Welcome Aboard!

AHOY,


UPDATE 12/21/13, 11:42 HOURS

I am revealing who I am today i.e. posting my name, I am Keith Oeffinger, I was born in San Antonio Texas in 1963. See today's post 12/21/13 .


Update, 01/11/14 12:30 hours;

I would like to say, with only one reply, like three years ago, this blog seems too much like a mirror site to me. And it appears very few patriots are looking back at past posts.

The new “Fragmented Fighting Facts” series of posts that dedicates one post to each Basic rule has now been completed. This series starts with the post tilted “Post # 1, Planning, Preface” that posted on 05/12/13. This series is under the label “Tri-F in progress”. Posts well be updated as I edit or discover additional knowledge thus the series is the most current version of my "Fragmented Fighting Facts" manual. For an old but complete version i.e. all in one post copy. Patriots are welcomed to try viewing one of the “pages” listed in the “special word section” on the starboard side of the blog. I say try due to the fact I’m not sure if they are published i.e. viewable to the general public due to all the issues or HACKING with my blog. There is also a complete copy posted, that is titled, “Tri-F in progress” too, it was posted 11/13/10.

And feel free to fire away with a reply, (sarcasm on).


FLASH REPORT; the “TERRORIST ARE NOT AMONG US, AND NEVER WERE I.E. AL QAEDA IS A STAWL MAN, GHOST”.

The most important lesson that everyone should have taken away from the Boston Marathon bombings was that those young men proved that no al-queda members are in the u.s. Otherwise they too would just go get some presure cookers and had to a parade.

“I AM NOT A TERRORIST” this nation’s worst enemy is FEAR. This fear is being promoted mostly by the back woods, right wing, Christians of this nation. We need to separate church and state, period. And that is of course for the States sake.


I would like patriots to understand that I use the terms "official revealed fact" to mean what everyone is being told by officials, media etc. I use the term "kings truth" to mean what I know or believe to actually be the actual facts. I DO NOT MEAN IT IN A RELIGIOUS WAY. I.E. the term Kings is plural as in those running the show.


Preface for the Fragmented Fighting Facts

Note pink highlighted material is that, that IMO is questionable factually, it maybe an “official revealed fact” that I am questioning. The material may need to be defined i.e. explained more or it could be a personal note. Yellow is location undecided or unedited material i.e. unread that I have not decided on what to keep or not. Green means a change has been made i.e. an update. By noting the green updated highlights a Patriot well not have to read the Fragmented Fighting Facts in its entirety to stay current. Red is important, perhaps the "kings truth".

Newjarheaddean; this is my collection of combat notes. One might call it my anthology of combat tactics, techniques, methods and skills. The note taking began about fourty years ago (I was around 13 years old) with the observation of 10 rules listed with in a book covering the French and Indian i.e. Native American, wars, entitled “Roger’s Rangers”. That’s right the rules that started all this are “Army Ranger” rules, this book was located in the “Westfall” library in San Antonio Texas off of Vance Jackson. I get a kick out of the libraries name due to the general agreement that modern or state vs state warfare started with the singing of the peace treaties at Westphalia. I could not read at the time; however I knew that a list in a book on war would be important. I copied those rules down like a scribe might have written hieroglyphs and had my dad read them to me. . This discovery preceded numerous sources including approximately one hundred books and about a dozen field manuals, of which a few were of WWII era. These were found at libraries, half price bookstores and garage sales. Since going on line in 2007, I have found material on web sites such as “Defense and National Interest” (DNI), “Global security”, “Strategy page” , “Wikipedia” and “Bayonet strength” and “Efour4ever” in the combat lessons learned section. These last two sites cover WWII.

Previously referred to as K.O.O.L.N. (acronym definition, top secret), FLASH REPORTS; I NOW AM TELLING EVERYONE IT STANDS FOR KEITH OEFFINGER'S ORGANIZATION OF LEARNED KNOWLEDGE the joke on me here was I believed Knowledge was spelled with an (N). I was a special education student and did not learn to read until my last year of high school. I have now titled my work “Fragmented Fighting Facts” or “Tri-F”; the name derives from the computer grammar function always alerting me to the fragmented nature of my sentences. This is due to the “just the facts, ma’am” manor the material is written i.e. there has been little if any effort to write in whole sentences or provide context. This is not to say there is no order with Tri-F, in fact there is a theme. I have laid out the information as one might expect a commander or members of a unit to recall it thus utilizing it to conduct a mission.

We start with “Planning”, followed by the section on “Defense”, then there’s “Preparations and conduct of patrols” or “PCP”, and we end with “Conduct of Engagements” or “COE”, i.e. engagements being the term used here for shootouts. Each section of Tri-F consists of numbered “Basic rules”, each basic rule followed by detailed notes that either relate to, explain, or give examples pertaining to the basic rules. As with the general format of Tri-F, each section’s basic rules are laid out as one might need to recall them. This is most obvious in the last section COE starting with basic rule number one, “Flash report”, i.e. actions to take upon contact with the enemy. This sections last basic rule deals with handling POWs.

Keep in mind this is a work in progress; I’m constantly discovering new information to add which in turn still at times requires rearranging things. At the same time, interestingly enough to me, I have not needed to rearrange my original order of the basic rules for quite some time. There are however, two instances where the detailed information fallowing a pair of basic rules became so similar I decided to combine the pair into one basic rule. These two occurrences are noted in footnotes.

Now heed this, out of all the information contained within this work, only an estimated 1% was taught to me while I was serving in the U.S.M.C. Moreover, to put a fine point on it, it’s worth noting I served in Charlie Company, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, i.e. an Infantry unit. Before my discharge (after only a two year cruse), I attended Jungle Warfare School in the northern training area of Okinawa (for two weeks), Mountain Warfare School in Korea (for one week) and Combat Town Camp Pendleton for MOUT training (for one day). I did not take part in any amphibious training nor did I ever go to Twenty Nine Palms for Desert Warfare training. We did ride around in AAVs once at Camp Pendleton. All in all I would say the only things I missed out on were a beach landing (at Coronado I believe) and a little sun burn, due to the fact that those twenty nine palms, I was told in the early eighties were all located at the front gate of that base. Needless to say, the training did not impress me, and I now know it was not going to get any better as some suggested to me at the time, and still others later claimed that I should have just stayed in longer.

With my position on the lack of training, I do wish to make it perfectly clear that I do support the service women and men in the U.S. armed forces. I also believe them to be as brave as any people on earth, (with the exception of the (Y) generation). My concern is in the way the Infantry especially is being mislead and used. I want people to understand my experience and IMO a lot of evidence suggests Uncle Sam intends to use his infantry in ways that does not include training any generation in the art of “traditional Guerilla combat tactics” i.e. as a “Traditional Commando” would be. I am not talking about “SWAT” team “Close quarter” tactics, like the “Stick dynamic entry”. That tactic should be called the “cluster f**k”. Just call that sort of tactic what it is NYPD (Cops T.V. show bad-boys, bad-boys) in Afghanistan.

The problem is that that tactic was developed by police departments to deal with an objective occupied by drugged up party animals, i.e. untrained civilians. The police never use it in a spur of the minute situation. They use it when the house/objective has been under constant surveillance for mouths in some cases and the police know all manner of information about everyone in the house and the structure and neighborhood in general. The cops choose a time when everyone is pasted out from partying the night before and have long lost any weapons (between the cushions or under the bed) they might have had on them as show pieces during the party. The primary reason for the large numbers of police in close proximity is to make sure the gang does not think the raid is a rival gang “brake in” and thus resist in any way. There is lots of yelling too, thus reinforcing the message that no one is trying to be covert, like one would be to get away with a crime.

This brings up an intriguing observation of mine; that being that by the book an assault should be made from the top down, yet the troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere use the Stick dynamic entry and usually enter from the front door, like a SWAT team. However resent high profile raids show the SWAT teams attacking from the top down. Examples you may recall are the raids on the Shinning path group in Peru in 2000 and the Mumbai raid by Indian forces on the Jewish center in 2008. IMO this proves the existence of what I’ll refer to as a “need to know” training policy, being followed by various governments, the purpose being to limit the number of true Commandos that could become tomorrow’s rebels, apposing corrupt governments. One last thing about the Stick, IMO every single time the regular forces unit conducting one of these foolish Stick dynamic entries comes under fire i.e. runs into resistance, the Stick brakes i.e. the whole unit evacuates and awaits some kind of support form tanks, guns, tubes or air. Bottom line IMO the Stick is used as a probing tactic and is meant to be a moral boosting show peace tactic to make the unit feel as if it has taken a hill, which was nothing more than another empty building, that IMO Intel suggested, was the case before the entry was ordered. Recalling the police policy of long periods of surveillance prior to raids.

It also seems to me that in light of the old saying “you can fight a war with bombs and blockades but only boots on the ground can win it” ( IMO, Uncle Sam has now revised that saying, as fallows) “you can win a war with bombs and blockades, but only the infantry can end the war”, farther more IMO Uncle Sam has gone one more step and decided to use private security companies and local i.e. indigenous people for the infantry role. All this fear of true commandos is all very similar to the “Mujahideen” not being allowed by various governments, to return to their homelands i.e. native nations, after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

And as for the U.S. and other Western nations, training foreigners to fight a counter insurgency goes. IMO this training includes nothing more than police procedures i.e. conducting investigations, forensics, searching individuals and buildings to collect evidence and yes serving warrants, if necessary, with those all mighty “stick” tactics. And of course, lots of “new innovative techniques and tactics” involving CAS and IMO (Old) so called high tech equipment the U.S. Military Industrial Congressional Complex wants to clear out of the warehouses.

All in all IMO Uncle Sam has chosen to put just about all his eggs in one advanced technology system, think Star Wars Storm Troopers or Matrix i.e. the Operator or Morpheus trying to guide Neo and others to safety. IMO it looks something like this; (x) unit go to (x) address, kick in front door, use stairs to your right, go south down hallway to (x) door, it is unlocked, interning room go to (x) window looking out window to the north you will see your target running east though the neighbors garden. All this information and the “live” feeds of target and area of operations would be provided by a fleet of satellites as well as Near space assets that are never mentioned by the media as current military assets and of course there’s the robots, UAVs and a flood of other covertly deployed sensors as well as covert eves dropping of any civilian electronic devices in the Area of operations.

Thus in light of these and similar so called “new innovative, techniques and tactics” (notice the media and governments choice of words “techniques and tactics” as if we’re talking Commando training i.e. why not use some modern high tech terms the system is so eager to introduce us all to normally as a matter of routine), IMO Uncle Sam has placed the traditional Guerrilla combat tactics, on the back burner and is hoping they all go the way of other black arts.

This is not just true of the infantry; let us take a peek at aerial combat. Does anyone out there actually think today’s U.S. pilots are turning and burning, pulling high (G) maneuvers trying to hit the entry windows and get inside the bandits turn. Think any pilot has conducted a yo-yo or split S maneuver lately or made the choice between a single or two-circle fight. Now days its all about stealth, ECM and Smart even autonomous weapons, missiles especially BVR tech. IMO this explains why the U.S. Navy is not concerned with not having a front line fighter equal to the USAF F-22 Raptor. An article I recently read on “Strategy page” mentioned a lot of talk about a Navy F/A-18E at an air show, displaying a little F-22 silhouette decal i.e. a simulated Kill credit symbol/icon. IMO the F/A- 18E did not gun down that kill.

And then everyone knows that just about all now and IMO soon all weapons systems including the bayonet well have a chip in it.

So if the electronics ever fail (maybe due to a shift in the axis of earths electromagnetic field, passed a certain point or perhaps a record size solar flare) IMO it well be the masters of the age-old Guerrilla combat tactics i.e. The Fragmented Fighting Facts Basic Rules that survive, keeping in mind “no one wins”.

I also wish, that those who join the various services where told all this up front i.e. “we do not intend to train you as a traditional Commando”.

Another thing I would like everyone to consider is that; what makes a Marine special is not the training she or he receives, no it’s the steel the youth demonstrates when they choose to join the Marines. Even when compared to the Special Forces, who IMO are only specialists in their particular field, once again mostly high tech specialties and whose ranks are filled with older personnel that have already been serving and have graduated from a boot camp i.e. are aware of the hoop and hype hurry up and wait tactics. And who are then usually chosen i.e. coached into changing their MOS. I am aware of the change in recruitment policy after 2001 allowing for direct entry into the S.F. community. IMO a rarity and IMO it is still not the same as just choosing to go to a Marine Corps Recruit Depot from the start.

Furthermore, to those who just well not accept the truth about the lack of training along the lines of traditional Guerrilla combat tactics. I can now say that I have exchanged comments with a number of Iraqi and Afghanistan combat vets. These comments can be found on the internet if you Google up my call sign, Newjarheaddean also spelled with one (D). IMO it is obvious that the tactics I speak of are news to the vets, some have made commits that proves in combat they were just winging it. And no, I don’t believe that all the vets are observing some kind of code of silence on these tactics including the vets who are against the wars. Unless everyone wants to say that YouTube and other internet companies are conspiring to edit all combat footage that shows these tactics being used and that, the vets are staging other videos that show them (albeit with great bravery) as armatures without a clue and winging it. If anyone ever sees video, showing the tactics listed in Tri-F being used, be sure and provide a link with your comment. I once saw a flash of film on CNN showing combat in Lebanon during the 1980s that showed some of these tactics being used by a Guerrilla fighter. I well also say I do believe that UAV footage is edited by the Pentagon to keep the public from seeing the few but well trained Taliban and other Guerrilla fighters that are using these tactics. Alternatively, maybe people think our professional highly trained well-equipped military is unable to defeat 10 – 20 thousand religious extremist amateur thugs in almost a decade of fighting. All the while killing at least by some estimates 100 a mouth including dozens of top commanders.

Let me also say, on the numbers of U.S. PTSD casualties, i.e. IMO, WIA, (And IMO deserving of a Purple Heart). The Government portrays these cases as a result of fighting a war that is “unlike any other war we have fought before” (LOL). Facing an enemy that is fighting in some mysterious and or cowardly manor that simply cannot be countered by military means. I believe the high numbers are a result of US forces fighting in a manner that is suicidal i.e. pointless and counterproductive to the real world situation. Example; you have a young brave American ready to fight for the nation, while on one of these IMO “Russian roulette parades” someone shoots at the unit from some building, everyone scrambles for cover, as some spray and pray, then after determining the location using SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems) sniper detectors, or one of the many similar vehicle mounted systems the commander calls in some sort of CAS, if someone’s brains have been blow out especially if it was an officer or the location is vague, a real “crowd pleaser” maybe used i.e. 2000 pounder.

IMO this is how 90% of engagements (fought by regular infantry units) are resolved. Special Forces are now and in the feature more and more regular infantry well be using the Matrix. And to those that think this is the exception I say show me the number of WIA or KIA (On either side) by small arms fire i.e. during traditional firefights. Even if one includes sniper fire those figures are really low. So IMO after witnessing all the carnage and innocent civilian life being lost and receiving all those looks from the witnesses, it is the American that realizes it is his unit that is not fighting right.

This is reinforced and really sinks in back in the states when the vet is asked to tell the Commando stories that never occurred and thus the vet must tell the truth i.e. give up the Commando reputation, keep it all inside or start lying. If the first option is chosen that unveiling reality is demoralizing and makes it all not worth it. If either one of the other chooses are made IMO the vet becomes the ticking bomb. And I can tell you all that many times, I have recalled being told once that “when you go home keep your mouth shut about the things we did. If you don’t you well be thought of as a liar or crazy and either which way your life well be over”. That First Sergeant was right, but like my daddy use to say, “He’s right but he does not know why he’s right” i.e. IMO the First Sgt. thought of what we did in terms of remarkable heroic feats. However, IMO certainly since the beginning of the Vietnam era, it is the lack of training i.e. the manner in which our service women and men are fighting that keeps this tragedy going.

I would also suggest the vets of today are just like I was 25 or so years ago in the sense that they know there training is lacking, however, they just cannot explain what’s missing. However unlike me they refuse to accept that old fashion “black arts” are the answer i.e. should be the basis of basic training. And I now know the “Black art” tactics they and I should have been trained in and I can now say, “The PFC that told the Corp it was out of step, now has provided the proof”. What surprises me is that most vets it seems don’t care at all about the tactics I speak of and seem to view me as an unpatriotic “party pooper”, when I’m just a U.S. Marine trying to improve the Corps and save lives. Bottom line IMO the infantry needs to consist of unmarried i.e. undistracted, NO CHILDREN, dedicated true professionals, trained in the tactics listed in Tri-F and many more I am sure exist.

And to those that say “chivalry is for the museums” I say “first we must have peace on earth”.

One Newjarheaddean

“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!

Update; 12/19/14 09/53 hours




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Friday, May 17, 2013

Post # 16, Planning, Step # 3

AHOY,

Update; 06/12/13 10: 39 hours this was just the title change. 

FRAGMENTED FIGHTING FACTS

Planning section, Step # 3 i.e. Commanders Intent


Note I well admit, this material really looks like a "manifesto" of a madman, LOL but hay I'm working on it i.e. I really need to stress here that this all is a work in progress. Most people thought those ten basic rules this Marine started dividing into sections and combining with the "LITTLE" knowledge I had gathered in the Marines, looked pretty silly at first, too. 



Step # 3 Concepts of operations,

STEP # 3 Concepts of operations:


Part A)
We start with (I.S.A.L.U.E., R.W. P.) reports. Used to describe Individuals, forces i.e. units, equipment or items and weapons available to all involved. Therefore, one would have foe and fellow reports. There could be a strategic grand report using general total figures, and or one report for each unit down to company level, or important individuals. Also one for each equipment or weapons class. What fallows is an example of listed items and information to be located after the various letters of the acronym (I.S.A.L.U.T.E.R.W.P.). It must be noted that starting with identification (I.D.) under the (I) on a computer it could be presented in bold or highlighted format; one could also use parenthesis or block lettering with a written report. The important thing to keep in mind is the I.D. is emphasized and used as a marker through out the report in all noted categories (i.e. after all letters in the acronym) to specify what figures/data relates to which I.D. i.e. individual, item or weapon. In a Forces available report, it is accepted that the sub categories fallowing the (U) are to numerous to separate each entry i.e. fact, within each sub category with a specific I.D. Therefore a typical entry would start with the I.D. fallowed by a paragraph of information keeping to the general order of sub categories. This rule may apply to (T) (R) and (P) as well. These exceptions are made obvious in the detailed examples in the ISALUTERWP appendix. 

Note specific information about the enemy on patrols in your area, such as “call signs” of the enemy you may be aware of, located under (I) in AFAR, would be copied to the corresponding item listed in your “Patrol order” i.e. item # 1 unit information. This “patrol order” is mentioned below.


2/11/11 with all that said, here below, I most admit things are a bit undecided to say the least, but I’m getting there. I would appreciate some help too. And I am ashamed at my having to create new terms and acronyms, however for me it was necessary for aiding in recalling all this system. Not to mention I’m creating a system from stratch. Once I have it completed I well bet it takes an act of congress to change it, I would point to my basic rules going unchanged for 35 years or so, as evidence to that.

FORCES AVAILABLE:
Example of a Forces Available report layout i.e. format, AKA an AFAR. Also note the acronym FEW for forces, equipment and weapons.  AFEWR part A forces, eq, wep, report, pronounced ah-fewer.

Zabihullah, a senior Taliban adviser. The movement’s founder, Mullah Mohammed Omar, has been unseen and silent since he fled Afghanistan in late 2001, and his right-hand man, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, has been held for the past year by Pakistani security forces. The two senior commanders who nominally run the war in the south now—Abdul Qayum Zakir and Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor—inspire little confidence in the ranks. 

I) this is an I.D. - that is to say the initial main/largest I.D. of subject answered strategically first i.e. Adversaries – Nation, state, province, county.  Ex; Russians, Indians, Chinese, or Israelis. Or a major branch of service. Ex; Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines. However this could be Tactical I.D. of an individual i.e. Name, with strategic or tactical I.D. we also include AKA, nicknames, aliases and item # 1 of patrol order i.e. call signs. Example of nicknames, blacks in the corps called dark green Marines or Mexicans muds WWII Japanese, AKA Japs, slopes.
Note; I find it funny how me and my brother begain calling Blacks “Muds” around 1990 or so. IMO the Corp got it wrong but in the corps defence it already had a term for the blacks.


S) Size – this could be demmintions, specifications or a numerical number. With units were talking numbers, individuals were talking measurements i.e. weight. WWII Japanese trooper averaged 130 lbs. U.S. trooper averaged 160 lbs. and height. Japanese trooper averaged 5’/3” U.S. trooper averaged 5’/9”.
A) Activity – This is past i.e. history. Present i.e. Tactical i.e. recent (within a mouth) activities observed, here we well make use of the five Ws and H. Who, I.D. What, appointments/entertainment/deployments/dutes/jobs/mission/routines/schedules/training/tactics. Where, is location of specific actions. Could be grids, GPS, address and or azimuths etc. also item # 2 of patrol order i.e. enemy Unit locations known. As well as items # 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. When, use 24 hour i.e. military system, include date. Also item # 3 of patrol order i.e. enemy times of departure. Why, note apparent reason, what this action may complement or be in preparation for. How.
Future; Operational/Strategic? items listed under What in Activity, older than a mouth or more. Date and time of oriental recon i.e. the acquisition of the information and the last update. Also an “Activity calendar” i.e. reference times and dates of important events. Combat experience, educational and medical records of Units or individuals, would be located here. 
Note up to one mouth equals tactical.

L) Location –This is home ports, bases, or with individuals residence by State, Provinces or City. Grids, GPS, address, references to be used in part B, BMMW, etc.
U) Unit – in depth I.D. more precise than under (I) include Photos, etc. possible categories, Special ops, Infantry, air borne, air Mobile, mechanized, armor, artillery. Division, regiment, battalion, company, platoon, squad, section, or fire team. Including rank for military personal and tittles for civilians, memberships, associations, gang, party, organizations, family, clan, tribe. Also structure of the chain of command next highest, lowest or adjacent units. If specific information is not available one might have to list numbers i.e. 3 companies per battalion. However it would be desired to name them. With individuals, Adult/child male/female.

Note Descriptions for individuals use movie stars and other well known celebrities as a counter part comparisons. Cosmetics, tattoos, scares. Uniforms, clothing, insignia, patches, awards, jewelry, apparel. Example; Iraqi guerrillas tend to be clean cut or have mustaches and well dressed. Where as farmers usually have beards.

(Reference, Defense rule # 5 under principal # 1, ISALUTE RWP)
T) Time –
E) Equipment – general over all lists of all equipment and weapons. Note, specifications would be located in Equipment and weapons available reports. Unit’s composition/locations i.e. organizational positions and numbers with in units, i.e. 18 guns per battery. Ammo supplies available or normally carried. Modes of transportation. Might include irregular uses. Carrying or storage habits. Note this info is repeated in e-war under locations. On individual bases this could be items owned.
R) Reinforcements – An analysis of factual or possible assistance from other units or allies and effects on all units by all units movements, support or lack there of. With individuals relationships, family ties. And thus information pertaining to item # 10 of patrol order.
W) Withdrawal – Routes, avenues of any kind being used or present on the battle field.
P) Personalities – attitudes, disposition, evaluation, ratings, religion, motivations, languages, statements, mottos.
Note unit composition located in Equipment might move to Unit? Sycological profiles.

(Reference, Defense rule # 5 under principal # 1, I salute R.W.P etc.)


EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS AVAILABLE:

Example of equipment and weapons available report layout i.e. format; AKA e-war. 1/29/11 these reports are still being developed. I’m working on hard copies and plan on just replacing these with the updated version soon.

I) I.D. designation/ AKA, nicknames. Note classification is detailed under (U).
S) Numbers, manufactured, available. Specifications Dimensions; Weight/loads/density/mass. Width/track. Length. Height/ground clearance/fording.
A) Activity this is recent activities observed, Here again we use the five Ws and a H. Who unit or individual. What specific activities observed i.e. deployments. Where specific locations of activities i.e. deployments. When time and date. How are they manufactured (note information would only be mentioned if it points out any weaknesses or strengths to the system), also disassemble, reassemble, operated, specific details on individual techniques of carrying or deploying. Trouble shooting, I.A.D or field striping.
L) Locations where are they manufactured, stored, users of the weapon i.e. nation unit or individuals. Training ranges or schools. Composition/locations and numbers with in units, i.e. 18 guns per battery. Note this info is repeat form equipment in Forces available report.
U) Units Variants i.e. models, caliber, photos, decals, color schemes. Also Utility uses/function/classification mounted or unmounted direct or indirect fire, crew served or small arms.
T) Date and time when information was acquisitioned and last updated. History of research and development. History of maintenance records and reliability statistics.
E) Equipment tools, machines used for maintenance, Periphery devices/scopes.  Transportation and platform vehicles ships or aircraft. Performance and dimensional specifications i.e. details are located under other categories. 
R) Reinforcements Crews functions and any other support needed etc. 
W) Weapons secondary and defensive, systems for platforms.
P) Performance, operational statistics of platforms and main weapons;
Ranges, Max over all or max effective (could also include effective at what altitude) in meters for weapon rounds or (operational) miles for vehicles and aircraft. Minimum ranges, safety arming ranges for rounds or danger close for explosives in meters. Note repeated in ammo below.
Speeds muzzle velocity for weapons, rates of fire max or sustained for weapons, mph max or acceleration for vehicles or aircraft.
Trajectories/envelopes Trajectories paths for rounds. Elevation and traverse or gimble limits for weapons. Flight envelopes ceilings climb rates or Angles of attack for aircraft.
Ammo/Fuels type’s and characteristics; warheads fuses casualty radiuses for weapons. Note repeated in Ranges above. Fuels and lubricates for vehicles or aircraft. Capacity # of rounds in magazines or storage for weapons or gals/lbs of fuel for Vehicles or aircraft.
Casualty radius armor Breaching and protection abilities;
Note Mortar CEP figures and single or multiple tube patterns. BDA 120 mm mortar vs 105mm or 155 mm howitzer. IMO crater for 155 would be elongated do to flater trajectory and larger.

(Reference, Defense rule # 5 under principal # 1, I salute R.W.P and Appendix ISALUTERWP for more detailed examples.)



Part B) MAPS, MODELS AND WEATHER;
AKA, your Bmw acronym could be written BMMW or BM2W.
Here we make use of yet another version of the Salute report.
Size: area of terra in sq. mi. greatest distance north and or south, east and west. Highest and lowest points, mean alt. Infrastructure statistics, numbers of everything. Lighting, location of switch board. Activity: could be land usages. Location: Grids, address, altitude, attitude/position. Unit: surface/vegetation, mountains, water shed, drainage, lakes, rivers. Time: seasonal changes. Climate and general history. Reinforcements:? With drawl: Traffic, secondary routes. Subterranean too. Air.
Over all tips: Construction tips; for terrain models use natural materials in the field to disguise in case enemy finds. Have scale and keep items proportional never use same items to represent two different things. Speed chart, scale charts, grid square. The nature of the terrain is often of more consequence than courage. Terrain sense, study when possible by walking or riding over it. Observe from vantage point of both your view and foes. Know what terrain will allow both sides to do. One who dose not employ local guides cannot gain advantage of terrain. Note overlays and maps. Overlay clear plastic sheet with patrol routes, and any additional information not included in map legend. It is written in grease pencil. It is placed over map. It is orientated by using reference grids, they are aligned to a cross hire printed on overlay. If map and or overlay are captured, with out knowing reference grids they are useless. Note map making is now automated. With weather information for one day prior, actual day of and day after. Dirt trails described as one, one and a half, or two lane.

(Reference, PCP rule # 11 for information on avalanches. COE over all tips, characteristics of military operations in cold climates etc., and Appendix PCP rule # 13 for information on glaciers and Appendix MM&W for more information.)

Part C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:
AKA the call i.e. CAL.

A real working knowledge of maintenance, supplies and movement factors must be the basis of every leader’s plans. Only then can it be known how and when to take risk with these factors. Basically answers three questions. 1) The acquisition or procurement. 2) Storage and Maintenance 3) distribution or transportation of it all.

Principals; they are used to evaluate and monitor concepts and methods. 1) Unity of purpose – key words or phases, cooperative effort, integration of actions and ideas to produce a mutual understanding between R&D and users. Matching capabilities/resources/constraints with aspirations and requirements. With Guerilla warfare bandages, beans and bullets in that order. Combat values in order of importance are reliability, ease of use, mobility and destructive power. It is also important to understand that it is not worth planning on supplying (x amount of tanks with ammo when (x) number of tanks will not be available after (x) amount of time. More supplies dose not equal more fire power. Today extra fuel needed to move heavier equipment and more vehicles many of them, for transportation not combat. More ammo but better armor too. In cold maintenance takes more time. Note BS modern term Unity of effort. LOL.
Principals: 2) viability - able to exits. Staying power. Emphasize cost, economically sustainable. Distribution and protection ratio, always include safety margin. When push comes to shove more effort goes into producing new weapons not spares. 3) Resourcefulness, develop aptitude, innovation, imagination and ingenuity. Be proactive not reactive. Joke, when did Noah build the ark, before the rain. Simper Paratus (always prepared) make do with what you have. Indigenous supplies. Cannibalizing equipment, living off land. Isolation makes logistics very important. Example wilderness, no infrastructure and when operating on islands. Use of local materials to include the selective rubbling of structures in the defensive can reduce supply requirements.

Who, what, where, when, why, and how, might also be utilized here.
Categories, classification is not a fixed order, priorities of logistics must be base on type of unit, order of battle, mission and situation factors.


Part D) PATROL ORDER:
AKA i.e. referred to as the depot.

This is Information pertaining to patrols, you will always have alternates, even a complete alternative sheet.

CALL SIGN, SHACKLE SHEET:  this is a list of all information used in communicating i.e. call signs for mission success, failure, abort, medivac, all secure, friendly or foe WIA, KIA, MIA, and or POWs etc. there would be a section called a Shackle sheet for encoding of numbers. Morse code etc...
Here I would note that the radio frequencies should change with the different patrol and or Attack Phases mentioned below. Like your Vietnam fighter bomber pilots did with ingress and egress channels. This may sound silly from a modern stand point, with all the burst transmitting, scrambling scanner communications equipment. So let me suggest this, a unit could switch operators and swop frequencies with another unit in the same general area, that has also switched operators, thus voice signatures, habits, styles i.e. altering the “chop” etc. of the operator if you well, as a counter to pattern recognition software.  And of course both units would have switched to alternate Call sign Shackle sheet codes for units and commands etc.

SPECIFIC PATROL INFORMATION;
1) Unit information (UI) – your patrols call sign i.e. name used to refer to your unit. Frequency, channel or phone number.
2) Unit position (UP) – call sign, grid coordinates (Gs), could also be address. Feature of recognition (F.O.R.) some sort of land mark for others to find your location, or for you to use upon return. All F.O.R. need to be described and would need a call sign so to not give enemy listening to radio transitions clues as to the patrols local. Example, you would not want to out right mention the mountains “sattle back” formation or the (T) shaped building, if those were your F.O.R.
3) Time of departure (TOD) – time patrol is set to start. Use 24 hour and synchronize with all Marines within your patrol and all units involved.
4) Point of departure (POD) – call sign, Gs, F.O.R., description and call sign. Estimated time of arrival (ETA) that is when you should be there and prepared to leave.
5) Line of departure (LOD) – call sign, Gs, F.O.R., E.T.A., in this case E.T.A. is when you will arrive at line of departure. At which time contact with foe is not only possible it is likely.
6) Patrol routes (PR) - call signs, cardinal or azimuth direction, distance or time (CAD-T) to remain on course. F.O.R. and suggested formations. There are multiple routes and you need reminding that you are on track. There for you will have call signs and features (plural) of recognition. Usually F.O.R. indicates i.e. is fallowed by a change in formation. So unit is better situated for different terrain.
7) Check points (C points) – call signs, Gs, F.O.R., ETA. Check points are usually in the range of 1km in jungle terrain. They are intersections of patrol routes; normally indicate a change in course. You well check your location and orientation do a roll call, check weapons, equipment, make any adjustments to schedules at these points.
8) Rally points (RP) - call signs, Gs, F.O.R. rally points are locations Marines can regroup with one another if they are separated. There is a final rally point that is used for regrouping after your unit has gone though objective. Because you will often scatter and leave objective in all directions, so witnesses cannot make a guess as to your general direction of travel, and thus your next objective. This also gives each Marine a chance to spot any enemy scouts or reinforcements in or approaching the area. If you are spotted on your way to the final rally point, you should lead foe away. The Final rally point dose have an ETA because you will not won’t to wait around there very long. You also have a password or signal and an avenue or direction of approach, as well as approach time intervals. Example, at hour or half hour marks. A rule of thumb is one or two can brake all the rules, many not any. This keeps you from killing some poor exhausted delirious just trying to get there bastards. One or two troops are not going to take your position. Large units on the other hand have no excuse. You can also post a Reception unit (PPP projected protective party) out in direction of approach (like a door butler). This unit can also serve as a maneuver counter attack unit if Final rally point is attacked. Note in some circumstances (deep in enemy terrain with only one extraction point) it is safer for the entire unit to withdrawal from objective as a fighting column.

(Reference, COE rule # 16)

Types of Rally points Note most likely I well only be using these term or items as examples of what other units may be doing things.
Initial, En Route, and Objective

Initial rally point. An initial rally point is a place inside of friendly lines where a unit may assemble and reorganize if it makes enemy contact ...

En Route, These are points selected along the patrol’s route to the objective and form the objective back to friendly line/areas. The patrol leader selects them as the patrol passes through likely areas for which rally points are needed.

Objective rally points; this is the rally point nearest the objective at which the patrol reassembles after the mission is accomplished. It may be located short of, to a flank, or beyond the objective. This may also be used as the final preparation point.

Final preparation position

Release point from which units move into formations and positions for attack,
Can serve as objective rally point advantage is the staging i.e. equipment can be left behind.




9) Objective (the O) – call sign, Gs, F.O.R. for air operations, features that stand out from the ground may not make good landmarks from the air, especially at night. These are the sort of things you should be looking for: Coastline in distinctive stretches, especially with breaking surf or white sands, river mouths over 100 meters wide or sharp promontories or inlets. Bends in rivers more than 100 meters wide, heavily wooded banks will reduce their visibility. Canals, their straight course and consistent width make them easy to spot, except where the surrounding countryside follows a uniform pattern (urban areas). Lakes at least a half square mile in area with a distinctive shape or feature. Woods and forests a square mile or more in size, with clear-cut boundaries or some special identifying feature. Major road and highway intersections. Railways, especially visible when there is snow on the ground.
You well also note here a General plan of attack; who, what, where, when, why, how.

General phases of an attack;

One (1st ) the approach, Two (2nd ) contact, Three (3rd ) the assault and Four (4th ) consolidation, this is all very much like the aerial combat phases of Detection, Sorting, Targeting, Intercept, Engage and Separation. Note with today’s Satellites, near space assets and UAVs and the like, the Detection, Sorting and Targeting phases could be separate i.e. preplanned phases prior to Approach, with Approach equaling patrols SOP i.e. conduct of maneuvers and Intercept phase equaling Contact, Engage equaling Assault, Separation equaling Consolidate, note if engagement does not end favorably for your unit or if publics attention has been gotten, you could be leaving area, thus phase could be extraction.
Reference, Recall Patrol Order item number # 8.   

Phase one The Approach; ideally, at this point you are not under fire i.e. the foe dose not know your maneuvering on their position.

(Reference, Preparations and Conduct of patrols, all the rules and info of that section)

Your plan may include diversionary or decoy measures.

(Reference, Defense, rule # 5, Disguises, Decoys, Diversions)


Inserting into hostile territory: Air options, there are three, Airborne and two Airmobile variants.
Airborne; 1) Low altitude low opening (LALO) WWII, troops dropped form 1k’ they had only four to five seconds to choose between life and death. 2) High Altitude Low Opening (HALO). 3) High Altitude High Opening (HAHO). Breathing pure oxygen for 45 minutes before jumping to prepare for lack of oxygen at altitudes of 28k’-30k’. Then using self contained rigs, at 18k’-15k’ air content is good. Temperature -45 degrees. 20k’-30k’ jump, Note Breathing pure oxygen for preparations for mountain operations? Air mobile operations (AMO). This is actually landing the aircraft on the ground/L.Z.. There are two options. 1) Helicopters, for hot landing zones helicopters would be loaded with fewer Marines for quicker debarking. When Marines planning on repelling or jumping out of helicopters, they could drop Alice packs from altitude onto landing zone first (anti minefield).

The British MERT CH-47 flies faster, but it’s slower to start. And does better in high altitude and hot temp. the doctor with british MERT can do blood transfusions but not PJs.

This rotation of Pedros had done just under 400 missions in three months.  Similar crews in Iraq might do half a dozen missions in the same period.

That's why there's probably at least 40 or more Army birds compared to our nine or so.

On very dark nights, they sometimes fire IR (infrared) illumination that helps our NVG.


2) Fixed wing aircraft (powdered or gliders) can also land on LZs. Considerations, a) Do you have a Reception unit, to act as guides and porters, transport people and supplies to safe locations, provide security and 'sterilize' the site. (Commands/voices from below can be heard quite well by paratroopers). Reception units are assets to all insertions. But may not always be available. In some cases you will have to go in blind. b) Do adequate DZs or LZs exist? LZ chosen, with regard to time available, direction of the sun and wind. Aircraft won’t to land and take off into the wind. Release point or beginning of runways marked with arrow pointing in direction of desired approach, coinciding also with the wind and only visible from approach side. Wind speed indicated by additional flares in arrow stem after three, flare intervals 25 meters. One extra = 5-10 mph, 2=10-15 mph, 3= 15-25 mph, higher than 25 mph consider another day.


(Reference, Appendix patrol order part A, for info continuing from “another day”, up to point of “continuation of other considerations” below.
Continuation of other considerations  c) Cover and concealment in area. Dimensions of landing zone, azimuths and range of F.O.R. as well as obstacles are recorded and reported as if in center of landing zone and in clockwise manner. Paratroopers do not want to land in cultivated fields. It is difficult to conceal tracks. d) Fire power you can bring to bare and enemy air defenses. e) How good are the foe’s defenses, radars and air traffic control systems? f) Weather to land on or near, than maneuver troops to objective. Surprise can sometimes be achieved landing on site. Advantages of Gliders and helicopters, all Marines land together on objective, more rested for combat.

(Reference, Appendix patrol order part B for details on parachuting.)

Amphibious insertions: Consider many of the factors that affect airborne/airmobile insertions, available and types of coastlines. Best to land between high and low tides where sand is firmest and at night due to wind direction. Do you have kit to make sure sea water can't affect vital pieces of equipment?

Over Land operations: Infiltration overland can be the most secure way of all for insertion, especially if time is not all-important. DZs or LZs and especially amphibious insertions are unlikely to be right next door to objective and will probably end up as overland journeys anyways. Even in time of war, it is usually possible to gain access to the enemy's territory from a neighboring country along long unprotected boards.



Phase two Contact; at this point, your cover has been compromised; you may come under attack from foe’s indirect fires, CAS, and or small arms, thus you may utilize your own. Immediate actions may include smoke for screening and signal flares for other units to begin maneuvers or supportive measures. Note from TDG/MCA: the unit SOP used a white star cluster as a signal for “shift or lift fire” and a red star cluster for “emergency, I need help now.”

Over land operations, could also involve interring through customs, using, false identities and disguises. The success of this method depends on the quality of your cover and documentation. Fabrications and forgeries serve as evidence when real documents are not available. Do not travel to nation your foreign documents are issued from.
Price of documents; those issued from nation with most influence in area are the cheapest priced. The biggest advantage of this approach is that once you have gotten through the identity checks, searches and interrogation, you will be able to live quite openly in enemy territory. Customs questioning; reason for travel, how did you get money, how long will you stay, who well meet you, where are you going to stay, what will you be doing, how did you get passport. Residence; ground floors provide opportunity for digging trenches, tunnels. Always have document, equipment and weapons hides. Emergency exits/routes. Evacuation plans, know who will leave with documents, who will destroy what’s left. You should not chose perimeter apartments especially for meetings. Do not rent in immoral areas or near police fire or government buildings. Rent in newly developed areas, these neighbors do not know each other yet. Older neighborhoods have nosy old people. Rent under false names and appearance. One person should not rent two apts. in same area. Have cover stories for visitors. Entry signals, example a curtain placed a certain way, to indicate all clear. Avoid isolation from public, traffic at odd hours. Do not show up as blue collar worker at doctor’s apt. unless your cover is repairman. Other covers for contact, relatives visiting. Phone answering and or monitoring procedures. Upon arrival in new city head for laundry mat, read billboards.
Meetings debark transportation far from objective and walk to objectives, avoid main bus and transit stations. Traveling, do not arrive at night, fewer people around during day. To uncover a tail, drop something and observe who picks it up. Forcing tails to transit through “Chock points” thus giving you a time and place to closely observe or study them. Joke: mailing yourself a copy of the constitution so they may read it. Get on bus and off at next stop. Driving in then out i.e. threw parking lots. Switch cars in parking lots, long before closing. Then just before closing, call tow truck to hall used car onto street near lot. You should disable interior lights. Do not inter meeting location before person your to meet with dose. You could be target for him sitting there. If person you are meeting with leaves to go to bath room or to get something, wait for his return in another location, for instance you might go stand at bar. Depart meetings separately always know secondary exits, use side streets. No items or evidence to I.D. you should be left behind. Finger prints on drinking glasses, rap it with a napkin. Go to bathroom to write notes.

Phase three The Assault; at this point units are breaching the foes defenses i.e. kicking in the gates, you are inside the wire.

(Reference, Conduct of Engagements, basically all rules and info) 

Other points to consider; in defense, a unit doubles or triples its combat power. Three to one ratio applies not just to Infantry but equipment. Ratio varies with size of force, platoon level maybe 10-1, theater 1-1 or 1-2 because only small part of terrain is fought over at a time. Nevertheless, with larger ratio less time is required to win. Information good, terrain/weather good day raid. Information bad, terrain/weather bad night raid. The worst the weather, longer the battle, more fatigue, greater the casualties. Deep operations are actions against enemy forces not yet in contact with friendly. Prevent foe from massing, create opportunities for other offensive actions, disrupt C4IRS and supplies. Slows foe down. Airpower and artillery are main weapons used. Light infantry is particularly suitable in areas of constricted terrain, fighting in MOUT and conducting airborne/mobile operations. Airborne/mobile operations used to seize key objectives before they are destroyed. Medical buildings, malls, stadiums, schools, (take advantage of air conditioning and electrical systems in large buildings). Parks, sports fields, swimming pools, construction sites, lumber and steel mills or yards, maintenance gauges. When a large force is concentrated on a narrow front attempting to break lines, airborne/mobile units may bypass adversaries’ main defenses to destroy artillery, C4I and logistical targets and secure key terrain in foe’s stern.

Phase four Consolidation/ Exploitation phase; the British refer to the fourth phase as “fighting through” it includes mopping up and securing the area i.e. setting up in a defensive position in preparation for a counter attack. Primary rules to consider here are located in the section titled Defense, initially along the lines of Conduct of defense i.e. after enemy has been repelled, pursue foe with a steady stream of fire, (shoot them right in the back) find, attend too and report all causalities, inventory and redistribute ammo etc. see reference note below.
During lulls in the fight, the squad leader checks ammunition and has ammunition collected from the dead and wounded.
Fallowed by setting up the defense i.e. perform defensive rules # 3 onward.
Note with this last phase you can also consider the aerial i.e. dog fight last phase of Separation if you are conducting small i.e. unconventional tactics of hit and run. Or if engagement does not go favorably for your unit.
Note tactics in aerial combat such as making note of your exit routes i.e. friendly lines or direction of friendly units, rally points etc.

(Reference, Defense, all rule especially Conduct of Defense, COE overall tips; Organizing the Assault unit, Reorganization and True V formation)

Debriefs;

In training debriefs are always conducted. This is truly where the learning occurs. This should not change in combat. After every patrol, firefight, guard duty etc, a debrief should follow. This allows you to develop a “truth report” i.e. “after action report” to be file with highers. Debriefs allow us to recognize our mistakes or improve our strengths, were you have presence and what areas have been neglected.  You may see that you are using the same routes and crossings, which is setting you up for an IED. All this keeps Marines engaged and does not allow complacency to creep in. As the fighting goes on every Marine gains understanding of the enemy, how they fight and how your actions affect them. You should take minutes i.e. have someone record. Follow the same format to create an organized system that allows for thorough and efficient information flow. Apply my notes on studying, at the beginning of Tri-F. The debriefs should be divided between enemy and friendly topics. IMO first, discuss any firefight in detail, analyzing your actions and the enemy’s actions. IMO; details of any firefight should be discussed before anything else i.e. get the emotional event out of the way. Give updates to the KIA, WIA or MIA if possible, thus ease emotions. This event was not planned i.e. written down before the patrol. The rest of the patrols events were. Thus this gives everyone time to organize and work through their thoughts about the firefight and make and compare notes. You could use the I.SALUTE R.W.P. format to break down all of the details about the enemy and how they fought. Discuss you’re an the enemies phases of combat. Then discuss significant events like atmospherics, locals you interacted with, compounds searched, confirm the census data. Finally discuss the basics of the patrol in detail covering the items on the patrol order, look for ways to improve these based on current events.

(Reference, Study notes at the begaining of the Fragmented Fighting Facts)


10) Support, reserves and R.O.E. (Sup-er) – there would be a list including Units, equipment or weapons available fallowed by grid co ordinances designating, areas (i.e. boxes or squares) where units could provide support. Basically you only need to know, who to contact (call signs and frequencies etc are located on call sign shackle sheet) and how and where unit can help you. NOT THEIR LOCATIONS this is so if any foe gets hold of your units Patrol order, they do not have all other units’ locations. Joke; remember if your foreword of your phase line, artillery will be short on its target.

(Reference, Step # 2 Leadership guidelines, company cmdr)

R.O.E.; Rules of engagements, any specifics. Troops most remember the political and psychological impact of their actions. Local populations may be neutral or have luke warm feelings for the foreign forces. Excessive use of force can cause locals to support foe. In MOUT troops most be concerned with the media due to large number of journalist. Any negative images can be published. Be open to the press play them against each other if one dose a negative story invite competitor to do an investigative report of its own.

Note make future note of other mentions of media example under pro and anti guerrilla/insurgency operations. Note also these points would only apply with a guerrilla group since government and media are “in Bed with each other”.

82d Airborne Division Standing ROE

(Pocket Card) ARMED



ATTACK. Attack only hostile forces declared by your commander. If attacked, return fire with aimed fire. Return force with force necessary to repel hostile acts (from any source).
RISK. Assess risks/anticipate attack. Against other than declared hostile forces, use force first if, but only if, you see clear hostile intent.
MEASURE. Measure the amount of force that you use. Use only the force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission. Detain only forces/civilians specified by your commander.
ENGAGEMENT AUTHORITY. Prior authorization may be required to use certain weapons. Use weapons such as artillery, riot control agents, mines, etc., in accordance with your commander’s orders.
DEADLY FORCE. Use deadly force to protect persons/property designated by your commander. Stop short of deadly force when protecting other persons/property.



Maneuver vs. Attrition

Maneuver: Waged against leadership, kills fewer on both sides. Characterized by a clean battle field, smaller foot print, less equipment, weapons and fewer troops used. With fewer troops on front more need for auto entrenching equipment. Economy of force – Example; in the defense taking every third Marine off a wall to move elsewhere. More than mass multiplied by speed, it is getting there first with the best. Valor is superior to numbers. Being more agile and efficient. Smaller more maneuverable forces can win, if things over quickly. “One must adjust to fighting limited engagements by minimal means for specific goals”. The days of single purpose missions are over. Another words, while on your mission, you most have multiple objectives and capabilities to assist others with information etc. Requires skill and daring by offices and willingness form superiors to tolerate an occasional mistake or loss.
The "zero defects mentality" must be exchanged for an environment in which all Marines are afforded the "freedom to fail" and with it, the opportunity to succeed. Leaders will only seize the initiative Marines say if they’ve been delegated true operational authority. The battle field leader senses the trust and responsibility. On whole it will inspire leaders to do better. There will be some incompetence and even some Lieutenant Caleys, (The My Lai massacre.) But the forces will move faster then those lead by leaders taught to do only what there told. Success is gauged by POWs, it suggest foe has not been able to adapt to changing situation that friction has over whelmed, C4i has broken down.

(Reference, 3rd generation warfare notes below.)

Attrition: Gives the illusion of predictable and reliable results. It’s a toe-toe slug match in which each side assumes that the other will abide by predictable rules and that sheer weight of numbers and materiel well determine the winner. Its equivalents in sports are tug of war and demolition derbies, in nature sea wearing down the stones. Foe viewed as unchanging mass. It is war in the administration. In which the important decisions are in fact logistical. Foe treated as inventory of targets and warfare is a mater of mustering support and resources. Drawn out war can cause foe to be dishearten if expecting a quick end and return home. Success gauged by KIAs. “You can win a war with bombs and blockades, but only the infantry can end the war”. IMO basis for US strategy with indigenous personal being recruited for the later i.e. end game. Brezhnev joked that, “Quantity has a quality of its own”.


Generations of War
Many argue that the evolution of war is shaped by a many-sided battle of ideas (with technology in a supporting role). They assert our adversaries are learning to counter the conventional attrition doctrine of the technology and firepower intensive forces of industrial based armies. They call this new form of warfare 4th Generation Warfare to contrast it to warfare of the 1st Generation (tactics of line and column, e.g., Napoleon), the 2nd Generation (the industrial logistics/firepower intensive attrition tactics from Civil War through WWI), and the 3rd Generation (maneuver warfare as evolved out of the German's 1918 infiltration tactics to blitzkrieg to the mission tactics adopted by the Marine Corps in the 1980s).
The 4th Generationists assert that the end of the Cold War neutralized the organizing dynamics of the bi-polar cold war rivalry and thereby unleashed a welter of nationalist, ethnic, religious, tribal, and criminal conflicts among state and non-state actors. They say these players fight differently and we better learn to exploit their very different weaknesses while avoiding their strengths.

On our Wilderness Road expedition, my friend and I visited the site of Drapers Meadows (now part of the Virginia Tech campus, Blacksburg), where Shawnee Indians captured a few whites and slaughtered the rest of that settlement's inhabitants in 1755. That made me interested in the French and Indian War. I looked it up in an old set of "The New Book of Knowledge" and found this passage:

In 1755 General Braddock arrived from England to take charge of the British troops … (He) had never fought in North America, where the enemy hid behind trees, melted away in the darkness, and never stood still to be fired at. Braddock had learned his fighting tactics in Europe, where armies fought in regular formations. Though Washington and the Indians [friendly scouts] told him otherwise, Braddock simply could not believe that tactics used by the best armies of Europe would not work against a ragged French-Indian force. The result was a French massacre of the British forces at Fort Duquesne. Two thirds of the approximately 1,500 British who fought were killed or wounded. Braddock himself was killed.

SP 12/14/08 The MIC always lean towards preparing for a large, conventional type war. Even though most of American military history consists of irregular warfare. Conventional wars were few, and brief. During the 18th and 19th centuries, most American military activity, at least in terms of years, was all about irregular warfare. Fighting Indians and frontier disorder defined the careers of generations of American troops. Even the American Revolution was largely irregular warfare, and often decisive irregular operations at that. The first four decades of the 20th century was largely irregular warfare and peacekeeping for U.S. forces. After WWII, there was more still, including the decade long war in Vietnam. But through all this, the MIC leadership focused on conventional warfare, and deliberately ignored the valuable lessons learned in generations of irregular warfare. It was as if irregular warfare was considered an exception, and conventional warfare the only thing that mattered. Another problem with irregular warfare is that, when these conflicts come along, the military establishment, and their political counterparts, proceed as if it's still peacetime. The military, especially those closest to the fighting, adopt a wartime mentality of urgency and immediacy. This causes friction with the military bureaucracy, who don't like to be hustled unless there is a national emergency they can identify with.

To counter such threats, these thinkers argue, that we will need fast-transient, expeditionary forces skilled in littoral operations, SOPs, political military operations, counter-drug, counter-terrorist, and nuclear operations, police work, all taking place more often in high density urban/suburban areas.

Without changing our patterns of thought, we will not be able to solve the problems we created with our current patterns of thought.
Albert Einstein
While military development is generally a continuous evolutionary process, the modern era has witnessed three watersheds in which change has been dialectically qualitative. Consequently, modern military development comprises three distinct generations. Modern war began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which ended the Thirty Years War. Why? Because with that treaty, the state, which was itself relatively new, established a monopoly on war. After 1648, first in Europe and then world wide, war became something waged by states against other states, using state armies and navies (and later air forces).
1st GW lasted from the Peace of Westphalia until around the time of the American Civil War. Most of the things that define the difference between “military” and “civilian”; such as saluting, uniforms, ranks i.e. military culture of order. Battles were fought with smoothbore muskets using lines and column tactics. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill generated a high rate of fire, etc. — and partially in response to social conditions and ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in 1st GW did not exist as a concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon. Just as most state militaries are still designed to fight other state militaries, so they also continue to embody the 1st GW culture of order. The problem is that, starting around the middle of the 19th century, the order of the battlefield began to break down the old line and column tactics became suicidal i.e. increasingly contradictory to order. 

2nd GW developed by the French in WWI to re-establish order on the battlefield. 2nd GW preserved the military culture of order it focused inward on orders, rules, processes/tactics and procedures/regulations. There is a "school solution" for every problem. Battles are fought methodically, so prescribed methods drive training and education, where the goal is perfection of detail in execution. 2nd GW like the First, values obedience over initiative (initiative is feared because it disrupts synchronization) and relies on imposed self discipline. 2nd GW saw the formal recognition and adoption of the operational art, initially by the Prussian army. Again, both ideas and technology drove the change. The ideas sprang largely from Prussian studies of Napoleon's campaigns. Technological factors included Von Moltke's realization that modern tactical firepower mandated battles of encirclement and the desire to exploit the capabilities of the railway and the telegraph. While ideas played a role (particularly the idea of lateral dispersion), technology was the principal driver of change. Technology manifested itself both qualitatively, in such things as (barbed wire, rifled musket, breechloaders, the machineguns, heavier indirect fire artillery and bombing aircraft) and quantitatively, in the ability of an industrialized economy to fight a battle of materiel (Materialschlacht). 2nd GW aka firepower/attrition warfare tactics relied on centrally-controlled indirect artillery fire synchronized with infantry, cavalry and aviation. However tactics remained essentially linear. The defense still attempts to prevent all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups. 2nd GW tactics were summed up in the French maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. The US Army and the U.S.M.C. both learned 2nd GW from the French during the WWI, 2nd GW tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until the 1980s, and it largely remains the "American way of war" today.
3rd GW aka Maneuver Warfare, has its roots in the German Army in WWI i.e. spring offensive of 1918. The German Army's new tactics were the first non linear tactics, they also broke with the 1st and 2nd GW culture of order. Instead of trying to restore order the German’s used chaos by relying less on firepower than on speed and tempo. It sought to present the enemy with unexpected and dangerous situations faster than he could cope with them mentally or physically. 3rd GW militaries focus outward on the situation i.e. the enemy, and the result the situation requires. Leaders at every level are expected to get that result, regardless of orders. Decentralization and focusing on the enemy rather than terrain and valuing initiative higher than obedience are central characteristics of maneuver warfare. The driving force was primarily ideas. Mistakes are tolerated and self discipline, rather than imposed discipline, is encouraged. A well trained officer corps, educated in the spirit of the commander is another central requirement for maneuver warfare. The defense was in depth and instead of trying to hold a line it often invited penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack. The object was to draw the enemy in, then cut him off. On the offensive, with the German "storm-troop tactics" of 1918 the attack relied on infiltration to bypass i.e. flow like water around enemy strong points, reaching deep into the enemy's stern area and rolling his forward units up from the flanks and stern thus collapsed the enemy rather than seeking to close with and destroy them. These WWI infantry tactics, when used by armored and mechanized formations in WWII, became known as “Blitzkrieg.” When 2nd and 3rd GW met in the German campaign against France in 1940, the 2nd GW French Army was defeated completely and quickly; the campaign was over in six weeks. Both armies had similar technology, and the French actually had more (and better) tanks. Ideas, not weapons, dictated the outcome. The addition of tanks caused a major shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to time. This shift was explicitly recognized only recently in the work of retired Air Force Col John Boyd and his”

OODA (observation- orientation- decision- action) theory."

(Reference, Manuver Vs Attrition above.)

4th GW is not, like its predecessors, a new method of war. Rather the state monopoly on violence is being lost.

The root of the problem is a political, social i.e. moral revolution: a crisis of legitimacy of the state. All over the world, citizens of states are transferring their primary allegiance away from the state to other things: tribes, ethnic groups, religions, Corporations, gangs, ideologies. Many people who will no longer fight for their state will fight for their new primary loyalty. In Iraqi state armed forces showed little fight, but Iraqi guerrillas whose loyalties are to non state elements, fight. The decline of the state means there can be no purely military solution. This is especially the case when the military force is foreign; usually, its mere presence will further undermine the legitimacy of the state it is attempting to support.

We sometimes (misleadingly) call war against non state opponents "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW) or “Stability and Support Operations” (SASO).

Much of 4GW is simply war as it was fought before the rise of the state and the Peace of Westphalia. Societies knew little internal order or peace; Mercenaries were hired, bands of men with weapons, when not hired out for wars, simply took whatever they wanted. In fact, before Westphalia, business enterprises, clans, Ethnic groups, Families, gangs, tribes, races and Religions, waged wars. These wars were often many sided, and alliances shifted constantly. The lines between “civilian” and “military”, and between crime and war, were non existent. Tactics included, assassination, bribery, betrayal, treachery, even dynastic marriage.

4th GW will have no definable battlefields or fronts. Terms Front-stern will be replaced with targeted-untargeted. Lines between responsibility and mission well blur. The tactical and strategic levels will blend as the opponent's political infrastructure and civilian society become battlefield targets. In fact targets may be more in the civilian than the military sectors. It seems likely to be widely dispersed. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity but including knowledge. Major military and civilian Centers of gravity i.e. COG facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, large headquarters, seats of government, power plants, and manufacturing and other industrial sites will become rarities.

Technology; computer viruses, including latent viruses, well be used. Research in superconductivity suggests the possibility of storing and using large quantities of energy in very small packages. Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) may bring electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects without a nuclear blast. Permitting small teams to destroy targets they could not with conventional weapons i.e. it is possible that a fire team could have the same battlefield effect as a current brigade. Car bombs may contain a product of genetic engineering rather than high explosives?
Psychological operations may become the dominant operational and strategic weapon in the form of (Logic bombs) and media/information intervention i.e. manipulating the media to alter opinion. A major target will be the enemy population's support of its leadership. However its effectiveness could rapidly eliminate the ability of a nuclear-armed opponent to wage war conventionally. Destruction or disruption of vital industrial capacities, political infrastructure, and social fabric, coupled with sudden shifts in the balance of power and concomitant emotions, could easily lead to escalation to nuclear weapons. This risk may deter 4th GW among nuclear armed powers just as it deters major conventional warfare among them today. IMO only delay i.e. just like MAD has not kept us out of a shooting war, neither will the most sophisticated syops.

4th GW will merely accentuate and combined all this. 3rd (not to speak of 2nd  GW) militaries seem to have little capability against such synthesis. This could be a signpost of a typical generational shift.

Thus we see two major catalysts for change in previous generational shifts: technology and ideas. Technology was the primary driver of 2nd GW; ideas were the primary driver of the 3rd. An idea-based 4th GW is also conceivable.

For about the last 500 years, the West has defined warfare. For a military to be effective it generally had to follow Western models. Because the West's strength is technology, it may tend to conceive of 4th GW in technological terms. However 4th GW may emerge from non-Western cultures, such as Arab or Asiatic. Thus trailing in technology may lead them to develop 4th GW through ideas rather than technology.
The genesis of an idea-based 4th GW may be visible in terrorism. This is not to say that terrorism is 4th GW, but rather that elements of it may be signposts of 4th GW. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, and so far it has proven largely ineffective.

Terrorists resolve the order vs chaos by eliminating the culture of order. Terrorists do not have uniforms, drill, saluting or, for the most part, ranks. Being of broader culture and non-Western may facilitate this development.
Even in equipment, terrorism may point toward signs of a change in generations. Typically, an older generation requires much greater resources to achieve a given end than does its successor. Today, the US is spending $500 million apiece for stealth bombers. A terrorist stealth bomber is a car with a bomb in the trunk a car that looks like every other car.

Some "carryovers" from 3rd GW. The more successful terrorists appear to operate on broad mission orders that carry down to the level of the individuals. The 'battlefield" is highly dispersed and includes the whole of the enemy's society. The terrorist lives almost completely off the land and the enemy. Two additional carryovers may be useful "signposts" of 4th GW. The first is a component of collapsing the enemy from within. It is a shift in focus from the enemy's front to his stern. 1st GW focused tactically and operationally (when operational art was practiced) on the enemy's front and combat forces. 2GW remained frontal tactically, but at least in Prussian practice it focused operationally on the enemy's stern through the emphasis on encirclement. The 3GW shifted the tactical as well as the operational focus to the enemy's stern. Terrorism takes this one step further. It attempts to bypass the enemy's military entirely and strike directly at his homeland at civilian targets. The second signpost is the way terrorism seeks to use the enemy's strength against him, this "judo" concept begin in 2GW, with encirclement. The enemy's fortresses became fatal traps. It was pushed further in 3GW where, on the defensive, one side often let the other infiltrate so his own momentum makes him less able to turn and deal with a counterattack. Terrorists use a free society's freedom and openness, its greatest strengths, against it. They can move freely within the society while actively working to subvert it. They use democratic rights not only to infiltrate but also to defend themselves. If we are forced to set aside our legal system to deal with terrorists, the terrorists win.

Attacking the enemy's culture works from within as well as from without. It can bypass not only the enemy's military but the state itself. The US is already suffering heavily from such a cultural attack in the form of the drug traffic. Drugs directly attack our culture. They have the support of a powerful "fifth column," the drug buyers. They bypass the entire state apparatus despite our best efforts. Some ideological elements in South America see drugs as a weapon; they call them the "poor man's ICBM”. They prize the drug traffic not only for the money it brings in through which we finance the war against ourselves but also for the damage it does to the hated North Americans.

Our national security capabilities are designed to operate within a nation-state framework. Outside that framework, they have great difficulties. The drug war provides an example. Because the drug traffic has no nation-state base, it is very difficult to attack. The nation-state shields the drug lords but cannot control them. We cannot attack them without violating the sovereignty of a friendly nation. A 4GW attacker could well operate in a similar manner, as some terrorists already do. A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or religion. SP Syria hosted terrorists for two reasons. Most importantly, this provided the dictator with considerable immunity to terrorist attacks. Second, this close relationship with terrorists made it easy to hire the terrorists for some freelance murder. Dictators have a lot of enemies, and having some grateful (for the sanctuary) terrorists on call, is a good way to deal with people out to do you harm. IMO note the same basic reasons for the ISIs support for the Taliban in Pakistan.
Note however then there’s the theory that Saddam did not let so called Al queda in out of fear they would take over.


5th GW note Maj Mark W. Elfers Gazette June 2009,
The author states, “[O]ur next conflict could well be small, morally confusing, and idea centered, combining the worst ends of Saigon, Mogadishu, 11 September 2001, and Baghdad.” LtCol Coerr’s first point is that America’s (5GW) opponent may not have a center of gravity (COG). Secondly that the state will lose its position as the prime mover and redresser of grievance. Thirdly that success in 5GW is inversely proportional to the amount of military force used. The following are counterpoints to LtCol Coerr’s thesis.

When current irregular warfare opponents are broken down to their basic components, one finds highly organized international criminal organizations. They conspire to kill people and to destroy property in order to develop or to secure their own positions of power. They use religion because it polarizes the issues.

4th GW is guerilla warfare more than “terrorism.” Terrorism is a single enemy tactical action designed to have direct operational or strategic effect. Because targets that have such operational or strategic effect are few and are usually well-protected, terrorism normally plays a minor role in 4th GW conflicts.

Terrorism also appears to represent a solution to a problem that has been generated by previous generational changes but not really addressed by any of them.

Colonel David Hackworth in Vietnam, called this “out-guerilla’ing the guerilla,” or “out-g’ing the G.” In his memoirs, About Face, he wrote, we would no longer be the counterinsurgents who, like actors on a well-lit stage, gave all their secrets away to an unseen, silent and ever-watchful (insurgent) audience in a darkened theater. Instead we would approach the battlefield and the war as our enemy approached it, and in so doing begin to outguerilla the guerilla – “out-G the G”. The basic concepts, men, not helicopters or mechanical gimmicks, won battles, and that the only way to defeat the present enemy in the present war at a low cost in friendly casualties was through adopting the enemy’s own tactics, i.e., cunning, deception, surprise, mobility . . . imagination, and familiarity with the terrain . . . In training Field training should be freeplay exercises against guerilla opponents who are allowed to make full use of such typical guerilla tools as mines, booby traps and infiltration of their enemy’s stern areas.

SP  In order to minimize civilian casualties, the air force relied more on over a thousand guided missiles (Hellfires and TOWs) fired from helicopters.
Israel only has 46 AH-64s, but several hundred F-16s that can drop smart bombs. So any operations in southern Lebanon would involve lots more smart bombs. Moreover, Gaza is much more densely populated than southern Lebanon, making it safer to use smart bombs.

4th GW Irregulars do enjoy some important advantages over conventional forces. They can avoid stronger but more heavily equipped opponents by using concealment and dispersal (often within the civil population). They can solicit popular support or, if unsuccessful, compel popular submission. They can be difficult to target, especially with air power and artillery. They can fight an endless war of mines and ambushes.
Light (or Jaeger) infantry is the best counter to irregulars because it offers three critical capabilities. First, a “man to man” fight avoids the “Goliath” image. If the light infantry does not pack to heavily with arms and equipment, it can enjoy the same mobility as the irregulars (enhanced, as necessary by helicopters or motor vehicles). Second, LI can be far more discriminating than other combat arms and avoid collateral damage. Third, LI can show the local population a “human face.” They can be courteous and even apologize for their mistakes. They can protect the local people from retaliation and train defense force.

Current Marine infantry is “light” only in the sense that it does not have its own medium or heavy armored vehicles. However, it has a superabundance of everything else. In the field, our “light” infantrymen routinely carry more than 50 kilograms of body armor, weapons, ammunition, radios, field equipment, etc. They must depend heavily on motor vehicles. These vehicles, in turn, tie them to roads and open terrain, expose them to mines and ambush and diminish their ability to operate in urban terrain. Reducing our motor vehicle dependence requires hard choices, including a reduction in the number and size of crew-served weapons. Although modest
firepower levels are enough to defeat most 4GW foes, we still arm our “light” infantry as if for conventional combat against heavily armed opponents who fight as we do. Light infantry tactics are above all hunting or stalking tactics. They must rely heavily on stealth, invisibility and trickery. To real light infantry, ambush is a mentality, not merely a technique.
A good LI defensive position is one that surprises the enemy from a short distance but, at the same time, enables the defender to move fast and under cover to a new position, unknown to the enemy.
In 4th GW most light infantry combat will occur at the company level or below.

Cash (buying goods) avoids illegitimate actions, but also creates a dependency of locals on friendly forces that will encourage the support from the population that LI requires for its operations to be successful.

Light infantry should be able to "live off the land" for prolonged periods and in almost any part of the world. It should be trained and equipped to use cash to draw on the local infrastructure for most of its needs. This type of true light infantry, or Jaegers, is very different from what Marines now know as light infantry.

Three levels
The three classical levels of war strategic, operational and tactical still exist in 4th GW.

Colonel John Boyd' s definition of grand strategy, the highest level of war; as the art of connecting yourself to as many other independent power centers (i.e. COG) as possible while isolating your enemies from theirs. A 4th GW conflict will usually have many different COG not only at strategic levels but tactical levels too. The game of connection and isolation will be central to tactics and operational art as well as to strategy and grand strategy. It will be important to ensure that what you are doing at the tactical level does not alienate independent COG you need to connect with at the operational or strategic levels present or future.

One important change is that while in the first three generations, strategy was the province of generals, 4th GW gives us the "strategic corporal." Especially when video cameras are rolling, a single enlisted Marine may take an action that has strategic effect. Another change is that all three levels may be local. A unit must harmonize its AOR i.e. local tactical actions with strategic goals i.e. both must be pursued consistently. (When assigning AOR it is important that its boundaries reflect real local boundaries, such as those between tribes and clans, and not be arbitrary lines drawn on a map at some higher headquarters.)


Because operational art is the art of focusing tactical actions on enemy strategic COG, operational art becomes difficult or even impossible in 4th GW were opponents' strategic COG are intangible. This was the essence of the Soviet failure in Afghanistan. The Soviets focused on operational art, they could not operationalize a conflict where the enemy's strategic COG was God. The Soviets were reduced to fighting at the tactical level only. IMO this operational art is all filibuster crap. I have noted it just to be aware of the definition when others start talking about it. As far as operationalizing God as a COG it’s “separation of Church and State”.


Colonel Boyd also identified three levels of any conflict; they were the physical, mental and the moral.
Boyd argued the physical is the least powerful, the moral level is the most powerful and the mental level lies between the other two. IMO the physical would include killing people, breaking things, kinetics etc. Moreover, I agree it would be the weakest of all. However with me the mental would include morals i.e. values and motivations, as well as I.Q. over all technological aspects etc. Further more even Lawrence of Arabia’s strategy on guerrilla warfare with its three elements 1) Algebraically 2) Biological 3) Psychological, could also be considered as a sub brake down of the Mental level, even the biological seeing how genetics plays such a row in our thinking. Psychological could drift off into the spiritual if you have the time or care.
 
Physical examples;

Mental examples;

Moral examples; the contradiction between the physical and moral levels is similar to the contradiction between the tactical and strategic levels, but the two are not identical. The physical and moral levels play at the tactical and strategic levels. Any disharmony among levels creates openings which opponents can exploit. Of course, we can also exploit our opponents' disharmonies. For example, lets say one opponent is a religious group. In a town where we have a presence, a local feud results in the killing of a clergyman by members of the same group. In itself, this is a minor tactical event. But if we use information warfare to focus the public's attention on it, pointing out how the tenets of the religion are not being observed by those who claim to speak for it, we might create a “moral bomb.” A physical action would play on the moral level, just as a tactical action would play on a strategic level.

A central dilemma of 4th GW: what works for you on the physical (and sometimes mental) level often works against you at the moral level. It is therefore very easy in 4th GW to win all tactical engagements yet lose the war. The basic problem remains the same: all actions, even the smallest, must be considered with great care and from a variety of perspectives lest they have unintended consequences on other (and possibly higher) levels. Note IMO this could bring about a paralyzing quick sand dead end attitude i.e. all the enlisted need to be taught is to “not do on to others as you would not wont done to you”. Using all the above winded theory as an example etc. otherwise your asking for the professional Warfighter to be a psychiatrist with a gun on nothing but a crash course.

Note keep in mind my preferred brake down however the fallowing notes continue more or less down the lines of Colonel Boyd’s views i.e. system.

Also, phase order of effects i.e. first, second or third. IMO first meaning direct effect on those concerned. Second, order a side effects. Third might be historical or traditional.

4th GW forces are free of the 1st GW culture of order; they focus outward, prize initiative and they are highly decentralized, rely on self discipline. 4th GW fighters are very good at making themselves untargetable.
Unlike state armed forces, most 4th GW entities cannot simply order their men to fight. Most 4th GW forces are, in effect, militias and throughout history, motivating them to fight has been a major challenge. We must ensure that we do not solve that problem for opponents. We emphasize the strategic level here in part because errors at the strategic level cannot be undone by successes at the tactical level (that is the primary lesson from Germany's defeats in both World Wars), and states often violate this rule in 4th GW.

In 4th GW less is more. First objective keep "footprint" as small as possible. Important to minimize the contradiction between the physical and moral levels.
The smaller foot print, the fewer negative effects our presence will have at the moral level. This is true not only for us but for the state we are attempting to buttress.

If the situation is such that Marines' presence must be obvious, that is, we cannot limit it in extent i.e. in situations where Marines do invade.
Another way to minimize our footprint is to limit its duration i.e. conducting expeditions, or raids.

An easy victory on the battle field brings with it a serious danger. Our victory can easily destroy the enemy state itself, not merely bring about "regime change.” If this happens, it may prove impossible to re create a state. As it is easy to loss by winning. Therefore, we must learn how to preserve enemy states at the same time that we defeat them. The key to preserve its armed forces. Here, the revival of an 18th century practice may be helpful: rendering the opposing armed forces the "honors of war." Instead of humiliating them, destroying them physically or, after our victory, disbanding them, we should do them no more damage than the situation requires. Prisoners should be treated with respect. If they are senior officers, they should be treated as "honored guests," invited to dine with our generals, given the best available quarters etc. we should praise how well they fought, give them respect in public. Throughout the conflict, all our actions should be guided by the goal of enabling and encouraging the armed forces we are fighting to work with us. The same is true for civil servants of the enemy state. It is critical that the state bureaucracy continue to function. We must be careful not to leave any segments of the enemy's society unrepresented in a new government. And, that government should be headed by local figures, not by someone from another country.

If all else fails, occupations should be by joint forces.
This is the least desirable option, because as foreign occupiers, we are at a severe disadvantage at the moral/legitimacy level.

“Joint” no longer means Army-Navy-Air Force and Marine Corp cooperation. Joint full spectrum goals for a region, area and community and they have sub goals by region and time leading to the overall goal. Marines must work hand-in-hand with organizations such as State Department, Aid organizations, NGOs etc. At the most powerful level of war, the moral level, the key to victory is to convince the local people to identify with us, or at least to acquiesce to us, rather than identifying with our enemies. Because we are foreign invaders representing a different culture (and sometimes a different religion), this is a difficult challenge.

Meeting this challenge will depend to a significant degree not on what we do, but on what we do not do. We cannot insult and brutalize the local population and simultaneously convince them to identify with us. We cannot represent a threat to their historic culture, religion or way of life. We cannot come across as Goliath, because no one identifies with Goliath. Nor do people identify with Paris, the Trojan champion in the Iliad, who fought from a distance (he was an archer) and was therefore a coward. This does not mean we should be weak, or project an image of weakness. That is also fatal, because in most other cultures, men do not identify with the weak. History is seldom determined by majorities. It is determined by minorities who are willing to fight.

In most 4th GW situations, the critical “constituency” we must convince to identify with or acquiesce to us is young men and women of fighting age. To them, we must appear to be strong without offering a challenge to fight that honor requires them to accept. They may identify with an outsider who is strong. They will fight any outsider who humiliates them. In terms of ordinary, day-to-day actions, there is a Golden Rule for winning at the moral level, and it is this: Don’t do on to others as you would not won’t done to you. This Golden Rule has a corollary: when you make a mistake and hurt or kill someone you shouldn’t or damage or destroy something you shouldn’t – and you will – apologize and pay up, fast. Repair and rebuild, quickly, if you can, but never promise to repair or rebuild and then not follow through. This brings us to the bottom line for winning at the moral level: your words and your actions must be consistent.

Another dilemma of 4th GW: What succeeds on the tactical level can easily be counter productive at the strategic level. Example, using overwhelming firepower at the tactical level, Marines may intimidate the local population into fearing and leaving them alone. But fear and hate are closely related, and hating us works toward our strategic defeat.
In 4th GW, the weak often have more power than the strong. One of the first to employ the power of weakness was Mahatma Gandhi. His insistence on non-violent tactics. Once the British responded to Indian independence gatherings and rallies with violence, they immediately lost the moral war. In most situations, our best hope of winning lies not in escalation but in de-escalation. Marines are taught to escalate. Cops don’t do that, because it enrages the community. With the David and Goliath story, most root for David. "One of our first rules is proportionality. A disproportionate response makes us look like cowards."

We must understand that, despite/in spite of, our vast tactical and technical superiority, at the strategic level we are weaker. The reason is simple: at some point we will go home, while our opponents will remain. That fact overwhelms all others, every local ask himself, “What will my situation be when the Marines leave?” If we fracture the local society to the point where order is unlikely after we depart, anyone who has worked with us will then be in danger.
Our strategic objectives must be realistic. Seldom if ever will we be able to re make other societies and cultures. Nor can we make ourselves loved by countries we invade; keeping them from hating us so much that they want to fight us will often be the best we can do. In insurgencies, "51% solutions" are acceptable. Remember, 4th GW is easy to lose and very challenging to win. In most 4th GW, state armed forces end up defeating themselves.

Accuracy of the Observation and Orientation is more important than speed. As in 3rd GW the tactical level in 4th GW conflicts is reconnaissance driven, not intelligence driven; the information Marines need will almost always come from below, not from higher headquarters.

No Fort Apaches. We'll live in the towns. We will billet with the people, paying them well for the quarters we occupy. We'll shop in the local markets, drink coffee in the local cafes. We protect the shopkeepers, but they also protect us. They don't want their shops blown up. Let captains, lieutenants and sergeants work their areas the way they see fit, blending in as much as possible.
“With that kind of dispersion, requires trust in command, not control. I give my subordinates mission orders. They know the result I want. Works like German operational philosophy based upon a common outlook and freedom-of-action, and realized through their concepts of mission and schwerpunkt, emphasized implicit over explicit communication.
Which suggests
The secret of the German Command and Control System lies in what’s unstated or not communicated to one another in order to exploit lower-level initiative yet realize higher-level intent, thereby diminish friction and reduce time, hence gain both quickness and security.
Result
The Germans were able to repeatedly operate inside their adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops.

Least we forget; in general, techniques have no place in a doctrinal manual because techniques should never be doctrine. Defining techniques as doctrine is a mark of a Second Generation military. In the Third and Fourth Generations, techniques are entirely at the discretion of whoever, regardless of rank, has to get a result. He is responsible only for getting the result, never for employing a set method. That is doctrine! 3rd GW militaries also recognize that any technique usually has a short "shelf life" in combat. As soon as the enemy comes to expect it, he turns it against you. This, in turn, means that the ability to invent new techniques is highly important. Units that develop a successful new technique should communicate their discovery laterally to other Marine units. 4th GW makes this all the more important, because 4th GW opponents will often use techniques very different from our own. Their "way of war" will reflect their culture, not ours.

"chivalric code" that sets rules both sides will follow. Some (not all) entities have self images that make honor, generosity, and lineage tracing to "knightly" forebears important to them. Just as chivalry was important before the state, it may again become important after the state. Where these attributes are present, it may be to our advantage (especially on the moral level) to propose a "chivalric code." The specifics of such a code would vary place to place. Regardless of the specifics, such codes will generally work to our advantage. They will diminish our "Goliath" image, demonstrate that we respect the local people and their culture, and generally help de-escalate the conflict. They will also assist in improving public order, which in turn helps in preserving or re creating a local state. IMO one problem with allowing people to be who they are is Religion is easy and people travel the path of least resistance, so the “Book Thumpers” will take over.
Disadvantages such codes may bring to us at the physical level will generally be more than compensated by advantages at the mental and moral levels.

"From day one, our message to the people was, 'We're not here to take over. You are in charge. You tell us what to do that will help you.' We helped them bring in NGOs to set up clinics and distribute food. We put our troops to work with local engineers and technicians to improve the infrastructure. “What we needed weren’t grunts. We need plumbers, carpenters, electricians, masons and construction material. Engineers, doctors, city planners, lawyers or professionals. The skills of each Marine should be identified at the battalion level.
Reservists and National Guardsmen may be better suited to 4th GW situations than many regulars. They are, on average, older and better educated than Active Units. Most are skilled in trades other than warfighting. Police officers and prison guards are often found in Reserve and National Guard units. The police officer who has walked a beat in any major American city has dealt with gang warfare, illicit drug dealing, gun running and other criminal enterprises. 4th GW war does not look much different than the streets of an American ghetto. The level of violence may be more extreme, but many police who serve on SWAT teams in major cities have dealt with more violence in a month than most Marines do in a year.

On security, we let the mayor and the local police set policy. We captured over 1000 insurgents. We released all locals; we did keep them with us for a while to show them that we treat people with respect and are trying to help. They get to know the Marines, who treat POW as guests. Only if we capture someone a second time or if they are not locals do we forward them to division.
They like us want order too, only they know a lot better than we do how to get it in their society." "We understand that real psyops are not what we say but what we do, and God help us if the two are different. The people well understand that we are not there to change the way they live, or to make them live by our rules. Put up signs in all our buildings, in Arabic and in English that say, 'When in Afghanistan, do as the Afghans do.' We go out of our way to make it clear that we do not see our way of life as superior to theirs. We are not somehow 'better' than they are. In cultures like this one, honor and pride are very important. If we seem to lord it over them, they have to fight us because their honor demands it."

American-style “Force Protection” is highly disadvantageous, because it seeks security by isolating marines from the surrounding population. Effectiveness demands the opposite: integration with the local populace. The reason is that just as Marines protect the local people, so the local people will protect them. Perhaps the best example of this symbiotic protection is the traditional British “bobby.” The bobby was, until recently, unarmed. The reason he did not need a weapon was that just as he protected the neighborhood, the neighborhood protected him. The bobby had a regular beat, which he patrolled on foot. He came to know every house and its inhabitants, and they came to know him. Just as his familiarity with his beat enabled him to see very quickly if anything was out of the ordinary, so the fact that the local people knew him as an individual meant they told him what he needed to know. Marines will not be able to go about unarmed in most situations. By buying bread, fruit or construction materials locally, Marines’ presence also contributes to the local economy. To be effective, they must reside in the same neighborhood or village for some time. Results usually come slowly. In Vietnam Marines had the CAP program i.e. integration with the local population. Highly effective By all accounts. Again, Marine commanders should attempt to learn from such past successes as the CAP program and not have to “reinvent the wheel” in each new conflict.

Develop a mental "switch." When the switch is set for combat with state armed forces, Marines must want to fight. When instead it is set for 4th GW situations, Marines must be equally keen not to fight. The second involves risks, as does the first. But the second is just as important as the first, because not wanting to fight is as important to victory in 4th GW as wanting to fight is in the 3rd. The key, as elsewhere, is the Marines' well known self discipline.

One part of "not wanting to fight" may require taking more casualties than you inflict. It is more important not to kill the wrong people than it is to kill armed opponents. Anytime an innocent person is wounded or killed, his family and clan members are likely to be required by the local culture to take revenge. This means when Marines are under fire, they must discipline themselves to return fire only when they are certain they are firing on armed enemies. If Marines are fired on in a situation where it is not clear who is firing and the Marines are intermixed with the civilian population, the best solution may be to withdraw. We need not “win” every firefight by leaving behind a pile of dead local people. Finally, despite a policy of de-escalation, there will be some situations where Marines do need to escalate. When that happens, we again stress that it must be over fast. Once the escalation terminates, Marines must make every effort to demonstrate that de-escalation remains Marine Corps policy.

Graffiti in Iraq "Now the real war starts." American tanks had ripped up some roads, crushed sewers and water pipes and even knocked down a few buildings.
Don’t go in with M-1s and Bradleys. Just HMMWVs and trucks. Ditch the helmets, armor and sunglasses. They make you look like Robocop. US troops in their helmets, armor and sunglasses, they looked like jinn, not men.

We treat their wounded just like our own. We sent them on helos to US run hospitals, not the crummy local ones. We transported their families to the hospitals to see them, and when they were well enough we took them back to their homes. We also gave money to the families that had lost wage earners." "Moslems bury their dead immediately, and I and my men went to all the funerals. Then I had memorial services for my two KIA and invited the townspeople. Many came, including three imams who offered prayers. That had a huge impact locally. I then asked the imams if they and their colleagues would give classes on Islam to me and my troops. "Sir, my other two wounded happened like this”. A couple kids with AK 47s jumped a patrols. They couldn’t really shoot, it was just pray and spray. Despite two men down, my guys did not shoot the kids. My patrol leader charged them and they dropped their weapons and ran. When he caught them, he brought them back to the ambush site, pulled their pants down and spanked them. The crowd loved it, and the kids were humiliated in front of their buddies instead of being heroes. Both of my guys have since returned to duty and the kids' parents have apologized to us.

If we have to take out an evil doer, the preferred option is to take out a contract on them. Locals do the dirty work, (American fingerprints.) There may be situations where escalation on the tactical level is necessary to obtain de-escalation on the operational and strategic levels i.e. if there is an insurgent cell that is too tough for locals to handle, we send in our Nighthunters, our equivalent to Delta Force. They specialize in being invisible. Local citizens never see them or deal with them. That enables us to keep the locals from seeing the average American as a threat. We try not to kill, make use of CS gas etc. if we do kill someone we pay blood money to his tribe.
"Of course, there are situations where we do want bloodshed. We constantly try to identify factional divisions among the insurgents. When we find one, we try to escalate it, to ramp up friction within the other side. We use (whispering campaigns) i.e. lies and deceptions to sway one faction to whack another, then we find discreet ways to help them do that. We do it in such a way that they all start blaming each other. Often, the insurgents do our most difficult jobs for us, killing their own leaders out of fear of being stabbed in the back. Also known as the "Mafia Model." How would the mafia do an occupation? One key to a mafia’s success is the concealed use of force as well as money as weapons. If an individual needs to be “whacked,” then it is usually done with little fanfare and in the shadows. The rule is, “No fingerprints.” Unless there is a specific message to be sent out to a larger audience, people who are killed by the Mafia are almost never found. This usually requires patience. It often takes a long time for the right situation to present itself. If there is a message to be made to a larger audience, then a public display of violence is used. But this is usually avoided, as it can backfire against the aims and goals of the organization due to public opinion. The mafia also operates on the principle that “everybody gets his cut.” If you are willing to work with the mafia, you get part of the profits. The rewards should grow as the “business” expands, that is, as Marines get closer to achieving their objectives. This is also important for leaving a stable situation behind.
What artillery and air power are in 3rd GW, cash is in the 4th GW: you’re most useful supporting arm. Local Marine commanders must have a bottomless “slush fund” of cash to use at their discretion. Obviously, this cash cannot be subject to normal accounting procedures; most will, necessarily and properly, be used for bribes. Just as a commander needs to have a plan for how to use artillery and air power, he will now need a plan for employing his cash. If our most important supporting arm is cash, we cannot just throw it around.

That is why in Northern Ireland, British troops are not allowed to return fire unless they are actually taking casualties. The Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that they have taken more casualties than they have inflicted.

Clausewitz, writing on war between states, said that "War is the extension of politics by other means." In 4th GW, the opposite is more likely to be true: politics can be a useful extension of war, one that gives us power but also is consistent with de-escalation. Nowhere more than in a post-state situations is the old saying "All politics is local" truer. When the state vanishes, everything becomes local. By understanding and leveraging local political balances, we may be able to attain many objectives without fighting.
A useful model here is the old British Northwest Frontier Agent. The Northwest Frontier was the lawless tribal area between British India and Afghanistan. In this area, the British government was represented by Frontier Agents. These were Englishmen, but they were also men who had lived in the area for a long time and knew the local players and politics well. Their actual power was small some cash and usually a company of Sepoys, Indian troops. But that small power was often enough to tilt the local political and military balance for or against a local chieftain. The local leaders were aware of this, and they usually found it worth their while to maintain good relations with the British so as to keep them on their side, or at least not actively intervening against them. Here again, the key is good local intelligence, especially political intelligence. By integrating with the local population, Marines can learn what the local political divisions and alignments are so that they can play on them. Just as with the Northwest Frontier Agents, Marines can leverage relationships to achieve their ends while avoiding fighting.

(Reference, Def. Rule # 7, 4th Generation warfare) 

Pro guerrilla / insurgency operations

Trans-national guerillas referred to as the great equalizer. Guerrilla warfare is for the morally strong and materially weak.

It is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge. Expansion phase volunteers trained as agitators (to stir up) and propagandists are sent out to enlist popular support. A process that is clandestine, methodical and progressive. May last for years.

(Reference, Planning summery Execution at the beginning of Fragment fighting facts)
Disassociates the population with government. They outline shared goals for guerrillas and population. The nation’s character/population must be favorable to the measures, motivations and cause. In early phases struggle must be purely defensive the guerrilla/volunteer most concentrate on his district. The threats of war most embrace a considerable extent of the nation. The war must first be carried out in the heart of the nation’s cities. The nation most be of broken and difficult nature, mountains, forest, marsh or dessert. Not easy for regulars to cut off support. Large areas of land between guerrillas and regulars laid waste by flood or fire (marsh or desert) so regulars will have to cross it. If regulars persist on staying there he will suffer in waist land. Ex; Anbar province in Iraq. Guerrillas should be concerned with the entire area that separates regulars from there bases. The war can not be decided by a single catastrophe. Vanity, the guerrilla who suffers from this is blinded by successes he winds up organizing action that he considers decisive and commits all resources. Stretching forces and influences to thin. Precipitous actions, leader loses patients suffers an attack of nerves. Dose not wait for everything to come together i.e. tries to solve problems by forcing actions. Prolonged operations are to be avoided hence preferred tactics to strategies. This means on a cell level not fighting to long for one thing. Be opportunist, attack everything and defend nothing. To gain terrain is no cause for joy, to lose it no cause for sorrow. Using death and destruction to spread panic far beyond points of physical impact. Targets are carefully picked to transmit psychological messages that shape public opinions and behavior. Design attack to take place where it will not bring with it an obvious or clear cut choice of response (Guerrillas often drive into town fire rockets thin leave). Targeting variety of victims at random times and places reduces the value of early warning. Novelty and surprises throw an enemy into consternation (dismay and confusion), but common incidents have a diminishing effect. The aim is to make security appear impotent and concessions seem preferable to chaos.

(Reference, Step # 2, leadership guidelines, Platoon cmdr, “there is a limit”)
 Organization; cellular structure is used at village and district level. Province or regional structure might be more like traditional government. Run companies for arms and equipment manufacturing. Stirring committee cells similar to Apache war parties, assume many sizes they generally start with a multi purpose nucleus, leadership or Command element/cell, Combat or Assault element/cell and Support or Logistics element/cell. Cells seldom exceed 10 members. Some stagnate others under the supervision of highly skilled handlers mature as multi faceted syndicates with numerous off shoots. Movement grows by adding cells instead of expanding elements. Keeping cells small helps to simplify internal control and prevent compromise (compromise is exposure of covert operations, plans or members). Intermediaries aka cutouts normally separate chiefs from Indians and cells from each other. So that captured members furnish few leads. During any interactions/contact i.e. meetings, ideally all cutouts conceal there true I.D. At worst the cutout knows his or her one contact. Blind drop covert delivery of message with out contact between cutouts i.e. hiding messages under rocks etc. Compartmentalization/cell system based on need to know bases. Cells subdivide support tasks and perform them step by step in series. One element/cell might make purchases, than a second manufactures components, third completes assembly and fourth distributes. Fifth uses product. Publish papers in same way.

The shadow governors appointed by the Taliban in every province were reshuffled to break up emerging bureaucratic fiefdoms and re-energize the movement.

Size of Counterinsurgency Units Do not form large units it diminishes one of the principle strengths of an insurgency; namely, dispersal into small and more mobile targets.
Know the enemy’s tactics and routines; strict adherence to doctrine or even repetition of innovative tactics is a common characteristic of conventional forces. Insurgent forces can exploit this weakness. Such knowledge can provide advance warning of COIN forces intentions.

Open resistance flared so quickly that only two months after the Soviet invasion, (on the night of 23 February 1980) almost the entire population of Kabul climbed on their rooftops and chanted with one voice "God is Great".

In CIS young men, from well off families, in major cities are drafted much less often (less than 20 percent as often) as those from rural areas. The urban kids either have the money (several thousand dollars will get you listed as unfit for service) or the connections (to get it done for a favor). It's easier to just "disappear" in the city, while in rural areas, everybody knows your name. Moreover, the rural guys have higher unemployment to deal with, so a year or so in the military is seen as a rational economic choice. Moreover, more of the rural population is more patriotic, and see military service as, well, service. But it's no secret that the urban kids are avoiding their service, and contributing to the corruption everyone complains about. 


Anti guerrilla / insurgence operations

Regulars in small wars must frequently adopt retrograde movements but these must be very deliberate as they always encourage the guerrilla. Squares and other defensive works are far more important then in regular warfare. Professional police work helps but informants are scares. Attempts to penetrate small hyperaware cells is a time consuming perilous occupation. Pay offs are limited unless plants are in C4I. Intimate relationships with local populations are to be avoided due to spies. Must not show favoritism to anyone either. Lawrence of Arabia’s strategy had three elements 1) Algebraically 2) Biological 3) Psychological. Over all goals, persuades population to cooperate with government. Militarily anti guerilla operations seldom succeed, unless a direct offensive roots out the infrastructure, separates local underground i.e. black market and the like from guerrillas and stops outside assistance. Kill the head, hearts and minds fallow, the separation of fish (Guerrillas) from the supporting sea (the people). As Mao once put it, mass deprivation of the agrarian infrastructure. Because the ability to furnish or deny food provides a useful lever.

Regimes which permit freedom of oral and written expression keep finger on the pulse of public. By allowing disgruntled citizens to air grievances, try to manage rather than resist change. Rally loyal factions leaving malcontents/Guerrillas with out support.

Two approaches to the press; defensive or offensive. In defensive, the objective is to minimize bad press by controlling the flow of news. This was typical of how militaries approached the press in 2nd and 3rd GW. The offensive approach seeks to use the press more than to control it, though some control measures may still be in place. Media is important at the mental i.e. moral level. In turn, the key to an offensive press strategy is openness. Few members of the press or media such as the internet will allow themselves to be so controlled as to present only the good news about Marines’ activities. Unless Marines are open about mistakes and failures, the press will devote most of their effort to ferreting them out. Worse, Marines will lack credibility when they have real good news to present. Paradoxically, openness is the key to controlling negative information when necessary. Sometimes, openness builds such a cooperative relationship with the media that they become part of your team and don’t want to report something that will really hurt you. At other times, you can expend the credibility you have built through a general policy of openness to deceive when deception is absolutely necessary. Just remember that when you do so, you may be using your only silver bullet. IMO the US mastered these techniques long ago i.e. the so called news is propaganda. And let’s not forget the Governments use of spokes/spooks persons. No freedom of speech in the ranks.

Promote understanding and contacts between artist, clergy, elites, journalists, labor leaders, military, political, teachers and students, with academic and cultural exchanges. Such as lectures, seminars, symposia, student exchange programs. The best way to deal with guerrillas is to preempt them through economical development and social reform. EX; Iraqi local tribes paid to protect pipelines. Clans providing security for convoys going through FATA. 

Deterrence that eliminates causes instead of symptoms is particularly illusive. Political economic and social reforms which deflate genuine grievances help eradicate guerrillas by convincing a populist majority that government programs are preferred to the guerrilla’s promises. Reforms that reapportion influence and provide equal opportunity for all may alleviate or eliminate guerrilla causes. If policy makers take appropriate steps early enough and avoid replacing one set of problems with others. Those techniques AKA winning hearts and minds however are less beneficial as a counter insurgency tool i.e. meaning Guerrillas are a foreign movement. Or if guerrillas are opposing a long time despised government. Negotiated compromise in such cases is possible but improbable. Rhetoric by officials increases guerrilla prestige government must match words with will and means. Negotiated compromise that offers some satisfaction to guerrillas customarily is an ultimatum, although guerrillas may approve of the process since it publicizes there purpose and divest them with status equal to beleaguered government. They will then share blame if blood shed continues. Consequently to not invite them relinquishes privilege and shared blame. Guerrilla motivations normally are to prevent open promises. Normally accept few rewards short of total success and publicized victory.


U.S. foreign policy equals Christian beliefs “we not only have the right but the obligation to spread our ways. Foreigners don’t know the benefits we have been blest with.” U.S. government’s cover i.e. message or revealed truth, to the public “we're going to help rescue these people”. IMO when politics is spun too much, population turns to religion so government must too. U.S. also anti communist vs. economical interest. Even if the opposition leader is not communist, what if leader is over thrown by someone who is. Not like U.K. or France, flat out up front explanation that it’s in our nation’s economic or security interest.
Example from Navy Times 3/21/11, “but the Western allies have sent mixed signals over their vision for the end game of their intervention in Libya. France has taken the most aggressive tone, with its U.N. ambassador saying the ultimate goal was to get rid of Gadhafi. But the top U.S. military officer took a more cautious stance, reflecting American worries about getting dragged deeper into the conflict”. Newjarheaddean and this with President Obama saying a week or so before the U.N. resolution 1973 that Gadhafi must go. But now his administration says that was just a suggestion i.e. as in, just in case Gadhafi had not thought about it etc.


Lessens learned by other nations witnessing U.S. supported coups. The CIA will use all means available to wreak target government. Universities, science, media, industry, trade, religion. Allies are reluctant to work with U.S. agents do to tight restrictions, also legal limitations and U.S. leaks that compromise their sources magnify difficulties. Tactical deterrence dilemmas. Israel’s swift and sure punishment vs. British approach which has kept better faith with humane principles and tactics. Threats can be constituted by phone call, visit to nation by guerrilla members or drop in/walk in informant.

"Hama model." Refers to what Syrian did when the Moslem Brotherhood, rebelled in 1982. On February 2, 1982, the Syrian Army was deployed into the area surrounding Hama. Within three weeks, the Syrian Army had completely devastated the city of Hama, resulting in the deaths of between 10,000 and 25,000 people. The use of heavy artillery, armored forces and possibly poison gas resulted in large-scale destruction and an end to the Moslem Brotherhood’s desires to overthrow the Baath Party. After the operation was finished, one surviving citizen of Hama stated, “We don’t do politics here anymore, we just do religion.” The results of the destruction of Hama were clear to the survivors. As the June 20, 2000 Christian Science Monitor wrote, “Syria has been vilified in the West for the atrocities at Hama. But many Syrians, including a Sunni merchant class that has thrived under Alawite rule, also note that the result has been years of stability.” What distinguishes the Hama model is overwhelming firepower and force, deliberately used to create massive casualties and destruction, in an action that is over fast. Speed is of the essence to the Hama model. The objective is to get it over with so fast that the effect desired locally is achieved before anyone else has time to react or, ideally, even to notice what is going on. If a Hama type operation is allowed to drag out, it will turn into a disaster on the moral level. It might become an option if a WMD were used against us on our own soil. The main reason we need to identify the Hama model is to note a serious danger i.e. it is easy, but fatal, to choose a course that lies between the Hama model and the de-escalation model. Such a course inevitably results in defeat, because of the power of weakness. Historian Martin van Creveld compares a state military that, with its vast superiority in lethality, continually turns its firepower on poorly equipped opponents to an adult who administers a prolonged, violent beating to a child in a public place. Regardless of how bad the child has been, every observer sympathizes with the child. That is why the rule for the Hama model is that the violence must be over fast. Any attempt at a compromise between the two models results in prolonged violence that is fatal.

MCA June 2009; Accept counterinsurgency as a political activity. An insurgency has political goals. Violence is but one element of power an insurgent movement asserts to achieve its objectives. As conditions change and counterinsurgents gain and maintain security, one can expect that political goals of insurgent movements will remain, though the strategies and tactics to achieve those goals will change. Oftentimes enemy efforts to achieve objectives will take place in the legitimate realm of local, provincial, and national politics. Thus, it is critical that companies learn and track the political situation in their battlespace as best as possible. Learn the political environment and attempt to understand agendas and alliances. How do changes in local political power influence the local security environment, and how will various insurgents take advantage of new opportunities? Some answers will come from the multiple engagements companies will have with the population and local leaders. Each conversation can be a piece to the political puzzle leading to indications and warnings of violence due to political change. The CLIC will need to assist the commander in compiling engagement reports and help put the pieces of the political puzzle together for the company’s battlespace.

Weighting the main effort. Each company assigned battlespace within the battalion’s area of operations will be confronted with unique human terrain that may or may not interrelate with adjacent villages and tribal areas. Assuming the battalion assigns battlespace to all four of its maneuver companies, an intelligence section without CLICs would be faced with collecting and analyzing information for four distinct and disparate areas. This is a tall order even for a regimental S–2 section, let alone that of a battalion. Consequently, the battalion commander must identify a main effort to ensure that the battalion intelligence section is focusing its limited resources on those areas that require the most attention to achieve the battalion commander’s objectives. For the companies that are not the main effort, the necessity for a top quality CLIC will become critical. With the bulk of the battalion intelligence resources focused elsewhere, CLICs will need to provide their company commander with the information management of collection efforts and limited analysis to maintain an understanding of the battlespace.

The CLIC team and the commander. The experiences of most infantry battalions reveal one well-known truism: the effort the company commander places on company-level intelligence is correlated/connected to the amount of actionable intelligence the company produces i.e. little attention to intelligence collection; the company will have little effect on the battlespace. Ultimately, the CLIC the commander builds is a direct reflection of the value he places on understanding and influencing his battlespace.

If a battalion is operating in a distributed environment, the companies will never be satisfied with the level of battalion level intelligence support. Only the company commander and his CLIC will focus their full efforts within the area of operations that is most critical to the company’s success. One of the most influential decisions a company commander makes is the selection of the CLIC Marines. As the CLIC is sourced “out of hide,” some commanders may want to shortchange the quality of personnel. This choice may be “pennywise but pound foolish” and result in a “what did these guys do for me” reflection later. Commanders must be willing to cut into muscle a stronger and more competent CLIC will result in a greater gain for the company than the cumulative loss felt by the squads. The counterinsurgent theorist, David Kilcullen, articulated this best, “Put the smartest soldiers in the [CLIC]. You will have one less rifle squad: but the [CLIC] will pay for itself in lives and effort saved. Who, then, are the right Marines? Successful CLICs possess attributes that include analytical ability, prior operational deployment, language training, and computer skills. Curiosity, “street smarts,” and effective written and oral communication.

A guerrilla war is not a war of technology versus peasantry. Rather, it is a contest of endurance and national will. The side with the greatest moral commitment (ideological, religious or patriotic) will hold the ground at the end of the conflict. Battlefield victory can be almost irrelevant, since victory is often determined by morale, obstinacy and survival. Lessons learned from this conflict were gathered by both sides. Whatever else these lessons may show, the most fundamental of them is that no army, however sophisticated, well trained, materially rich, numerically overwhelming and ruthless, can succeed on the battlefield if it is not psychologically fit and motivated for the fight. The force, however destitute in material advantages and numbers, which can rely on the moral qualities of a strong faith, stubborn determination, individualism and unending patience will always be the winner. These may not be the optimum qualities always found in the armies of western democracies.


The Soviet concept for military occupation of Afghanistan was based on the following:
Stabilizing the country by garrisoning the main routes, major cities, airbases and logistics
Sites; relieving the Afghan government forces of garrison duties and pushing them into the
Countryside to battle the resistance; providing logistic, air, artillery and intelligence support to the Afghan forces; providing minimum interface between the Soviet occupation forces and the local Populace; Accepting minimal Soviet casualties; and, Strengthening the Afghan forces, so once the resistance was defeated, the Soviet Army could be withdrawn.

It proved a bloody experience in which the Soviet Union reportedly killed 1.3 million people and forced five and a half million Afghans (a third of the prewar population) to leave the country as refugees. Another two million Afghans were forced to migrate within the country. The countryside is ravaged and littered with mines.


Battalion and regimental‐level combat was fought primarily in the mountains against separate detachments of mujahideen [insurgents]. The war was fought under conditions where the enemy lacked any aviation capabilities, but had modern air defense systems and modern mines. A lack of front lines and advances along varied axes (which were not mutually supporting) characterized the decisive actions of the opposing sides as they attempted to seize the initiative and gain control over certain territories.
The Soviet forces encountered several unique combat characteristics which necessitated that they adopt more effective methods for combating guerrilla forces of mujahideen. The principal types of combat included: raids; blocking off areas where the enemy was located prior to searching out and destroying guerrilla forces; and the simultaneous attack on several groups of the enemy located at various depths and locations. The specific combat conditions influenced the way in which the advance through mountains and inhabited areas was conducted; led to a change in air assault tactics; changed the methods of conducting marches and providing convoy security; and caused a change in the tactics of organizing and conducting ambushes. One of the fundamental methods for fulfilling combat missions was to block off a region in which guerrilla forces were located and then to thoroughly comb the region to find and destroy the mujahideen. Coordination between the blocking and combing forces, their bronegruppa, artillery and aviation; the application of military cunning and the application of reasoned initiatives; However, firepower is not an absolute substitute for maneuver and close combat. The Soviets chose to expend massive firepower in order to save Soviet lives and to compensate for their lack of infantry. It was an expensive, indiscriminate and, probably, ineffective practice. The Soviet Army does not push on despite heavy casualties. They transition to the defense after moderate casualties and call for fire support.

The Soviets adopted bounding overwatch in this vignette and apparently throughout the Afghanistan War. Bounding overwatch was not in the European battle book since it slowed down movement tempo. However, bounding overwatch is essential when moving over rough terrain or when your enemy is not totally occupied with your artillery and air strikes.

The decentralized nature of the resistance, factionalism and lack of unified command were both a Mujahideen strength and weakness.
First of all Mujahideen groups generally operated on their home turf. Acting outside their home turf could have unfavorable political and support ramifications. Secondly, the Mujahideen wanted to harass their enemy as close to the capital as possible for political and propaganda reasons. Attacks at the gates of Kabul were more significant than attacks further out.
Mujahideen and their weapons. The DRA had traveling propaganda/civil affairs teams which provided  entertainment, medical treatment and pro‐regime propaganda throughout Afghanistan.

The Mujahideen conducted ambushes for harassment or for spoils. Often, harassing ambushes were small‐scale ambushes which would only fire a few rounds into the convoy to destroy or damage some vehicles. Then the ambushers would withdraw without attempting to loot the column before the convoy commander could react. Ambushes conducted for spoils (weapons, ammunition, food, clothing and other military supplies) were normally conducted by larger forces who could maintain their positions for up to an hour.

The Mujahideen understood that guerrilla war is a contest of endurance and national will. Battlefield victory is almost irrelevant, provided that the guerrilla survives to fight the next of a thousand battles before passing the torch to his children. The Mujahideen did not necessarily expect to win this war but fought because it was the right thing to do – it was a religious and national obligation. They accepted an asymmetry of casualties which eventually,
but unexpectedly, led to the Soviet withdrawal. In many respects, the tactics of the Anglo‐afghan Wars (1839, 1852, 1878‐1880, 1919) still applied. Technology has added range and accuracy, but the terrain still dictates tactics and
the Mujahideen were quite comfortable applying their time‐honored tactics against a modern foe.

Tactical innovation occurs only where tactical innovation is required and the Mujahideen eventually found ways to work around the problem technology. Where innovation was not required, the Mujahideen stayed with the tried and true. Thus the basic Mujahideen ambush and pursuit were little changed from last century whereas their actions against an air assault or a fortified security post were quickly developed out of necessity.

Technology can provide advantages but it is not decisive in this type of war. Soviet smart bombs had a decided impact when an appropriate target set could be identified. U.S. supplied, shoulder fired Stinger air defense missiles, in the hands of the Mujahideen, created a great deal of consternation and led to a dramatic change in Soviet air tactics. Neither system, however, was a war winner. The Soviet equipment was designed for a different war on different terrain. It failed to function optimally in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. The Kalashnikov
assault rifle was not always better than the World War I designed British bolt action Enfield rifle. The Enfield shot further accurately and would penetrate flak jackets designed to stop Kalashnikov bullets.

Mujahedeen Strengths:
Familiarity with the terrain
Tactical mobility
Ability to achieve surprise i.e. blind in with locals.
Ability to operate at night
Rugged and highly motivated fighters
Sanctuaries in Pakistan and Iran.

No mention of all the patches giving info to guerrillas with access to the wild wild west LOL internet that could be used in syops. Has that not been a problem with this well equipped organized al-queda types.
Statement Information more from the bottom up i.e. squad leader is going to know area better than battalion cmdr. IMO this has been mentioned on all kinds of sites but only whispered if at all on CNN.



Note from TDG/MCA
As soon as the Marines leave the area the enemy will go door to door spreading his propaganda

The enemy will also use local imams to spread the word from minarets and Friday prayer.
Propaganda on the Internet or posters/graffiti on walls.
Conduct sensitive site exploitation,

The key is to deny the enemy access to terrain until, at a minimum, after you have put out your message.
Also see Terms under (s) for SALTA
End of TDG/MCA

False flag operations are covert operations designed to deceive the public in such a way that the operations appear as though they are being carried out by other entities. The name is derived from the military concept of flying false colors; that is, flying the flag of a country other than one's own. False flag operations are not limited to war and counter-insurgency operations, and can be used in peace-time.

You also ask him to let the EPWs go home after their wounds are sufficiently healed. They will carry your request for a meeting to arrange a cease-fire, and their release itself will send a peaceful message to whatever clan they come from.

Battle of Khafji
At one point in the battle, the Saudis saw Iraqi soldiers on top of a water tower. Not wishing to blow up the tower, the Saudis fired a TOW, blew the ladder off the tower and left the Iraqis stranded until the end of the battle."
In Lebanon Marines firing at rock out croppings above Hezbollah rocket firing positions. Due to the fact they did not have permission to fire on the enemy.


This concludes part four of the Planning section.

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start" IKYG

G-day!

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