Thursday, May 16, 2013
Post # 15, Conduct of Engagement basic rule # 3
AHOY,
FRAGMENTED FIGHTING FACTS
Update;
07/10/13 08: 54 hours, the update here is the addition of some hand drawn
diagrams to illustrate my notes on the various formations. Note, all previous
green highlight has been removed i.e. only the most recent update or additional
knowledge is highlighted in green. And of course the “Reference” notes are also
in green as normal and due to the update i.e. the added notes on the (posts
number) that the “Reference note is located in for this series of posts. I have
left the previous yellow highlighted information highlighted in yellow due to
the fact I have not yet fully edited it or decided exactly where to place it.
Conduct of Engagements
Basic rule # 3
3) Attack or retreat in shifts:
This is covering each other during attacks or retreats i.e. during
advancing or withdrawal rushes/movements and you should take special care in
exposed places i.e. crossing open spaces, avenues or around blind corners.
Attacking or retreating in shifts can also be done vertically i.e. from
different floors. Teams can cover each other from different buildings. Historically
horses i.e. cavalry units have been used to lead charges and cover retreats.
When bounding with individuals, units or vehicles, those providing cover fire
should be halted, making accurate fire of a half mile to one mile ranges
possible. It is always best if the one providing cover is concealed too i.e.
unseen no movement, remaining motionless until the one being covered is ready
to provide cover. It maybe advantages at times to avoid even numbers with
groups. For example an individual covering a fireteam or fireteam covering a
platoon. Three methods: movement
by successive bounds, this is leap froging to each other’s position. Take
care to avoid bunching up in large groups. Movement
by alternate bonds, this is leap froging pass one another’s positions. Note
that, point man commonly moves to fast or far breaking formation (if you well).
Three man filer buster method, the
method starts with a three man unit in a (V) formation. It involved each Marine
at some point becoming the so-called “Middleman” (i.e. next to advance) and who
advances between the other two Marines. This method provides a unique option,
that being that a team could use it in a defensive stand, with the team leader
remaining stationary i.e. becoming the center if you well at the base of the
(V) while the other two took turns rushing between the leader and their fellow
maneuvering Marine as they rotated around the team leader, thus shifting
locations and providing fire in whatever direction the leader directed. At
night especially, this would give the foe, an impression the unit was larger
than just three. In general, the filer buster method also provided for maximum
flexibility for units to change directions i.e. move and fight in any direction
needed.
Images;
NOTES; I have used the symbols here that
are mentioned in the notes on the U.S. Marine Corps, Fire team organization,
i.e. Ready, Team, Fire, Assist where (R) is your team leader etc. see notes
below after images beginning with “A Fire Team”.
On cover fire shown in red, (T) i.e.
team leader, would open fire first to direct front at possible or actual enemy
positions. (F/A) and (R) initially open fire in a near (i.e. merging manner on
location (T) first opened up on) or actual cross-fire manner i.e. in the
general direction and location each would be maneuvering towards as they moved.
Thus if enemy is only or manly located between the two of them i.e. directly in
front of (T) then (F/A) and (R) would merge their cover fire. They could
initially always start their cover fire in a cross fire manner i.e. engaging
the area each would be maneuvering towards, then shift to the merging fire
location directly in front of (T) and continue the shift outwardly. The main
point to remember is that if the “middle man” in this case (T) is to rush in
front of (F/A) first then (F/A) has to shift and seize fire the quickest to
avoid shooting the maneuvering “middle man” in these case (T). See notes “with
filer buster method” underlined and highlighted “red” below. Thus any additional
cover fire to the North would be provided by (R) in this case. There would also
be no reason why (T) could not “spray and pray” if he noticed any rounds
impacting around him i.e. if he came under enemy fire. I also noticed here
after drawing my diagrams that I should have had (T) rush in front of (R) first
in that way leaving (F/A) as better cover fire.
On the Defensive stand or posture
diagram if I had just been more artistically inclined I could have drawn a
better star, lol.
On the charge of direction diagram if
the unit now wanted to move north again (T) could move north and in front of
(F/A) or (R) could be instructed to return or back track and (T) could move
north and in front of (R) thus leaving (F/A) as best base of fire. Like in the
first maneuver to starboard i.e. note
how (F/A) remain in place as (T) and (R) maneuver.
One, two and three
In principle the
responsibilities of all Marines providing cover and with the filibuster method
the two stationary Marines, are to assist the maneuvering middle man by placing
well aimed shots on foe (i.e. shooting the foe) this distracts and keeps foe
from being able to keep tabs on the maneuvering middleman and causes foe’s fire
to be ineffective and or to seize. In addition, they keep tabs on foe, feed
information to the middleman about foe. With filer buster method, the
Marine located at the stern should initiate cover fire, ideally only a three
round burst. This is due to the fact that middleman i.e. rusher well be quickly
crossing the stream of cover fire.
With all methods of bounding Marines providing cover
may chose to sound off “Move, or some other verbal” to indicate they are
prepared to provide cover. This maybe the case in particular before the
shooting starts. However ideally before shooting starts especially if foe is
unaware of your units approach, hand signals, i.e. maybe a twisting of the
rifle from horizontal to the upright should be used. IMO normally under fire
most likely it well be the volume, location i.e. direction and perhaps slightly
different sound of the weapon providing the cover fire that clues you in to the
times to move i.e. rush. If your not shooting you should be, doing a tactical
reload (i.e. loading even through your not completely out, IMO switch to full
magazine and top off old magazine after placing it back in pouch) this is
coupled with a 360 check, and or communicating with others or moving. You
choose the method of bounding based on the amount of cover and concealment
available in the area and the volume of fire you are under. If your group is
under heavy fire, with lots of cover in area, there is less need for always
alternating who moves next.
The methods of fire and
movement described above have a drawback in the application. Depending upon the
distance to be covered, the need to swap fire positions to maintain cover also
slows the advance. Making rushes as long as possible can help, however the
longer the assault takes, and with any lessening of cover fire, the greater the
chance for the foe to target the attackers. An alternative is marching fire i.e. the Squad advancing
as a single entity. All arms are brought to bear on the enemy during the
advance. The key to success is in overwhelming supporting fire delivered from
artillery, mortars, machine guns and ideally accompanying tanks. There is no
subtlety involved whatsoever. The advantage is speed, using such shock action,
a line of riflemen can advance quickly to the enemy line and move into the
close combat i.e. Assault phase and when pressed resolutely it can be
astoundingly successful.
Even in very open terrain the
well-trained rifleman will be able to locate and use all kinds of limited
cover, such as slight depressions or rises. You can low crawl sometimes under
cover fire right up to foe’s position. In snow you maybe able to crouch on to
skies and slide or be pulled into positions. However, in very open areas, an
advance will usually necessitate overwhelming fire superiority with consequent
longer bounds between firing positions.
(Reference, STEP #
2, Leadership guidelines, Light machine gun group i.e. post # 12 of this series.
And COE overall tips; Machine gun sections i.e. post # 62 of this series.)
Unit estimated
capabilities (i.e. speed and ranges obtainable). Comparative
information to consider, (Olympic athletes 60 meter run 7 seconds. 100 meters
9.85 seconds. 200 meters 19.85 seconds. Also, various altitudes would affect
performance). As a rule of thumb for Marines conducting alternate bounding
cycles, with a column lateral movement, Marines humping 25- 50 lbs of combat
kit, executing zigzags and momentary stops and or drops. 150’/50 m rushes in 20
seconds would be well within their capabilities. To continue, with a six man
fire team, 50’ intervals, divided into two sections of three moving in pairs
(i.e. pairs being last Marine from each section) cycle starts with rushers
advancing 50’ past respective point man for a total rush of 150’/50m. Thus 40
seconds between individual rushes, 1 minute between cycles for each section.
Thus 60 cycles per hour for a max of one hour. Thus 60 x 150’ = 9000’ exactly
or about one and three quarters of a mile (9240’) an hour on average. Note if
individuals rushed the entire length of the six-man fire team they would have
to do 300’ rushes, taking up to a minute with 6-minute cycles, 10 cycles per
hour 10 x 300’ equals 3000’ per hour. Note IMO with the last method the
individual would be in motion far to long for secure movement however, the one
advantage is more cover fire is at the ready. Therefore, if a unit was under
heavy fire and the goal was to place one Marine in a specific location this
would be the preferred method.
With sections of three Marines each rushing as groups, each section
member rushes 300’/100m or yards, in 30 seconds. 30 seconds between section
rushes one minute cycles. Thus 60 cycles per hour for a maximum of one
hour. Thus 60 x 300’ = 18000’ (3.4 miles
exact) or 3 and a half miles 18480 feet.
More comparative information with unit runs female Olympic runners are
doing 5kms i.e. 3miles in 15 minutes. Thus, IMO combat troops humping 25 lbs of
kit 18 minutes would be well within their capabilities.
Note work figures for successive bounds of pairs or sections.
Indian running units, vehicles or ships.
Firefighters said to be capable of climbing an average of 25 flights of
stairs an hour. IMO the weight of equipment between firefighters and Marines
would be about the same.
On “war cries”, one should not sound off until combatants have joined
in combat. Sounding off too early, can be considered a sign of arrogance or
cowardice. The effect is grater when foe is hearing cry, at the same time they
are meeting weapons.
Note again on this GO, GO, GO, GO, we here the Mainers and troops
barking out as they exit or enter things. This not only lets all foes in the
area know precisely when your exiting or interring, it IMO distracts and
hinders the hearing abilities of those in your unit. IMO its just hoop and hype
Bull Shit cheerleading. I wound just prefer to here a single “Due it” i.e. the
old D.I. command that is instilled in all Marines during boot camp (this being
the execution command fallowing any detailed instructions). It should carry
over to the FMF and there be reinforced.
A fire team
is the basic element of the GCE. It consists of four Marines: three riflemen
and a team leader, typically a Corporal or Lance Corporal.
The USMC summarizes its
fireteam organization with the mnemonic "ready-team-fire-assist",
the following being the arrangement of the fireteam when in a column:
Rifleman: acts as a scout;
"Ready".
Team Leader (M203): also
works as the grenadier; "Team".
Automatic Rifleman (currently
M249 SAW or M27 IAR, formerly BAR): also serves as second in command for the
fireteam; "Fire".
Assistant Automatic Rifleman:
carries extra ammunition; "Assist".
The fireteam is organized
around the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon and now there is also the M-27 Infantry
Automatic rifle I. A. R. Upon receiving fire, the fireteam can organize in a
methodical way to engage the enemy with fireteam "rushes". Fireteam
rushes are movement by one part of the team during cover by fire by the other
part of the team. Generally, first the Rifleman and Team Leader will move
ahead, being covered by the Automatic and Assistant Automatic Riflemen, then
the Automatic and Assistant Automatic Riflemen will move up to the Rifleman and
Team Leader, being covered by the Rifleman and Team Leader. The process is
repeated until no forward progress is possible without serious risk to the
entire fireteam. When finally upon the objective, the fireteam assumes a
"hasty 180", where the Automatic Rifleman covers 11 o'clock to 1
o'clock (12 o'clock being the most likely avenue of enemy approach), with the
Rifleman and Assistant Automatic Rifleman covering 9 to 11 and 1 to 3
respectively. The Team Leader is next to the Automatic Rifleman to complement
his fire with grenade rounds and to assign targets for the M249. Once a frontal
enemy counterattack is deemed unlikely, the fireteam then will assume a
"consolidated 360" to ensure the flanks of the fireteam are
protected. The position of Marines in the fireteam is sometimes called RTFA
(Ready - Team - Fire - Assist) because of one of the fireteam formations that
are possible.
Maneuvers and Formations;
At this point I would like to
suggest everyone recall the General phases of an attack; one the approach, two
contact, three the assault and four consolidation.
Maneuvers: Single
envelopment – advantages, element of surprise is usually possible. Choose
the ground you fight on. Causes enemy to fight in two directions. Generally
effects foe’s moral vs. a frontal attack. Should not be used at night. Maneuver
element two thirds of unit’s total strength. Uses fire and maneuver until fire
and movement becomes necessary. Note; fire
and maneuver involves units or groups moving. Fire and movement is individual
Marines or vehicles moving. Base
element one third of unit’s total strength. Assist maneuver element in the same
manor as mentioned under responsibilities of Marines providing cover fire in
successive, alternate or filer buster methods.
Double envelopment – one form of a double envelopment is a pincer, note; over all the
units movements could be simultaneous or alternating i.e. one element for
holding/placing fire on target or used as a decoy.
Formations:
Column – Purpose;
for traveling long distances. Make time. Difficult for foe to count your unit
quickly. Keep injuries down. Put large unit through small narrow passages. Down
hill movement, deep snow may also dictate the use of a line formation when it
would not be considered suitable on level ground. Pros; strong flanks,
good control and communication. Cons; weak point and stern. Slow in
reacting laterally (i.e. to the bow or stern).
During WWII, a typical
formation was lead by the Squad Leader. Behind him came the Gun Group, ready to
provide quick supporting fire. The riflemen followed the gun team, with the
Assistant Leader bringing up the rear in the German and American model to close
up the formation. British and Russian variations placed him with the Gun
Group. This column formation was favored during the advance to the combat
zone. It was not a fighting formation, merely a traveling one. In those areas
where it was uncertain precisely at what point the Squad could expect to
encounter resistance, one or two men would go forward as scouts. The US Squad
routinely placed two men on point for a column in front of the Leader. Prior to
combat, or after coming under unexpected fire, the Squad would deploy. The
riflemen would form a skirmish line, either centered around the light machine
gun, or flanking it on one or the other side, depending upon the favored
doctrine. To reduce vulnerability to enemy fire, this skirmish line would
spread out, leaving some 3 to 5 meters between each man. In reality, movement
was more dictated by terrain, conditions and enemy action. Men learned to break
up the intervals between units or individuals, as well as to avoid bunching up.
IMO thus keeping the foe from being able to guess location of another man based
on knowing location of one in the formation. This (bunching up i.e. cluster
fuck) was a cardinal sin, as to submit to the temptation of sticking close to,
a friend in front meant a far greater chance of both falling victim to a single
shell or machine gun burst. Men would always seek to advance under cover
of trees, hedges, walls, defiles, streams, natural depressions, anything that
would place a barrier between them and the enemy's line of sight. However, the
ground was not always kind, and at some point would come a tract of land with
no discernible cover. Only the most charitable or incompetent of enemies would
fail to cover that tract with fire. Negotiating passage over ground under fire
called for speed and suppression, but how was the infantryman to quell the
barrage of distant artillery? Unless his own guns were mounting counter battery
fire, the only solution was to wait for a pause and then rush forward.
(Reference, COE,
rule # 5 i.e. posts # 20 and PCP rule # 11 i.e. post # 11)
Echelon – Purpose;
protect flanks. Probing foe lines. Pros; difficult for foe to tell your
direction of travel. Difficult for foe to out flank. Cons; slow moving.
Difficult to control. Odd fields of fire.
Wedge- Purpose;
foe presents expected, location unknown. When in dense terrain or during bad
weather, and at night. Pros; maximum separation with in minimum area.
All around good fire. Good control and communication. Quick reacting. Cons;
complacency and working closely with other units. A pincer is commonly used to
counters a wedge.
With a three Squad Platoon,
there were three offensive formations that could be used. Known by many names,
but perhaps the most descriptive would be arrowhead, V shape, and line.
Arrowhead or narrow wedge (a reverse V shaped see fig below with command unit
in center) formation, with scout unit up front other squads trailing in
echelons. Formation had the advantage that it kept the bulk of the Platoon from
direct contact with the enemy during the initial stage. On encountering
resistance, the lead Squad would shift to a fire role, pinning the enemy.
Arrowhead
shaped like inverted (V) with a stick out the top. Machine Gun group/team on
flank enemy expected or known to be on. It is a maneuver unit formation. Used
when enemy location known. Fire team on opposite side as flanking unit.
Spearhead
machine gun group/team is centered up front. Purpose as line breaker. Pros;
good for machine gun team vs. fire team.
True V formation; It mimicked the arrowhead but inverted the deployment
of the Squads. Now, the advance was carried by two Squads moving in
parallel i.e. two squads up front. The third Squad was held back in support,
while Platoon Headquarters again occupied the centre. This reversal placed the
greater part of the Platoon in direct line with the enemy, it also increased
the weight of fire the Commander could bring to bear against the foe. The
leading Squads would cover each other using fire and movement. The third Squad
was held back in reserve, or used to provide additional over watching fire. The
drawback was that the only way to achieve numerical superiority in the assault
phase was to throw in the third Squad, or better still use it to cover the
final assault of the other two. It was a slow and deliberate advance,
unsuited to a fast moving assault. It was of great benefit against a true
defense in depth, where there were several lines to be breached. There was also
a problem though, in that as the bulk of the company was in the leading
echelon, once battle was joined it had a tendency to become engaged in the
firefight i.e. if two squads, platoons or companies became pinned down by
effective enemy fire, they were robbed of their ability to maneuver. There was
a school of thought which reckoned units should be presented more like an
iceberg, in that the majority of its strength was kept uncommitted, until the
true dispositions of the defender had been revealed. A single fire
team/squad/platoon/company/battalion advance kept the greater part of the over
all unit under control this helped to counter the defense in depth. The
Commander could now decide how to develop the attack with a far more capable
reserve. The drawback was the obvious reduction in the frontage of the unit involved. IMO
making it possible that two units on patrol may discover one another only after
the units where near or on each other’s flanks. Leading with just a single unit
i.e. fire team, squad, platoon, company, or battalion, meant now instead of the
unit’s effort being dissipated across a two unit frontage, the Commander could
utilize all of his available firepower to support the efforts of his single
main effort unit. As a result, they had far greater potential to win the
firefight, and quickly close with the enemy. The second unit would follow hard
on the heels of the first, ready to exploit the breakthrough and move through
the lead unit to continue the advance. The third unit would then follow in
their wake to repeat the process. If the second unit had to pitch in to help
the first secure the breached point, the third would still be available for the
exploitation phase. By choosing to concentrate on breaching a single point, the
key to success shifted to how quickly they could exploit the breach i.e. pour
troops through the breach to compromise the foe’s line across a far greater
length than they had actually engaged it on.
(Reference, all
locations discussing “Reserves” starting with Step # 2 leadership guidelines,
Company Cmdr “The Reserves” i.e. post # 12)
Skirmishes- Purpose;
for attack, mob up, or search. Pros; natural for fire and maneuver or
movement. Max fire to front/bow and stern. Cons; bad control, weak
flanks.
Line; each
squad formed itself into a skirmish line; the instruction that the line should
only be formed if the squad, platoon etc was caught by surprise seems somewhat
vague. IMO by doing so if you catch i.e. happen to end up with the enemy on one
side of your line that makes maxing your fire on them easy. If the enemy ends
up on one end i.e. stern or bow, your unit can move away i.e. exit area quicker
and easier.
Phalanxes –
defined as closed ranks of heavily armed infantry.
Images; four and five;
Note; Here with the two Columns A and B you see in A the members of the
fire teams are in normal order. The problem with this order is that if the
patrol is walking down a road and comes under fire from the direct front or
stern the members of the fire teams would take cover in the direction of the
closest side of the road to them. Thus you end up with half of each fire team
on different sides of the road. If you team takes cover on the same side, some
of your unit has to cross the avenue of fire. So I suggest fire teams use the
formation I drew on the B column. And as you can see you could reverse the
order of every other fire team to keep your fire team leaders from being
bunched up. I represented this last suggestion with square boxes not circles.
Note: Equipment on port side
of troops, and hence units on the port side, are traditionally considered
weaker. Troops traditionally hampered by shields etc. Port side unit’s also
defensive side, starboard side, offensive side. Your offensive units advanced
obliquely on foes port units. Traditional term Seventh formation used when natural obstacle such as a lake, river,
ocean, mountain, was available to cover one flank.
(Reference Step # 2 in planning,
Leadership Guidelines, Squad leaders onward especially Company cmdr. “The
Reserves” i.e. post # 12)
(Reference, PCP rule # 3, “snipers
can be used” i.e. post # 14)
“Let
no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”
"
Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"
"
When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose
not have (S) nothing on me"
"
I well bet my lucky start"
“IKYG”
G-day!
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