.

(Newjarheaddean; nothing wrong here except the repeat and a couple of these points could have been made i.e. used the first time. And then just the sustained nature would have needed to defined).

Sustained effective fire. Effective fire of any kind halts a unit’s ability to maneuver and return fire freely. When that fire is sustained, the ground commander and COC need to begin to utilize supporting arms internally to the ground element or externally utilizing 81mm mortars, close air support, or artillery. As Marines we can never become fixed by the enemy and allow them the ability to maneuver on us and control the pace of the firefight. For the COC, an element taking sustained effective fire should initiate some type of support.

What type of weapons system? Knowing the different types of weapons systems and their effective ranges will allow the ground force and COC the ability to locate the enemy and determine what type of force you are up against. Everyone utilizes Russian-style small arms, but different weapons mean different things. Many times in Marjah a light machinegun and AK-47s would engage us. This was standard for small ambushes or harassing fire. When we received a rocket propelled grenade shot or started receiving mortar impacts, we immediately knew it was a more deliberate attack.

(Newjarheaddean; here with say a PK or AK they use the same round right so it would be the burst or accuracy that may I.D. a difference right?)

Is the enemy maneuvering or static? Are they egressing the area? Are they harassing you or becoming decisively engaged? The enemy’s movement during a firefight is key to their overall plan. If the enemy is using multiple elements, establishing a base of fire, and attempting to flank the ground elements, it is a deliberate attack and the ground commander and COC should act accordingly. If the enemy is static or has fired a few shots and then egressed out of the area, that is the opposite. Either they are attempting to bait the ground element or firing at the Marines in an attempt to harass.

(Newjarheaddean; I find the term egressing interesting due to the fact I’ve been planning on introducing some tactics to Tri-F that I found mentioned by Vietnam pilots. Meanly the switching of channels on the egress i.e. after the attack on the objective).

L) Location.

Friendly position should already be sent to higher at the initial contact; if it has changed it can be corrected here.

(Newjarheaddean; if COC does not have their Blueforce Tracker data something’s wrong)

Enemy position should be passed in one of the following ways: Mills and a distance using a VECTOR DAGR or compass. Guided reference graphic location (not for targeting, but this allows the FiST to obtain an accurate precision strike suite for special operations forces grid). Grid. North 400 meters is not helping the COC or any air assets.

(Newjarheaddean; you can say that again. And “Guided reference graphic”LOL, is that like a picture of a FOR i.e. “feature of recognition” I’ve mentioned in Tri-F, I do like the mention of the use of a FOR here though even if they use the term, Guided reference graphic).
The best means is a guided reference graphic talk-on. A VECTOR DAGR direction and distance or grid.

 T) Time. When contact was initiated and the date time group.

 A) Activity of friendlies. This is not your game plan just a quick assessment. Do you have positive identification? Are you returning fire? Can you maneuver? This gives the COC and higher headquarters a quick snapshot of what you are doing. You can look at this as the wave tops of your plan.

Clear site picture of what is going on. For example, ?I am going to use my over watch element in Compound 7 CE4 Sector to suppress the enemy fire team in the tree line as my satellite element maneuvers west 200 meters to a north/south running tree line to close on the enemy. I will contact you when my element begins maneuvering north

in the tree line.? This kind of communication lets the COC know who is doing what, how you plan to maneuver, and when you will call them with your next update. This type of positive control of communications allows the unit leader to fight his element.

(Newjarheaddean; with A) Activity of Friendlies and the following three paragraphs, again, here I do not have a clear sight picture, this is wrong, the COC should just be monitoring, so Co dost not have to repeat or waist time. IMO NO Satellite term should be used, to confusing with modern assets, or that’s right they call sats birds LOL do they say bird dish or net?)


Debriefs…

(Newjarheaddean; this I replied to in my post “more on sniper flashcard site” posted on June 29, 2011).

“I well bet my lucky star” IKYG

G-day! 
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