Welcome Aboard!

AHOY,


UPDATE 12/21/13, 11:42 HOURS

I am revealing who I am today i.e. posting my name, I am Keith Oeffinger, I was born in San Antonio Texas in 1963. See today's post 12/21/13 .


Update, 01/11/14 12:30 hours;

I would like to say, with only one reply, like three years ago, this blog seems too much like a mirror site to me. And it appears very few patriots are looking back at past posts.

The new “Fragmented Fighting Facts” series of posts that dedicates one post to each Basic rule has now been completed. This series starts with the post tilted “Post # 1, Planning, Preface” that posted on 05/12/13. This series is under the label “Tri-F in progress”. Posts well be updated as I edit or discover additional knowledge thus the series is the most current version of my "Fragmented Fighting Facts" manual. For an old but complete version i.e. all in one post copy. Patriots are welcomed to try viewing one of the “pages” listed in the “special word section” on the starboard side of the blog. I say try due to the fact I’m not sure if they are published i.e. viewable to the general public due to all the issues or HACKING with my blog. There is also a complete copy posted, that is titled, “Tri-F in progress” too, it was posted 11/13/10.

And feel free to fire away with a reply, (sarcasm on).


FLASH REPORT; the “TERRORIST ARE NOT AMONG US, AND NEVER WERE I.E. AL QAEDA IS A STAWL MAN, GHOST”.

The most important lesson that everyone should have taken away from the Boston Marathon bombings was that those young men proved that no al-queda members are in the u.s. Otherwise they too would just go get some presure cookers and had to a parade.

“I AM NOT A TERRORIST” this nation’s worst enemy is FEAR. This fear is being promoted mostly by the back woods, right wing, Christians of this nation. We need to separate church and state, period. And that is of course for the States sake.


I would like patriots to understand that I use the terms "official revealed fact" to mean what everyone is being told by officials, media etc. I use the term "kings truth" to mean what I know or believe to actually be the actual facts. I DO NOT MEAN IT IN A RELIGIOUS WAY. I.E. the term Kings is plural as in those running the show.


Preface for the Fragmented Fighting Facts

Note pink highlighted material is that, that IMO is questionable factually, it maybe an “official revealed fact” that I am questioning. The material may need to be defined i.e. explained more or it could be a personal note. Yellow is location undecided or unedited material i.e. unread that I have not decided on what to keep or not. Green means a change has been made i.e. an update. By noting the green updated highlights a Patriot well not have to read the Fragmented Fighting Facts in its entirety to stay current. Red is important, perhaps the "kings truth".

Newjarheaddean; this is my collection of combat notes. One might call it my anthology of combat tactics, techniques, methods and skills. The note taking began about fourty years ago (I was around 13 years old) with the observation of 10 rules listed with in a book covering the French and Indian i.e. Native American, wars, entitled “Roger’s Rangers”. That’s right the rules that started all this are “Army Ranger” rules, this book was located in the “Westfall” library in San Antonio Texas off of Vance Jackson. I get a kick out of the libraries name due to the general agreement that modern or state vs state warfare started with the singing of the peace treaties at Westphalia. I could not read at the time; however I knew that a list in a book on war would be important. I copied those rules down like a scribe might have written hieroglyphs and had my dad read them to me. . This discovery preceded numerous sources including approximately one hundred books and about a dozen field manuals, of which a few were of WWII era. These were found at libraries, half price bookstores and garage sales. Since going on line in 2007, I have found material on web sites such as “Defense and National Interest” (DNI), “Global security”, “Strategy page” , “Wikipedia” and “Bayonet strength” and “Efour4ever” in the combat lessons learned section. These last two sites cover WWII.

Previously referred to as K.O.O.L.N. (acronym definition, top secret), FLASH REPORTS; I NOW AM TELLING EVERYONE IT STANDS FOR KEITH OEFFINGER'S ORGANIZATION OF LEARNED KNOWLEDGE the joke on me here was I believed Knowledge was spelled with an (N). I was a special education student and did not learn to read until my last year of high school. I have now titled my work “Fragmented Fighting Facts” or “Tri-F”; the name derives from the computer grammar function always alerting me to the fragmented nature of my sentences. This is due to the “just the facts, ma’am” manor the material is written i.e. there has been little if any effort to write in whole sentences or provide context. This is not to say there is no order with Tri-F, in fact there is a theme. I have laid out the information as one might expect a commander or members of a unit to recall it thus utilizing it to conduct a mission.

We start with “Planning”, followed by the section on “Defense”, then there’s “Preparations and conduct of patrols” or “PCP”, and we end with “Conduct of Engagements” or “COE”, i.e. engagements being the term used here for shootouts. Each section of Tri-F consists of numbered “Basic rules”, each basic rule followed by detailed notes that either relate to, explain, or give examples pertaining to the basic rules. As with the general format of Tri-F, each section’s basic rules are laid out as one might need to recall them. This is most obvious in the last section COE starting with basic rule number one, “Flash report”, i.e. actions to take upon contact with the enemy. This sections last basic rule deals with handling POWs.

Keep in mind this is a work in progress; I’m constantly discovering new information to add which in turn still at times requires rearranging things. At the same time, interestingly enough to me, I have not needed to rearrange my original order of the basic rules for quite some time. There are however, two instances where the detailed information fallowing a pair of basic rules became so similar I decided to combine the pair into one basic rule. These two occurrences are noted in footnotes.

Now heed this, out of all the information contained within this work, only an estimated 1% was taught to me while I was serving in the U.S.M.C. Moreover, to put a fine point on it, it’s worth noting I served in Charlie Company, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, i.e. an Infantry unit. Before my discharge (after only a two year cruse), I attended Jungle Warfare School in the northern training area of Okinawa (for two weeks), Mountain Warfare School in Korea (for one week) and Combat Town Camp Pendleton for MOUT training (for one day). I did not take part in any amphibious training nor did I ever go to Twenty Nine Palms for Desert Warfare training. We did ride around in AAVs once at Camp Pendleton. All in all I would say the only things I missed out on were a beach landing (at Coronado I believe) and a little sun burn, due to the fact that those twenty nine palms, I was told in the early eighties were all located at the front gate of that base. Needless to say, the training did not impress me, and I now know it was not going to get any better as some suggested to me at the time, and still others later claimed that I should have just stayed in longer.

With my position on the lack of training, I do wish to make it perfectly clear that I do support the service women and men in the U.S. armed forces. I also believe them to be as brave as any people on earth, (with the exception of the (Y) generation). My concern is in the way the Infantry especially is being mislead and used. I want people to understand my experience and IMO a lot of evidence suggests Uncle Sam intends to use his infantry in ways that does not include training any generation in the art of “traditional Guerilla combat tactics” i.e. as a “Traditional Commando” would be. I am not talking about “SWAT” team “Close quarter” tactics, like the “Stick dynamic entry”. That tactic should be called the “cluster f**k”. Just call that sort of tactic what it is NYPD (Cops T.V. show bad-boys, bad-boys) in Afghanistan.

The problem is that that tactic was developed by police departments to deal with an objective occupied by drugged up party animals, i.e. untrained civilians. The police never use it in a spur of the minute situation. They use it when the house/objective has been under constant surveillance for mouths in some cases and the police know all manner of information about everyone in the house and the structure and neighborhood in general. The cops choose a time when everyone is pasted out from partying the night before and have long lost any weapons (between the cushions or under the bed) they might have had on them as show pieces during the party. The primary reason for the large numbers of police in close proximity is to make sure the gang does not think the raid is a rival gang “brake in” and thus resist in any way. There is lots of yelling too, thus reinforcing the message that no one is trying to be covert, like one would be to get away with a crime.

This brings up an intriguing observation of mine; that being that by the book an assault should be made from the top down, yet the troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere use the Stick dynamic entry and usually enter from the front door, like a SWAT team. However resent high profile raids show the SWAT teams attacking from the top down. Examples you may recall are the raids on the Shinning path group in Peru in 2000 and the Mumbai raid by Indian forces on the Jewish center in 2008. IMO this proves the existence of what I’ll refer to as a “need to know” training policy, being followed by various governments, the purpose being to limit the number of true Commandos that could become tomorrow’s rebels, apposing corrupt governments. One last thing about the Stick, IMO every single time the regular forces unit conducting one of these foolish Stick dynamic entries comes under fire i.e. runs into resistance, the Stick brakes i.e. the whole unit evacuates and awaits some kind of support form tanks, guns, tubes or air. Bottom line IMO the Stick is used as a probing tactic and is meant to be a moral boosting show peace tactic to make the unit feel as if it has taken a hill, which was nothing more than another empty building, that IMO Intel suggested, was the case before the entry was ordered. Recalling the police policy of long periods of surveillance prior to raids.

It also seems to me that in light of the old saying “you can fight a war with bombs and blockades but only boots on the ground can win it” ( IMO, Uncle Sam has now revised that saying, as fallows) “you can win a war with bombs and blockades, but only the infantry can end the war”, farther more IMO Uncle Sam has gone one more step and decided to use private security companies and local i.e. indigenous people for the infantry role. All this fear of true commandos is all very similar to the “Mujahideen” not being allowed by various governments, to return to their homelands i.e. native nations, after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

And as for the U.S. and other Western nations, training foreigners to fight a counter insurgency goes. IMO this training includes nothing more than police procedures i.e. conducting investigations, forensics, searching individuals and buildings to collect evidence and yes serving warrants, if necessary, with those all mighty “stick” tactics. And of course, lots of “new innovative techniques and tactics” involving CAS and IMO (Old) so called high tech equipment the U.S. Military Industrial Congressional Complex wants to clear out of the warehouses.

All in all IMO Uncle Sam has chosen to put just about all his eggs in one advanced technology system, think Star Wars Storm Troopers or Matrix i.e. the Operator or Morpheus trying to guide Neo and others to safety. IMO it looks something like this; (x) unit go to (x) address, kick in front door, use stairs to your right, go south down hallway to (x) door, it is unlocked, interning room go to (x) window looking out window to the north you will see your target running east though the neighbors garden. All this information and the “live” feeds of target and area of operations would be provided by a fleet of satellites as well as Near space assets that are never mentioned by the media as current military assets and of course there’s the robots, UAVs and a flood of other covertly deployed sensors as well as covert eves dropping of any civilian electronic devices in the Area of operations.

Thus in light of these and similar so called “new innovative, techniques and tactics” (notice the media and governments choice of words “techniques and tactics” as if we’re talking Commando training i.e. why not use some modern high tech terms the system is so eager to introduce us all to normally as a matter of routine), IMO Uncle Sam has placed the traditional Guerrilla combat tactics, on the back burner and is hoping they all go the way of other black arts.

This is not just true of the infantry; let us take a peek at aerial combat. Does anyone out there actually think today’s U.S. pilots are turning and burning, pulling high (G) maneuvers trying to hit the entry windows and get inside the bandits turn. Think any pilot has conducted a yo-yo or split S maneuver lately or made the choice between a single or two-circle fight. Now days its all about stealth, ECM and Smart even autonomous weapons, missiles especially BVR tech. IMO this explains why the U.S. Navy is not concerned with not having a front line fighter equal to the USAF F-22 Raptor. An article I recently read on “Strategy page” mentioned a lot of talk about a Navy F/A-18E at an air show, displaying a little F-22 silhouette decal i.e. a simulated Kill credit symbol/icon. IMO the F/A- 18E did not gun down that kill.

And then everyone knows that just about all now and IMO soon all weapons systems including the bayonet well have a chip in it.

So if the electronics ever fail (maybe due to a shift in the axis of earths electromagnetic field, passed a certain point or perhaps a record size solar flare) IMO it well be the masters of the age-old Guerrilla combat tactics i.e. The Fragmented Fighting Facts Basic Rules that survive, keeping in mind “no one wins”.

I also wish, that those who join the various services where told all this up front i.e. “we do not intend to train you as a traditional Commando”.

Another thing I would like everyone to consider is that; what makes a Marine special is not the training she or he receives, no it’s the steel the youth demonstrates when they choose to join the Marines. Even when compared to the Special Forces, who IMO are only specialists in their particular field, once again mostly high tech specialties and whose ranks are filled with older personnel that have already been serving and have graduated from a boot camp i.e. are aware of the hoop and hype hurry up and wait tactics. And who are then usually chosen i.e. coached into changing their MOS. I am aware of the change in recruitment policy after 2001 allowing for direct entry into the S.F. community. IMO a rarity and IMO it is still not the same as just choosing to go to a Marine Corps Recruit Depot from the start.

Furthermore, to those who just well not accept the truth about the lack of training along the lines of traditional Guerrilla combat tactics. I can now say that I have exchanged comments with a number of Iraqi and Afghanistan combat vets. These comments can be found on the internet if you Google up my call sign, Newjarheaddean also spelled with one (D). IMO it is obvious that the tactics I speak of are news to the vets, some have made commits that proves in combat they were just winging it. And no, I don’t believe that all the vets are observing some kind of code of silence on these tactics including the vets who are against the wars. Unless everyone wants to say that YouTube and other internet companies are conspiring to edit all combat footage that shows these tactics being used and that, the vets are staging other videos that show them (albeit with great bravery) as armatures without a clue and winging it. If anyone ever sees video, showing the tactics listed in Tri-F being used, be sure and provide a link with your comment. I once saw a flash of film on CNN showing combat in Lebanon during the 1980s that showed some of these tactics being used by a Guerrilla fighter. I well also say I do believe that UAV footage is edited by the Pentagon to keep the public from seeing the few but well trained Taliban and other Guerrilla fighters that are using these tactics. Alternatively, maybe people think our professional highly trained well-equipped military is unable to defeat 10 – 20 thousand religious extremist amateur thugs in almost a decade of fighting. All the while killing at least by some estimates 100 a mouth including dozens of top commanders.

Let me also say, on the numbers of U.S. PTSD casualties, i.e. IMO, WIA, (And IMO deserving of a Purple Heart). The Government portrays these cases as a result of fighting a war that is “unlike any other war we have fought before” (LOL). Facing an enemy that is fighting in some mysterious and or cowardly manor that simply cannot be countered by military means. I believe the high numbers are a result of US forces fighting in a manner that is suicidal i.e. pointless and counterproductive to the real world situation. Example; you have a young brave American ready to fight for the nation, while on one of these IMO “Russian roulette parades” someone shoots at the unit from some building, everyone scrambles for cover, as some spray and pray, then after determining the location using SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems) sniper detectors, or one of the many similar vehicle mounted systems the commander calls in some sort of CAS, if someone’s brains have been blow out especially if it was an officer or the location is vague, a real “crowd pleaser” maybe used i.e. 2000 pounder.

IMO this is how 90% of engagements (fought by regular infantry units) are resolved. Special Forces are now and in the feature more and more regular infantry well be using the Matrix. And to those that think this is the exception I say show me the number of WIA or KIA (On either side) by small arms fire i.e. during traditional firefights. Even if one includes sniper fire those figures are really low. So IMO after witnessing all the carnage and innocent civilian life being lost and receiving all those looks from the witnesses, it is the American that realizes it is his unit that is not fighting right.

This is reinforced and really sinks in back in the states when the vet is asked to tell the Commando stories that never occurred and thus the vet must tell the truth i.e. give up the Commando reputation, keep it all inside or start lying. If the first option is chosen that unveiling reality is demoralizing and makes it all not worth it. If either one of the other chooses are made IMO the vet becomes the ticking bomb. And I can tell you all that many times, I have recalled being told once that “when you go home keep your mouth shut about the things we did. If you don’t you well be thought of as a liar or crazy and either which way your life well be over”. That First Sergeant was right, but like my daddy use to say, “He’s right but he does not know why he’s right” i.e. IMO the First Sgt. thought of what we did in terms of remarkable heroic feats. However, IMO certainly since the beginning of the Vietnam era, it is the lack of training i.e. the manner in which our service women and men are fighting that keeps this tragedy going.

I would also suggest the vets of today are just like I was 25 or so years ago in the sense that they know there training is lacking, however, they just cannot explain what’s missing. However unlike me they refuse to accept that old fashion “black arts” are the answer i.e. should be the basis of basic training. And I now know the “Black art” tactics they and I should have been trained in and I can now say, “The PFC that told the Corp it was out of step, now has provided the proof”. What surprises me is that most vets it seems don’t care at all about the tactics I speak of and seem to view me as an unpatriotic “party pooper”, when I’m just a U.S. Marine trying to improve the Corps and save lives. Bottom line IMO the infantry needs to consist of unmarried i.e. undistracted, NO CHILDREN, dedicated true professionals, trained in the tactics listed in Tri-F and many more I am sure exist.

And to those that say “chivalry is for the museums” I say “first we must have peace on earth”.

One Newjarheaddean

“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!

Update; 12/19/14 09/53 hours




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Tuesday, August 9, 2011

Fragmented Fighting Facts applied! three

AHOY,

8/13/11 GOD DAM; believe me I here you i.e. enough updates i.e. changes but this info too was worthy of mentioning it way down the way i.e. dam near to the end of the post. Its about one of the contradictions of one of the so called guerrilla's weaknesses.

8/10/11 11:13 okay okay already, but I did realize a very important point to bring up about all this talk about tactics being amateurish etc. see up date below. 

8/10/11 10:09 hours, LOL Like I've said a don't mind laughing at myself and I'm not perfect. See update below on Alexander the Great. 


And one other quick note I've realized that the copy of my Fragmented Fighting Facts on this blog is not as updated as a copy I posted on the Strategypage site mouths ago. However that copy is trash as far as the formatting goes i.e. the thread template did not allow for any text clues like italics, bold, spacing etc. etc. so its just a long none stop bunch of sentences. ANYWAYS! I may have refereed to some info here or there that is not in the copy posted on this blog. I'm working right now on the latest update that well be out soon i.e. I'M BUSY! Also see correction below about Alexander the great.


8/10/11 08:54 hours, update below as usual high lighted in green.


Here I believe I got this information from “Sniper Flash Cards” site or a link from that site. I have seen all this info before on other sites too. I have rearrange some of it and edited it too, so I could make my points and keep the post some what shorter.

All this info refereed to in my Fragmented Fighting Facts well be noted in Reference notes in my latest update do out soon. So I don't specifically note all locations in this post of rules and detailed notes. 

My main point here is that its all western media hype. The so called "lessons learned" are actually being relearned and then swept under the rug i.e. conveniently forgotten, stored in file 13.

How do I know this, its all in Fragmented Fighting Facts i..e. my collection of combat rules I have put together over the last 30 years.

It dose not matter but it gets my attention, i.e. actually its been more like, 39 years I was only about 11 or 12 years old when I pick up that first book on the French and Indian wars. Its contained those "Roger's Rangers Rules", that started it all for me.  I'm 50 years old now, time dose fly. 

One last thing about these so called "lessons learned" papers/reports. They almost always deal more with operational or strategic information. And like I've said about the old saying of only armatures talking tactics. You can go to any library and fine isle after isle of books on Strategies of every commander in history worth noting. But try and find a book on tactics, not just tilted tactics but about tactic.

My point is so why dose the system, print all the books about the so called crown jewels? IMO its because they (Strategies) are really more like Ass holes. They are the mental quicksand to stall the  public's thoughts. Chew the cud sheedhood, crew the cud.

Its the tactics that win wars, those little things that matter. 

And some say tactics as doctrine is 2nd generation, as if they have those generations right in the first place.
I say you must have tactics as your doctrine and then you add your special touches of individuality with your imagination and creativity that hopefully well turn the battle in your favor. To suggest its all about creativity up front leaves you at a point were its "kay surrah surrah" what ever well be well be and hopefully I well reinvent the wheel before I am killed.

One last point here I feel is worth mentioning, and that is some of my best original work, found at the very beginning of Tri-F and that is my three golden rules, they are like supervising a consent consideration.


1) There well be times for exceptions to the rules; due to circumstances. You well learn this through experience.
2) Avoid setting patterns; from time to time, you should conduct yourself in an unorthodox manor as apposed to an orthodox manor. Make a habit of considering if not choosing alternatives to unfolding situations.
3) Think like the foe; for instance recall and consider your offensive knowledge when in the defense to predict your foes offensive plans.  

This is the best you can do to avoid patterns, you don't level street fighting up to every members creativity. Just like you don't throw out the baby with the bathwater.   

Here the info from the site or link; 

Chechens had a fixed method of conducting ambushes, based on the 25-man group, composed of three mobile squads of two heavy machine gunners, two RPG gunners, one sniper, and three riflemen.  Three of these 25-man groups (supported by an 82mm-mortar crew with two tubes) would conduct an ambush as a 75-man unit.  Three of the eight-man squads would serve as a “killer team” and set up in three positions along the ambush route.  They would occupy the lower level of buildings in the ambush zone to prevent being wounded by incoming artillery.  The remaining fifty men would occupy blocking positions to ensure the entrapped Russians could not escape and to prevent reinforcements from entering the ambush area. To counter this tactic, the Russians would conduct extensive artillery fire on a proposed route of advance, attempting to reduce buildings along the route to rubble.  This method proved effective, although on occasion the rubble served as excellent ambush positions for the Chechen fighters.

Organizationally, the Chechen force had seven-man subgroups (armor hunter-killer teams, a number slightly different than the six-man groups reported earlier) that contained three riflemen/automatic riflemen/ammunition bearers, two RPG gunners, one sniper, and one medic/corpsman.  Three of these subgroups made up the majority of a 25-man group or platoon, and three of these platoons formed 75-man groups. 

Newjaheaddean; is that eight, six and time three squads equals 24 or 25 LOL, its 75 total, no matter what its 75.

Snipers set up in hide positions that supported their respective platoons. 

Each 75-man ambush group set up in buildings along one street block, and only on one side of the street—never on both sides of a street because of the cross fires a two-sided ambush would create.

Newjarheaddean; this is why we have an (L) shaped ambush i.e. max fire from two directions without cross fire.

Only the lower levels of multi-story buildings were occupied to avoid casualties.

Newjarheaddean; you don’t want to put everyone on the ground floor. The rule is to avoid the roof and top floor do to indirect fires, not just occupy the ground floor.

One 25-man platoon comprised the "killer team" and set up in three positions along the target avenue. They had the responsibility for destroying whatever column entered their site. The other two 25-man platoons set up in the buildings at the assumed entry-points to the ambush site. They had responsibility for sealing off the ambush entry from escape by or reinforcement of the ambushed forces. The killer platoon established a command point (platoon HQ) with the center squad. As the intended target column entered the site, the squad occupying the building nearest the entry point would contact the other two squads occupying the center and far building positions. Primary means of communications was by Motorola radio.

Newjarheaddean; WRONG, IMO radio silence would have been observed, only hand and other visual signals would have been used in the ambush area just before it was sprung.

Once the lead vehicle into the site reached the far squad position, the far squad would contact the other two squads. The commander at the central squad would initiate or signal to initiate the ambush. Minefields were employed to reinforce ambushes by taking out reinforcing armor and to relieve pressure on the killer platoons in case the ambush bogged down.

Newjarheaddean; this minefield stuff is good, all found in my Tri-F burred in "Vehicle check points".


"amateur" improvements to fighting vehicles and firing positions (such as putting screens on armor made from fine mesh metal netting, or filling cartridge and shell boxes with crushed rock, broken brick, or gravel to reduce the effect of rounds fired at the vehicle).

Newjarheaddean; all good, known and done since Vietnam.

The article also revealed that on many occasions one Russian unit fired on another due to Chechen chicanery.  For example, during the assault on Grozny:

Mortars mounted on Kamaz trucks fire one salvo and immediately moved to another area. They have learned to skillfully disorient fire spotters [forward observers], often creating a friendly fire situation?

Newjarheaddean; now here I had to go looking for any kind of detail info i.e. examples. What I found is listed below.

The Chechen force also was very successful in redirecting Russian artillery and fighter fire to rain down on Russian forces.  Chechen hunter-killer units would sneak between two Russian positions in the city, especially at night, and fire in one direction and then the other before moving out of the area. Thinking they were under attack, the Russian units would fire at each other, sometimes for hours?

Newjarheaddean; Once again old Vietnam sniper tactics. And found in Tri-F

The Chechen force exploited Russian disorientation by moving behind and parallel to the Russian force once it entered the city? 

Newjarheaddean; here I’ll admit to being at a loss. Moving parallel to a large unit imo could be fatal if you find yourself discover and happen to be somewhere at midpoint of a large enemy patrol. Think encirclement, only one way out, if they should decide to go into a skirmish i.e. move to their flank on line with the stern and point moving much faster.


There were few local guides to move Russian forces through the city.  As a result, Russian forces ended up in gardens and dead-end streets. 

To distinguish fighters from peaceful city dwellers, the army and MVD began looking at men’s shoulders of men for evidence of bruising (from firing weapons) and at forearms for burned hair or flesh from the extraction of hot cartridges.  They closely examined clothing and smelled for gunpowder residue.  Further, in order to identify a Chechen artilleryman, Russians looked for glossy spots left by artillery and mortar rounds on the bends and cuffs of sleeves.  Pockets that carried cartridges, if turned inside out, showed a shiny, silvery-leaden hue.  A grenade launcher operator or mortar man was recognized from fibers and crumpled pieces of gun cotton (cotton wool in the original) on clothing.


Newjarheaddean; this is some good info. I can’t recall right now where I put it but there was some rehashing of this type of info out of Iraq just recently. Like I say the media is just feeding the sheephood.

Two other initial Russian mistakes were that they did not always properly employ infantrymen in support of armor attacks (they followed behind armor instead of feeling out Chechen ambush sites)

Newjaheaddean; who really thinks the Russians did not know this rule. IMO they were doing just like the U.S. did lately in Iraq i.e. let the elephant go first we are not up against large numbers of enemy infantry that are going to overrun us.

Grachev underscored that Grozny demanded tactical changes in the way Russian forces would conduct city fights, especially in terms of manning assault units, improving sniper activities, carrying out intelligence operations, and even explanatory work among the population.

Newjarheaddean; sound familiar, i.e. its all so new and different this think call city fighting i.e. MOUT. Sarcasm on!


While command was less centralized than in the Russian force, Motorola radios made coordination possible.  Chief of Staff Maskhadov directed his forces to fight in small groups, although this limited their ability to engage in extended combat. 

Control was another problem for Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov.  He stated that many of the independent groups decided for themselves when, where, and how long they would remain in combat.  On more than one occasion, Maskhadov noted that local militia forces would simply pick up and go home when they got bored, tired or cold. 

Newjarheaddean; with the above, there was a note somewhere about this so called weakness mentioned problem being a moral and advantage of the Mujahideen or Taliban. It went something like this, “we fight when we wont to, shoot and go home, eat sleep and choose another victum on another day of our choosing” or something to that effect. So I say its an advantage not a weakness. Guerilla warfare is a long difficult road not a drag race.

I found that info ("It went something like this") it was in the same article I believe here it is...

"[Our tactic in Grozny] was to fire at the enemy everywhere without being seen anywhere. We shot, destroyed, withdrew, went home to sleep, returned to start military actions again. No organization or planning. We were independent hunters."
I believe it was stated by Aslan Maskhadov


Troops were required to withstand long periods of intense combat with limited resupply and rest.

Newjarheaddean; I’m not sure exactly how the last sentence was meant it fallowed Aslan Maskhadov’s statement. IMO though it is the regular troops that suffer the long periods of intense combat with limited rest etc.

When the Chechens were able to force Russian soldiers from a building they left at most five of their fighters in the building. After some time, the Russians would counterattack and concentrate at least a company against the building…but having taken back the building they invariably found only a few bodies of Chechen fighters. Also whenever the Russian soldiers took up defensive positions, they customarily positioned several people in every building, thus diluting their forces.

Newjarheaddean; Here in Tri-F I have mentioned that if you must give up buildings give up two or more burning the first one i.e. the one you had occupied for concealment. There is some wisdom in leaving a detail behind at your old defensive site as a decoy. This is also mentioned in Tri-F. And lastly the Russians again are being portrayed as if they did not know Alexander the Greats rule of “if you try to defend every place you defend nothing” etc. Also mentioned in Tri-F.

It's "Frederick the great" found in Defense, over all tips.


In one interview, entitled "Chechen Commander: Urban Warfare in Chechnya," First, study the people.  One must understand the enemy in detail, and not only from a military and political sense, but also from a cultural sense.  Chechens also used non-combatants to exercise psychological deception on the urban battlefield.  They declared some villages and suburbs as "pro-Russian" or non-committed when in fact these same areas were centers for strategic planning, command and control, and logistic purposes. 

Newjarheaddean; YES we see this in Afghanistan today. It’s the old “surrender, surrender…but don’t give yourself away, ayyay. Save yourself for me, heee. LOL.

Second, know the territory.  Key terrain in a city is at the micro level.  Do not rely on streets, signs, and most buildings as reference points.  Use prominent buildings, and monuments instead as they usually remain intact.  It was better to conduct reconnaissance by day and attack at night, which the Russians did not like to do.  When forty Ukrainian volunteers signed up to support the Chechens, they were required to conduct detailed reconnaissance with Chechens before entering combat.

Newjarheaddean; good stuff I would only substitute prominent etc with natural features if at all possible. And the Volunteers thing again you find in Tri-F under Pro-guerilla / insurgency notes with back ground checks. They get to know those trying to join i.e. before they get any info they must supply lots.

Third, study the opposition’s weapons and equipment, and how this equipment might be employed in an urban environment.  The most effective weapon system employed against pure infantry was the sniper, a casualty producer, psychological weapon, and impediment to rapid movement.  Nothing could slow down a force as much as the sniper.  Chechens feared the Russian mortars more than any other weapon in the city, but learned to employed their own with great skill as well. 

The Chechen force began the battle for Grozny with individual protective equipment but soon discarded it because it impaired mobility in the urban environment. 
Finally, the Chechen force (by necessity) went into battle as light as possible. Mobility was the key to success against the slower and heavier Russian force. 

Newjarheaddean; soon to be found in Tri-F, Mujahedeen Strengths: Rugged and highly motivated fighters Tactical mobility, I recall the story of the latest Medal of Honor winner in Afghanistan. The one Trooper mentioned how he ended up in a rut on his back and could not get up i.e. he was not unlike a turtle.  Ability to operate at night, most do not want to except we do not own the night in Afghanistan. I recently read a time magazine story about how quite things got at base at night an all the lights being out as troops retired to their quarter as night fill. IMO it do the fact the Machines need it that way so they can guard the FOBs. Ability to achieve surprise i.e. blind in with locals, Familiarity with the terrain, Sanctuaries in Pakistan and Iran. These are the same Advantages the Taliban bookthumpers have today.


The Chechens was their inability to conduct an extensive engagement.  The small size of the Chechen units, coupled with their limited ammunition supplies, caused them to avoid large-scale battles.

The Russians discovered that drawing the Chechens into a long engagement would allow the Russian force the time to surround the position and use overwhelming fire support. 

Newjarheaddean; here the media is trying to suggest the Russians were choosing the time and place of the fight. And this also allows for a justification of bombing i.e. massive air support so the U.S. can say it’s just the best way and we at least use more precision munitions.

And now I’m going to get back on schedule with updating the Fragmented Fighting Facts.

“I well bet my lucky star” IKYG

G-day!
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