Welcome Aboard!

AHOY,


UPDATE 12/21/13, 11:42 HOURS

I am revealing who I am today i.e. posting my name, I am Keith Oeffinger, I was born in San Antonio Texas in 1963. See today's post 12/21/13 .


Update, 01/11/14 12:30 hours;

I would like to say, with only one reply, like three years ago, this blog seems too much like a mirror site to me. And it appears very few patriots are looking back at past posts.

The new “Fragmented Fighting Facts” series of posts that dedicates one post to each Basic rule has now been completed. This series starts with the post tilted “Post # 1, Planning, Preface” that posted on 05/12/13. This series is under the label “Tri-F in progress”. Posts well be updated as I edit or discover additional knowledge thus the series is the most current version of my "Fragmented Fighting Facts" manual. For an old but complete version i.e. all in one post copy. Patriots are welcomed to try viewing one of the “pages” listed in the “special word section” on the starboard side of the blog. I say try due to the fact I’m not sure if they are published i.e. viewable to the general public due to all the issues or HACKING with my blog. There is also a complete copy posted, that is titled, “Tri-F in progress” too, it was posted 11/13/10.

And feel free to fire away with a reply, (sarcasm on).


FLASH REPORT; the “TERRORIST ARE NOT AMONG US, AND NEVER WERE I.E. AL QAEDA IS A STAWL MAN, GHOST”.

The most important lesson that everyone should have taken away from the Boston Marathon bombings was that those young men proved that no al-queda members are in the u.s. Otherwise they too would just go get some presure cookers and had to a parade.

“I AM NOT A TERRORIST” this nation’s worst enemy is FEAR. This fear is being promoted mostly by the back woods, right wing, Christians of this nation. We need to separate church and state, period. And that is of course for the States sake.


I would like patriots to understand that I use the terms "official revealed fact" to mean what everyone is being told by officials, media etc. I use the term "kings truth" to mean what I know or believe to actually be the actual facts. I DO NOT MEAN IT IN A RELIGIOUS WAY. I.E. the term Kings is plural as in those running the show.


Preface for the Fragmented Fighting Facts

Note pink highlighted material is that, that IMO is questionable factually, it maybe an “official revealed fact” that I am questioning. The material may need to be defined i.e. explained more or it could be a personal note. Yellow is location undecided or unedited material i.e. unread that I have not decided on what to keep or not. Green means a change has been made i.e. an update. By noting the green updated highlights a Patriot well not have to read the Fragmented Fighting Facts in its entirety to stay current. Red is important, perhaps the "kings truth".

Newjarheaddean; this is my collection of combat notes. One might call it my anthology of combat tactics, techniques, methods and skills. The note taking began about fourty years ago (I was around 13 years old) with the observation of 10 rules listed with in a book covering the French and Indian i.e. Native American, wars, entitled “Roger’s Rangers”. That’s right the rules that started all this are “Army Ranger” rules, this book was located in the “Westfall” library in San Antonio Texas off of Vance Jackson. I get a kick out of the libraries name due to the general agreement that modern or state vs state warfare started with the singing of the peace treaties at Westphalia. I could not read at the time; however I knew that a list in a book on war would be important. I copied those rules down like a scribe might have written hieroglyphs and had my dad read them to me. . This discovery preceded numerous sources including approximately one hundred books and about a dozen field manuals, of which a few were of WWII era. These were found at libraries, half price bookstores and garage sales. Since going on line in 2007, I have found material on web sites such as “Defense and National Interest” (DNI), “Global security”, “Strategy page” , “Wikipedia” and “Bayonet strength” and “Efour4ever” in the combat lessons learned section. These last two sites cover WWII.

Previously referred to as K.O.O.L.N. (acronym definition, top secret), FLASH REPORTS; I NOW AM TELLING EVERYONE IT STANDS FOR KEITH OEFFINGER'S ORGANIZATION OF LEARNED KNOWLEDGE the joke on me here was I believed Knowledge was spelled with an (N). I was a special education student and did not learn to read until my last year of high school. I have now titled my work “Fragmented Fighting Facts” or “Tri-F”; the name derives from the computer grammar function always alerting me to the fragmented nature of my sentences. This is due to the “just the facts, ma’am” manor the material is written i.e. there has been little if any effort to write in whole sentences or provide context. This is not to say there is no order with Tri-F, in fact there is a theme. I have laid out the information as one might expect a commander or members of a unit to recall it thus utilizing it to conduct a mission.

We start with “Planning”, followed by the section on “Defense”, then there’s “Preparations and conduct of patrols” or “PCP”, and we end with “Conduct of Engagements” or “COE”, i.e. engagements being the term used here for shootouts. Each section of Tri-F consists of numbered “Basic rules”, each basic rule followed by detailed notes that either relate to, explain, or give examples pertaining to the basic rules. As with the general format of Tri-F, each section’s basic rules are laid out as one might need to recall them. This is most obvious in the last section COE starting with basic rule number one, “Flash report”, i.e. actions to take upon contact with the enemy. This sections last basic rule deals with handling POWs.

Keep in mind this is a work in progress; I’m constantly discovering new information to add which in turn still at times requires rearranging things. At the same time, interestingly enough to me, I have not needed to rearrange my original order of the basic rules for quite some time. There are however, two instances where the detailed information fallowing a pair of basic rules became so similar I decided to combine the pair into one basic rule. These two occurrences are noted in footnotes.

Now heed this, out of all the information contained within this work, only an estimated 1% was taught to me while I was serving in the U.S.M.C. Moreover, to put a fine point on it, it’s worth noting I served in Charlie Company, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, i.e. an Infantry unit. Before my discharge (after only a two year cruse), I attended Jungle Warfare School in the northern training area of Okinawa (for two weeks), Mountain Warfare School in Korea (for one week) and Combat Town Camp Pendleton for MOUT training (for one day). I did not take part in any amphibious training nor did I ever go to Twenty Nine Palms for Desert Warfare training. We did ride around in AAVs once at Camp Pendleton. All in all I would say the only things I missed out on were a beach landing (at Coronado I believe) and a little sun burn, due to the fact that those twenty nine palms, I was told in the early eighties were all located at the front gate of that base. Needless to say, the training did not impress me, and I now know it was not going to get any better as some suggested to me at the time, and still others later claimed that I should have just stayed in longer.

With my position on the lack of training, I do wish to make it perfectly clear that I do support the service women and men in the U.S. armed forces. I also believe them to be as brave as any people on earth, (with the exception of the (Y) generation). My concern is in the way the Infantry especially is being mislead and used. I want people to understand my experience and IMO a lot of evidence suggests Uncle Sam intends to use his infantry in ways that does not include training any generation in the art of “traditional Guerilla combat tactics” i.e. as a “Traditional Commando” would be. I am not talking about “SWAT” team “Close quarter” tactics, like the “Stick dynamic entry”. That tactic should be called the “cluster f**k”. Just call that sort of tactic what it is NYPD (Cops T.V. show bad-boys, bad-boys) in Afghanistan.

The problem is that that tactic was developed by police departments to deal with an objective occupied by drugged up party animals, i.e. untrained civilians. The police never use it in a spur of the minute situation. They use it when the house/objective has been under constant surveillance for mouths in some cases and the police know all manner of information about everyone in the house and the structure and neighborhood in general. The cops choose a time when everyone is pasted out from partying the night before and have long lost any weapons (between the cushions or under the bed) they might have had on them as show pieces during the party. The primary reason for the large numbers of police in close proximity is to make sure the gang does not think the raid is a rival gang “brake in” and thus resist in any way. There is lots of yelling too, thus reinforcing the message that no one is trying to be covert, like one would be to get away with a crime.

This brings up an intriguing observation of mine; that being that by the book an assault should be made from the top down, yet the troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere use the Stick dynamic entry and usually enter from the front door, like a SWAT team. However resent high profile raids show the SWAT teams attacking from the top down. Examples you may recall are the raids on the Shinning path group in Peru in 2000 and the Mumbai raid by Indian forces on the Jewish center in 2008. IMO this proves the existence of what I’ll refer to as a “need to know” training policy, being followed by various governments, the purpose being to limit the number of true Commandos that could become tomorrow’s rebels, apposing corrupt governments. One last thing about the Stick, IMO every single time the regular forces unit conducting one of these foolish Stick dynamic entries comes under fire i.e. runs into resistance, the Stick brakes i.e. the whole unit evacuates and awaits some kind of support form tanks, guns, tubes or air. Bottom line IMO the Stick is used as a probing tactic and is meant to be a moral boosting show peace tactic to make the unit feel as if it has taken a hill, which was nothing more than another empty building, that IMO Intel suggested, was the case before the entry was ordered. Recalling the police policy of long periods of surveillance prior to raids.

It also seems to me that in light of the old saying “you can fight a war with bombs and blockades but only boots on the ground can win it” ( IMO, Uncle Sam has now revised that saying, as fallows) “you can win a war with bombs and blockades, but only the infantry can end the war”, farther more IMO Uncle Sam has gone one more step and decided to use private security companies and local i.e. indigenous people for the infantry role. All this fear of true commandos is all very similar to the “Mujahideen” not being allowed by various governments, to return to their homelands i.e. native nations, after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

And as for the U.S. and other Western nations, training foreigners to fight a counter insurgency goes. IMO this training includes nothing more than police procedures i.e. conducting investigations, forensics, searching individuals and buildings to collect evidence and yes serving warrants, if necessary, with those all mighty “stick” tactics. And of course, lots of “new innovative techniques and tactics” involving CAS and IMO (Old) so called high tech equipment the U.S. Military Industrial Congressional Complex wants to clear out of the warehouses.

All in all IMO Uncle Sam has chosen to put just about all his eggs in one advanced technology system, think Star Wars Storm Troopers or Matrix i.e. the Operator or Morpheus trying to guide Neo and others to safety. IMO it looks something like this; (x) unit go to (x) address, kick in front door, use stairs to your right, go south down hallway to (x) door, it is unlocked, interning room go to (x) window looking out window to the north you will see your target running east though the neighbors garden. All this information and the “live” feeds of target and area of operations would be provided by a fleet of satellites as well as Near space assets that are never mentioned by the media as current military assets and of course there’s the robots, UAVs and a flood of other covertly deployed sensors as well as covert eves dropping of any civilian electronic devices in the Area of operations.

Thus in light of these and similar so called “new innovative, techniques and tactics” (notice the media and governments choice of words “techniques and tactics” as if we’re talking Commando training i.e. why not use some modern high tech terms the system is so eager to introduce us all to normally as a matter of routine), IMO Uncle Sam has placed the traditional Guerrilla combat tactics, on the back burner and is hoping they all go the way of other black arts.

This is not just true of the infantry; let us take a peek at aerial combat. Does anyone out there actually think today’s U.S. pilots are turning and burning, pulling high (G) maneuvers trying to hit the entry windows and get inside the bandits turn. Think any pilot has conducted a yo-yo or split S maneuver lately or made the choice between a single or two-circle fight. Now days its all about stealth, ECM and Smart even autonomous weapons, missiles especially BVR tech. IMO this explains why the U.S. Navy is not concerned with not having a front line fighter equal to the USAF F-22 Raptor. An article I recently read on “Strategy page” mentioned a lot of talk about a Navy F/A-18E at an air show, displaying a little F-22 silhouette decal i.e. a simulated Kill credit symbol/icon. IMO the F/A- 18E did not gun down that kill.

And then everyone knows that just about all now and IMO soon all weapons systems including the bayonet well have a chip in it.

So if the electronics ever fail (maybe due to a shift in the axis of earths electromagnetic field, passed a certain point or perhaps a record size solar flare) IMO it well be the masters of the age-old Guerrilla combat tactics i.e. The Fragmented Fighting Facts Basic Rules that survive, keeping in mind “no one wins”.

I also wish, that those who join the various services where told all this up front i.e. “we do not intend to train you as a traditional Commando”.

Another thing I would like everyone to consider is that; what makes a Marine special is not the training she or he receives, no it’s the steel the youth demonstrates when they choose to join the Marines. Even when compared to the Special Forces, who IMO are only specialists in their particular field, once again mostly high tech specialties and whose ranks are filled with older personnel that have already been serving and have graduated from a boot camp i.e. are aware of the hoop and hype hurry up and wait tactics. And who are then usually chosen i.e. coached into changing their MOS. I am aware of the change in recruitment policy after 2001 allowing for direct entry into the S.F. community. IMO a rarity and IMO it is still not the same as just choosing to go to a Marine Corps Recruit Depot from the start.

Furthermore, to those who just well not accept the truth about the lack of training along the lines of traditional Guerrilla combat tactics. I can now say that I have exchanged comments with a number of Iraqi and Afghanistan combat vets. These comments can be found on the internet if you Google up my call sign, Newjarheaddean also spelled with one (D). IMO it is obvious that the tactics I speak of are news to the vets, some have made commits that proves in combat they were just winging it. And no, I don’t believe that all the vets are observing some kind of code of silence on these tactics including the vets who are against the wars. Unless everyone wants to say that YouTube and other internet companies are conspiring to edit all combat footage that shows these tactics being used and that, the vets are staging other videos that show them (albeit with great bravery) as armatures without a clue and winging it. If anyone ever sees video, showing the tactics listed in Tri-F being used, be sure and provide a link with your comment. I once saw a flash of film on CNN showing combat in Lebanon during the 1980s that showed some of these tactics being used by a Guerrilla fighter. I well also say I do believe that UAV footage is edited by the Pentagon to keep the public from seeing the few but well trained Taliban and other Guerrilla fighters that are using these tactics. Alternatively, maybe people think our professional highly trained well-equipped military is unable to defeat 10 – 20 thousand religious extremist amateur thugs in almost a decade of fighting. All the while killing at least by some estimates 100 a mouth including dozens of top commanders.

Let me also say, on the numbers of U.S. PTSD casualties, i.e. IMO, WIA, (And IMO deserving of a Purple Heart). The Government portrays these cases as a result of fighting a war that is “unlike any other war we have fought before” (LOL). Facing an enemy that is fighting in some mysterious and or cowardly manor that simply cannot be countered by military means. I believe the high numbers are a result of US forces fighting in a manner that is suicidal i.e. pointless and counterproductive to the real world situation. Example; you have a young brave American ready to fight for the nation, while on one of these IMO “Russian roulette parades” someone shoots at the unit from some building, everyone scrambles for cover, as some spray and pray, then after determining the location using SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems) sniper detectors, or one of the many similar vehicle mounted systems the commander calls in some sort of CAS, if someone’s brains have been blow out especially if it was an officer or the location is vague, a real “crowd pleaser” maybe used i.e. 2000 pounder.

IMO this is how 90% of engagements (fought by regular infantry units) are resolved. Special Forces are now and in the feature more and more regular infantry well be using the Matrix. And to those that think this is the exception I say show me the number of WIA or KIA (On either side) by small arms fire i.e. during traditional firefights. Even if one includes sniper fire those figures are really low. So IMO after witnessing all the carnage and innocent civilian life being lost and receiving all those looks from the witnesses, it is the American that realizes it is his unit that is not fighting right.

This is reinforced and really sinks in back in the states when the vet is asked to tell the Commando stories that never occurred and thus the vet must tell the truth i.e. give up the Commando reputation, keep it all inside or start lying. If the first option is chosen that unveiling reality is demoralizing and makes it all not worth it. If either one of the other chooses are made IMO the vet becomes the ticking bomb. And I can tell you all that many times, I have recalled being told once that “when you go home keep your mouth shut about the things we did. If you don’t you well be thought of as a liar or crazy and either which way your life well be over”. That First Sergeant was right, but like my daddy use to say, “He’s right but he does not know why he’s right” i.e. IMO the First Sgt. thought of what we did in terms of remarkable heroic feats. However, IMO certainly since the beginning of the Vietnam era, it is the lack of training i.e. the manner in which our service women and men are fighting that keeps this tragedy going.

I would also suggest the vets of today are just like I was 25 or so years ago in the sense that they know there training is lacking, however, they just cannot explain what’s missing. However unlike me they refuse to accept that old fashion “black arts” are the answer i.e. should be the basis of basic training. And I now know the “Black art” tactics they and I should have been trained in and I can now say, “The PFC that told the Corp it was out of step, now has provided the proof”. What surprises me is that most vets it seems don’t care at all about the tactics I speak of and seem to view me as an unpatriotic “party pooper”, when I’m just a U.S. Marine trying to improve the Corps and save lives. Bottom line IMO the infantry needs to consist of unmarried i.e. undistracted, NO CHILDREN, dedicated true professionals, trained in the tactics listed in Tri-F and many more I am sure exist.

And to those that say “chivalry is for the museums” I say “first we must have peace on earth”.

One Newjarheaddean

“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!

Update; 12/19/14 09/53 hours




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Thursday, May 16, 2013

Post # 15, Conduct of Engagement basic rule # 3

AHOY,


FRAGMENTED FIGHTING FACTS


Update; 07/10/13 08: 54 hours, the update here is the addition of some hand drawn diagrams to illustrate my notes on the various formations. Note, all previous green highlight has been removed i.e. only the most recent update or additional knowledge is highlighted in green. And of course the “Reference” notes are also in green as normal and due to the update i.e. the added notes on the (posts number) that the “Reference note is located in for this series of posts. I have left the previous yellow highlighted information highlighted in yellow due to the fact I have not yet fully edited it or decided exactly where to place it.

Conduct of Engagements


Basic rule # 3

3) Attack or retreat in shifts:
This is covering each other during attacks or retreats i.e. during advancing or withdrawal rushes/movements and you should take special care in exposed places i.e. crossing open spaces, avenues or around blind corners. Attacking or retreating in shifts can also be done vertically i.e. from different floors. Teams can cover each other from different buildings. Historically horses i.e. cavalry units have been used to lead charges and cover retreats. When bounding with individuals, units or vehicles, those providing cover fire should be halted, making accurate fire of a half mile to one mile ranges possible. It is always best if the one providing cover is concealed too i.e. unseen no movement, remaining motionless until the one being covered is ready to provide cover. It maybe advantages at times to avoid even numbers with groups. For example an individual covering a fireteam or fireteam covering a platoon. Three methods: movement by successive bounds, this is leap froging to each other’s position. Take care to avoid bunching up in large groups. Movement by alternate bonds, this is leap froging pass one another’s positions. Note that, point man commonly moves to fast or far breaking formation (if you well). Three man filer buster method, the method starts with a three man unit in a (V) formation. It involved each Marine at some point becoming the so-called “Middleman” (i.e. next to advance) and who advances between the other two Marines. This method provides a unique option, that being that a team could use it in a defensive stand, with the team leader remaining stationary i.e. becoming the center if you well at the base of the (V) while the other two took turns rushing between the leader and their fellow maneuvering Marine as they rotated around the team leader, thus shifting locations and providing fire in whatever direction the leader directed. At night especially, this would give the foe, an impression the unit was larger than just three. In general, the filer buster method also provided for maximum flexibility for units to change directions i.e. move and fight in any direction needed.

Images;

NOTES; I have used the symbols here that are mentioned in the notes on the U.S. Marine Corps, Fire team organization, i.e. Ready, Team, Fire, Assist where (R) is your team leader etc. see notes below after images beginning with “A Fire Team”.

On cover fire shown in red, (T) i.e. team leader, would open fire first to direct front at possible or actual enemy positions. (F/A) and (R) initially open fire in a near (i.e. merging manner on location (T) first opened up on) or actual cross-fire manner i.e. in the general direction and location each would be maneuvering towards as they moved. Thus if enemy is only or manly located between the two of them i.e. directly in front of (T) then (F/A) and (R) would merge their cover fire. They could initially always start their cover fire in a cross fire manner i.e. engaging the area each would be maneuvering towards, then shift to the merging fire location directly in front of (T) and continue the shift outwardly. The main point to remember is that if the “middle man” in this case (T) is to rush in front of (F/A) first then (F/A) has to shift and seize fire the quickest to avoid shooting the maneuvering “middle man” in these case (T). See notes “with filer buster method” underlined and highlighted “red” below. Thus any additional cover fire to the North would be provided by (R) in this case. There would also be no reason why (T) could not “spray and pray” if he noticed any rounds impacting around him i.e. if he came under enemy fire. I also noticed here after drawing my diagrams that I should have had (T) rush in front of (R) first in that way leaving (F/A) as better cover fire.

On the Defensive stand or posture diagram if I had just been more artistically inclined I could have drawn a better star, lol.

On the charge of direction diagram if the unit now wanted to move north again (T) could move north and in front of (F/A) or (R) could be instructed to return or back track and (T) could move north and in front of (R) thus leaving (F/A) as best base of fire. Like in the first maneuver to starboard i.e. note how (F/A) remain in place as (T) and (R) maneuver.

One, two and three









In principle the responsibilities of all Marines providing cover and with the filibuster method the two stationary Marines, are to assist the maneuvering middle man by placing well aimed shots on foe (i.e. shooting the foe) this distracts and keeps foe from being able to keep tabs on the maneuvering middleman and causes foe’s fire to be ineffective and or to seize. In addition, they keep tabs on foe, feed information to the middleman about foe. With filer buster method, the Marine located at the stern should initiate cover fire, ideally only a three round burst. This is due to the fact that middleman i.e. rusher well be quickly crossing the stream of cover fire.
With all methods of bounding Marines providing cover may chose to sound off “Move, or some other verbal” to indicate they are prepared to provide cover. This maybe the case in particular before the shooting starts. However ideally before shooting starts especially if foe is unaware of your units approach, hand signals, i.e. maybe a twisting of the rifle from horizontal to the upright should be used. IMO normally under fire most likely it well be the volume, location i.e. direction and perhaps slightly different sound of the weapon providing the cover fire that clues you in to the times to move i.e. rush. If your not shooting you should be, doing a tactical reload (i.e. loading even through your not completely out, IMO switch to full magazine and top off old magazine after placing it back in pouch) this is coupled with a 360 check, and or communicating with others or moving. You choose the method of bounding based on the amount of cover and concealment available in the area and the volume of fire you are under. If your group is under heavy fire, with lots of cover in area, there is less need for always alternating who moves next.
The methods of fire and movement described above have a drawback in the application. Depending upon the distance to be covered, the need to swap fire positions to maintain cover also slows the advance. Making rushes as long as possible can help, however the longer the assault takes, and with any lessening of cover fire, the greater the chance for the foe to target the attackers. An alternative is marching fire i.e. the Squad advancing as a single entity. All arms are brought to bear on the enemy during the advance. The key to success is in overwhelming supporting fire delivered from artillery, mortars, machine guns and ideally accompanying tanks. There is no subtlety involved whatsoever. The advantage is speed, using such shock action, a line of riflemen can advance quickly to the enemy line and move into the close combat i.e. Assault phase and when pressed resolutely it can be astoundingly successful.  
Even in very open terrain the well-trained rifleman will be able to locate and use all kinds of limited cover, such as slight depressions or rises. You can low crawl sometimes under cover fire right up to foe’s position. In snow you maybe able to crouch on to skies and slide or be pulled into positions. However, in very open areas, an advance will usually necessitate overwhelming fire superiority with consequent longer bounds between firing positions.

(Reference, STEP # 2, Leadership guidelines, Light machine gun group i.e. post # 12 of this series. And COE overall tips; Machine gun sections i.e. post # 62 of this series.) 



Unit estimated capabilities (i.e. speed and ranges obtainable). Comparative information to consider, (Olympic athletes 60 meter run 7 seconds. 100 meters 9.85 seconds. 200 meters 19.85 seconds. Also, various altitudes would affect performance). As a rule of thumb for Marines conducting alternate bounding cycles, with a column lateral movement, Marines humping 25- 50 lbs of combat kit, executing zigzags and momentary stops and or drops. 150’/50 m rushes in 20 seconds would be well within their capabilities. To continue, with a six man fire team, 50’ intervals, divided into two sections of three moving in pairs (i.e. pairs being last Marine from each section) cycle starts with rushers advancing 50’ past respective point man for a total rush of 150’/50m. Thus 40 seconds between individual rushes, 1 minute between cycles for each section. Thus 60 cycles per hour for a max of one hour. Thus 60 x 150’ = 9000’ exactly or about one and three quarters of a mile (9240’) an hour on average. Note if individuals rushed the entire length of the six-man fire team they would have to do 300’ rushes, taking up to a minute with 6-minute cycles, 10 cycles per hour 10 x 300’ equals 3000’ per hour. Note IMO with the last method the individual would be in motion far to long for secure movement however, the one advantage is more cover fire is at the ready. Therefore, if a unit was under heavy fire and the goal was to place one Marine in a specific location this would be the preferred method.  

With sections of three Marines each rushing as groups, each section member rushes 300’/100m or yards, in 30 seconds. 30 seconds between section rushes one minute cycles. Thus 60 cycles per hour for a maximum of one hour.  Thus 60 x 300’ = 18000’ (3.4 miles exact) or 3 and a half miles 18480 feet. 
More comparative information with unit runs female Olympic runners are doing 5kms i.e. 3miles in 15 minutes. Thus, IMO combat troops humping 25 lbs of kit 18 minutes would be well within their capabilities.
Note work figures for successive bounds of pairs or sections.   
Indian running units, vehicles or ships.
Firefighters said to be capable of climbing an average of 25 flights of stairs an hour. IMO the weight of equipment between firefighters and Marines would be about the same.

On “war cries”, one should not sound off until combatants have joined in combat. Sounding off too early, can be considered a sign of arrogance or cowardice. The effect is grater when foe is hearing cry, at the same time they are meeting weapons.
Note again on this GO, GO, GO, GO, we here the Mainers and troops barking out as they exit or enter things. This not only lets all foes in the area know precisely when your exiting or interring, it IMO distracts and hinders the hearing abilities of those in your unit. IMO its just hoop and hype Bull Shit cheerleading. I wound just prefer to here a single “Due it” i.e. the old D.I. command that is instilled in all Marines during boot camp (this being the execution command fallowing any detailed instructions). It should carry over to the FMF and there be reinforced.  

A fire team is the basic element of the GCE. It consists of four Marines: three riflemen and a team leader, typically a Corporal or Lance Corporal.
The USMC summarizes its fireteam organization with the mnemonic "ready-team-fire-assist", the following being the arrangement of the fireteam when in a column:
Rifleman: acts as a scout; "Ready".
Team Leader (M203): also works as the grenadier; "Team".
Automatic Rifleman (currently M249 SAW or M27 IAR, formerly BAR): also serves as second in command for the fireteam; "Fire".
Assistant Automatic Rifleman: carries extra ammunition; "Assist".

The fireteam is organized around the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon and now there is also the M-27 Infantry Automatic rifle I. A. R. Upon receiving fire, the fireteam can organize in a methodical way to engage the enemy with fireteam "rushes". Fireteam rushes are movement by one part of the team during cover by fire by the other part of the team. Generally, first the Rifleman and Team Leader will move ahead, being covered by the Automatic and Assistant Automatic Riflemen, then the Automatic and Assistant Automatic Riflemen will move up to the Rifleman and Team Leader, being covered by the Rifleman and Team Leader. The process is repeated until no forward progress is possible without serious risk to the entire fireteam. When finally upon the objective, the fireteam assumes a "hasty 180", where the Automatic Rifleman covers 11 o'clock to 1 o'clock (12 o'clock being the most likely avenue of enemy approach), with the Rifleman and Assistant Automatic Rifleman covering 9 to 11 and 1 to 3 respectively. The Team Leader is next to the Automatic Rifleman to complement his fire with grenade rounds and to assign targets for the M249. Once a frontal enemy counterattack is deemed unlikely, the fireteam then will assume a "consolidated 360" to ensure the flanks of the fireteam are protected. The position of Marines in the fireteam is sometimes called RTFA (Ready - Team - Fire - Assist) because of one of the fireteam formations that are possible.

Maneuvers and Formations;
At this point I would like to suggest everyone recall the General phases of an attack; one the approach, two contact, three the assault and four consolidation.

Maneuvers: Single envelopment – advantages, element of surprise is usually possible. Choose the ground you fight on. Causes enemy to fight in two directions. Generally effects foe’s moral vs. a frontal attack. Should not be used at night. Maneuver element two thirds of unit’s total strength. Uses fire and maneuver until fire and movement becomes necessary. Note; fire and maneuver involves units or groups moving. Fire and movement is individual Marines or vehicles  moving. Base element one third of unit’s total strength. Assist maneuver element in the same manor as mentioned under responsibilities of Marines providing cover fire in successive, alternate or filer buster methods.
Double envelopment – one form of a double envelopment is a pincer, note; over all the units movements could be simultaneous or alternating i.e. one element for holding/placing fire on target or used as a decoy.

Formations:

ColumnPurpose; for traveling long distances. Make time. Difficult for foe to count your unit quickly. Keep injuries down. Put large unit through small narrow passages. Down hill movement, deep snow may also dictate the use of a line formation when it would not be considered suitable on level ground. Pros; strong flanks, good control and communication. Cons; weak point and stern. Slow in reacting laterally (i.e. to the bow or stern).

During WWII, a typical formation was lead by the Squad Leader. Behind him came the Gun Group, ready to provide quick supporting fire. The riflemen followed the gun team, with the Assistant Leader bringing up the rear in the German and American model to close up the formation. British and Russian variations placed him with the Gun Group. This column formation was favored during the advance to the combat zone. It was not a fighting formation, merely a traveling one. In those areas where it was uncertain precisely at what point the Squad could expect to encounter resistance, one or two men would go forward as scouts. The US Squad routinely placed two men on point for a column in front of the Leader. Prior to combat, or after coming under unexpected fire, the Squad would deploy. The riflemen would form a skirmish line, either centered around the light machine gun, or flanking it on one or the other side, depending upon the favored doctrine. To reduce vulnerability to enemy fire, this skirmish line would spread out, leaving some 3 to 5 meters between each man. In reality, movement was more dictated by terrain, conditions and enemy action. Men learned to break up the intervals between units or individuals, as well as to avoid bunching up. IMO thus keeping the foe from being able to guess location of another man based on knowing location of one in the formation. This (bunching up i.e. cluster fuck) was a cardinal sin, as to submit to the temptation of sticking close to, a friend in front meant a far greater chance of both falling victim to a single shell or machine gun burst. Men would always seek to advance under cover of trees, hedges, walls, defiles, streams, natural depressions, anything that would place a barrier between them and the enemy's line of sight. However, the ground was not always kind, and at some point would come a tract of land with no discernible cover. Only the most charitable or incompetent of enemies would fail to cover that tract with fire. Negotiating passage over ground under fire called for speed and suppression, but how was the infantryman to quell the barrage of distant artillery? Unless his own guns were mounting counter battery fire, the only solution was to wait for a pause and then rush forward.

(Reference, COE, rule # 5 i.e. posts # 20 and PCP rule # 11 i.e. post # 11)

EchelonPurpose; protect flanks. Probing foe lines. Pros; difficult for foe to tell your direction of travel. Difficult for foe to out flank. Cons; slow moving. Difficult to control. Odd fields of fire.
Wedge- Purpose; foe presents expected, location unknown. When in dense terrain or during bad weather, and at night. Pros; maximum separation with in minimum area. All around good fire. Good control and communication. Quick reacting. Cons; complacency and working closely with other units. A pincer is commonly used to counters a wedge.

With a three Squad Platoon, there were three offensive formations that could be used. Known by many names, but perhaps the most descriptive would be arrowhead, V shape, and line. 

Arrowhead or narrow wedge (a reverse V shaped see fig below with command unit in center) formation, with scout unit up front other squads trailing in echelons. Formation had the advantage that it kept the bulk of the Platoon from direct contact with the enemy during the initial stage. On encountering resistance, the lead Squad would shift to a fire role, pinning the enemy.
Arrowhead shaped like inverted (V) with a stick out the top. Machine Gun group/team on flank enemy expected or known to be on. It is a maneuver unit formation. Used when enemy location known. Fire team on opposite side as flanking unit.
Spearhead machine gun group/team is centered up front. Purpose as line breaker. Pros; good for machine gun team vs. fire team.
True V formation; It mimicked the arrowhead but inverted the deployment of the Squads. Now, the advance was carried by two Squads moving in parallel i.e. two squads up front. The third Squad was held back in support, while Platoon Headquarters again occupied the centre. This reversal placed the greater part of the Platoon in direct line with the enemy, it also increased the weight of fire the Commander could bring to bear against the foe. The leading Squads would cover each other using fire and movement. The third Squad was held back in reserve, or used to provide additional over watching fire. The drawback was that the only way to achieve numerical superiority in the assault phase was to throw in the third Squad, or better still use it to cover the final assault of the other two. It was a slow and deliberate advance, unsuited to a fast moving assault. It was of great benefit against a true defense in depth, where there were several lines to be breached. There was also a problem though, in that as the bulk of the company was in the leading echelon, once battle was joined it had a tendency to become engaged in the firefight i.e. if two squads, platoons or companies became pinned down by effective enemy fire, they were robbed of their ability to maneuver. There was a school of thought which reckoned units should be presented more like an iceberg, in that the majority of its strength was kept uncommitted, until the true dispositions of the defender had been revealed. A single fire team/squad/platoon/company/battalion advance kept the greater part of the over all unit under control this helped to counter the defense in depth. The Commander could now decide how to develop the attack with a far more capable reserve. The drawback was the obvious reduction in the frontage of the unit involved. IMO making it possible that two units on patrol may discover one another only after the units where near or on each other’s flanks. Leading with just a single unit i.e. fire team, squad, platoon, company, or battalion, meant now instead of the unit’s effort being dissipated across a two unit frontage, the Commander could utilize all of his available firepower to support the efforts of his single main effort unit. As a result, they had far greater potential to win the firefight, and quickly close with the enemy. The second unit would follow hard on the heels of the first, ready to exploit the breakthrough and move through the lead unit to continue the advance. The third unit would then follow in their wake to repeat the process. If the second unit had to pitch in to help the first secure the breached point, the third would still be available for the exploitation phase. By choosing to concentrate on breaching a single point, the key to success shifted to how quickly they could exploit the breach i.e. pour troops through the breach to compromise the foe’s line across a far greater length than they had actually engaged it on.

(Reference, all locations discussing “Reserves” starting with Step # 2 leadership guidelines, Company Cmdr “The Reserves” i.e. post # 12)

Skirmishes- Purpose; for attack, mob up, or search. Pros; natural for fire and maneuver or movement. Max fire to front/bow and stern. Cons; bad control, weak flanks.
Line; each squad formed itself into a skirmish line; the instruction that the line should only be formed if the squad, platoon etc was caught by surprise seems somewhat vague. IMO by doing so if you catch i.e. happen to end up with the enemy on one side of your line that makes maxing your fire on them easy. If the enemy ends up on one end i.e. stern or bow, your unit can move away i.e. exit area quicker and easier.   

Phalanxes – defined as closed ranks of heavily armed infantry. 

Images; four and five;

Note; Here with the two Columns A and B you see in A the members of the fire teams are in normal order. The problem with this order is that if the patrol is walking down a road and comes under fire from the direct front or stern the members of the fire teams would take cover in the direction of the closest side of the road to them. Thus you end up with half of each fire team on different sides of the road. If you team takes cover on the same side, some of your unit has to cross the avenue of fire. So I suggest fire teams use the formation I drew on the B column. And as you can see you could reverse the order of every other fire team to keep your fire team leaders from being bunched up. I represented this last suggestion with square boxes not circles.






Note: Equipment on port side of troops, and hence units on the port side, are traditionally considered weaker. Troops traditionally hampered by shields etc. Port side unit’s also defensive side, starboard side, offensive side. Your offensive units advanced obliquely on foes port units. Traditional term Seventh formation used when natural obstacle such as a lake, river, ocean, mountain, was available to cover one flank.

(Reference Step # 2 in planning, Leadership Guidelines, Squad leaders onward especially Company cmdr. “The Reserves” i.e. post # 12)
(Reference, PCP rule # 3, “snipers can be used” i.e. post # 14)



“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!

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