Welcome Aboard!

AHOY,


UPDATE 12/21/13, 11:42 HOURS

I am revealing who I am today i.e. posting my name, I am Keith Oeffinger, I was born in San Antonio Texas in 1963. See today's post 12/21/13 .


Update, 01/11/14 12:30 hours;

I would like to say, with only one reply, like three years ago, this blog seems too much like a mirror site to me. And it appears very few patriots are looking back at past posts.

The new “Fragmented Fighting Facts” series of posts that dedicates one post to each Basic rule has now been completed. This series starts with the post tilted “Post # 1, Planning, Preface” that posted on 05/12/13. This series is under the label “Tri-F in progress”. Posts well be updated as I edit or discover additional knowledge thus the series is the most current version of my "Fragmented Fighting Facts" manual. For an old but complete version i.e. all in one post copy. Patriots are welcomed to try viewing one of the “pages” listed in the “special word section” on the starboard side of the blog. I say try due to the fact I’m not sure if they are published i.e. viewable to the general public due to all the issues or HACKING with my blog. There is also a complete copy posted, that is titled, “Tri-F in progress” too, it was posted 11/13/10.

And feel free to fire away with a reply, (sarcasm on).


FLASH REPORT; the “TERRORIST ARE NOT AMONG US, AND NEVER WERE I.E. AL QAEDA IS A STAWL MAN, GHOST”.

The most important lesson that everyone should have taken away from the Boston Marathon bombings was that those young men proved that no al-queda members are in the u.s. Otherwise they too would just go get some presure cookers and had to a parade.

“I AM NOT A TERRORIST” this nation’s worst enemy is FEAR. This fear is being promoted mostly by the back woods, right wing, Christians of this nation. We need to separate church and state, period. And that is of course for the States sake.


I would like patriots to understand that I use the terms "official revealed fact" to mean what everyone is being told by officials, media etc. I use the term "kings truth" to mean what I know or believe to actually be the actual facts. I DO NOT MEAN IT IN A RELIGIOUS WAY. I.E. the term Kings is plural as in those running the show.


Preface for the Fragmented Fighting Facts

Note pink highlighted material is that, that IMO is questionable factually, it maybe an “official revealed fact” that I am questioning. The material may need to be defined i.e. explained more or it could be a personal note. Yellow is location undecided or unedited material i.e. unread that I have not decided on what to keep or not. Green means a change has been made i.e. an update. By noting the green updated highlights a Patriot well not have to read the Fragmented Fighting Facts in its entirety to stay current. Red is important, perhaps the "kings truth".

Newjarheaddean; this is my collection of combat notes. One might call it my anthology of combat tactics, techniques, methods and skills. The note taking began about fourty years ago (I was around 13 years old) with the observation of 10 rules listed with in a book covering the French and Indian i.e. Native American, wars, entitled “Roger’s Rangers”. That’s right the rules that started all this are “Army Ranger” rules, this book was located in the “Westfall” library in San Antonio Texas off of Vance Jackson. I get a kick out of the libraries name due to the general agreement that modern or state vs state warfare started with the singing of the peace treaties at Westphalia. I could not read at the time; however I knew that a list in a book on war would be important. I copied those rules down like a scribe might have written hieroglyphs and had my dad read them to me. . This discovery preceded numerous sources including approximately one hundred books and about a dozen field manuals, of which a few were of WWII era. These were found at libraries, half price bookstores and garage sales. Since going on line in 2007, I have found material on web sites such as “Defense and National Interest” (DNI), “Global security”, “Strategy page” , “Wikipedia” and “Bayonet strength” and “Efour4ever” in the combat lessons learned section. These last two sites cover WWII.

Previously referred to as K.O.O.L.N. (acronym definition, top secret), FLASH REPORTS; I NOW AM TELLING EVERYONE IT STANDS FOR KEITH OEFFINGER'S ORGANIZATION OF LEARNED KNOWLEDGE the joke on me here was I believed Knowledge was spelled with an (N). I was a special education student and did not learn to read until my last year of high school. I have now titled my work “Fragmented Fighting Facts” or “Tri-F”; the name derives from the computer grammar function always alerting me to the fragmented nature of my sentences. This is due to the “just the facts, ma’am” manor the material is written i.e. there has been little if any effort to write in whole sentences or provide context. This is not to say there is no order with Tri-F, in fact there is a theme. I have laid out the information as one might expect a commander or members of a unit to recall it thus utilizing it to conduct a mission.

We start with “Planning”, followed by the section on “Defense”, then there’s “Preparations and conduct of patrols” or “PCP”, and we end with “Conduct of Engagements” or “COE”, i.e. engagements being the term used here for shootouts. Each section of Tri-F consists of numbered “Basic rules”, each basic rule followed by detailed notes that either relate to, explain, or give examples pertaining to the basic rules. As with the general format of Tri-F, each section’s basic rules are laid out as one might need to recall them. This is most obvious in the last section COE starting with basic rule number one, “Flash report”, i.e. actions to take upon contact with the enemy. This sections last basic rule deals with handling POWs.

Keep in mind this is a work in progress; I’m constantly discovering new information to add which in turn still at times requires rearranging things. At the same time, interestingly enough to me, I have not needed to rearrange my original order of the basic rules for quite some time. There are however, two instances where the detailed information fallowing a pair of basic rules became so similar I decided to combine the pair into one basic rule. These two occurrences are noted in footnotes.

Now heed this, out of all the information contained within this work, only an estimated 1% was taught to me while I was serving in the U.S.M.C. Moreover, to put a fine point on it, it’s worth noting I served in Charlie Company, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, i.e. an Infantry unit. Before my discharge (after only a two year cruse), I attended Jungle Warfare School in the northern training area of Okinawa (for two weeks), Mountain Warfare School in Korea (for one week) and Combat Town Camp Pendleton for MOUT training (for one day). I did not take part in any amphibious training nor did I ever go to Twenty Nine Palms for Desert Warfare training. We did ride around in AAVs once at Camp Pendleton. All in all I would say the only things I missed out on were a beach landing (at Coronado I believe) and a little sun burn, due to the fact that those twenty nine palms, I was told in the early eighties were all located at the front gate of that base. Needless to say, the training did not impress me, and I now know it was not going to get any better as some suggested to me at the time, and still others later claimed that I should have just stayed in longer.

With my position on the lack of training, I do wish to make it perfectly clear that I do support the service women and men in the U.S. armed forces. I also believe them to be as brave as any people on earth, (with the exception of the (Y) generation). My concern is in the way the Infantry especially is being mislead and used. I want people to understand my experience and IMO a lot of evidence suggests Uncle Sam intends to use his infantry in ways that does not include training any generation in the art of “traditional Guerilla combat tactics” i.e. as a “Traditional Commando” would be. I am not talking about “SWAT” team “Close quarter” tactics, like the “Stick dynamic entry”. That tactic should be called the “cluster f**k”. Just call that sort of tactic what it is NYPD (Cops T.V. show bad-boys, bad-boys) in Afghanistan.

The problem is that that tactic was developed by police departments to deal with an objective occupied by drugged up party animals, i.e. untrained civilians. The police never use it in a spur of the minute situation. They use it when the house/objective has been under constant surveillance for mouths in some cases and the police know all manner of information about everyone in the house and the structure and neighborhood in general. The cops choose a time when everyone is pasted out from partying the night before and have long lost any weapons (between the cushions or under the bed) they might have had on them as show pieces during the party. The primary reason for the large numbers of police in close proximity is to make sure the gang does not think the raid is a rival gang “brake in” and thus resist in any way. There is lots of yelling too, thus reinforcing the message that no one is trying to be covert, like one would be to get away with a crime.

This brings up an intriguing observation of mine; that being that by the book an assault should be made from the top down, yet the troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere use the Stick dynamic entry and usually enter from the front door, like a SWAT team. However resent high profile raids show the SWAT teams attacking from the top down. Examples you may recall are the raids on the Shinning path group in Peru in 2000 and the Mumbai raid by Indian forces on the Jewish center in 2008. IMO this proves the existence of what I’ll refer to as a “need to know” training policy, being followed by various governments, the purpose being to limit the number of true Commandos that could become tomorrow’s rebels, apposing corrupt governments. One last thing about the Stick, IMO every single time the regular forces unit conducting one of these foolish Stick dynamic entries comes under fire i.e. runs into resistance, the Stick brakes i.e. the whole unit evacuates and awaits some kind of support form tanks, guns, tubes or air. Bottom line IMO the Stick is used as a probing tactic and is meant to be a moral boosting show peace tactic to make the unit feel as if it has taken a hill, which was nothing more than another empty building, that IMO Intel suggested, was the case before the entry was ordered. Recalling the police policy of long periods of surveillance prior to raids.

It also seems to me that in light of the old saying “you can fight a war with bombs and blockades but only boots on the ground can win it” ( IMO, Uncle Sam has now revised that saying, as fallows) “you can win a war with bombs and blockades, but only the infantry can end the war”, farther more IMO Uncle Sam has gone one more step and decided to use private security companies and local i.e. indigenous people for the infantry role. All this fear of true commandos is all very similar to the “Mujahideen” not being allowed by various governments, to return to their homelands i.e. native nations, after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

And as for the U.S. and other Western nations, training foreigners to fight a counter insurgency goes. IMO this training includes nothing more than police procedures i.e. conducting investigations, forensics, searching individuals and buildings to collect evidence and yes serving warrants, if necessary, with those all mighty “stick” tactics. And of course, lots of “new innovative techniques and tactics” involving CAS and IMO (Old) so called high tech equipment the U.S. Military Industrial Congressional Complex wants to clear out of the warehouses.

All in all IMO Uncle Sam has chosen to put just about all his eggs in one advanced technology system, think Star Wars Storm Troopers or Matrix i.e. the Operator or Morpheus trying to guide Neo and others to safety. IMO it looks something like this; (x) unit go to (x) address, kick in front door, use stairs to your right, go south down hallway to (x) door, it is unlocked, interning room go to (x) window looking out window to the north you will see your target running east though the neighbors garden. All this information and the “live” feeds of target and area of operations would be provided by a fleet of satellites as well as Near space assets that are never mentioned by the media as current military assets and of course there’s the robots, UAVs and a flood of other covertly deployed sensors as well as covert eves dropping of any civilian electronic devices in the Area of operations.

Thus in light of these and similar so called “new innovative, techniques and tactics” (notice the media and governments choice of words “techniques and tactics” as if we’re talking Commando training i.e. why not use some modern high tech terms the system is so eager to introduce us all to normally as a matter of routine), IMO Uncle Sam has placed the traditional Guerrilla combat tactics, on the back burner and is hoping they all go the way of other black arts.

This is not just true of the infantry; let us take a peek at aerial combat. Does anyone out there actually think today’s U.S. pilots are turning and burning, pulling high (G) maneuvers trying to hit the entry windows and get inside the bandits turn. Think any pilot has conducted a yo-yo or split S maneuver lately or made the choice between a single or two-circle fight. Now days its all about stealth, ECM and Smart even autonomous weapons, missiles especially BVR tech. IMO this explains why the U.S. Navy is not concerned with not having a front line fighter equal to the USAF F-22 Raptor. An article I recently read on “Strategy page” mentioned a lot of talk about a Navy F/A-18E at an air show, displaying a little F-22 silhouette decal i.e. a simulated Kill credit symbol/icon. IMO the F/A- 18E did not gun down that kill.

And then everyone knows that just about all now and IMO soon all weapons systems including the bayonet well have a chip in it.

So if the electronics ever fail (maybe due to a shift in the axis of earths electromagnetic field, passed a certain point or perhaps a record size solar flare) IMO it well be the masters of the age-old Guerrilla combat tactics i.e. The Fragmented Fighting Facts Basic Rules that survive, keeping in mind “no one wins”.

I also wish, that those who join the various services where told all this up front i.e. “we do not intend to train you as a traditional Commando”.

Another thing I would like everyone to consider is that; what makes a Marine special is not the training she or he receives, no it’s the steel the youth demonstrates when they choose to join the Marines. Even when compared to the Special Forces, who IMO are only specialists in their particular field, once again mostly high tech specialties and whose ranks are filled with older personnel that have already been serving and have graduated from a boot camp i.e. are aware of the hoop and hype hurry up and wait tactics. And who are then usually chosen i.e. coached into changing their MOS. I am aware of the change in recruitment policy after 2001 allowing for direct entry into the S.F. community. IMO a rarity and IMO it is still not the same as just choosing to go to a Marine Corps Recruit Depot from the start.

Furthermore, to those who just well not accept the truth about the lack of training along the lines of traditional Guerrilla combat tactics. I can now say that I have exchanged comments with a number of Iraqi and Afghanistan combat vets. These comments can be found on the internet if you Google up my call sign, Newjarheaddean also spelled with one (D). IMO it is obvious that the tactics I speak of are news to the vets, some have made commits that proves in combat they were just winging it. And no, I don’t believe that all the vets are observing some kind of code of silence on these tactics including the vets who are against the wars. Unless everyone wants to say that YouTube and other internet companies are conspiring to edit all combat footage that shows these tactics being used and that, the vets are staging other videos that show them (albeit with great bravery) as armatures without a clue and winging it. If anyone ever sees video, showing the tactics listed in Tri-F being used, be sure and provide a link with your comment. I once saw a flash of film on CNN showing combat in Lebanon during the 1980s that showed some of these tactics being used by a Guerrilla fighter. I well also say I do believe that UAV footage is edited by the Pentagon to keep the public from seeing the few but well trained Taliban and other Guerrilla fighters that are using these tactics. Alternatively, maybe people think our professional highly trained well-equipped military is unable to defeat 10 – 20 thousand religious extremist amateur thugs in almost a decade of fighting. All the while killing at least by some estimates 100 a mouth including dozens of top commanders.

Let me also say, on the numbers of U.S. PTSD casualties, i.e. IMO, WIA, (And IMO deserving of a Purple Heart). The Government portrays these cases as a result of fighting a war that is “unlike any other war we have fought before” (LOL). Facing an enemy that is fighting in some mysterious and or cowardly manor that simply cannot be countered by military means. I believe the high numbers are a result of US forces fighting in a manner that is suicidal i.e. pointless and counterproductive to the real world situation. Example; you have a young brave American ready to fight for the nation, while on one of these IMO “Russian roulette parades” someone shoots at the unit from some building, everyone scrambles for cover, as some spray and pray, then after determining the location using SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems) sniper detectors, or one of the many similar vehicle mounted systems the commander calls in some sort of CAS, if someone’s brains have been blow out especially if it was an officer or the location is vague, a real “crowd pleaser” maybe used i.e. 2000 pounder.

IMO this is how 90% of engagements (fought by regular infantry units) are resolved. Special Forces are now and in the feature more and more regular infantry well be using the Matrix. And to those that think this is the exception I say show me the number of WIA or KIA (On either side) by small arms fire i.e. during traditional firefights. Even if one includes sniper fire those figures are really low. So IMO after witnessing all the carnage and innocent civilian life being lost and receiving all those looks from the witnesses, it is the American that realizes it is his unit that is not fighting right.

This is reinforced and really sinks in back in the states when the vet is asked to tell the Commando stories that never occurred and thus the vet must tell the truth i.e. give up the Commando reputation, keep it all inside or start lying. If the first option is chosen that unveiling reality is demoralizing and makes it all not worth it. If either one of the other chooses are made IMO the vet becomes the ticking bomb. And I can tell you all that many times, I have recalled being told once that “when you go home keep your mouth shut about the things we did. If you don’t you well be thought of as a liar or crazy and either which way your life well be over”. That First Sergeant was right, but like my daddy use to say, “He’s right but he does not know why he’s right” i.e. IMO the First Sgt. thought of what we did in terms of remarkable heroic feats. However, IMO certainly since the beginning of the Vietnam era, it is the lack of training i.e. the manner in which our service women and men are fighting that keeps this tragedy going.

I would also suggest the vets of today are just like I was 25 or so years ago in the sense that they know there training is lacking, however, they just cannot explain what’s missing. However unlike me they refuse to accept that old fashion “black arts” are the answer i.e. should be the basis of basic training. And I now know the “Black art” tactics they and I should have been trained in and I can now say, “The PFC that told the Corp it was out of step, now has provided the proof”. What surprises me is that most vets it seems don’t care at all about the tactics I speak of and seem to view me as an unpatriotic “party pooper”, when I’m just a U.S. Marine trying to improve the Corps and save lives. Bottom line IMO the infantry needs to consist of unmarried i.e. undistracted, NO CHILDREN, dedicated true professionals, trained in the tactics listed in Tri-F and many more I am sure exist.

And to those that say “chivalry is for the museums” I say “first we must have peace on earth”.

One Newjarheaddean

“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!

Update; 12/19/14 09/53 hours




Total Pageviews

Thursday, May 16, 2013

Post # 12, Planning, Step 2 i.e. part three




Fragmented Fighting Facts


Planning step 2



STEP # 2 Commander’s intent: 

Statement about the situation using general information given as a I.S.A.L.U.T.E, R. W. P. report (i.e. format for briefing). Most importantly the commander defines objectives and how far to go to achieve them. Also time limits if any. Leaders should know commander’s intent two levels above his own, to better evaluate his own decisions. Commander’s Objectives are divided into Short term and Long term. Ex. mission may be a precise, detailed order of the day or a continuing command responsibility. Leaders should keep a log. George C. Marshall - any order that can be misunderstood will be. They must be clearly and candidly presented with neither equivocation nor ambiguity. Comprehensive, yet not involved. It must appear clear when read in poor light, in the mud and rain.
Source MCG June 2009, goals must be measurable, easy to understand, and achievable within the nation’s or the coalition’s resource constraints. Once the goal is defined, military must devote considerable intellectual rigor defining and understanding the problem, the enemy, his COGs, and their corresponding vulnerabilities. Only then can you develop a plan that achieves the assigned goals.


(Reference, Decision Guidance, part D, below)


MCA Gazette June 2009; Code of a Naval Officer written by John Paul Jones in the late 1700s. However hard it may be for Marines to turn to a naval officer for leadership advice it would be worse to ignore timeless advice. Midshipmen at the Naval Academy consider John Paul Jones a Revolutionary War hero and father of the U.S. Navy. His maxims on leadership are just as relevant today as they were during the days of sail-powered wooden ships.

It is, by no means, enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He should be, as well, a gentleman of liberal education, refined manner, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor. . . . He should be the soul of tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity, honor, courtesy.  These are to be the hallmarks of a leader’s disposition. How many times has the public, much less the Marine Corps, witnessed leaders who display the opposite of these qualities? How often do leaders, unseen by the public eye, fail to display these qualities? The newspapers and 24-hour news channels are replete with stories of NCOs and officers involved in unethical and inappropriate behavior. This conduct is unsatisfactory and has led to the near complete erosion of the “special trust and confidence” once afforded to young leaders.

He should not only be able to express himself clearly and with force in his own language both with tongue and pen, but he should be versed in French and Spanish. It seems strange that the ability to communicate should be so difficult in this age of information. An unfortunate byproduct of e-mail, text chat, and the Internet is the inability of many leaders to effectively communicate with their peers and Marines in their charge. The ability to speak in front of an audience with confidence and to write clear and logical thoughts is essential for a leader.

Today’s leaders require a liberal knowledge of the cultures and nuances of the countries and regions vital to America’s national security. This knowledge can include proficiency in a foreign language, but is not limited to becoming bilingual. Cultural understanding includes language, economics, societal customs, religion, geography and, most of all, history. Only by understanding the many aspects of foreign societies can leaders expect to operate successfully in the current and future battlefields of the long war where the populace is seen more and more as the center of gravity.

No meritorious act of a subordinate should escape his attention or be left to pass without its reward, if even the reward be only one word of approval. In this modern world, military personnel are beginning to feel that they are owed, or “rate,” an end of tour award for successfully completing a tour, regardless of their actual accomplishments or impact on mission success. This current trend causes the relative value of personal awards to plummet lower and lower until one’s medals have no real meaning at all.

“Discipline in private” “Praise publicly” as an incentive to others. Marines desire to be relevant, and public recognition in the presence of their peers meets that need. A leader who spends enough time in the presence of his Marines will be able to identify meritorious acts and duly recognize them swiftly and in proportion to the act performed—not inflated or deflated. According to this guidance no one rates anything, and all recognition is to be earned and rewarded commensurately.

Learn Discernment; Conversely, he should not be blind to a single fault in any subordinate, though at the same time he should be quick and failing to distinguish error from malice, thoughtlessness from incompetence, and well-meant shortcoming from heedless or stupid blunder. Leaders make decisions every day. Some of these decisions are benign while many can have great ramifications on their subordinates’ lives. The key to making wise decisions is discernment. An experienced leader can discern honest mistakes from malice or incompetence. This leader allows subordinates to learn (and make mistakes) in an environment that is conducive to learning and growing while separating and disciplining the malcontents and incompetent members of the command. A good leader learns the art of discernment through study, by learning from past decisions, and by seeking advice from all levels of leadership. A junior leader however, should not be left alone to discern by mere trial and error. This is where the true power of mentorship is witnessed as junior leaders learn from the past mistakes and successes of their seniors. Through mentorship young leaders can learn to handle hard cases of discipline and motivation with discernment and discretion, thus Jones’ more well-known maxim to “discipline in private.” Implicit in Jones’ instruction is for leaders (at all levels) to be visible. It is not enough to command from the corner.

Impartial Justice; As he should be universal and impartial in his rewards and approval of merit, so should he be judicial and unbending in his punishment or reproof of misconduct. All leaders have favorites. It’s a fact. One of the most difficult actions a leader can take is imposing discipline or punishment on a favorite subordinate. Leaders desire to promote and award while accepting the responsibility to punish. Conflict is hard, and many leaders abdicate this role to their subordinate leaders or abandon it all together to the detriment of good order and discipline. The just and impartial imposition of rewards and punishment is vital if a leader is to serve as the moral arbitrator and judge. Only through consistently treating all subordinates in an equal manner will leaders be able to lead without the stain of favoritism or discrimination. Justice, above all else, should be the goal.

imbue them with their wisdom too. If continually referenced and followed, this code can provide the necessary “rudder guidance” to ensure that Marine leaders continue to set the example for solid leadership and high performance for many years to come.


Decision guidance A) Type of order. Routine matters coming under previously approved policy are generally covered by SOPs and are handled by the staff without repeated visits to the commander. The fallowing will be brought without delay to the attention of the commander. Disapprovals form higher authority. Errors, deficiencies or irregularities alleged by higher authority. Appeals from subordinate commanders about decisions made at Hqt. Serious accidents involving personnel of unit. B) Time available. Short time between completing preparations and implementation. Note here too, the tried and true VC tactical doctrine of “four fast”, “one slow”; fast advance, fast assault, fast battlefield clearance, and fast withdrawal are based on slow preparation. Have a definite time for completion of objective. Make one individual responsible, request assignee to estimate completion time, date, or set one. Scheduling; promotes coordination and ensures completion in a timely manner.
Especially important when commands or units must work together. Keeps appropriate pressure on subordinates. Allow sufficient time for the capable. Avoid becoming a leader who demands regularly that tasks be completed “yesterday”.

(Reference, also mentioned earlier in the Planning section, Execution phase.)


C) Restated mission. Involves reviewing commander’s intent. Never bring a problem to the commander without at lease a tentative recommendation. Make sure that you know what you’re talking about when you apprise the commander (or Xo) of a problem. Ideally you should present solutions in such form that only approval or disapproval of the plan is required. Note, ask yourself, would you stake your reputation on plan. Should a failure to agree develop, the divergent (different) view must be presented objectively. The staff officer is not settling a debate, but is presenting facts and views and making a recommendation. The commander will make the final decision. D) Current scheme of maneuvers. Reviewing circumstances. It is necessary to know sentiments of your foe, are they confident or apprehensive. Point out foe’s weakness your advantages, and give argument for foe’s case to incite rage. Analyze foe weather strength is in experience or equipment. Stronger in infantry or cavalry. F. M. Erwin Ugen Rommel – “bold decisions, give the best promise of success, but one must differentiate between strategical and tactical as well as boldness or a gamble”. A bold decision is one that in the event of failure leaves one with sufficient force to deal with out come. A gamble is a decision that can lead to complete destruction of ones forces. “Situations do arise where a gamble maybe justified, as for instance when in the general course of events defeat is merely a mater of time”. Col. Boyd’s (OODA) loop. The principle of (OODA) is to ultimately ware foe down. Destroy paradigm, (foe’s view of the world), by sending ambiguous or deliberately misleading signals, and also moving and thinking faster than foe can respond. No one, no mater how weak, can be completely ruined by a foe, unless ones fall be facilitated by one’s own actions. Most desirable is to attack the mind, another words, plans and intensions. Next his allies which makes foe’s own world stable, provides the emotional and moral bunds to sustain his effort. Worst his armies. And worst yet, his armies in cities. The (OODA) Loop; O) Observation- perception, heighten awareness. I.S.R. i.e. Intelegence, servailence, recon. O), Orientation-  i.e. (S.A.) to new circumstances, unfolding situation. Includes analyzing or synthesizing. Entropy after initial shock of war or battles, actions settle down to steady grind. Casualties and movement rates become predictable. Events tend to regress towards the means. Don’t let flashy press reports fool you; exceptions tend to get published, not day to day averages. Attitudes differ on the battlefield. It can be difficult to tell whose winning. Especially today when battles are lost, units are quickly repositioned. Troops decide who won or lost. It’s possible for non combat troops to maintain reasonable belief in continuing victory with out knowledge of the big picture. A local defeat can be explained as an exception. Opinions also very with M.O.S. rank and location. NOTE: with advanced technologies and systems like Network centric warfare this naivety would be less likely in the feature. D) Deciding on counters, could be hypothesis - OA operational adaptation; Anticipation of enemies adaptations not only minimizes there effectiveness it increases our ability to achieve intent forewarning i.e. predict their objectives. Maintenance of main objective as situation develops there is a temptation to change objective. This waist time and energy. Consistent pursuit of original objective is preferred. Considering “dimensional effects” of all decisions. As in how well my decisions effect all dimensions in my A.O. and higher up. The grid system or Matrix suggested by Mr. Lind across the top he listed, Physical, mental, and moral. Mr. Lind’s system listed tactical, operational, and strategically down the side.


(Reference, the beginning of step # 2)

A) Acting- could include testing of hypothesis. Fuller “A battle some times decides everything and some times the most trifle thing decides a battle”. “In war so much is unknown that it frequently happens that the simple to the complex is the rule of war”. “There for the simpler and more direct the beginning the less likely it is that things well get out of hand”. NOTE; Boyd came to the conclusion that all stages of the OODA Loop were not created equal. ‘Orientation is the Schwerpunkt’, he wrote in 1987—the decisive point of the OODA Loop and of human decision-making. Orientation ‘shapes … the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act. In this sense, Orientation shapes the character of present [OODA] loops—while these present loops shape the character of future orientation. As the warfighter orients himself (and this is the crucial point) he brings to the process not only the imperatives of his immediate situation—whether piloting an F-86 over the Yalu River, leading an armored column through the Ardennes Forest, or planning the invasion of Iraq—but all his past experiences and the values of his society. Indeed, Orientation is nothing less than ‘the interplay of genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences, and unfolding circumstances’.  Only the last of these is normally considered by the warfighter or businessman trying to get an edge on his immediate adversary.
Nor are relations between Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action limited to ‘feed forward’, as the Loop is usually diagrammed. Rather, there is feedback at every stage of the cycle. Note too, that Boyd has now made a plural out of the Observation stage of the cycle:

(Reference, Planning, Step # 1, Gathering info. Prioritizing criteria.)


Qualities of leaderships

Candor- it’s more then openness, it’s saying the things that need to be said without a lot of words, yes sir no sir, or under the table agendas. The battle field is the most honest place in the world. The stakes are to high and time to short to mess around with anything but the essence and truth. The candor of the battle field is why cohesiveness forms there so quickly and permanently and why lies told there are punished not with gossip but with actions. Officers cannot lead well, if subordinates are telling them only what they think they want to here. Scorn sycophancy, servility/bootlicking, close cousins to backstabbing, character assassination and worst of all, pure corruption always fallows. All are enemies of meritocracy. Don’t be seduced by the dark side. Such actions are deliberately designed to thwart those who might otherwise advance based on competence. Officers must differentiate between appropriate respect and sycophantic or obsequious behavior, i.e. those who do there duty to the best of there abilities and those licking boots. Guide lines; those who work hard all the time vs. those working only when Cmdr is around. Those who are avid golfers and who accept invite to play vs. those who suddenly develop interest. Those who express honest opinions vs. those who express opinion coinciding with commander and who often express them publicly. Don’t be fooled by superficialities. Discipline goes deep and is the result of compliance and completion of major and minor orders and objectives. Fairness is a cornerstone of meritocracy. Fairness does not mean identical treatment for all. Rather what is best for the Marine and Corps. Explain your decisions about promotions, punishments, unit policies and so forth to subordinate commanders and staffs. So they can readily and logically explain them to their Marines. This is not to say that they must agree with them, but they do need to comprehend the rationale behind them. The SAS is different from the regular army, its all self discipline. No shouting, no bull, no one pulls rank and everyone is expected to express his opinion. Commitment – The phrase “clean as you go” means that jobs started are finished. It means order and thoroughness as a matter of course. It means policing an area to keep it sat; in contrast to a periodic, hurried cleanup to make it momentarily sat. It means being on the JOB all the time. Commitment, mainly to people rather than ideas. To that old buddy and then squad, some to the larger unit and nation, but no where near as much as to the buddy. F.M. William Slim. “I tell you as officers, if you don’t eat, smoke, or sleep until your subordinates have done so, they well fallow you to the ends of the earth.” Last in the chow line, but first out of the fighting hole. Never say, get going, always say lets go. Thus, living by the same standards and in the same conditions, you will inspire their confidence in you and elicit trust in your judgment. Take care of them and they well take care of you. Subordinates nor enlisted give their trust and confidence to leaders who appear to be remote and unattached. Similarly, they are wary of those who appear to be unfamiliar or insensitive to their needs. You must learn their names quickly, call them by name and learn their specialties, strengths and weaknesses; this creates a personal bond between the individual and the commander. My captain knows me, the Marine will say. They will not mistake a poor commander for a good one. The relationship is one of daily contacts and is too continuous, to allow for any deceptions. If command is the highest responsibility of an officer, the first responsibility is to lead. DO NOTs & TABOOs: Avoid having people guessing your name. Do not use 3rd person, Ex; dose the Colonel, when addressing a Col. Never lean on a superior’s desk. Avoid profanity and vulgarity. Never volunteer excuses or explain short comings, unless asked to. Never indicate that you had recommended a different course of action. No bruised feelings or silent resolution the old NEXT TIME! Thus the general has five dangerous characteristic traits. One committed to dying can be slain. One committed to living can be captured. One easily angered and hasty to act can be fooled. One obsessed with being scrupulous and untainted can be shamed. One who loves the people can be troubled. One whose troops repeatedly congregate in small groups whispering has lost the masses. If they are leaning on there weapons they are hungry. If those who gather water drink first they are thirsty. When they see potential gain but do not advance they are tired. If the officers are angry troops are exhausted. If the Corps is turbulent the Commandant lacks severity. One who frequently grants rewards is worried. One who frequently imposes punishment is in trouble. Where troops have penetrated deeply troops and officers will be united fight hard, if only shallowly they will tend to scatter. To counter those more afraid drawl up formations often, to accustom them to sights and sounds of battle. When punishment is administered, it is done impersonally, objectively, without rancor. Never resort to scorn or ridicule. The goal is to convince transgressors that they have everything to gain by doing their duty and being good Marines. Never promise a consequence that you cannot personally enact. An empty threat will only earn you scorn. Choose always the lesser punishment until convinced of its ineffectiveness. Get all the facts before taking action. Mutinies; punish ring leaders more than group. Always record counseling’s and get signature (whether one signs or not the counseling record is valid.) Later, such forms can be used to refresh your own memory of the actions as well as trace the development (or lack thereof) of the warfighter’s character or duty performance.

Note; Some repeat.

Desertion. Men desert to save their wives and children, not themselves. The principle advantage of the invaders is that their families are safe. Never pad troop numbers with married men; have them dig bunkers. Recruit only unmarried men and women to be civilian snipers. Women make better snipers than men because they posture less.

I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR THAT I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL ENEMIES, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC; THAT I WILL BEAR TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE TO THE SAME AND THAT I WILL OBEY THE ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORDERS OF THE OFFICERS APPOINTED OVER ME, ACCORDING TO THE REGULATIONS AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. SO HELP ME GOD.

(Reference, Leadership guidelines, Platoon commander)


 Competence- This is the oldest and most important quality of leadership, you can have candor and commitment but if you’re not competent you won’t last. Competence established the pecking order. Which may or may not correspond to rank and chain of command, depending on the competence of those in the chain. No commander should be aloud to remain long at the helm. By rotation you avoid the cult of personality, leader becomes ordinary member. With second mission failure leader should resign. This can be over turned with confidence vote. But three defeats, ends command. Choose subordinate with most victories. One indicator of good leadership is when officers have higher casualty rate than enlisted. Unless enemy only targets command, like in Iraq.

(Reference, Leadership Guidelines, squad leader/ squad leader group and platoon Commander, below)


All things being equal, if fighting dose not end quickly, you can be fairly sure neither side has a leadership advantage. If one side has force advantage, you can be sure, smaller force has grater leadership. James web management vs. leadership. It is much easier to educate a manager than to develop a leader. Management is the physics of things, it can be approached as an academic discipline, one can be taught to analyze data, weight alternatives and make decisions. Leadership is a subjective chemistry, filled with human variables. One must be able to motivate and reach the emotions, threw command presents, example and force. “When in war men must die” (an in war some must) “they can’t be managed to death, they must be lead there.” Sacrifice has and honored place in leadership but not in management. The military it is socialistic in that the group is more important than the individuals, it is a meritocracy in that the ways of rating are not based on monetary terms but on values of performance that only matter within the unit, and are meaningless otherwise. For management, Leaders and subordinates conducting Maneuver warfare the fallowing can apply. The way of thinking to encourage initiative on the part of subordinates is to be in close touch with them, to be alert for breakthroughs, discoveries, and ideas that occur at the lowest level, to keep subordinates aware of corporate or unit goals and values, always keeping sensitive to speed, so successful operations are never slowed. For subordinates, the way of thinking is using personal initiative and independent thought to serve corporate or unit goals, close cooperation with one another, to take risks when opportune, to act now and never delay when action can reap advantage, act and inform rather than ask permission. In addition, for leaders, management and subordinates alike, the focus is always outward, situational awareness i.e. on the environment: for business, focus on the customer; for war, on the enemy. The sales person cannot ignore issues of dollars and cents, competition, economic changes. They can kill him. But focus on the customer prevails. Loyal customers mean there is a future. For the soldier, it is the same. He cannot ignore logistics, terrain, routes of communication i.e. (LOC), and changes in the weather. They can kill him. But focus on the enemy prevails. A disrupted, confused, demoralized enemy means success. The hill is yours when the enemy quits, whether you've reached the hill yet or not. History shows any unit can be effective with good leadership. Recruits drawn form the more intelligent 20% of population are twice as effective as lower 20%. Twenty one year olds more effective than teenagers. Conscript armies generally consist of only 15- 30% long term professionals. Volunteer army 40-70% pros. Western type military requires highly industrialized well educated pool of recruits. The best uniformed units are generally the least effective. A fresh coat of paint makes any weapon appear capable. Ship crews operate in more of a controlled situation, where drills, technique, and skills are decisive. Experience is perishable; Armed forces tend to retain no more information than their oldest member. SAS developed a seriousness which dealt with each obstacle as an interesting challenge. Nothing was beneath consideration, from the calorific content of your food, the best method of putting on socks or applying band aids to blisters. Or the most energy saving way to climb a slope. On the surface it seemed almost boy Scoutish. They are not truculent (savage) or sadistic (abnormal delight in cruelty) as the Para’s are. The Para’s talk about everyman being an emperor. The SAS live it. SAS is without class, every officer first served in the ranks. They are free thinkers, that will question an order they think is wrong. They show stamina, initiative, independence, patience and self-discipline, a resilience to work without support and to endure loneliness without deteriorating. They believe as did the ancient Greeks who originated the word “aristocracy” that every man with the right attitude and talents, regardless of birth and riches, has a capacity in his own lifetime of reaching that status in its true sense. The Australian SAS in Vietnam, made the US Green Berets, look like amateurs. They had 500 kills and only one loss.

Leadership Guidelines

Leadership is the art of imposing one’s will upon others in such a manner as to command their respect, their confidence, and their whole-hearted cooperation. It’s part official and written but it’s mostly traditional and unwritten. With good leadership and discipline, achievement of the mission with minimum casualties is the rule. The main goal of leadership is discipline and cohesion in units, especially under stress. It’s a product of shared experiences, a confidence between commander and subordinates, who have the enthusiasms and ambitions of youth. There are few responsibilities equal in satisfaction to training, developing and leading young Marines. You are assisted by NCOs the back bone of our Corps and who are Marines you will respect and whose respect you will treasure. Gen. Mc Author, master yourself before you seek to master others, learn to laugh yet never forget how to weep. The open mind of true wisdom the meekness of true strength. Patience under adversity of courage under fire, modesty in victory. We are reaching out to new and boundless frontiers. We speak in strange terms of harnessing the cosmic energy of making winds and tides work for us, of creating unheard of synthetic materials, to supplement or even replace our old standard basics. Purifying sea water, mining ocean floors for new fields of wealth and food. Disease preventatives to expand life into the hundreds of years. Controlling the weather for a more equitable distribution of heat and cold, rain and shine. Space ships to the moon. Of the main target in war no longer limited to the armed forces of an enemy but instead to include his civil population, of the ultimate conflict between a united human race and the sinister forces of some other planetary galaxy. Of such dreams and fantasies as to make life the most exciting of all time. The long gray line. The shadows are lengthening for me. Gray line (graduates program) and Age of iron equals refining /hardening of S.O.P. Officers West point provides 25% of the over all 25k lieutenants for army every year. Mexican war 1846 there were 800 officers in USA corp. Class of 1915, “class the stars fill on”, 1/3 became generals, and one became President Eisenhower. U.S. Army uses parallel rank structure for enlisted troops instead of a lot of NCOs you have troops with the rank of specialist 4, 5, 6. The numbers represented pay grades. For senior more experienced technicians/troops, use was made of four grades of warrant officers. This rank was given all the privilege of officer. Now days less need or use of uniformed techs. Neither fish nor foul. Company grades these are apprentice/junior officers. Lieutenants and captains in the Marines/Army and Air force, Ensigns and lieutenants in the Navy. Command company size unit or small ship. Field grade major or Lt. Col. and Col. in Marines/Army or Air force, Lt. Cmdrs. Commanders and Captains in Navy. Command Battalions, Regiments, Brigades, ships of all size. Flag officers Generals in Marines/Army and Air force Admirals in Navy. Staff officers serve in staffs of unit’s one level higher than they would command. More officers serve in staff positions than in command positions. Each unit of battalion or larger has only one commander, but four or more staff officers. The battalion is the smallest unit that has a staff made up of officers, although even at company level there are officers and NCOs whose duties parallel those of staff officers. A staff officer; is an aid to commander, Assures unity of action throughout the command, by ensuring compliance with orders. Providing basic information and technical advice by which Cmdr may arrive at decisions. Relieves Cmdr of details by translating/drafting the basic decisions into adequate plans or orders. Transmitting them to subordinate leaders. Anticipates future needs. In short a properly functioning staff is an extension of the eyes, ears and will of the commander. The staff assists the commander in the performance of four functional areas. S1, S2, S3, S4.


(Reference, company cmdr 2inC notes below and the last step i.e. # 6 Supervise)

 (S) Preface is used at Regiment or below, at Division the prefix (G) is used. Joint task force (J) is used also for Joint Chiefs. And sometimes in combined Commands (C). S1 Adjutant/Legal administration officer. Normally a Capt. duties Hqt. mgt. and myriad administrative tasks. Records, bookkeeper for all secretaries. The adjutant (One who Assist.) is usually also charged with maintaining the commanders official schedule as well as preparing and circulating Cmdr. correspondences. Unit strength management, responsible for officer personnel management. Social events, morale activities, supervises unit PRS ctr. Chaplin, Fire Dept., MPs. (the command Sergeant major is usually charged with enlisted personnel management). S2 Intelligence officer, normally a Major. Tactical Intel. Counter Intel. (Physical security, including safes). Debriefs of patrols or individuals, or the company-level intelligence cell. Collects, correlates, evaluates and interprets information. Clearances, maps, communications, recon MRS. intelligence training. Staff officers are often used as spies. Intelligence cushy job in peacetime, career killer during war. S3 Operations and training officer. Lt/Col. Responsible for planning, the unit readiness. Schools Cmd inspections program. Casualty Medivac. Operations officers often chief of staff. Chief of staff is the principal assistant to the Cmdr. At low levels Executive officer fills the function of the chief of staff. He is often a prior logistics officer. It is the best possible training towards becoming a battalion commander. S4 logistics officer. Usually a Major. Duties include supplies, allocation, inventories, transportation and maintenance. Command of logistics more difficult during wartime too.
In the Newjarheaddean the S1 would remain the same. S2 Department would be broken down into Intel (info gatherers), Counter Intel (preventing enemy from gathering info) and Counter Counter Intel (preventing enemy Counter Intel from preventing ones own Intel gathering in the first place or Countering ones Counter measures).  S3 the way it is described above IMO sounds like the responsibilities of the Commander, assistant commander and their general staff i.e. secretaries. So I say make S3 the Science officer, to include medical officers, M.D. and Psychological, and bring the Chaplin (book thumpers) over from S1. Note the Chaplins would only serve as advisors on religious matters. S3 would also take on the responsibilities of civil affairs. S4 remains the same, there would be no S5, 6 7 8 9 or 10, (LOL). Note with Newjarheaddean division IMO Engineers should be combined with recon. There mission parameters could include prepping sites for basing i.e. in a guerrilla warfare situation engineer units could find vacant houses, terminate rats, bugs set up water, electricity etc.
People who own their own motorcycle and rifle will care for them.



Squad leaders;

The US WWII Squad referred to a leader, with scouts (Security), BAR team (Base of Fire) and riflemen (Maneuver). In WWII regardless of national origin, was comprised of three elements; machine gun group, riflemen group and the Squad Leader group, who provided the first link in the long chain of command that stretched all the way back to Divisional HQ and beyond. A Squad Leader was reinforced by his Assistant, either a second NCO or a senior Private. If the Squad Leader fell, he would take over command, nominating another to act as his deputy and potential successor.


(Reference, Qualities of leadership, Competence above and Company Cmdr. 2inC notes below.)

The leader had to direct his men to achieve their goals in a far more hands on manner than any other Cmdr above him.  To survive, the squad needed to use terrain and supporting fire to maximum effect.  It was vital to maintain its integrity i.e. operate as a single entity even when men were separated.  The distance had to be monitored closely by the leader who could only affect control through vocal commands or hand signals, this before ICOMs. In any engagement, there could be a host of targets. The key was to prioritize those targets and engage them in order of precedence. One man i.e. Squad Leader has to orchestrate the fire plan. The philosophy was better lose one man from the fire fight to direct the efforts of the remainder, than have all the Squad engaged in an undisciplined free for all. The temptation for the Squad Leader to join in the gun battle was always there, so he was issued a (shorter range) submachine gun. This diverted him from the lure of the longer range fire fight. Also, it increased the firepower of the Squad in the close quarter battle (CQB), putting the weapon in the hands of the man tasked with leading it. Another responsibility of the Squad Leader was to husband the ammo resources, as in when far forward and supplies may be limited. A typical Rifle Squad carried between 1500 - 1600 rounds of rifle and pistol calibers. 


Light Machine Gun group;

Every man in the Squad could operate the gun and carried ammunition. In WWII, it was the sole means by which the Squad could project sustained, accurate, automatic fire. The gun could sweep an area in a way which individual riflemen could not. It could dominate an approach in the defense, or by turn fix enemy defenders to allow the Rifle Group to close for the assault and the riflemen aka Maneuver or Assault Group. Its size varied between six and eight men, dependent upon nation and, of course, casualties. It was the manpower pool of the Squad, providing quite literally its bayonet strength. The Rifle Group provided the Squad with its scouts, grenadiers and marksmen. Since the introduction of the light or general purpose machine gun, there has been a tendency to describe the riflemen as virtual ammunition bearers and escorts for the weapon.  The evolution of tactics gives that argument some validity, but ultimately without the presence of the individual riflemen the Squad would prove a one dimensional tool. Its strength lay in the co-operation of the Rifle Group and Gun Group, united under the direction of the Squad Leader. In order to protect the light machine gun, alternative fire positions needed to be used. Once the Squad's weapon opened fire, it naturally made itself a target for retaliatory enemy action. If it stayed in the same spot for too long, return fire could be accurately and effectively zeroed in. Where possible, every advantage was taken of terrain and surroundings to allow the gun group to disengage and move to an agreed second location, without breaking cover. During this time, the riflemen were not idle. If the distance to the enemy line was too great to cross in a single bound, they would seek a defensible position.  Once reached, this would enable the gun group to make their switch.  Now it became the turn of the riflemen to provide cover fire, ideally directed against the enemy position of the greatest threat to their now vulnerable gun group. Once the light machine gun had reached its secondary position, the crew could recommence fire, this time from a different angle, thus forcing the return fire to be redirected. It may seem a logical compromise, but the idea of splitting the attacking force was to prevent the defender concentrating his fire on one target. 

(Reference, COE rule # 3 and COE overall tips; machine gun sections)


Platoon commander;

Usually a Lieutenant was uniquely positioned to share the frustrations of his men at the sometimes absurd orders they received from above, but was duty bound to carry them out to the best of his ability.  He was also best placed to see the often-tragic consequences. There was also the question of whether he was the Plt's Leader, or its Cmdr, there is a subtle difference. Some officers lead from the front. While highly commendable they often paid the ultimate price. Armies needed to promote experienced Platoon Commanders to the next level, but they had to live long enough to gain that experience.

(Reference, Qualities of leadership, commitment)
 


There is a limit to the number of men a Cmdr can exercise personal control over, roughly speaking around ten (as demonstrated on the sports field). That helped determine the size of the Squad.  The Inf Plt could vary between as few as thirty or as many as fifty men. With three Sq Leaders and between 30 and 40 men, Lieutenants needed to learn the art of delegation using sq leaders to direct the efforts of their men and deploy support weapons. Without necessarily becoming embroiled in the fire fight.  Yet when the unit faltered or found itself pinned down, it was the Plt Cmdr's responsibility to rise up and urge his men onward with the cry of follow me or come on lads!  That was when the Commander became a Leader.
At this point leaders need to be keenly aware of tempo and the limits of readiness i.e. alertness of the majority of forces available.


(Reference, Step # 3, Pro-guerrilla/insurgency operations, Organization celluar structure)


Company commander;

The Rifle Company marked the first step on the way to the fully integrated 'all arms' team. Despite the ever increasing layers of fire support which existed to underpin its mission, it always had to be capable of doing the job alone. For the most part though, the Rifle Company acted in concert with the heavy weapons which made up the rest of the fighting strength of its Battalion and above.  Some may be located in the Weapons Platoon, but the bulk would be held in the Weapons Company of the Battalion proper. Co HQ was generally split between command functions, administration and supply duties. The 'O' Group or orders group was composed of the, signaler, runners and relevant Section Cmdrs. The latter elements were usually a few cooks and supply personnel. It was headed by the Commander assisted by a senior Sgt., whose role it was to aid in the issue of orders and intelligence to the forward troops. In WWII, the Co C/P today’s COC, was normally a fixed position. In the assault, the Cmdr would often go mobile and take with him his Sgt, runners and signalers, and possibly some men to act as an escort. The burden of command was normally shared between two officers, the Company commander and his 2nC or Executive Officer (XO). The 2inC would establish a reserve fixed post, to which messengers could head in the event they could not find the mobile CP. The 2inC helped alleviate the workload in effect allowing the Company Commander proper to attempt the trick of being in two places at once i.e. one could maintain the company command post while the other went 'topside' to judge the situation for himself. 


(Reference, Leadership Guidelines “A Staff Officer” in bold print.)


German practice differed here, with there being only one officer at Co HQ, his deputy actually being the Cmdr of the 1st Plt. The Co Cmdr could have from 100 to 200 men under his command. Leadership required a different approach to that of a Plt leader/Cmdr. With various units attached to support his force. There was no way he could personally lead this number of elements spread across a frontage measured in the hundreds of meters. He had to exercise much more command and control by way of delegation to subordinates not personal leadership. The Co Cmdr needed to brief his subunit leaders including any attached assets on the mission and ensure each understood his role within it. Once his force deployed, his attention needed to focus on the overall progress of the battle, determining where success was being made and where efforts were faltering. He would also be acutely aware of developments on his flanks, where events involving neighboring units could demand others intervene in aid, or might find themselves exposed by a sudden reverse. He had then to decide how to best exploit or reinforce these areas. Simultaneously, he would be in touch with his Battalion superiors, who would be demanding updates and monitoring progress. During maneuvers; the actual separation distance between units would vary greatly, the most important determining factor probably being the nature of the terrain involved. However, it could not be allowed to become so great that it would impair the need for mutual flank protection between the Platoons. In the offense; one major concern was the divisions of forces between the assault echelon the reserve and or support elements. The Company Commander had to think of the battle as a developing struggle, and had to visualize his assets to enable him to in affect stay two or more moves down the line. To that end, he could only commit a portion of his troops to the initial assault, holding a number in reserve. Company Commanders tended to think of their unit as whole Platoons rather than individual Squads. Mathematically speaking, the decision was simple, one Platoon upfront, or two? The Reserves; One of the most vital decisions is when to commit the reserves. The ideal time would already have been identified during planning, usually signified by the capture of a primary objective allowing the exploitation phase to begin. The platoon  in a reserve role, would move through one of the forward units, providing fresh legs to exploit the opening. Once the reserve element had been committed, the Company Commander would need to assemble a new one ASAP. In this instance, the unit it relieved could then become the new reserve as it gathered its strength and reorganized. 

Yet all too often enemy defenses well withstand the initial assault, forcing the commander to consider their earlier use.  The commander who had only committed one of his platoons to lead the assault had the breathing space afforded by having two or more in reserve. The reserve could be used to regain proper intervals between units thus assuring mutual flank protection or to relieve pressure by outflanking i.e. launching its own attack on enemy unit being fixed by the fire of another thus bolster a lead platoon. Likewise, it could filter in to replace the platoon in the fire role, while the original unit attempted the flanking movement.

Ho chi min trails 40 troop or less
At full strength per the Army’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), a World War II U.S. Army infantry company consisted of three rifle platoons and one heavy weapons platoon. The company commander was a Captain in rank. A platoon consisted of three squads plus a small headquarters team. The platoon leader was a Lieutenant. Rifle squads consisted of 12 men each, lead by buck sergeant.


(Reference, note by far this is the largest collection of reference notes in one area, Step # 3, part D) item # 10 support, reserves and R.O.E. and Defense rule # 4 subsection, ATGM, “anti structure role” and mortars/mobile fire control and Exploitation phase. And Def. Conduct of the defense, “If next attack well succeed”, as well as COE rule # 3 as well as Maneuvers and formations located in the detailed notes of that rule as well as “True V formations as well as COE over all tips, “Reorganiztion and exploitation”)


Infantry battalion;
The Battalion Commander would normally be either a Lieutenant Colonel or Major. Interestingly, the German Battalion had no 2inC at Battalion Headquarters rather the senior Company Commander would take over the role as required. Another option is the Supply Officer i.e. Quartermaster. Note the frontage covered? During maneuvers, In the offense, and Reserves; Basic responsibilities were the familiar questions of how much of the force should be commit to the initial offensive, and secondly how could one best employ support weapons to aid them. One needs only to refer back to company commander’s notes above, substituting platoon with companies thus increase magnitude to appreciate battalion commander’s duties. IMO an increased knowledge in logistics, and communications thru chain of command are the main priorities at this level.
  

In so called 4th GW, shifting the tactical focus to company-sized and smaller units will probably mean a major force reorganization in favor of a “flatter” command structure. To flatten a command structure is to have fewer echelons control the same number of troops. For example, a conventional command structure would divide a dozen maneuver companies among three or four battalion headquarters. The battalions, in turn, report to a regimental or brigade headquarters. A flatter version of this might eliminate the battalion headquarters and have the regimental or brigade headquarters control all companies directly. (If one prefers to be less radical this regiment might have only eight companies. Prior to 1914, during an era that often presented similar challenges to what Fourth Generation war currently presents, the standard British battalion had eight rifle companies. This gave the battalion great flexibility in irregular warfare because it enabled it to create numerous detachments while still retaining a tactically viable force under its own control.) Conventional wisdom has it that a given command element cannot tactically control more than four maneuver elements. However, on a Fourth Generation battlefield tactical control above the company level is seldom needed. When it is needed, it is likely to be for only a limited time and to involve limited forces. Instead of worrying about tactical control, a higher headquarters should focus on administration, logistics, operational and strategic objectives, intelligence analysis and dissemination and relations with the local rulers. It should usually leave tactical matters to its platoons and companies.


Note add much more from Marine officer’s guide MCA magazines and place in Appendix.

This concludes part three, the Planning section, Step 2



" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start" IKYG

G-day!




Posted by at

No comments:

Post a Comment

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)