Newjarheaddean Rumor Board: Post # 17, Defense, rule # 4

Welcome Aboard!

AHOY,

UPDATE 12/21/13, 11:42 HOURS

I am revealing who I am today i.e. posting my name, I am Keith Oeffinger, I was born in San Antonio Texas in 1963. See today's post 12/21/13 .

Update, 01/11/14 12:30 hours;

I would like to say, with only one reply, like three years ago, this blog seems too much like a mirror site to me. And it appears very few patriots are looking back at past posts.

The new “Fragmented Fighting Facts” series of posts that dedicates one post to each Basic rule has now been completed. This series starts with the post tilted “Post # 1, Planning, Preface” that posted on 05/12/13. This series is under the label “Tri-F in progress”. Posts well be updated as I edit or discover additional knowledge thus the series is the most current version of my "Fragmented Fighting Facts" manual. For an old but complete version i.e. all in one post copy. Patriots are welcomed to try viewing one of the “pages” listed in the “special word section” on the starboard side of the blog. I say try due to the fact I’m not sure if they are published i.e. viewable to the general public due to all the issues or HACKING with my blog. There is also a complete copy posted, that is titled, “Tri-F in progress” too, it was posted 11/13/10.

And feel free to fire away with a reply, (sarcasm on).

FLASH REPORT; the “TERRORIST ARE NOT AMONG US, AND NEVER WERE I.E. AL QAEDA IS A STAWL MAN, GHOST”.

The most important lesson that everyone should have taken away from the Boston Marathon bombings was that those young men proved that no al-queda members are in the u.s. Otherwise they too would just go get some presure cookers and had to a parade.

“I AM NOT A TERRORIST” this nation’s worst enemy is FEAR. This fear is being promoted mostly by the back woods, right wing, Christians of this nation. We need to separate church and state, period. And that is of course for the States sake.

I would like patriots to understand that I use the terms "official revealed fact" to mean what everyone is being told by officials, media etc. I use the term "kings truth" to mean what I know or believe to actually be the actual facts. I DO NOT MEAN IT IN A RELIGIOUS WAY. I.E. the term Kings is plural as in those running the show.

Preface for the Fragmented Fighting Facts

Note pink highlighted material is that, that IMO is questionable factually, it maybe an “official revealed fact” that I am questioning. The material may need to be defined i.e. explained more or it could be a personal note. Yellow is location undecided or unedited material i.e. unread that I have not decided on what to keep or not. Green means a change has been made i.e. an update. By noting the green updated highlights a Patriot well not have to read the Fragmented Fighting Facts in its entirety to stay current. Red is important, perhaps the "kings truth".

Newjarheaddean; this is my collection of combat notes. One might call it my anthology of combat tactics, techniques, methods and skills. The note taking began about fourty years ago (I was around 13 years old) with the observation of 10 rules listed with in a book covering the French and Indian i.e. Native American, wars, entitled “Roger’s Rangers”. That’s right the rules that started all this are “Army Ranger” rules, this book was located in the “Westfall” library in San Antonio Texas off of Vance Jackson. I get a kick out of the libraries name due to the general agreement that modern or state vs state warfare started with the singing of the peace treaties at Westphalia. I could not read at the time; however I knew that a list in a book on war would be important. I copied those rules down like a scribe might have written hieroglyphs and had my dad read them to me. . This discovery preceded numerous sources including approximately one hundred books and about a dozen field manuals, of which a few were of WWII era. These were found at libraries, half price bookstores and garage sales. Since going on line in 2007, I have found material on web sites such as “Defense and National Interest” (DNI), “Global security”, “Strategy page” , “Wikipedia” and “Bayonet strength” and “Efour4ever” in the combat lessons learned section. These last two sites cover WWII.

Previously referred to as K.O.O.L.N. (acronym definition, top secret), FLASH REPORTS; I NOW AM TELLING EVERYONE IT STANDS FOR KEITH OEFFINGER'S ORGANIZATION OF LEARNED KNOWLEDGE the joke on me here was I believed Knowledge was spelled with an (N). I was a special education student and did not learn to read until my last year of high school. I have now titled my work “Fragmented Fighting Facts” or “Tri-F”; the name derives from the computer grammar function always alerting me to the fragmented nature of my sentences. This is due to the “just the facts, ma’am” manor the material is written i.e. there has been little if any effort to write in whole sentences or provide context. This is not to say there is no order with Tri-F, in fact there is a theme. I have laid out the information as one might expect a commander or members of a unit to recall it thus utilizing it to conduct a mission.

We start with “Planning”, followed by the section on “Defense”, then there’s “Preparations and conduct of patrols” or “PCP”, and we end with “Conduct of Engagements” or “COE”, i.e. engagements being the term used here for shootouts. Each section of Tri-F consists of numbered “Basic rules”, each basic rule followed by detailed notes that either relate to, explain, or give examples pertaining to the basic rules. As with the general format of Tri-F, each section’s basic rules are laid out as one might need to recall them. This is most obvious in the last section COE starting with basic rule number one, “Flash report”, i.e. actions to take upon contact with the enemy. This sections last basic rule deals with handling POWs.

Keep in mind this is a work in progress; I’m constantly discovering new information to add which in turn still at times requires rearranging things. At the same time, interestingly enough to me, I have not needed to rearrange my original order of the basic rules for quite some time. There are however, two instances where the detailed information fallowing a pair of basic rules became so similar I decided to combine the pair into one basic rule. These two occurrences are noted in footnotes.

Now heed this, out of all the information contained within this work, only an estimated 1% was taught to me while I was serving in the U.S.M.C. Moreover, to put a fine point on it, it’s worth noting I served in Charlie Company, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, i.e. an Infantry unit. Before my discharge (after only a two year cruse), I attended Jungle Warfare School in the northern training area of Okinawa (for two weeks), Mountain Warfare School in Korea (for one week) and Combat Town Camp Pendleton for MOUT training (for one day). I did not take part in any amphibious training nor did I ever go to Twenty Nine Palms for Desert Warfare training. We did ride around in AAVs once at Camp Pendleton. All in all I would say the only things I missed out on were a beach landing (at Coronado I believe) and a little sun burn, due to the fact that those twenty nine palms, I was told in the early eighties were all located at the front gate of that base. Needless to say, the training did not impress me, and I now know it was not going to get any better as some suggested to me at the time, and still others later claimed that I should have just stayed in longer.

With my position on the lack of training, I do wish to make it perfectly clear that I do support the service women and men in the U.S. armed forces. I also believe them to be as brave as any people on earth, (with the exception of the (Y) generation). My concern is in the way the Infantry especially is being mislead and used. I want people to understand my experience and IMO a lot of evidence suggests Uncle Sam intends to use his infantry in ways that does not include training any generation in the art of “traditional Guerilla combat tactics” i.e. as a “Traditional Commando” would be. I am not talking about “SWAT” team “Close quarter” tactics, like the “Stick dynamic entry”. That tactic should be called the “cluster f**k”. Just call that sort of tactic what it is NYPD (Cops T.V. show bad-boys, bad-boys) in Afghanistan.

The problem is that that tactic was developed by police departments to deal with an objective occupied by drugged up party animals, i.e. untrained civilians. The police never use it in a spur of the minute situation. They use it when the house/objective has been under constant surveillance for mouths in some cases and the police know all manner of information about everyone in the house and the structure and neighborhood in general. The cops choose a time when everyone is pasted out from partying the night before and have long lost any weapons (between the cushions or under the bed) they might have had on them as show pieces during the party. The primary reason for the large numbers of police in close proximity is to make sure the gang does not think the raid is a rival gang “brake in” and thus resist in any way. There is lots of yelling too, thus reinforcing the message that no one is trying to be covert, like one would be to get away with a crime.

This brings up an intriguing observation of mine; that being that by the book an assault should be made from the top down, yet the troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere use the Stick dynamic entry and usually enter from the front door, like a SWAT team. However resent high profile raids show the SWAT teams attacking from the top down. Examples you may recall are the raids on the Shinning path group in Peru in 2000 and the Mumbai raid by Indian forces on the Jewish center in 2008. IMO this proves the existence of what I’ll refer to as a “need to know” training policy, being followed by various governments, the purpose being to limit the number of true Commandos that could become tomorrow’s rebels, apposing corrupt governments. One last thing about the Stick, IMO every single time the regular forces unit conducting one of these foolish Stick dynamic entries comes under fire i.e. runs into resistance, the Stick brakes i.e. the whole unit evacuates and awaits some kind of support form tanks, guns, tubes or air. Bottom line IMO the Stick is used as a probing tactic and is meant to be a moral boosting show peace tactic to make the unit feel as if it has taken a hill, which was nothing more than another empty building, that IMO Intel suggested, was the case before the entry was ordered. Recalling the police policy of long periods of surveillance prior to raids.

It also seems to me that in light of the old saying “you can fight a war with bombs and blockades but only boots on the ground can win it” ( IMO, Uncle Sam has now revised that saying, as fallows) “you can win a war with bombs and blockades, but only the infantry can end the war”, farther more IMO Uncle Sam has gone one more step and decided to use private security companies and local i.e. indigenous people for the infantry role. All this fear of true commandos is all very similar to the “Mujahideen” not being allowed by various governments, to return to their homelands i.e. native nations, after fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

And as for the U.S. and other Western nations, training foreigners to fight a counter insurgency goes. IMO this training includes nothing more than police procedures i.e. conducting investigations, forensics, searching individuals and buildings to collect evidence and yes serving warrants, if necessary, with those all mighty “stick” tactics. And of course, lots of “new innovative techniques and tactics” involving CAS and IMO (Old) so called high tech equipment the U.S. Military Industrial Congressional Complex wants to clear out of the warehouses.

All in all IMO Uncle Sam has chosen to put just about all his eggs in one advanced technology system, think Star Wars Storm Troopers or Matrix i.e. the Operator or Morpheus trying to guide Neo and others to safety. IMO it looks something like this; (x) unit go to (x) address, kick in front door, use stairs to your right, go south down hallway to (x) door, it is unlocked, interning room go to (x) window looking out window to the north you will see your target running east though the neighbors garden. All this information and the “live” feeds of target and area of operations would be provided by a fleet of satellites as well as Near space assets that are never mentioned by the media as current military assets and of course there’s the robots, UAVs and a flood of other covertly deployed sensors as well as covert eves dropping of any civilian electronic devices in the Area of operations.

Thus in light of these and similar so called “new innovative, techniques and tactics” (notice the media and governments choice of words “techniques and tactics” as if we’re talking Commando training i.e. why not use some modern high tech terms the system is so eager to introduce us all to normally as a matter of routine), IMO Uncle Sam has placed the traditional Guerrilla combat tactics, on the back burner and is hoping they all go the way of other black arts.

This is not just true of the infantry; let us take a peek at aerial combat. Does anyone out there actually think today’s U.S. pilots are turning and burning, pulling high (G) maneuvers trying to hit the entry windows and get inside the bandits turn. Think any pilot has conducted a yo-yo or split S maneuver lately or made the choice between a single or two-circle fight. Now days its all about stealth, ECM and Smart even autonomous weapons, missiles especially BVR tech. IMO this explains why the U.S. Navy is not concerned with not having a front line fighter equal to the USAF F-22 Raptor. An article I recently read on “Strategy page” mentioned a lot of talk about a Navy F/A-18E at an air show, displaying a little F-22 silhouette decal i.e. a simulated Kill credit symbol/icon. IMO the F/A- 18E did not gun down that kill.

And then everyone knows that just about all now and IMO soon all weapons systems including the bayonet well have a chip in it.

So if the electronics ever fail (maybe due to a shift in the axis of earths electromagnetic field, passed a certain point or perhaps a record size solar flare) IMO it well be the masters of the age-old Guerrilla combat tactics i.e. The Fragmented Fighting Facts Basic Rules that survive, keeping in mind “no one wins”.

I also wish, that those who join the various services where told all this up front i.e. “we do not intend to train you as a traditional Commando”.

Another thing I would like everyone to consider is that; what makes a Marine special is not the training she or he receives, no it’s the steel the youth demonstrates when they choose to join the Marines. Even when compared to the Special Forces, who IMO are only specialists in their particular field, once again mostly high tech specialties and whose ranks are filled with older personnel that have already been serving and have graduated from a boot camp i.e. are aware of the hoop and hype hurry up and wait tactics. And who are then usually chosen i.e. coached into changing their MOS. I am aware of the change in recruitment policy after 2001 allowing for direct entry into the S.F. community. IMO a rarity and IMO it is still not the same as just choosing to go to a Marine Corps Recruit Depot from the start.

Furthermore, to those who just well not accept the truth about the lack of training along the lines of traditional Guerrilla combat tactics. I can now say that I have exchanged comments with a number of Iraqi and Afghanistan combat vets. These comments can be found on the internet if you Google up my call sign, Newjarheaddean also spelled with one (D). IMO it is obvious that the tactics I speak of are news to the vets, some have made commits that proves in combat they were just winging it. And no, I don’t believe that all the vets are observing some kind of code of silence on these tactics including the vets who are against the wars. Unless everyone wants to say that YouTube and other internet companies are conspiring to edit all combat footage that shows these tactics being used and that, the vets are staging other videos that show them (albeit with great bravery) as armatures without a clue and winging it. If anyone ever sees video, showing the tactics listed in Tri-F being used, be sure and provide a link with your comment. I once saw a flash of film on CNN showing combat in Lebanon during the 1980s that showed some of these tactics being used by a Guerrilla fighter. I well also say I do believe that UAV footage is edited by the Pentagon to keep the public from seeing the few but well trained Taliban and other Guerrilla fighters that are using these tactics. Alternatively, maybe people think our professional highly trained well-equipped military is unable to defeat 10 – 20 thousand religious extremist amateur thugs in almost a decade of fighting. All the while killing at least by some estimates 100 a mouth including dozens of top commanders.

Let me also say, on the numbers of U.S. PTSD casualties, i.e. IMO, WIA, (And IMO deserving of a Purple Heart). The Government portrays these cases as a result of fighting a war that is “unlike any other war we have fought before” (LOL). Facing an enemy that is fighting in some mysterious and or cowardly manor that simply cannot be countered by military means. I believe the high numbers are a result of US forces fighting in a manner that is suicidal i.e. pointless and counterproductive to the real world situation. Example; you have a young brave American ready to fight for the nation, while on one of these IMO “Russian roulette parades” someone shoots at the unit from some building, everyone scrambles for cover, as some spray and pray, then after determining the location using SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems) sniper detectors, or one of the many similar vehicle mounted systems the commander calls in some sort of CAS, if someone’s brains have been blow out especially if it was an officer or the location is vague, a real “crowd pleaser” maybe used i.e. 2000 pounder.

IMO this is how 90% of engagements (fought by regular infantry units) are resolved. Special Forces are now and in the feature more and more regular infantry well be using the Matrix. And to those that think this is the exception I say show me the number of WIA or KIA (On either side) by small arms fire i.e. during traditional firefights. Even if one includes sniper fire those figures are really low. So IMO after witnessing all the carnage and innocent civilian life being lost and receiving all those looks from the witnesses, it is the American that realizes it is his unit that is not fighting right.

This is reinforced and really sinks in back in the states when the vet is asked to tell the Commando stories that never occurred and thus the vet must tell the truth i.e. give up the Commando reputation, keep it all inside or start lying. If the first option is chosen that unveiling reality is demoralizing and makes it all not worth it. If either one of the other chooses are made IMO the vet becomes the ticking bomb. And I can tell you all that many times, I have recalled being told once that “when you go home keep your mouth shut about the things we did. If you don’t you well be thought of as a liar or crazy and either which way your life well be over”. That First Sergeant was right, but like my daddy use to say, “He’s right but he does not know why he’s right” i.e. IMO the First Sgt. thought of what we did in terms of remarkable heroic feats. However, IMO certainly since the beginning of the Vietnam era, it is the lack of training i.e. the manner in which our service women and men are fighting that keeps this tragedy going.

I would also suggest the vets of today are just like I was 25 or so years ago in the sense that they know there training is lacking, however, they just cannot explain what’s missing. However unlike me they refuse to accept that old fashion “black arts” are the answer i.e. should be the basis of basic training. And I now know the “Black art” tactics they and I should have been trained in and I can now say, “The PFC that told the Corp it was out of step, now has provided the proof”. What surprises me is that most vets it seems don’t care at all about the tactics I speak of and seem to view me as an unpatriotic “party pooper”, when I’m just a U.S. Marine trying to improve the Corps and save lives. Bottom line IMO the infantry needs to consist of unmarried i.e. undistracted, NO CHILDREN, dedicated true professionals, trained in the tactics listed in Tri-F and many more I am sure exist.

And to those that say “chivalry is for the museums” I say “first we must have peace on earth”.

One Newjarheaddean

“Let no Marines ghost say if my training had only done its job”

" Give me a million dollars and I well change the world"

" When it comes to persecution and suffering that fairly tale about christ dose not have (S) nothing on me"

" I well bet my lucky start"

“IKYG”

G-day!

Update; 12/19/14 09/53 hours

Friday, May 17, 2013

Post # 17, Defense, rule # 4

AHOY,

FRAGMENTED FIGHTING FACTS

Defense

Basic rule # 4

Update; 06/06/13 08:36 hours, this was a web site I happen to find a while back, it is tilted “a view from the back of the envelope” I well prove a link below. I’m sure that anyone with the basic math skills I do not have well benefit much more from this site than I did i.e.find your own take a ways. And yes I deleted the green highlight for the older updated knowledge.

Note here with any and all weapons data, I could have color coded all that data in “pink”. I would hope patriots would consider all of it suspect i.e. don’t bet your life on it. I recall when I was serving, during a class on the new mortars i.e. M224s. We were told that you could basically double the range and other figures. This particular improvement was due to the new powders being used i.e. charges. Not to mention all the other design improvements.

4) Position main weapons:

This is most effective weapon located in most advantageous point or centrally located to allow access to multiple points, to cover points of interest, avenues and passages. (NOTE on a personal basis this could be placing weapon in a central hallway of a house, so someone could get to it and make their way to any area or room). If more than one weapon available do not bunch them up. Concentrate fire power not weapons. Crew serve weapons covered/concealed to prevent detection i.e. keep enemy form locating them or damage during preparation fires.

(Reference, mortars/secondary observation posted below.)

The primary consideration impacting on the employment of machineguns within built-up areas is the limited availability of long-range fields of fire. Although machineguns should be emplaced at the lowest level possible, grazing fire at ground level is frequently obstructed by rubble. When mounted on a tripod, the .50 caliber machinegun can be used as an accurate, long-range sniper weapon. BGM – 71 TOWs and DRAGONs; within built-up areas, they are best employed from the upper stories of buildings in order to attain long-range fields of fire. Elevated firing positions also increase the first-round hit probability. Firing down at a tank from an angle of 20 degrees increases the chance of a hit by 2/3 at 200 meters. A 45-degree angle doubles the first-round probability of a hit when compared to a ground level shot. Their minimum firing ranges of 65 meters (214 ft) may limit firing opportunities in dense built-up areas (max range is 2 1/3 miles, with muzzle velocity of 278m/s or 917 ft/s). The maximum depression and elevation limits of the TOW mount well result in dead space and hinder close engagements. When deciding whether to dismount TOWs, the commander must weigh the advantage of more flexible firing envelopes against the disadvantage of losing mobility. The portable TOW requires considerable time and effort to move launcher and missiles from position to position. The best technique may be to detach TOWs to units detailed to operate on the periphery of the built-up area, rather than to those within it. Note rocket burn and maneuverability at close range. The DRAGON is lightweight and easily moved. Dragons and LAWs; because of their light weight and mobility, can attain effective short-range shots and catch the tank in a situation where it cannot counter fire. Since the LAW warhead is less lethal than those of the other antitank weapons, multiple hits are necessary. LAWs should be used in volleys, pairs, or sequences. Back blast is an important limiting factor when employing antitank weapons in MOUT. Curtains and overstuffed furniture in the back blast area should be left in place to help absorb sound. Combustible material must be removed from the back blast area. All small loose objects and window/door glass must be removed. In all cases there must be 20 square feet (2 square meters) of ventilation to the stern of the weapons. An open door will normally provide adequate ventilation. For ATGMs, the following vertical clearances between the bottom of the launch tube and the firing aperture are required. The enclosure must be of sturdy construction with a ceiling at least 7 feet (2.1 meters) high. Everyone in the room must be forward of the exhaust pipe of the weapon and must wear helmets and earplugs. Anti structure Role While they are designed and employed primarily to defeat enemy armor, they may also be used when required to attack structures or fortified targets. WWII Anti-tank guns posed something of a problem. Their main role in an offensive action was to be ready to respond to an enemy counterattack including armor. They were too vulnerable and unwieldy in the towed version to accompany the assault troops, largely necessitating their being held back along with the reserve. They would be pushed forward following a successful action to help consolidate the objective, but if they were used in the initial firefight they risked exposing their position to enemy observers.

(Reference, Step # 2, Company Cmdr, Reserves i.e. post # 12 or this series)

The following table summarizes the penetration capability of antitank weapons.

Depth of penetration for armor;

Figure in feet then meters.

WEAPON EARTH REINFORCED STEEL

CONCRETE

TOW 8/2.6 4/1.3 1.33/.4

Note TOW 24 inches or two feet to 40 inches or 3.3 feet of armor.

DRAGON 9/2.6 4/1.3 1/.3

LAW 6/1.9 2/.6 .67/.2

90mm HEAT 3.5/1.1 2.5/.8 .83/.3

NOTE: Penetration does not necessarily mean destruction of the structure.

Against sandbagged emplacements, antitank weapons should be aimed at the center of the porthole i.e. aperture. Even if the round does not go through the aperture, the bunker's walls are easier to penetrate at the apertures.

Against structures, AT weapons should be aimed about 6 inches below or to the side of an aperture. This will increase the fragmentation effect and enhance the probability of killing soldiers behind the wall.

Mortars;

Mortars; Terrain masking by buildings in MOUT is an important consideration. Mortars are the least affected because of their high-angle trajectory. Mortars can also be fired from between tall buildings. Not wanting to give away their location the mujahedeen staggered there rockets. During Mountain or MOUT operations mortars are placed on a layer of branches not directly on frozen ground, ice or concrete. Because of radar mortars must be fired from bunkers. Position mortars under the streets to fire through a manhole, muzzle close to opening. Test fire the mortar, with dummy round. Can be dug in to depth of 10 feet for cover and concealment with the right surface. In MOUT, on hard surfaces mortar aiming stakes can be placed in cans filled with dirt or use knifes etc. Mortars are the main indirect-fire support for forward units in MOUT. Fixed winged CAS and Artillery is often precluded because of blast radius. Due to cover afforded defending forces in MOUT and after enemy has broken though lines accurate indirect fire is of greater importance. Target priorities are given to streets especially intersections and other open areas. WP rounds should impact on or behind building so enemy cannot escape in smoke. Proximity fuses used against roof top targets. With MT. mortar rounds will penetrate snow blanket if proximity fuses are not used. Spongy ground of north in summer has a smoothing effect on all fire from all types of weapons hard frozen bare ground or ice when not covered by snow frozen clogs of dirt increases fragmentation effects. MT due to supplies of ammo targets and allotments are important one exception would be units detailed to cover narrow passages. Other target examples, large snow mass or rocks above enemy location.

WWII Fire support; at the start of the war the light 51 mm type mortar was a popular support weapon, versions equipping British, German and Russian Platoons. By 1942/43 only the British retained their 2 inch model in the role. Such weapons were intended to deliver explosive rounds, but these proved of minimal tactical benefit, and the British increasingly used theirs to provide a smokescreen.

In WWII the Mortar Platoon was invariably the single most powerful element of the Infantry Battalion. Dependent upon the particular model and ammunition, it could project fire anywhere between 2400 and 3000 meters, close to a maximum of two miles. (Note modern US M252 81mm, min 83m or 273ft. max 5935m or 3.7 miles).

Fire control could be exercised in one of two ways, through a fixed observation post or a mobile fire controller, but ideally a combination of the two was used (note today add UAV and other aerial sensors). Danger close for most Artillery is 50 meters. And 600 feet for 500 lbers. Bracketing targets in your own city is stupid?

The WWII mobile fire controller (MFC) took the principle one stage further. Again drawn from the Platoon, he would accompany the Headquarters of a Rifle Company operating further forward of the established OP. He would be linked by radio to the mortar position and undertook largely the same role as the observer, correcting fall of shot. However, his presence with the Rifle Company allowed him to call in fire missions to engage targets of opportunity or help overcome stubborn points of resistance out of sight of the OP. Without Ops the only solution to such shortcomings was either to push the weapons forward so the crews could see their targets, ignoring a major strength of the mortar i.e. shooting from defiles, or restrict support to rigid fire plans on pre-determined positions, severely limiting the potential for engaging targets of opportunity. Exploitation phase; where an attack succeeded it would open the gap between the mortar positions and the leading riflemen. To continue effective support fire, the mortars had to close that gap by moving forward. This could not be done by the whole Platoon at once, less the Battalion be entirely deprived of its fire for the duration of the movement. Rather, the Platoon would relocate by Sections, perhaps regrouping around the base of fire provided by an already detached forward Section operating with a Rifle Company. In the withdrawal, the Platoon would again relocate by stages. The advantage was of course that the route and new positions would have been well prepared beforehand. Supplies of ammunition could be located at both the current and secondary sites, allowing the mortars to move quickly into action on arrival at their new home.

Secondary observation posts would likewise be prepared. In static situations, the Mortar Platoon would be loathed to fire from its main position prior to a major assault, as this would inevitably reveal its location to enemy observers. Detachments and Sections could however launch harassing strikes from temporary sites before removing themselves quickly to avoid the inevitable retribution. Such ‘shoot and scoot’ missions would have to be performed well away from the dug in riflemen to spare them the retaliatory bombardment. These tactics could also be used to support fighting patrols gathering information on enemy dispositions, as well as outposts subjected to probing attacks. (Note all the above would be the Taliban methods today).

The M224 can fire 120 rounds in four minutes - a three-man crew can have 15 to 20 rounds in the air before the first round impacts. Minimum range with zero charges 70 meters. Maximum range four charges 2400 meters. Minimum elevation 1200 mils i.e. 67%. 2011“The new system is made out of what’s called an inconel alloy metal on the cannon which is lighter weight and has better properties at high heat,” the old system weighted about 40-45 lbs. the new alloy has reduced that by about 9 lbs.

A field-expedient means of measuring the river's width is with a compass. While standing at the waterline, fix your sight on a point on the opposite side and note the magnetic azimuth. Move upstream or downstream until the azimuth reading to the fixed point on the opposite bank is 45 degrees different than the original reading. The distance from the original point to the final point of observation is equal to the river's width (see Figure 7-6). Note IMO this would also be useful for determining distance to targets. Using a back azimuth to the original point would provide best accuracy over all.

Not only are crew served weapons heavy, each requires several times its own weight in ammunition.

(Reference, Step # 2 Leadership guidelines, Squad leader, and especially Co. cmdr. “The Reserves”, And COE rule # 3, including maneuvers and formations. That would be Post # 12 and #15 in this series of posts.)

Update; 06/06/13, this knowledge would relate to the knowledge above starting with “A field-expedient means of measuring…”